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1 Rural development as a field of social 
interaction 
Introduction 
This book tells of a community development programme in a Benin village that 
formed part of a national programme called Programme de Redynamisation des Villages 
or Programme de Développement Communautaire (mid-1989 to 1993), involving five to 
eight villages in each of the six provinces of the country. In this book I refer to it in 
its English translation as the 'Community Development Programme'. The story 
takes us into the everyday endeavours of the actors involved in the programme and 
shows how and over what matters they interact, the kinds of coalitions, negotiations, 
struggles and consensuses they engage in, and their attempts to get what they value 
as the best out of the programme. I analyze how the parties involved in these 
interface encounters invest the experiences gained in their practices, skills and 
culture when dealing with each other in relation to development intervention and 
everyday life situations. In other words, I examine how the social processes at work 
in these interfaces help to reproduce and transform them and how at the same time 
they affect daily organisation and interaction in the broader context of social life. But 
beyond the accounts and interpretations narrated - so commonplace to be hardly 
worth the telling for those familiar with development projects and village situations 
- the main concern of this book is to explore the reproduction, rhetoric and practice 
of what is generally called 'rural development'. How precisely are the realities of 
'rural development' constructed by actors at grass-roots level? And in what ways 
do these processes affect larger institutions - generally considered as leading the 
game in matters of development intervention? 
I argue that, contrary to what policy makers, development practitioners and many 
social scientists would have us believe, the issues referred to as 'development', 
that absorb their attention and become the object of their professional preoccupa-
tions, do not arise from the realities of so-called 'under-developed' people, nor can 
they pretend to change significantly these realities since the realities of such people 
play only a marginal role in the making of the language and practice of develop-
ment intervention. Instead, I argue that the rhetoric and practice of rural develop-
ment operates within a relatively autonomous self-reproducing logic,1 sometimes 
processing old jargons, but permanently creating its own social realities and prob-
lems, which serves its own reproduction and not that of the so-called 'develop-
ment' it seeks to achieve. The links between these self-reproducing processes and 
ongoing social change are to be found, not in the written or spoken discourses on 
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development, but in the actual practices of social actors who dismember the dis-
courses and the material dispositions that go with them, and turn what are some-
times rather marginal aspects into assets that may contribute to the improvement of 
their own conditions, sometimes even against the will of the intervenors and their 
plans. I contend that, in this process, roles are not fully determined in advance. Any 
category of social actor involved (whether from the side of the intervenors or the 
'intervened') can take a leading role at any particular time, in steering the affairs 
of intervention. My point of view is that, within the framework imposed on them 
by powerful institutions such as the state and by international development policies 
(e.g. structural adjustment programmes, International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank policies, GATT Treaties and world market opportunities and constraints), the 
actors involved in the local scenes of rural development interact in arenas and 
grounds where neither the 'intervenors' nor the 'intervened' are awarded 
dominant roles beforehand. They negotiate and fight, expressing conflicting views 
and interests, and with unequal resources, to shape the processes of intervention. 
In this process, policy or programme documents and dispositions as a whole may 
play only a marginal role as far as the stakes of the actors involved are concerned 
and as compared to the way in which actors, in diverse micro situations, use and 
digest those parts of the programmes that they find relevant to their interests. 
The discussions in the book deal with the concept of rural development as a. field 
of social interaction between different categories of actors, and explore why and how 
people acting at development interfaces arrive at consensuses for the reproduction 
of particular 'rural development' frames of interaction. In the next chapter, I 
clarify my use of these concepts, including the concept of 'consensus', which from 
the beginning I emphasise is neither linked to a functionalist explanation of the so-
called status quo of social order or of equilibrium in the Durkheimian tradition (see 
Lukes 1973: 139), nor is it to be equated with Bourdieu's (1990: 41) concepts of 
'recognition and miscognition', whereby the dominated are brainwashed - a sort 
of internalisation of submission to a given hegemonic power. From my point of 
view, consensus accounts for the strategies of actors 'living apart together', in an 
effort to avoid hampering the intervention process whilst keeping the gate open for 
further negotiation, or even struggle. 
Based on my interpretations of carefully documented daily happenings within the 
community development programme (in both village and development agency) -
happenings as perceived by the researcher but also as interpreted by the actors 
involved - I give the concepts of 'intervention' and 'rural development' a differ-
ent meaning from that usually accorded by social scientists and development 
practitioners. In this introductory chapter, I set the scene by raising the major 
questions to be investigated and by indicating the methodological approaches used 
in the field for tackling these questions. 
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Community Development: a 'new-old' fashion from the black box of 'rural 
development' 
What made me consider it necessary to study and question the notions of 'rural 
development' and 'intervention'? After all they seem to be as commonplace as 
'hello' or 'hi' to the average young Dutch person. But during fieldwork one 
quickly gets confused by the rhetorical utilisation of the phrase 'rural develop-
ment' by various people in different contexts, which leads one to question the 
function of the word in the production of development language and practice. A 
particular stimulus came from the manipulation of the phrase 'community develop-
ment' which was supposedly buried three decades ago. 
The 'community development' fashion, or back to the fifties 
For readers abreast of the literature on development intervention issues (social 
scientists and development practitioners alike), it is strange to come across a 'com-
munity development programme' in the so-called Third World at the end of the 
1980s and in the early 1990s. It is generally accepted in this circle that 'Community 
Development' projects are now out of date in such countries, having once been the 
fashion of development intervention in Africa, Asia and Latin America. According 
to some scholars (see Staatz and Eicher 1990: 8) the notion grew out of the Cold War 
atmosphere of the early 1950s and 1960s, when foreign aid programmes were 
searching for a non-revolutionary approach to rural change. Its promise to generate 
permanent political peace and quick economic growth (Holdcroft 1984: 46-7) now 
seems irrelevant and naive. It has been successively replaced by approaches such as 
the Green Revolution (a high pay-off input model, which is a 'non-red' revolution-
ary way of fighting against hunger and inducing rural development), Integrated 
Rural Development and Basic Needs projects, and Farming Systems approaches, 
coupled, since the early 1980s, with macro-policy reforms and market liberalisation 
tailored by the IMF-WB tandem (see Staatz and Eicher 1990). 
However, some recent literature reports cases of Community Development 
Programmes having been implemented in rural and suburban areas of Britain, the 
USA, Canada and Ireland. These projects cover various sectors of community life 
such as education, water supply, housing, health care, domestic waste disposal etc., 
and are generally said to aim at global improvement of the living conditions in local 
communities. It has been suggested that the ideas of community development, 
propounded in the colonies in the 1950s and 1960s in the run-up to independence, 
probably reached rural Britain (and other European and American countries) in the 
1970s via returning colonial staff or development field agents and experts who took 
posts as directors and executive committee members of rural community councils 
(Wright 1992:16; Rogers 1992: 96-104).2 However, as far as developing countries are 
concerned, the catch-word 'community development' was largely absent by the 
end of the 1980s, being relegated to the archives of the language of state intervention 
in rural areas. Even its simple use in the discourse of so-called Integrated Rural 
Development was rare, let alone a whole intervention package labelled as such. So 
why does it suddenly spring up in Benin in 1989? Is it a non-revolutionary device, 
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from a collapsing revolutionary regime? The basic launching rhetoric of the pro-
gramme is expressed in the words of the newly-nominated Minister of Rural 
Development: 
'The various development programmes carried out to date have failed to drive local 
entities from poverty to the extent that most of our villages, yesterday flourishing, are 
now transformed into dying places. Therefore, each of the six CARDERs (Centres 
d'Action Régional pour le Développement Rural) will directly sélect a few villages where 
high and medium level staff volunteers will be sent to live, design and implement projects 
with peasants. That will give new impetus to, and make the economic and social life of 
the villages more dynamic'. 
Most importantly, what type of 'rural development' was this supposed to achieve 
and how were those concerned supposed to relate to it? Are we to assume from the 
return of this old fashion of development intervention that planners of rural devel-
opment in Benin had gone full circle and that nothing had changed? Or was it that 
they had finally found the path to 'rural development', discovering that the old 
approach was best? On the other hand, might it represent a challenge to the ways 
in which intervention had been conceptualised, and thus a request for further 
exploration of the social construction of intervention in order to know more of its 
nature? 
Intervention, 'intervenors' and 'intervened' 
Since the early 1950s stories of project failures abound in the field of rural develop-
ment, internationally and locally. But instead of discouraging intervention, these 
stories have apparently been used to justify the need for more 'improved' projects 
with new packaging. Relationships between the staff of development intervention 
institutions and villagers have generally been ambiguous. Each party complains of 
the other - the extensionists blaming peasants for being ignorant, stubborn or lazy, 
while peasants complain of the irrelevance of agents' advice, or their selfish and 
cheating practices, especially concerning export crops, agricultural inputs and state 
regulations on natural resources and environmental issues. However, while open 
clashes between the two parties do exist, they are rather rare. In the Zou Province 
in Benin, where I did my research, the focal point of mutual criticism by villagers 
and state agents was the Integrated Rural Development Project, launched and 
implemented during 1983 by the CARDER, the state regional agency in charge of 
rural development. Some peasants, especially the leaders, were very violent in 
expressing their indignation against the practices of project agents, sometimes 
asserting that as peasants they were more abreast of the farming techniques and 
other related skills advocated by CARDER than the government officers (village 
agents) who were supposed to teach them. Peasants claimed that they no longer 
needed them and that the Government should withdraw them from extension work 
and settle them on their own farms so that everybody could see what they were 
capable of. Some critics added that their salaries were being paid from the resources 
generated by peasant labour, and concluded that this was a waste of money and a 
mode of exploitation that should stop. 
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Despite the endless diatribe between peasants and village agents and their 
complaints about each other, they apparently live on good terms in their everyday 
life. One such case struck me at the very beginning of my research in the area: 
I was seated one day with Topipha, a fifty-five year old peasant, next to the main road 
that crosses the village. It was a sort of public place where people came for many different 
things, including games. That day, two men were playing the game called adji, while 
Topipha, seated at some distance from the players, was fixing his bicycle. I was keeping 
him company and we were discussing this and that: his duties in the village church, his 
unwillingness to continue to take care of the wife of his son who had migrated to Nigeria, 
the wife's becoming more and more capricious like most girls nowadays, the last rain 
that fell on market day making it difficult for people to do good business etc. In the mean 
time, the district extension officer passed by in his car and waved his hand. Suddenly, 
Topipha switched topic: 'Look they are passing, the thieves!' he said. And he went on 
muttering about how village agents continually cheated peasants, giving examples of 
cotton cultivation and marketing. He became so vehement in his expressions, that I was 
scared and wondered how things would turn out should the extension officer happen to 
arrive at that very moment. 
A few minutes later, the extension officer returned and stopped. He got out of his car, 
walked up to us and shook our hands. Topipha offered him a seat, asked about his wife 
and children and offered him a beer. They had a rather nice discussion on the troubles 
Topipha was having with his bicycle and then about cotton issues (fertilizers, marketing 
etc), Topipha being the one asking about the why, when and how of things in a coaxing 
voice. Once the officer finished his beer, he thanked the peasant, greeted us again and left. 
I asked Topipha about his attitude which I considered contradictory to his declarations a 
few minutes earlier. He replied: "That's nothing! Showing warmth to someone is not 
an indication of friendship and does not mean that you do not harbour resentments 
against him on account of one thing or another. You have red blood within your body and 
nevertheless manage to spit white. Moreover, you should know that it is no use trying 
to rape a woman with whom you are sure to share the bed all night long'2. 
How can people complain so much about each other, especially on issues that are 
supposed to be crucial to their daily lives, and still find ways of chatting together 
in such a convivial manner? The bed in question here is most probably that of 
'rural development', which seems then to depict the cohabitation between peasants 
and state as a permanent situation, at least in the views of Topipha. The picture 
which the bed-and-rape metaphor intended to give was that there was little use 
fighting those one had to live beside. It indicated a preference for softer weapons 
of negotiation, in contrast to the verbal violence used by Topipha a few minutes 
earlier. People expressing the denial of friendship towards each other and harbour-
ing resentments, which they want 'outsiders' to see as strong, signifies that despite 
the conflictive situation they live in, presented as potentially explosive, they manage 
to find and maintain some common ground for action. How is this common ground 
achieved? And at what cost? At first sight, Topipha was not obliged to offer the 
extension officer a beer and, most importantly, he did not have to behave so nicely 
to him. He had been so angry against him just a few seconds before. This apparent 
contradiction raises crucial questions: What role do the complaints and criticisms by 
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the actors on specific occasions play in the process of rural development interven-
tion? Can we still hold to a top-down view implied in the actual use of the concept 
of 'development intervention', which seems to portray the presence of the state or 
external institutions as imposed on peasants, leaving them no alternative but simply 
to accommodate to and play with it? Such a view, if looked at closely, still retains 
some cargo image of intervention (see Long and van der Ploeg 1989: 230) and 
prevents us from seeing the changes that are taking place in front of us, i.e. the 
'intervened' taking initiatives of 'intervention', over and above those of the 
'intervenors'.4 The failure to adopt such a perspective on the dynamics of inter-
vention prevents us from opening the black box of 'rural development'. 
What does the black box of 'rural development' contain? 
'Rural development' is a concept that is now used world-wide to describe the 
process of (state) intervention in rural areas focusing largely on agricultural produc-
tion and the incorporation of rural producers into the market economy. This process 
has been linked to the building of 'modern' nation-states in former colonial 
territories, and to the establishment of state authority over geographical areas 
shaped arbitrarily, especially in Africa, au hazard des aventures coloniales. State 
intervention in rural areas - now referred to as 'rural development' - has gone 
through different fashions and has been variously labelled over time as mise en 
valeur des colonies, increased agricultural production, rural modernisation, commun-
ity development, agricultural development, animation rurale, rural extension, etc. 
In countries such as Benin, 'rural development' is a strongly technical concept, 
but is also used for political purposes. Its technical strength is derived from the fact 
that agriculture is assumed to be the largest and most vital sector of the economy 
of Third World countries (Johnson and Mellor 1961). Over 80 percent of the popula-
tion of China, India and Africa live and work on the land (Laite 1984:197). In Benin, 
the actions that the state and development organisations (governmental and non-
governmental alike) initiate in the name of 'rural development' are said to aim at 
improving the living conditions of the rural population that make up more than 
three quarters of the population of the country. These actions are said to concern an 
agricultural sector that employs more than 70 percent of the active population and 
produces more than 70 percent of the foreign currency earnings and some 40 percent 
of the Gross Domestic Product. Such information sounds very convincing and incon-
testable: Is it possible to think of 'developing' a country without starting from the 
sector that carries all these attributes? Development plans since the colonial period 
have invariably set rural development at the forefront (see the 1938,1945,1963 and 
1975 Development Plans of Dahomey/Benin). 
But 'rural development' is also a problematic notion, a set of self-reproducing 
practices that are given very different meanings by the different actors involved in 
its reproduction. The various kinds of organisations and categories of Ministry 
officials, politicians, head office staff, district and village extension agents, develop-
ment experts, representatives of funding agencies, trade union leaders, farmers, 
traders, and make extensive use of the term, but, depending on their social category 
and on the specific social time and space in which they live, they have very different 
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representations in mind when speaking of rural development. For example, protests 
against the reduction of staff by Government under IMF pressure, claims for salary 
increases by the trade unions representing agricultural bureaucrats, as well as the 
attempts of Government to decrease staff members and thus reduce the salary 
burden on the state budget, are all presented as steps towards the same goal, that 
of 'rural development'. The same thing goes for traders claiming better trading 
conditions for agricultural products (often at the disadvantage of rural producers), 
farmers asking for lower prices for inputs and higher prices for agricultural prod-
ucts (here affecting the interests of traders), and agricultural bureaucrats fighting for 
better working conditions. 
In fact, 'rural development' has become a taken-for-granted concept and its use 
and reproduction have gone beyond the political arenas indicated above. It has 
attracted social scientists, first development economists and social geographers, and 
later rural sociologists who seem to have been knocking insistently at its door since 
the 1970s (see Copp 1972, and especially Hall and Midgley 1988: 2-5). It is an institu-
tion in itself, a subject of teaching and research in university departments and is 
supposed to be the central occupation of a whole Ministry in Benin as it is in many 
other Third World countries. It is the main focus of state intervention in rural areas, 
and the main argument used by state as well as non-state organisations to legitimise 
their actions in villages. Apart from the semantic problem raised by these multiple 
representations behind the rhetoric of rural development (even though we should 
not be looking for uniform meanings), there are some simple practical questions one 
might ask, which at least troubled me during my fieldwork and since: What is 
particularly rural about the changes taking place in the context of the Community 
Development Programme in Togoudo? And in what sense are these changes specific 
to rural areas? 
The Community Development Programme as an anthropological entrée into the field of 
rural development 
The field research on which these discussions are based was conducted for the main 
part in 1991-1992, with additional field visits since, and within the frame of the 
Community Development Programme in the Zou Province, though the programme 
came to an end in 1993. The project was implemented in eight villages of the 
province (see Map 2), within each of which an extension agent at Masters degree 
level was appointed as a community development agent - called Responsable de 
Dynamisation du Village (RDV). 
According to the plan, actions within the project were twofold: first were the 
actions at the village level conducted by the RDV, with occasional technical and 
institutional support from the head office. He was requested to reside in the village, 
to design and implement projects with local participation, that would provide new 
impetus and dynamise the economic and social life of the village. The RDVs 
received every two weeks or so the visit of a technical assistant from the head office 
to give them advice and, most importantly, to monitor the programme. They were 
told that whenever needed, they could request the assistance of the subject matter 
specialists within CARDER, or any other resource person outside of CARDER. All 
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RDVs met quarterly at the head office where they reported on their activities and 
were given instructions by the General Director of CARDER concerning the types 
of tasks they should undertake. The second block of activities included in the Com-
munity Development Programme concerned agricultural training, provided for 
young school leavers coming mainly from the villages involved in the programme. 
In the present study I have limited myself to the activities in the villages and to the 
links between the RDVs and the head office, leaving out the youth training block, 
which, in any case, was a rather one-off activity. 
This book is thus not about a 'big project', with a huge budget allocation by the 
World Bank or some other important donor agency. We are not concerned here with 
centrally planned and financed schemes for constructing roads, bridges, schools, 
health centres etc. Nor are we interested in issues such as pricing policy, market 
regulations or vaccination campaigns. Comparing those types of projects to 'Com-
munity Development', some would say that the latter is no more than peanuts, the 
jardin de recreation of development workers. Even for CARDER staff the programme 
was not worth mentioning as part of the current activities of the organisation. In any 
case, during the 1989-1991 period, in the Zou Province there was no big project 
whatsoever. The period was one of intense political activities and of a waiting 
attitude from most donors and intervention staff. If I had not come across the Com-
munity Development Programme, this book would have been about the strikes and 
daily political talk of the staff of an intervention organisation sentenced to death by 
a structural adjustment programme conducted under the control of the World Bank 
and IMF tandem. 
But more than just a case 'in place of any better case', the Community Develop-
ment Programme was an interesting one for me as a research focus. It was unique 
in that it did not start with a detailed and centralised project plan. Nor did it start 
with any budget allocated by a donor agency, though the staff and villagers 
involved thought the contrary at the beginning. In a sense, it was a kind of 'pro-
gressive, open-ended and participatory' type of programme where the problems 
to be dealt with were expected to be those considered the most important by the so-
called clients themselves. Yet, the programme was caught up in the bureaucratic and 
top-down intervention culture of CARDER, as well as in the project dismembering 
practices of those involved. It was therefore transformed within CARDER and 
between CARDER agents and villagers, and became locked into the divergent, even 
conflictive, interests of the various parties. Pieces of it were used by individuals and 
groups for achieving objectives that had very little to do with programme aims and 
activities. The programme provided grounds where various categories of institutions 
and actors met, debated and negotiated their different and conflicting views and 
projects of 'rural development' expressing the 'historical imprint, the accumulated 
experiences of interventions of various sorts and times' (Long and van der Ploeg 
1989: 230). At the same time, it provided space for actors to open up new opportun-
ities and to engage in dynamics that stretched far beyond the explicit and implicit 
scope of the plan and its implementation. The senior staff of Togoudo (see Map 2) 
- one of the eight villages involved in the programme in the Zou Province - became 
the most successful because of the enthusiasm of the population and the dynamism 
of the RDV appointed there. As argued by the staff, within the first nine months of 
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Map 2 Zou Provice B O R G O U 
A T L A N T I Q U E 
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The senior staff of Togoudo (see Map 2) - one of the eight villages involved in 
the programme in the Zou Province - became the most successful because of the 
enthusiasm of the population and the dynamism of the RDV appointed there. As 
argued by the staff, within the first nine months of the programme, Togoudo was 
the only village where many 'significant activities' were reported by both male 
and female peasant groups, and also where brick houses were built with the active 
involvement of the population, one for the school and the other for storing agricul-
tural inputs (mainly for cotton production). I concentrated my investigations in 
Togoudo, helped by a research assistant who resided permanently in the village.4 
The discussions in this book are based upon ethnographic data, our personal 
experiences in the village and on relevant events at the district and head office levels 
of CARDER. Moreover, I contacted officers in the Ministry on the subject and was 
also given opportunities to interact with staff and villagers in other provinces. For 
example, in the Atlantic Province in South Benin, I was able to document the formal 
burial of the Community Development Programme by those involved, which I will 
use to illustrate the hidden aspects of the manufacturing of state intervention policy. 
In the process of the research, I ended up building and reactivating (together with 
the researched and my assistant), social networks with ramifications at village and 
district levels, but also at the regional head office of CARDER and at the Ministry 
of Rural Development. My first intention was to conduct a systematic comparison 
between Togoudo and Dani, a second village with similar ecological and ethnic 
characteristics but considered to be the least successful of the programmes. But in 
the actual process of negotiating my way through the daily ventures of the research 
endeavour, as I elaborate below, I found such an attempt at comparison positivistic 
and meaningless, or at least unsuited to my overall way of dealing with the field 
'realities'. Instead of such a comparison, special reference is made now and then 
to this village and to others in the programme, in order to discuss the different ways 
in which actors interpret and make use of what was ostensibly the same interven-
tion asset for rural development. I also sometimes bring in experiences gained in 
Dani, helping a women's group to acquire implements for gardening, a refrigerator 
(He omi tutu or 'the house of cold water' as they called it) for selling ice and cold 
drinks, and for starting a savings-and-credit group. 
Investigating the field of rural development: methodological dimensions 
In the foregoing discussions, I hope to have made it clear that the field research on 
which the present book is based was conducted with an actor-oriented approach 
(see Long 1984; 1989; 1992 for extended elaborations on the approach). I was 
interested in understanding what kinds of relationships the individuals, groups and 
categories of people involved in a specific type of state intervention (in this case the 
Community Development Programme) built with each other, and what roles these 
relations played in the logic of the intervention and its reproduction. I did not want 
to 'teach' people about 'development', nor could I find for myself any legitimacy 
or competence to pretend to do so. Therefore, I did not start with a preconceived 
ideal theoretical model, to end up with 'conclusions and recommendations' for 
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making reality fit better with the model and thereby giving 'development' a better 
chance to come about. I started the research with my mind set on the fact that 
within my scope, as indicated above, I would let the social actors faced with the 
circumstances of action speak for themselves in their own logic, giving their 
accounts of their everyday life. From this entry point, I assumed that such reflexive 
accounts of events by social actors would not necessarily, at least not always, lead 
to 'objective data'. I knew, and further learned through this research, that actors' 
accounts can be, and mostly are, political (i.e. manipulative) - one of the implica-
tions of which is that I did not consider myself as being outside of the events I was 
researching. Rather, I was part of the game and a central element in the structuring 
exercises performed by informants when accounting for and rationalising their 
actions. I realised throughout the research that no matter what theoretical and 
political background one might have, one becomes an actor in the game, in the 
dynamic and conflict-generating social interactions that are being investigated. One 
is attributed roles in various social dramas, according to where you do or do not go, 
who you visit or talk to, what you do or do not say etc. Before discussing these 
issues, let me emphasise that my preference for an actor-oriented approach was not 
an abstract choice between theoretical paradigms, but was the result of personal 
experience, of previous disappointments when, in earlier research, I had tried to use 
generic models for explaining and attempting to change reality. 
From 'Agricultural Knowledge Systems' theory to the discovery of the actor-oriented 
approach in the field 
Being an agronomist trained within the ideology of 'enlightening peasants for 
improving their production and standard of living', I became seduced by the idea 
(mainly developed in the Department of Communication and Extension Sciences of 
Wageningen Agricultural University) of bridging the gap between trainers, 
researchers, extensionists and farmers, in such a way that the whole AKIS (Agricul-
tural Knowledge and Information System) - as it is labelled (see Roling 1988) -
operates synergically to bring information to the place where it is needed, so as to 
enhance 'agricultural development'. In an attempt to apply the AKIS model, I had 
the chance to conduct fieldwork on a Research and Development (R&D) project 
whose objective was to bridge this gap by bringing all the partners together in 
devising, testing and stimulating the use, at farm level, of agricultural technology 
packages that suited the cultivators' conditions. The fieldwork was conducted in 
Benin in 1988 and lasted four months, during which time I was integrated into the 
project team, taking part in all its activities, which included field trials (conducted 
by farmers with the assistance of field research and extension agents), and evalu-
ation meetings between farmers, researchers and extensionists. At the same time, 
being a staff member of the Faculty of Agriculture at the National University of 
Benin, I could visit the villages of the project and have independent contact with the 
people, since the Faculty had been engaged in relationships with these villages from 
1985 through a Farming Systems Research programme. I found this fieldwork an 
unexpected opportunity to identify communication gaps between the actors involved 
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(researchers, extensionists, farmers and traders), and then the work out the 'linkage 
mechanisms' between these different groups as suggested in the AKIS model. 
Very soon, I realised that there was indeed a lack of communication between the 
different parties, groups and hierarchical levels involved in the project, but that 
these gaps could not be explained as technological gaps that could be bridged by 
a simple communication device. The structural discontinuities that were the frame-
work of these gaps did not derive simply from the institutions' mandates or from 
their formal structural organisation. They also resulted from the cultural, socio-
professional backgrounds and from the world views of the individuals. They 
resulted from the ways in which each strategic but casually formed interest group 
interpreted and used the mandate, and created new and informal structures that cut 
across formal boundaries in order to achieve different, mostly divergent objectives. 
When they occurred, communication gaps and ignorance were frequently not 
accidental, but consciously (intentionally) structured, as part of the strategies 
deployed by the groups involved in order to achieve hidden as well as contradictory 
objectives. Most importantly, although they might talk informally about these gaps, 
the various actors and interest groups involved hated the issue to be brought into 
the open in formal settings. Discourse, and various resources from the formal and 
non-operational structures, were used by actors within informally generated struc-
tures and networks (in the course of the action) that were instrumental in achieving 
objectives more in line with the logic of the informal structures than with that of the 
formal ones (Mongbo 1989a and 1989b). 
From there, I began to understand the meaning of what 'systems thinkers' 
approach from a different perspective and label 'communication gaps'. For me, it 
became clear that, unless the actual discourse of gap bridging is instrumental to the 
achievement of objectives other than those formally stated by 'systems thinkers and 
managers', it was useless trying to bridge the gaps, since by attempting to do so 
we adhere to the formal structures of the project. Such structures are not the actual 
frames of action through which actors give concrete life to the project, thus turning 
it into a series of experienced realities. My discovery in the field (given succour later 
by relevant literature and discussions mainly in the Department of Sociology of 
Rural Development in Wageningen Agricultural University, with Norman Long and 
his scholars) was that if one wanted to understand what the project had become in 
reality, one needed in fact to deconstruct it and analyze it from an actor-oriented 
perspective (Long and van der Ploeg 1988). The project has to be conceived as an 
arena of negotiation between various strategic groups (Bierschenk 1988), and one has 
to investigate the ways in which different actors (with their differences in culture, 
world views and interests) use the resources they are able to mobilise from the 
structural environment of their activities (taking active part in the reproduction and 
transformation of these structures) to achieve the formally prescribed and/or hidden 
objectives. One needs also to research the influence which these processes produce 
on the essence and dynamism of intervention institutions and on the outcomes of 
their actions. 
With the experience gained in this R&D project, I first decided to focus the 
investigations for this thesis on R&D cases, and to compare the Mono and Zou 
projects. But once in the field, it was circumstance and the actors who guided me 
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to the actual focus of the research, which is the Community Development Pro-
gramme. 
Choosing a focus for the research from an actor-oriented perspective 
I let myself be guided by circumstances and actors, but I tried, as Law warns, not 
to celebrate them (Law 1991: 12). I did not just let myself be led by actors, because 
I had learned that their guidance can be manipulative. Also, in many instances, I 
was the one taking the decisions as to where to go, whom to talk to and with which 
subject to start the discussions. In so doing, I often made mistakes (interrupting an 
account from actors, or failing to fully document an ongoing social event etc), which 
I regretted at the end of the day. In fact, I was filtering through the flow of events 
I was experiencing. For example, issues of interest to the unions of agricultural 
bureaucrats and their networking and political affiliations were uppermost and there 
were many attempts by their agents to enrol me in order to enlarge their networks. 
But I did not find these issues to be particularly relevant. I was interested in 
situations entailing encounters between agents and villagers concerning questions 
of rural development. I was concerned with contributing to a debate on social actors, 
intervention, social interface and rural development - a scientific debate taking place 
far away from the research setting. In some ways, I was forcing my 'informants' 
to produce for me a discourse on topics in which they themselves might not have 
been interested. Walking with them, I tried to deconstruct them in such a way that 
they guided me, but could not lead me just to where they wanted. But this I 
experienced as a permanent negotiation, the outcome of which I could not predict 
beforehand. They were always free to stop collaborating. But they also managed 
many times to embark on their own projects. An illustration here will be helpful. 
I started fieldwork in the Zou Province in early 1990. After a few days of discussions 
with the regional unit of the R&D project in Bohicon, one of the major cities of the 
province, I expressed my intention to settle in one of the villages of the project. The 
project head staff had recommended two villages where, as I later understood, they had 
many problems enlisting villagers but also disciplining some field staff. I decided to settle 
in one of these villages but kept contact with the regional unit based in Bohicon, where 
the head offices of the CARDER were located. I soon realised that the field agents and 
villagers in close contact with them were more preoccupied by whether the funding of the 
project would continue or not, than by the actual activities of the project concerning 
agricultural technology development. I answered them, repeating the information I got 
from the head staff that the project would continue for at least two more years. While I 
based the assurances I was giving field agents on the information I got from head staff, 
the latter were using the very fact of my presence in the village to convince field staff that 
the project would be renewed. I later discovered that the negotiations with the funding 
institution for continuing the project were much harder than the head staff made me 
believe. And in that bargain, one argument they put to both field agents and representa-
tives of funding agencies was this: '...The project is very important to the Government 
and scientists of our country. You see the University is becoming more interested in it 
than ever before: not only students are coming to the villages for fieldwork, but even the 
lecturers themselves.' 
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My assistant and I went through similar experiences in Togoudo. The ritual per-
formed by the RDV when introducing us to village people and to visitors, which 
included attempts by him to use the situation to try to settle previous conflicts and 
to convince representatives of funding agencies coming to the village, gave us the 
chance to know, without asking, the previous realities of the project and their 
relationship to the present. I consider these experiences as situations where we were, 
what Fabian has called, 'catalysers' or providers of occasions (quoted by de Vries 
1992: 79), which in the end helped us sometimes and fitted well into my analytical 
framework. On the other hand, my encounter with the Community Development 
Programme resulted from pure chance and I would not have discovered it if I had 
limited myself to formal and informal interactions with CARDER agents and the 
accounts most staff, including the directors, gave me of their current activities. 
My encounter with the Village Redynamisation Programme 
During the period 1989-1990, if an outsider talked with CARDER agents, three main 
topics would come to the fore, one of which was the R&D project referred to above. 
The second topic, ranked higher than the previous one, was the Integrated Rural 
Development Project that ran between 1983 and 1990. It aimed to 'increase agricul-
tural (in fact cotton) production with a view to improving the level of revenue for 
the farmers' and the foreign currency earnings for the state'. These two projects 
were about to end without any clear prospect for other funding. Donors seemed no 
longer willing to allocate funds to Benin projects unless there were fundamental 
changes in the supposedly Marxist-Leninist political system. The working atmos-
phere was one of absenteeism and 'wait-and-see'. In any case, people seemed 
uninterested in talking about this project (at least with me), and when they did, it 
was in very negative ways. There were not many activities going on and the staff 
were more interested in whether there would be another project when the current 
one finished in the following year.5 One soon got the point that when there was no 
'project', there was nothing much to do. They conveyed the impression of non-
activity. Yet, later when I attended staff meetings, I realised from their reports -
though exaggerating the achievements and 'difficulties encountered' - that there 
were things going on in the field. Their reports were not just empty speeches but 
did in fact reflect concrete activities. On the other hand, neither was the impression 
of 'non-activity' conveyed to me without some substance. The nuance was that it 
expressed something different from merely the absence of activity. It reminded me 
of how Adja women talked about farm work. In 1986,1 was interested in when and 
how Adja women started to become involved in agriculture. The answer of almost 
all the informants (female) was that 'In the old days, women did not do farm 
work'. Later I realised that this did not mean that the women did not work on the 
farm. They did help their husbands in many farm activities (sowing, harvesting, 
even sometimes weeding). It only meant that the women did not perceive it as 
'farm work' as such, since they did not undertake such work on their own account 
and did not earn cash from it (see Mongbo 1988). In the same way, the perception 
of 'non-activity' by staff in the absence of projects, as I later understood and 
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discuss in Chapter 4 and 5 of this book, is part of the historically-built culture of 
development intervention in Benin. 
The third topic which always came to the fore in discussions was national politics 
and ruminations as to the survival prospects of the CARDER. As I elaborate in 
Chapter 3, the political atmosphere was very tense around 1989-1990. An IMF-WB 
structural adjustment programme had started and there were prospects of some 
funding for the Zou CARDER, though contingent upon dismissal of more than half 
the staff. At the national level, the economic crisis was severe and salaries were paid 
very irregularly to all civil servants, with delays amounting from 5 to 8 months. 
Schools and trade unions were often on strike and street demonstrations were 
frequently organised. In the offices, discussions were generally about the latest 
public unrest rather than 'rural development' matters. Not once did I hear the 
Community Development Programme mentioned as an ongoing activity of the 
CARDER and I could not have selected this programme as the focus of my research 
if I had not come across it, almost by accident. 
One morning, while I was in Bohicon for a few days and using one of the housing 
facilities of the CARDER, I met a group of 16 young men (18-20 years old on average). 
They came from rice producing villages and were on their way to an irrigation scheme 
to learn about rice production. They slept in rooms next to mine and were attracted by 
the music of my radio cassette. We talked a few minutes and shared maize porridge and 
toasted peanuts at breakfast. These young men had very different ideas about the ultimate 
goal of their training. Some of them were sent by their villages so that, once trained, they 
could teach their parents back home. Others considered themselves recruited as CARDER 
staff to teach farmers about rice cultivation techniques wherever needed, while others 
thought CARDER was intending to give them financial and technical assistance to start 
an irrigation scheme as 'modern farmers'. Later, the CARDER member of staff (Ekanye, 
as I refer to him in this book) in charge of the operation arrived and we were introduced 
to each other. 
During our discussions Ekanye explainedi'This training session is part of the Village 
Redynamisation Programme, in which I am in charge of coordination and monitoring. 
The trainees come from the villages involved in the programme. This is the second step 
in our training plan. The first was held in the villages on several topics related to crop 
production, animal production etc., and was of direct profit to many people. The ultimate 
goal of these activities is to modernise our agriculture through the young people, solving 
at the same time the problem of migration and unemployment.' 
I kept contact with Ekanye and with other staff involved in the programme. I 
questioned them on the programme, visited the trainees on site and discussed with 
them their training. I also visited three villages of the programme where I had 
discussions with field agents and villagers. From all these contacts, I received 
different, sometimes contradictory, views of the programme. On these occasions, 
most CARDER staff made extensive use of the rhetoric of community and participa-
tory development, one of the oldest devices in development intervention, but 
presented here as a new approach that would enlighten and revitalise our villages. 
But some staff found no relevance in the programme and criticised it as a waste of 
time, funds and manpower. 
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The actual investigations: the social networks for the field research 
I started to take part in the meetings and activities of the project at head office as 
well as in some of the villages. I also managed to follow a monitoring mission in all 
the eight villages of the programme, during which I recorded all the interactions I 
witnessed between the RDV, the head office official and the villagers. After this tour 
with the CARDER officer in charge of the monitoring of the programme, I visited 
six of the villages on my own, in order to have more independent accounts of the 
RDVs perceptions of the programme and their daily activities. I used various 
research techniques: observation and systematic recording of events, open-ended 
and sometimes semi-structured interviews on various issues, extensive documenting 
and analysis of specific social situations (of encounters between different parties) 
and cases through time and space. 
Then, mainly because of the success the programme was accredited with, and also 
because of the enthusiasm and optimism of the RDV, I decided to base the research 
in Togoudo. Nevertheless, I maintained contact with the head offices and with a few 
other RDVs whom I visited now and then for discussions. I attended most meetings 
of the programme and managed to interact informally with the various staff 
involved. In the end, I made close relationships, ranging from the directors to low 
level staff, staying in their houses in Bohicon, and going out with them on social 
occasions that had nothing to do with professional matters. I felt that, at some stage 
during the research, I would need to conduct a survey of the personnel, their ages, 
gender, qualifications, career, religion, future expectations etc. Such data would have 
allowed me to build a more situated idea of the staff involved in the Community 
Development Programme, whose life histories I had already documented. This 
attempt to conduct a survey, in the bosom of CARDER, failed because most field 
staff (those at district and village levels), including the union leaders, saw it as a 
government ploy to get round their resistance to earlier attempts by the Ministry of 
Rural Development to conduct a census whose objective was believed to be the basis 
for deciding on who would be made redundant within the structural adjustment 
programme. I thus had to resort to secondary data. Also, archives, annual reports 
and key informants were consulted for the history of development intervention in 
Benin and specifically in the Zou Province. 
In Togoudo, where I focused the village work, I deployed no pre-selected samples 
or pre-established questionnaires. Those informants I interviewed were selected in 
the light of their participation or non-participation in specific action situations. Apart 
from his intensive focus on the Groupement Villageois (GV) and cotton growers, the 
Rural Development Worker (RDV) of Togoudo devoted a great deal of attention to 
women's groups. I recorded all the groups that were formed and I conducted open-
ended discussions with them on their daily activities and also on those of the 
individual members. In some cases, specific activities were identified about which 
more structured discussions were conducted. These observations and discussions 
were organised both in formal and informal contexts. Later, random samples of 65 
women and 65 men were drawn up, which some female and male informants 
agreed to classify for me according to their notions of 'well-being'. From this 
exercise, which I elaborate in Chapter 8, I obtained some major locally-produced 
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indicators of socio-economic status. Three to five persons from each of the socio-
economic categories thus obtained were interviewed in a more structured way on 
their individual activities and their perceptions of group activities. I documented -
more through informal than formal interviews - the ways in which these people try 
to earn a living, and explored their operationalisation of 'well-being' and what 
they called the 'opening of eyes'. I also recorded the problems they encountered, 
their attempts at reaching solutions and, through their life histories, how all these 
evolved over time. The insights obtained from this investigation were placed within 
a broader context of the local economy using data I collected in a quantitative 
survey conducted early in 1995, the details of which are spelled out in Chapter 7 of 
this book. 
The outline of the book: the structure of an argument concerning the field of rural 
development 
I found the village scene to be the most appropriate for experiencing the ways in 
which 'global' phenomena, including the rhetoric of 'rural development' are 
dynamically appropriated by people, decoded according to individuals' life-worlds, 
made culturally, locally and politically meaningful, and incorporated into individ-
uals' and groups' strategic and tactical initiatives for self-achievement, differently 
referred to as 'ways ahead', 'opening of eyes' (which means to become modern), 
'well-being', 'good fortune' and so forth. These processes, involving the individ-
ual and collective search for self-achievement, carry with them three main character-
istics which lie at the heart of the arguments in this thesis. 
First, they are conflict-generating par excellence, but at the same time become an 
object of consensus. In fact, even when actors confront each other on issues related 
to their life-projects, and especially in the context of a development intervention, 
they always reach operational consensus, at least provisional or tactical consensus 
with themselves and with others, so as to proceed with the intervention process and 
the reproduction of the language of 'rural development', no matter how curtailed 
and biased the consensus might look. Indeed, people arguing from different per-
spectives and dealing with different issues end up taking common decisions, and 
establishing some consensus built out of cacophonic, non-dialogical social interac-
tion. Most important, it seems, is the necessity of keeping enough room to be able 
to continue struggling for definitions that best fit their own perceptions and inter-
ests. By so doing, the actors involved in these social interactions contribute efficient-
ly, though not intentionally, to the reproduction of the field of rural development. 
Second, not only are they open to the active appropriation of external opportun-
ities (including so-called external interventions), which actors deconstruct, transform 
and incorporate into their own projects and plans, they also generate interaction 
situations where local people, who are supposed to accommodate to external 
intervention, actually take initiative away from the 'interveners'. I contend that, 
in their daily reproduction of the discourse and practice of rural development, actors 
do not conform to a linear model which depicts development and change as being 
initiated by state-designed policy, implemented by state agents and backed up by 
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funding bodies and external experts. In fact, invervention roles and practices are 
defined, negotiated and established in the process of interaction, as a means for 
achieving different interests. 
Third, they are world-time bound in that they incorporate local interpretations 
and understandings of global (national and international) political and economic 
events that set the limits to, or open latitude for, their definition and therefore their 
room for manoeuvre. But with these interpretations and appropriations of external 
events, actors take a big share in the construction of the contexts of their actions, 
contexts that are no longer externally determined but socially constructed. 
In order to make this argument, I organize the remaining part of the book, 
depicted in the table presented below, as follows: 
In Chapter 2,1 set out the theoretical dimensions of rural development as a social 
field of interaction. I ground this theoretical discussion on a meeting of the cotton 
growers' organisation of Togoudo, which reveals some concrete manifestations of 
the social field, i.e. the grounds and arenas on which social actors - the stakeholders 
interact for achieving different sorts of interests, using specialised language and 
different discursive and rhetorical expertise. The chapter discusses the concepts 
entailed in the notion of the field of rural development. Other concepts are only 
introduced here and discussed further in the chapters to which they are most 
pertinent. For example, the concept of state is discussed in Chapter 5 and that of 
social interface in Chapter 9. 
Elaborating the theoretical framework of the argument based upon the case of the 
Community Development Programme has the advantage of bringing readers directly 
into the practical world of the social actors involved, while allowing them to engage 
in discussions on how one can best make sense of practice. But having completed 
this discussion, there is the need for a further understanding of this practical world 
of social actors, by stepping back and viewing the processes through the context 
from which the Community Development Programme emerged. This is done in 
Chapter 3, which explores the political and economic contexts of Benin at both 
national and village level, covering, among other dimensions, the economic crisis, 
the activism of political groups at local level, and the place of cotton in the local 
economy. I have avoided presenting this as a static or ad hoc context but have looked 
at it more from a historical and dynamic perspective, thus analyzing the logic 
whereby the Community Development Programme is conceived as a political 
innovation of development policy. 
This throws up the following questions, which I tackle in the remaining chapters: 
What is the nature of the institutional framework in which the programme was 
implemented and how did this framework emerge and evolve? (Chapter 4); Who 
are the people involved in the actual implementation, what are their life-worlds and 
future perspectives and how do they conceive rural development? (Chapter 5 for the 
state agents and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 for villagers); and lastly, How is implementa-
tion actually carried out? (Chapter 9). 
In Chapter 4,1 look at the frame of (state) intervention in rural development as 
historically rooted in the colonial mise en valeur policy that created a bureaucracy 
and an intervention culture useful for meeting the state's needs to earn currency, 
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territorial (administrative) legitimacy and eventually for contributing to the well-
being of the population. 
The bureaucracy of state intervention in rural development is analyzed in Chapter 
5, focusing, on the one hand, on the ways in which development intervention 
language and culture emerge in the context of intervention, where donors and 
experts play an important role, and on the other, on a discussion of the sorrows and 
daily search for self-achievement of the staff. To this end, distinction is made 
between four different categories of agents as broadly defined by the agents them-
selves in their interactions with each other. As a first step I argue for a 
deconstruction of the state in the matter of development intervention and for the 
need to pay more attention to how state power is appropriated or contested in 
specific situations by the staff to serve personal or group interests that might later 
be presented as a matter of state policy. I provide an illustration from the Atlantic 
Province concerning the process by which individual interests of staff members 
become entangled with technical arguments and vagaries of interpersonal relation-
ships leading to the closure of the Community Development Programme in the 
name of, what representatives of the funding agency believed to be, state policy, 
despite their willingness to support the programme. 
Chapter 6 opens the discussions on the village context and its significance for the 
implementation of the programme and the everyday life of the villagers. Here, I 
discuss the settlement patterns of the different socio-ethnic groups in so far as these 
patterns (which are more like farm-centred settlements) are relevant for understand-
ing the stakes, stakeholders and the local politics of the present-day social entity that 
was given the status of 'village' by the public administration in the mid-1960s. 
Chapter 7 concerns a description of the productive activities of men and women in 
the village, giving some insight into the local economy as a dynamic and diversified 
one linked to national and regional markets (Nigeria, Togo and Niger mainly) via 
Gbomina market. The actual strategies of men and women for self-achievement are 
discussed in Chapter 8. Prior to this discussion, an emic categorisation of men and 
women is given in order to provide as large a view as possible of how different 
categories of local people define and procure self-achievement, well-being, and rural 
development. 
Chapter 9 focuses on the crossroads of the Community Development Programme, 
where the social actors referred to in the preceding chapters meet. Here, actors 
merge their complex and divergent preoccupations in various ways, depending on 
their lifeworlds and life-projects. Centring the discussion on the concept of social 
interface, I first explore the discrepancies among bureaucrats in order to illustrate 
how a policy statement becomes locked into the conflictive partisan life in a particu-
lar development institution, is transformed into assets for (and sources of) coalitions, 
as well as conflict, and yet contributes to the reproduction of the institution and to 
the manufacturing of its image and development rhetoric. A similar analysis is made 
at village level, where the gap between programme activities and the everyday lives 
of the people is revealed and analyzed. 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 10) looks back over the whole argument of the 
book and closes with a critical reflection on the rural specificity of the field of social 
interaction generated in the process of development intervention. 
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Table 1 The general frame of the book 
Blocks Chapters Contents Main topics 
1 General 
argument of 
the book 
Chapter 1 Main questions and 
methodological dimen-
sions 
The problematic, theory 
and methodological 
dimensions of Hie field of 
rural development 
Chapter 2 The field of rural devel-
opment and the CDP*: 
main concepts 
2 Socio-political 
context of the CDP 
Chapter 3 Local and national 
rationales of the CDP: 
a historical perspective 
State politics, economic 
crisis and policy innova-
tion in the field of rural 
development 
3 Bureaucrats' 
frames of 
interaction 
Chapter 4 CARDER and the 
intervention frame: 
emergence and evol-
ution 
State and bureaucrats in 
Hie field of rural develop-
ment: life-worlds, histori-
cal background and pres-
ent-day realities 
Chapter 5 The CARDER staff: 
actual preoccupations 
and future perspectives 
4 Villagers' 
strategies and 
frames of 
action 
Chapter 6 Togoudo: a residential 
composite 
Villagers in the field of 
rural development: life-
worlds, life circum-
stances and everyday 
livelihood strategies 
Chapter 7 Togoudo: diversified 
production activities 
Chapter 8 Togoudo: differential 
life-worlds and self-
achievement strategies 
5 Development 
intervention 
and local 
realities 
Chapter 9 Dismembering of the 
CDP at the crossroads 
Highlighting the field of 
rural development: mul-
tiple languages and 
interests, common 
grounds and arenas for 
social interaction 
Chapter 10 Reflecting back on the 
argument 
* CDP: Community Development Programme 
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Notes 
1 Throughout the text the concept of 'logic' or 'logics' is used in a 'soft' sense and does not imply 
the existence of dominant structuring forces or central normative frameworks. Here I follow Olivier de 
Sardan (1988: 216-224) in his discussion of development project logics and peasant logics. 
2 A strong call was made to British councillors, aclministrators and planners, as early as 1966, for 
community development work in Britain similar to that being carried out at the time in India, Ghana etc 
(Sautoy 1966: 56). The message seems to have been heard and acted upon, if one takes account of the 
reports devoted to the issue. See, for example, Amstrong 1993; Smiley 1975; Wadham 1993; and more 
generally the publications of the Community Development Journal. 
3 Gbe donumzko nyi me. mdn gbd Se a. Hun kbnbn 8o me xome cob'enim t'atan wewe. ho b, nyonu ekpoms. 
kpo So kpb na db we le b, e rum xivlen kan hee a. 
4 Gerard Verschoor (1994) has also recently used the concepts of 'intervenors and intervened' in a 
Costa-Rican situation to discuss the gaps between both categories of actors in intervention contexts. Our 
discussion of this idea took place separately and at roughly the same time. My conceptualisation of 
'intervened' is not restricted to the coping of clients with intervention situations, but is used to argue the 
static roles generally attributed to the different stakeholders involved in the field of rural development. 
5 Fagbemy Mouftaou (the research assistant) holds a Masters degree from the Benin University Faculty 
of Agricultural Sciences in the field of economics and rural sociology. His previous experiences in field 
research include six months fieldwork for the writing of a thesis on farming systems analysis and 
resource allocation (see Fagbemy 1988), one year fieldwork on the interactions between village extension-
ists and peasants in the Atlantic Province (southern Benin), within a Training-and-Visit extension system 
(see van de Luhe 1991), and three months of ethnographic investigations into the daily activities of a 
peasant cooperative established in 1963 (see Daane and Mongbo 1991). 
6 These attitudes from the staff should be put in proper context. First the political situation in Benin at 
that moment gave, at least to the staff, more exciting topics for discussion than the ending of the rural 
development project. Second, I was hardly of any interest to the people concerned. If I had been a white 
researcher, or an expert from one of the international organisations such as the FAO, UNDP etc. then 
things would have been different. People would have hosted me in more formal ways and would have 
fed me with standard rhetoric. I did not regret this situation, on the contrary! I was much more interested 
in what people normally thought and did, rather than in formal and standard discourse, which I could 
get any way by attending official meetings or by being in offices when the staff hosted visitors. 
2 Stakeholders in the field of rural development at 
local level: Theoretical perspectives 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the main concepts used to make sense of the ethnography 
and to explain bottom-up theoretical insights based on some methodological 
innovations. I treat the concept of 'rural development' as a 'field of social interac-
tion'. I first discuss the concept of 'social field'. This is later broken down into 
'social grounds and arenas' where social actors (stakeholders) coalesce, negotiate 
with and/or confront each other on specific interests and 'stakes'. This brings me 
to pay particular attention to the concept of 'social actor', distinguishing the 
agency side of the actor from his acting-contexts, the latter being the situations 
where acting-agency is exhibited through differential degrees of identification of 
resources and constraints, and through the enrolment of (and negotiation with) other 
actors on the scene. The emergent forms and frames of interaction generated by 
social actors in the acting-context produce social interfaces, which I will briefly 
introduce in this chapter (but further discuss at the beginning of Chapter 9), prior 
to an exploration of the concepts of discourse, rhetoric, development language, and 
brokerage. 
The discussion in this chapter is organised through the presentation of a general 
assembly of a peasant1 organisation in Togoudo (of cotton growers), a situation 
typical to the reproduction of the discourse and practice of rural development in 
Benin. Indeed, my choice for cotton and a peasant organisation as symbolic vehicles 
for these discussions is not neutral. In Benin, as in many other African countries 
south of the Sahara, export crops (especially cotton since the mid-sixties in the Benin 
case) are symbolic of peasant-state relationships, while the act of 'bringing peasants 
together into groups or organisations' is symbolic for rural development interven-
tion tout court, whether the intervention is conducted by government or non-govern-
ment organisations. 
For the state and the peasant growers, cotton as an export crop has reached the 
status of social object (Blumer 1969: 2), carrying decades of a fluctuating history of 
interactions, made up of controversies, intended and unintended miscommunication, 
and struggles within communities between growers, state agents and state-con-
trolled institutions for rural development. Such commodities, important in linking 
the peasant economy to a world market economy, have also been the basis of 
different sorts of models on the part of international development agencies, such as 
the diffusion model, the high-pay off input model, the induced innovation model 
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(see Eicher and Staatz 1984: 41-44). They have also provoked theorising among 
scholars and political activists about the so-called dependency of peripheral econ-
omies on modern capitalist centres. On the other hand, as we have shown elsewhere 
for the Benin case since the colonial period (Daane and Mongbo 1991), one can 
hardly find cases of development intervention in rural areas (and more recently in 
urban areas also) by state or non-state organisations that do not involve some 
aspects of, or some discourse on, organising people. Leading on from this, I would 
say that in the Benin case, cotton as a commodity and peasant organisation as an 
intervention device lay at the heart of the issue of rural development, and that a 
meeting of the cotton growers' organisation may be used as a vehicle for a general 
enquiry into this problematic and into some crucial features of peasant-state rela-
tions. 
A social situation as an analytical starting point 
From the specific social situation of the general assembly of the cotton growers -
following the method developed by Gluckman (1940) and Mitchell (1956) in The 
Kalela Dance - I wish to sketch the social fabric of rural development intervention 
in Benin. But at this particular juncture, I am not after what might be called the 
essential inner meaning or the definitive structuring element of this fabric. Indeed, 
as Andrew Long argues, the analysis of social events is not aimed at revealing some 
fundamental logic or social order, at least not a Levi Straussian type of deep 
structure behind reality. Within the general structural ecological, socio-political and 
economic features, the limits or constraints on action are defined by actors them-
selves in specific contexts, not by some deus ex machina (1992:165). In the same way, 
resources for action are, more than mere identification, contextually elaborated by 
actors themselves, where they identify, construct and make use of room to 
manoeuvre (or otherwise fail to do so). Therefore, my concern here in describing the 
process of the general assembly of cotton growers in Togoudo is to set out the 
complexity and ambiguity of the rural development intervention endeavour, as 
differentially constructed by the individuals and groups involved, and, at the same 
time, to elaborate a conceptual framework flexible enough to capture these ambi-
guities and complexities and to account for the various and changing ways in which 
people deal with them. Therefore, my analysis of this meeting is interspersed with 
discussions on conceptual and methodological issues. But let me first try to clarify 
the notion of 'rural development' and its functioning as a social field. 
Rural development as a social field 
The 'archives' of the concept of 'social fields' lie in the work of the Manchester 
School of the 1950s and 1960s. The notion was primarily used to conceptualize so-
called plural societies characterised by major asymmetries of socio-cultural scale and 
complexity between their ethnic constituents. In such a context, specific sectors of 
social life (e.g. politics, economy), together with the relationships between the 
individuals and groups involved, are conceptualised as social fields, for example, 
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'political field', 'economic field' etc. (see Swartz et at 1966: 2-4; Long 1968: 9). 
The concept proved efficient in handling situations where one is not dealing with 
an integrated cultural system but with one in which quite disparate systems of belief 
may exist (Long 1968: 9, quoting Mitchell 1960). This basis allowed further elabor-
ation of the concept and its use to depict sets of relationships between actors, 
including activities, resources and values utilised in attempting to achieve particular 
goals, which implies a degree of common commitment to rules or values that 
defines appropriate and inappropriate modes of social action (Long 1989: 243 n7). 
In other words, one could consider a sphere of social practice as a social field, which 
Bourdieu, comparing the notion with a game field, describes as the ensemble made 
up by the area of the game, the rules of the game, the stakes etc. (1980: 112) and I 
would add, following Palumbo (1987: 32), the 'stakeholders' (not forgetting that 
all the stakes and stakeholders of a social field are not necessarily physically present 
at any given concrete situation of that social field). Social fields are therefore 
historically constituted areas or domains of activity (endowed with objectified and 
embodied history and language), with their specific institutions and their own laws 
of functioning (Bourdieu 1990: 87). These laws are not, of course, divine laws 
imposed on the people involved, nor are they rigid, but continuously constructed, 
negotiated and manipulated by them within the range of alternatives available to 
actors within the confines of the general structural features mentioned above. 
Therefore, if a social field can be equated with a game field (a la Bourdieu), then I 
would argue that we are concerned here with a game of which roles, rules and 
meanings, though following some broad and historically established orientations, 
are not fixed in advance but differently appropriated and renegotiated by the actors 
involved during different performances and phases of the game. As a 
conceptualisation of a long and slow process of specialisation, the idea of field of 
activity remains, as Long puts it: 
'wider than what we normally mean by economic or political structure [or system] for 
it refers not only to those institutional arrangements specifically designed to attain 
economic or political ends, but also takes into account other kinds of relationships and 
values that may be utilised for the same purpose... (The concept) covers both the import-
ant structural features (which to some extent limit the range of choices open to individ-
uals) while at the same time, giving attention to what Firth (1964: 17) has called the 
'organisational elements' the processes by which individuals choose between alternative 
courses of action and manipulate various norms and values in order to justify them.' 
(Long 1968: 9). 
'Rural development', as a field of human activity, is indeed a historically-consti-
tuted area of social activity where quite disparate systems of belief coexist. In this 
field, as I already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the actual representations 
that people involved make of 'rural development', vary in time and space, and the 
struggle over its ideological construction among politicians, policy makers (of 
funding or intervention institutions, universities or research institutes), researchers 
and development practitioners sometimes takes the form of an opposition of 
'knowledge for understanding' as against 'knowledge for action' (see Long 
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1992). The major stake of this battle, as shown in the fights over the allocation of 
teaching and research budgets in universities, is to survive and remain in the field. 
But, first and foremost, 'rural development' is a normative concept, expressing 
a set of policy goals that assume the superiority of Western, 'modern* (or external, 
urban) norms, values, technologies and organisational patterns, over rural, 'tradi-
tional' (or local, indigenous) ones. Contrary to what Hall and Midgley seem to 
suggest (1988: 2), the formation of these prejudices towards rural people and the 
subsequent voluntarist attempts to change this state of affairs from outside, i.e. the 
very act of intervention (which in itself is another prejudice, an assumption that 
change cannot come from within) did not start with the independence of the former 
colonies, but much earlier during the colonial period. The declared intention was not 
initially rural development but the wise en valeur des colonies (the development of the 
colonies). Nevertheless, the logic was quite similar, namely, to bring the dynamic 
of local initiatives into line with the interests and perspectives of public authorities, 
and to reproduce the image of the state (or other agencies) as the key to develop-
ment (see Long and van der Ploeg 1989: 236, and also Daane and Mongbo 1991). It 
is through the putting into practice (intervention) of such interested and normative 
conceptions of well-being in rural areas (rural development) that a whole specialised 
and specific sphere or domain of human activity is generated and continuously 
reproduced. This, I call the field of rural development. 
As Edwards (1989) puts it, 'the natural consequence of a concern for technical 
interpretations of reality is that knowledge and the power to control it become 
concentrated in the hands of those with the technical skills necessary to understand 
the language and methods being used'. Similarly, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan 
treats the 'world of development' as a 'market' on which populism2 sells lots 
of goods. 'Development' he writes, 'has become a profession a market. In that 
profession, in that market, the populist approach... got largely institutionalised, and 
has produced an ensemble of rhetoric, practices and institutions which one could 
call the development populist complex' (Olivier de Sardan 1990: 479). I will later 
show that specialised language and rhetoric are one of the assets or bases for 
brokerage in the field of rural development. I will not discuss here the different 
specialisations that contribute to the reproduction of the field of rural development 
as this has been largely debated by other authors (see for example Hobbs 1980; 
Lassey and Lovrich 1985; Cloke 1985; Hall and Midgley 1988; Long 1992). It is worth 
noting, however, that what emerges from this literature is that rural development, 
as a field of human activity, is now largely taken for granted and that none of the 
disciplines of the social sciences wants to stay out of the field or leave it to the 
development economists alone. The following argumentation illustrates a coup de 
coude, a nudge, from the sociologists to get, or have acknowledged, adequate room 
for themselves in the field of rural development. 
'Although sociological involvement in development is limited and based on a poorly 
formulated notion of practical engagement,... sociologists do have an important role to 
play in the formulation, implementation and assessment of development policies. ...(They) 
have expertise in providing social information for development policy-making, assisting 
in the determination of the social objectives of the plans... Because of their training, 
sociologists are particularly sensitive to those intangible social realities which defy 
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quantification and objectification. They are also particularly concerned with the neglected 
aspects of development such as culture, the status of women and the subjective human 
experience of poverty and deprivation.' (Hall and Midgley 1988: 4). 
Not all sociologists interested (or involved) in the field of rural development are 
concerned with engineering development, with policy-making or assisting in the 
determination of social objectives of plans, though their works might be used by 
others in such perspectives. According to Long and van der Ploeg, 'focusing upon 
intervention practices allows one (the sociologist) to take into account the emergent 
forms of interaction, procedures, practical strategies, types of discourse, cultural 
categories and the particular 'stakeholders' (Palumbo 1987: 32) present in specific 
contexts and to reformulate questions of state intervention and agrarian develop-
ment from a more thorough-going actor perspective' (1989: 226-7). To some extent, 
though not completely, the emergent forms of interaction indicated by these authors 
portray concrete manifestations of what I call the field of rural development. Instead 
of this concept, Long and van der Ploeg prefer the concept of 'agrarian structure'. 
Let me quote them in extenso: 
the concept of 'agrarian structure' can be operationalised as composed of a set of 
interlinked human agencies involved in the 'everyday negotiation of the role-definition 
and role-enactment of farmers' (Benvenuti 1985: 225) and forming part of a wider 
regional constellation which,... we may call 'a regional system of production'. The latter 
is a shorthand for the complex system of capital, labour and socio-political linkages that 
develops historically between various economic sectors and activities and between the 
social classes and groups that are spawned by them. This system of linkages is dynamic 
and not simply determined by the actions of one dominant sector. It is continuously being 
remoulded by the struggles that go on between different individuals and social groups, 
and of course, affected by the ways in which outside forces impinge upon it.' (Long and 
van der Ploeg 1989: 238; see also Long and van der Ploeg 1988: 37). 
Basically, two problems with the concept of 'agrarian structure' make it less 
helpful for me in the present discussion. First, is its limited scope as indicated by 
the term 'agrarian' (related to agriculture), although the authors recommend that 
attention be paid to the interaction between different sectors (agrarian and non-
agrarian). This puts agriculture and related activities at the centre, making the 
assumption in advance that they are the most important for people living in the 
area, and in reference to which other activities are defined (agrarian and non-
agrarian) - one of the congenital mistakes (intended, at least at the beginning) of 
state intervention in rural areas. Hence, one should not consider the concept and its 
operationalisation without taking into account the context of its production.3 Also, 
the 'structure' or 'system' qualification attributed to 'agrarian' does not allow 
the concept to appreciate fully the flexible and dynamic character of the realities 
depicted, as clearly intended by the authors. Neither does it indicate that the struc-
tures in question result, in large part, at the instance of their emergence and/or 
reproduction from the interactions of the actors involved. 
The second basic problem I have with the concept of 'agrarian structure' is its 
attempt to set the researcher apart from the scene of state-peasant relations, thereby 
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neutralising or idealising the researcher's role. The concept does not seem to allow 
one to consider the researcher as a 'protagonist', not only in the actual processes 
under way, but also in some sense being responsible for how the other parties might 
work out their roles in the future. This is especially the case for policy makers and 
planners, who might, independently of the will of the researcher, use his account 
of these processes. While one of the major contributions of the actor-oriented 
approach in investigations of intervention and development situations is to recognise 
the researcher as a full member of the scene (see Long 1992: 10; Torres 1992: 110), 
the concept of 'agrarian structure' seems to place the researcher outside, watching 
the policy-makers, planners, intervention agents and peasants gambling on 'agrar-
ian development'. In contrast, in this book I need a concept that allows me to 
account for emergent forms of interaction between the particular stakeholders, 
including the researcher.4 The concept of 'field of rural development' seems more 
suitable because it encompasses those concerned with policy models (here I have in 
mind villagers and intervention agents, planners and policy makers), but also social 
scientists who claim to produce 'knowledge for action' (i.e. development econom-
ists, social geographers, communication scientists, sociologists and anthropologists 
busy working out tool kits for development intervention such as 'Rapid/Participa-
tory or Relaxed Rural Appraisal' (Chambers 1993) and the like, whether from the 
policy or planning and implementation side), as well as those concerned with 
theoretical models aimed at understanding processes of social change and develop-
ment. I therefore reject the point made by Copp, who suggests that 
'rural development itself will always remain unanalyzdble in a sociological sense and 
remain apart from any theoretical system. It is a rubric or a code word used by opinion 
leaders in everyday discourse to refer to a desired goal. It is not and cannot be a scientific 
term because of its normative nature.' (Copp 1972: 519). 
Contrary to Copp, it is precisely the manipulative and political use of the term rural 
development that makes the field of rural development an interesting field for sociologi-
cal research. As I indicated earlier, my empirical ground for exploring the concept 
of field of rural development is the local level, in this case, the context of a com-
munity development programme. As revealed in the discussions that follow, I do 
not feel fully satisfied with the concept because of the limiting scope of the term 
'rural'. But here, I base the conceptualisation of the 'field' on the language used 
by the actors involved, be they peasant leaders, village extensionists, high ranking 
officers in development intervention institutions, politicians, social scientists etc. 
Towards the end of the book, I will come back to this in the light of the ethnogra-
phy. For the moment, it helps us to have access to the annual general assembly of 
the cotton growers' organisation of Togoudo. 
The meeting sous l'arbre à palabre, the first ten minutes 
Togoudo, June the 4th, 1991. The cotton growers' organisation called Groupement 
Villageois (GV) is holding today its annual meeting for the election of a new board, 
the Administrative Council (Conseil d'Administration or CA). Thanks to the new 
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development project (Community Development Programme) that started in Septem-
ber 1989 with the arrival of the RDV (Responsable de Dynamisation du Village) in the 
village, this is the second time that the GV is holding an annual general assembly 
to elect a new board, something that has not happened in the past eight years. 
About 150 persons are in the village square, sous l'arbre à palabre, arranged in a 
semicircle. The participants are composed of young and middle-aged men and 
women, a few old men called Agba Ilu (in French les vieux sages, or 'wise elders'), 
and some children. Many of the young men present are said to be members of the 
local branch of a radical left-wing national political party, the Communist Party of 
Dahomey (PCD), while among the middle-aged men are the leaders of a few newly-
formed small peasant cooperatives for agricultural production, which they call 
GRVC,5 and most of the presidents of the 18 cotton markets6 of the village. Among 
the Agba Ilu are Tolidji and Goudali, two old men, each of whom argues that his 
grandfather founded the village, and hence that he is the right person to tell the 
history of the village and to receive the honour due to village founders. Four of the 
outgoing council members are sitting facing the participants, next to the five state 
officials present, among whom are the RDV (Responsable de Dynamisation du Village), 
the C/PACA (Chef Poste Action Coopérative et Alphabétisation), the specialist on 
literacy tjaining and cooperatives, and the RDR (Responsable du Développement Rural), 
the district extension officer who arrived after the meeting had already started. 
There is also the VNU (United Nations Volunteer), a man from Mali based in the 
village.7 We (Mouftaou, my assistant, and I) find a seat next to some middle-aged 
men at one end of the semicircle. We succeeded in resisting the offer made by the 
RDV and the C/PACA to come and sit with the officials, though they did not insist. 
It is 9:50 am. After the usual greetings, the RDV introduces each of the 'offi-
cials', each time interrupted by a round of applause by the attendants. Participants 
even request that the RDV introduces himself, and likewise the VNU and the other 
agents based in the village or well known to the villagers. This gives the attendants 
the opportunity to clap and to laugh each time someone is introduced. Then the 
RDV asks the President of the GV to take the floor and chair the meeting. He says: 
'Now, President, it is up to you. This is not our meeting but yours.' The President of 
the GV launches the meeting saying: 
'My people, I welcome you all and thank you, so many, for coming to this assembly. We 
will report to you on what we have achieved during the last year. Baba, our Secretary, 
will give you that report....' 
The C/PACA jumps from his seat and says energetically: 
'Perhaps you are used to doing it another way, but now this is howr we will do it: 
first a report on last year's activities, second a plan for next year, third the election 
of the new council and finally the miscellaneous.' 
Kossi, a young man, presumed member of PCD (Communist Party of Dahomey), 
shouts with equally strong conviction: 
'First, and before any of these things starts, all the other members of the outgoing 
council must leave the crowd and join the table in the middle. We want to be looking 
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them in the face while listening to their (ironically) «report on what they achieved during 
the past year»' 
The reaction comes from one of the Agba Ilu. Calmly but firmly he says: 'Do you see 
there enough place for the 15 members of the GV council?' To which the RDV replies: 
'Kossi is right! The normal way is that all the outgoing council members sit in the middle. 
Therefore, we ask them to come to the table. Come on!' The people indicated start 
moving slowly, a bit reluctantly, but it is quickly agreed that there is not enough 
room for all of them. Then the RDV says: 'OK, all right. We will leave them at their 
place. But if any one of them is called or has something to say, he will come to the table. Let 
us start.' Then Baba, the Secretary of the outgoing Adrninistrative Council of the 
GV, gets up and begins: 'We will report to you on the activities we have conducted from 
the 14th of April 1990 to June the 4th 1991 ' 
Within the first 10 minutes of the meeting, different categories of people present 
at the I'arbre a palabre enter the scene, to whom it is worth paying some closer 
attention. First is the RDV, who seems to act as the master of the scene. His remarks, 
that seem to be directed at the peasants, are actually more intended for the officials 
present. In the past, before the start of the Community Development Programme, 
a meeting such as the general assembly of the GV was held under the supervision 
of the AVA (the village extension agent) or the C/PACA (the local specialist on 
cooperatives and literacy training), and/or the RDR (the district extension officer). 
That the RDV invites and leads the present meeting is one of the sources of conflict 
between him and his other colleagues. Telling the peasants that the meeting is theirs 
and that they (which means the CARDER staff present there including himself) are 
only observers, is more to prevent his colleagues from taking leading roles in the 
meeting. At first glance, this remark refers to the current discourse on participation: 
'people holding control over their own affairs' etc. The RDV might mean this. But 
taking into account his own ways of dealing with peasants and his ways of taking 
over the direction of their affairs (as will become evident in this meeting), one might 
rightly suppose that his plea for the peasants to direct their meeting is more moti-
vated by his fear that his position in the village will be over-shadowed by the other 
staff, rather than by a willingness to leave the major role to peasants. 
Through his strong intervention, the C/PACA does not bring any bright idea to 
the meeting, and does not, in my view, intend to do so either. It is more a question 
of proving one's presence on the scene, and of indicating that he remains the one 
in the district whose job it is to inform peasants on the rules and management of 
cooperatives. 
As for the interventions of the so-called PCD member and the Agba Ilu, the 
motives are quite different. Though both persons address the same GV board, as did 
the RDV and the C/PACA, the targets are different. The PCD member is launching 
his strategy in line with the agenda of his political group, which aims to take control 
of the major institutions of the village. The Agba Ilu wanted to obstruct any action 
initiated by these young men whom some Agba Ilu now accuse of wanting to break 
up the village. 
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Social actors and battlegrounds of interests 
Before I proceed with the discussion, there is a need to break for some clarification: 
the 'common' concern over which the people seem to be arguing is the cotton 
growers' organisation. Within my frame of argumentation, does this define a field 
in the way I have defined the field of rural development? Surely not. The categories 
of people present at (or more precisely concerned with) this meeting interact over 
many other issues regarding individual and collective life in or outside the village, 
all of which merge under the term 'rural development', especially within this 
Community Development Programme: village infrastructures, problems concerning 
education, health, drinking water, sanitation, agricultural production, processing, 
trade, individual careers, etc. Each of these situations represents some concrete 
setting (as compared to the more fluid notion of field) in which, as we have seen 
within the first 10 minutes of this meeting, paradigms and/or resources are con-
tested. This is what Norman Long calls arenas. He writes: 'although arenas vary in 
their degree and idiom of 'publicness' and their formality, they always exhibit 
elements of antagonism (actual or symbolic) and incompatibility' (Long 1989). As 
a first approach to the problem, therefore, I would use the concept of arena to depict 
the encounter situations in which the field of rural development takes concrete and 
manageable forms for the individuals and interest groups concerned. But not all of 
those situations I have just enumerated necessarily exhibit or even contain antagon-
ism. For that reason, I will use the concept of 'ground' interchangeably to some 
extent with that of 'arena'. While an arena cannot be but one of struggle (be it 
open or veiled), a ground, as I will use it in this book, may be one of battle or of 
coalition between actors. The latter (a coalition ground) indicates complex processes 
entailing the strategic interlocking of life-worlds and definition of boundaries among 
a group of actors that establish the interface between a cooperating group and 
another one, postponing or preparing the struggle until the actual or symbolic 
encounter takes place. A coalition ground is therefore a potential arena. 
Within the field of rural development - and presumably within any other social 
field - a given ground or arena can veil or hide many others. The present meeting 
brings us onto the ground of 'peasant organisation' but we will miss the point if 
we try to understand the processes of the meeting by sticking simply to patterns of 
peasant organisation. In fact, though the first addresses of this meeting seem to 
relate to a sort of common concern for establishing ways and means for a 'good' 
meeting, where peasants might freely discuss their own affairs, the people arguing 
have very different objectives. For almost all of them, the stakes of the discussions 
are beyond the actual setting of the arbre a palabre and beyond the issues of peasant 
organisation. The latter seems to serve at this stage of the meeting as the playing 
arena for different, even conflicting, interests, which the parties in confrontation 
project and carry into and from arenas completely different from the existing one 
as far as the stakes, rules and even physical space are concerned. The stakes of this 
short conversation are not easy to grasp or to read, especially for someone new to 
the village and to the everyday operation of the Community Development Pro-
gramme. Only the intonation of the voice of the young man when he said 'their 
report on what they achieved during the past year' might raise suspicions. For the rest, 
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one would be far from thinking that a subtle and insidious fight was going on 
between the RDR on the one hand, and the C/PACA and the RDV on the other. The 
stakes here (and therefore the mentally represented/constructed arenas on which 
these actors have projected themselves while physically present at this particular 
meeting) are at least two or three, as it appeared to me weeks before the meeting 
and also afterwards. These are the reputation and job legitimation of state agents 
within the village, and the resources of the GV. Let me briefly discuss these stakes. 
Although reputation within the village and the feigned reverence given agents by 
the villagers might not seem much of an asset or gain to fight for, it is very import-
ant for the reproduction of the status of the extension agent in the village. More 
than for himself, this legitimating behaviour towards him is a kind of consolation 
to turn to when faced with disappointing situations vis-à-vis their bosses. For some 
villagers, the simulated inferiority and docility in front of field agents is mostly 
played by those who attempt to enrol the agents in their own projects, using them, 
for example, as intermediaries to gain access to external resources that they cannot 
get otherwise. This, in turn, might lead the agent to expect some reward (e.g. farm 
produce after the harvest, a piece of land to cultivate during his stay in the village, 
the buying of farm and animal products at preferential prices etc.). Let me give one 
or two illustrations from the cases I have recorded that fall under this unspoken 
contract between field agents and villagers. 
Unspoken contract between peasants and field agents 
After we (Mouftaou and I) made our first contact with a village man or woman, we 
would often visit him or her at some working place where we might spend a whole 
day, helping if we could, and talking informally to acquire first hand information 
on the way he or she managed their affairs and interacted with others. At least this 
allowed us to obtain a deeper insight into people's everyday lives than what we 
could get from interviews alone. When this took place on a farm, it might happen 
that a village agent would pass by pass by and stop. Most of the time, the latter 
would make some technical comments on the specific work the peasant was doing 
at the moment, or on the state of the crops or storage. We do not really know 
whether our presence stimulated these interventions, though in many cases the 
peasant would say, after the agent had left, 'but he has always seen this thing as 
it is now but has never stopped before to say all the things he has just said. He 
wants to show his bosses8 that he is doing his job well'. But these types of state-
ments might well be made to please MS or to ingratiate the speaker to us; in other 
words they could represent an attempt to enrol us. 
One day in May we were with a peasant called Ekpemi on his farm with his elder 
wife and four of their children. During the first part of the day, he ploughed a 
portion of his land which he planted with cowpeas while his wife and children were 
weeding the maize field, planted one month earlier. Later in the afternoon, they 
opened one of the three storage bins and started shaking and choosing the maize 
which they would carry home to eat. At that moment, the RDV passed by. 
The RDV had a short discussion with Ekpemi. He first asked about his second 
wife and made a joke about her being pregnant. Then he took a few maize cobs and 
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shook them in his hand and asked the peasant about what he sprayed the maize 
with when storing it. 'Cotton insecticide', the peasant replied. Then, the RDV went 
into a long explanation about the danger of such a chemical product that contained 
organic and chlorine material, that peasants have always been told to avoid such 
practices, and that it is fortunate that the active element of the insecticide he used 
was not phosphorus, which remains active longer than chlorine and was therefore 
very dangerous. Meanwhile, the peasant behaved as if he did not know this or had 
not understood the issue like that before. 
The second subject was on the sowing density of the maize field, which the RDV 
found too little. The peasant had explained to us in the morning that this was a way 
to manage labour and to cope with the overlapping between the first and the second 
rainy seasons which provokes high needs of labour at critical periods. Then, the 
spaces between two maize plots are planted with cotton before the maize is ripe. 
Therefore, he does not need to plough new land, which would require labour. The 
RDV knew part of this argument apparently. He said that it was economically 
wrong, that the peasants are lazy and don't want to work hard. Here again, 
Ekpemi held the same stance of the ignorant peasant. And when the RDV was about 
to leave, Ekpemi said, with a nice and respectful voice: 
'Cheffou'l (Chief) 'Have you remembered my problem? Do you want me to come 
tonight so that we discuss it?' It was about ox-plough equipment (actually a solution 
to his labour constraints) which Ekpemi was trying to obtain credit for and was hoping 
to get the assistance of the RDV.' 
Another case I witnessed concerned unclean drinking water which people used on 
the farm, and on that occasion, they pretended not to be aware of the dangers of 
getting guinea worms from drinking it. When the village agent demonstrated how 
one gets the worms, the few peasants present (in fact a household) simulated great 
astonishment and admiration, especially the man, with strong expressions on his 
face while repeating 'Hey!, is that so?, great goodness! etc' At the very time when 
this drama was taking place, the wife had just finished boiling water in the hut for 
her four year old son to drink. After the agent had left, I asked her aside from the 
husband: 
'But why do you boil the water before you give it to your child?' I did not expect any 
answer related to guinea worms and was surprised when she replied: 'I do this for the 
water I give my children because they might get guinea worms from drinking it. If you 
had ever had these worms, you would know that it is too painful for a child', which 
indicates that the relation between drinking water and guinea worms was well known in 
the household. Later, I heard that there were discussions under way with a USAID 
project about constructing a few drinking water wells scattered over the farming area. Of 
course, the closer a well is to one's farm the better. 
To come back to the meeting, not only was the legitimation of the C/PACA in front 
of peasants endangered by the RDV, but also his position as the specialist on 
cooperative issues for the whole district, which reveals the contradictory situations 
created in the organisational structure of the CARDER by the Community Develop-
ment Programme, including the positions of the AVA and the RDR. This contradic-
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tion was at the basis of conflicting situations between RDVs and RDRs in other 
places. Here in Togoudo, the RDV is a native of the same area as the RDR, which 
is not closeby. They speak the same mother language and, most importantly, belong 
to the same church. The former visits the latter now and then, especially during the 
weekends. All this gives the conflict between job positions a different character in 
Togoudo as compared to the situation in most other villages of the programme. 
As for the young men labelled PCD members, the stake is the resources generated 
by the GV and controlled by the board, whom they accuse of misusing the GV's 
revenue. The topic was at the centre of talks for weeks before the meeting, in 
various situations, and was sometimes turned into jokes at games, drinks and work 
parties. The intervention of the young man was quite clearly related to the project 
of a group of young, and slightly older, peasants to overthrow the board members. 
This was more clear to the participants than it could have been to the RDV or the 
C/PACA, Less than two years ago, they had already overthrown the Mayor of the 
commune during an upheaval. This was seen by some Agba Ilu as a sort of breaking 
up of the village, together with increasing the risk that the old men might lose 
control over important decisions concerning public life. 
Finally, the RDV himself was interested in the resources of the GV, since he relies 
on these resources for what he calls 'development actions' in the village. His 
strong engagement in the whole process was meant to secure these resources for the 
actions which he had more or less set in his mind, and that were important for his 
report to his bosses, rather than for any neutral goal of enlightening peasants with 
sound principles of cooperative management. 
For Bourdieu, 'every field, as a historical product, generates the interest which 
is the precondition for its functioning,., in so far as (interest) is what 'gets people 
moving', what makes them get together, compete and struggle with each other, and 
the product of the way field functions... The existence of specialised and relatively 
autonomous fields is correlated with the existence of specific stakes and interests' 
(1990: 87-88). 
What we already suspect, after a close look at the first 10 minutes of the meeting, 
is that the interests at stake are many, complex, and interwoven in such a way that 
the boundaries or identities of the stakeholders or interest groups cannot be easily 
drawn on the basis of some simple and/or fixed categories. Consider, for example, 
the case of the RDVs, the C/PACAs, the AVAs and the RDRs. Also, as we will later 
see, it is not possible to group all the young men, or the Agba Ilu, into the same 
categories. Hence, 'social categories' are not static categories drawn along institu-
tional or organisational boundaries. They are dynamic categories that are hard to 
grasp, both temporarily and spatially. Labels used locally to identify them are many 
and fluid: GV members or non-members (indicating peasant producers of cotton and 
non-producers), wise elders (Agba Ilu), young PCD members, inhabitants of wards 
x or y, members of pato-families x or y, members of markets x or y, GRVC (cooper-
atives of farmers), the akowes (the educated), the peasants, the CARDER, e t c ' The 
most interesting aspect of these labelling processes is that some people who are 
attributed a given label use the same label to refer to other persons. Social categories 
then seem to operate as a stock of available resources used in discourse and also as 
Theoretical perspectives 35 
a reservoir for the constitution of strategic (but also provisional) groups for pursuing 
specific interests. 
Although within categories there are personal alternatives and strategies, we are 
almost never faced with only individual interests. Neither are the people voicing 
these interests just individual actors. They need to be deconstructed into their socio-
cultural components and artifices. As argued by Long, 'the strategies and cultural 
constructions employed by individuals do not arise out of the blue but are drawn 
from a stock of available discourses (verbal and non-verbal) that are to some degree 
shared with other individuals, contemporaries and perhaps predecessors. It is at this 
point that the individual is, as it were, transmuted metaphorically into the social 
actor' (Long 1992: 25). Law goes somewhat further by mamtaining that an actor 
should be seen as an outcome rather than as an inherent individual or as some 
socio-cultural characteristics of the actor in question (Law 1991:12). In other words, 
the actor should be seen in action, which then raises the question as to whether the 
actor should be defined a posteriori, only (or at least partly) when the action is 
completed. In my view, the actor should be characterised before and after an action. 
His individual and socio-cultural artifices and components constitute, on the one 
hand, his agency (i.e. his capability of doing things in the first place (Giddens 1984)), 
while on the other, we have the circumstances that put him into motion. The first 
side encompasses the individual, social and cultural origins (or assets) of the actor, 
which Long refers to in terms of the metaphorical transmutation whereby the 
individual actor plays a role as social actor. The other side, without which the actor 
cannot be complete, is made up of all those other materials that make the actor-mix 
heterogeneous (Law 1991:12), and thus quite rightly, as Callon puts it, a role is not 
necessarily fully established in advance (Callon 1986: 210). Basically, these latter 
constitute the other actors' worlds, those on the scene with our actor, and without 
whom we would not have been able to identify him as an actor at all. An actor 
exhibits his acting agency in specific action-contexts, where he defines limits or 
constraints to action, identifies resources, enrols other actors in negotiated projects 
or simply fails to do so. The action-context does not allow the actor fully-controlled 
and rational decision making. It encompasses, on the one hand, factors beyond the 
control of the actor - the structural features that set limits to the range of alterna-
tives at the disposal of the actor - and on the other, the unpredictability of some 
outcomes of social interactions and of some individual decisions. In the latter case, 
there are also spontaneous and simple decisions that end up having a significant 
influence on the course of events. As Wole Soyinka puts it, criticising Senghor's 
rather passive philosophy of 'negritude', 'a tiger does not simply roar its 'tiger-
ness': it jumps, with its nails out'. And, I would add, in order to balance the 
agency-side of the actor, the tiger roars and jumps as it does because it is a tiger in 
the first place. As for the acting-context, I would say that the tiger can jump as far 
as it will but can never fly, nor can it fully anticipate the escaping reactions of its 
prey or the possibility of other predators or hunters hunting the same prey as itself 
or even hunting the tiger itself. The tiger cannot also be ever fully sure whether any 
prey is going to walk around in its area in the first place, to provide it with the 
opportunity to jump and show its tigerness. 
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In short, an actor is not only defined through his/her acting potential (agency), 
nor can his action be fully rationalised only in the acting ground/arena. Hence one 
is required to investigate the ground of the action, at the encounter, but also beyond 
(i.e. backwards and forwards in time). Defining the actor in relation to the others on 
the scene and in relation to the stakes involved points to a difficult problem of 
selecting or limiting the scope of one's research. As I indicated earlier, not all the 
stakes and stakeholders were present at the physical encounter of the meeting. 
Nevertheless we can already identify a few grounds related to ethnic origin, institu-
tional affiliation and prerogatives, career, farm practices and labour management, 
local politics and so forth. In other words, what we have here is, as Bourdieu (1981) 
puts it, a complex interlocking of histories, 'interactions between agents' disposi-
tions and (their institutional) positions'. The concept of 'field of rural develop-
ment', I contend, helps to maintain an adequate scope for looking at the complex-
ities of such social realities, while still avoiding artificial and arbitrary delimitations. 
This indicates, as shown in the present case, that searching beyond the setting of the 
meeting and the actors present is necessary for a more complete view of issues 
concerning the field of rural development in the village and within the Community 
Development Programme. 
Interested but absent 
Not many people in Togoudo seem to be interested in this particular scene of 
negotiation over 'rural development' (or 'well-being' as it is conceived of in the 
village) taking place at that moment under the arbre d palabre. In fact, among the 
2500 inhabitants of the village, there are about 600 officially registered cotton 
growers9 while not more than 150 persons are attending the meeting. Some partici-
pants say that such a large crowd is unusual, even for an annual election meeting. 
According to them, the reason why so many people came is the fact that yesterday, 
the announcer added that at the end of the meeting cotton seeds would be distrib-
uted to growers. This was important at that moment because there was not enough 
cotton seed available for the village. During the previous three years peasants in 
Benin had expanded areas cultivated with cotton in order to increase their cash 
earnings. This ran counter to national policy which emphasised reducing and 
improving production techniques in order to increase yields, for the sake of the 
ecology and because of the limited capacity of the SONAPRA factories (the state 
parastatal company that holds the monopoly of cotton processing and marketing) 
to process all the cotton produced. This increased during the previous five years 
(1988-1991) about 70,000-180,000 metric tons and to 280,000 metric tons by 1993 (see 
Table 5, Chapter 3, p. 67). SONAPRA also has difficulties in selling all the cotton on 
the international market. Yet despite this, more and more people are interested in 
growing cotton, and are expanding the area under cultivation, especially in 
Togoudo. One of the strategies of SONAPRA, as people in the villages understand 
it, is to limit access to cotton seeds by distributing only a limited amount to every 
village, and by delaying its delivery. Cotton seeds have therefore become very 
important to individual peasants. The idea of announcing the distribution of cotton 
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seeds was the RDVs. He wanted a large audience so that issues concerning the 
'development of the village can be properly discussed and as many people as 
possible would feel responsible for the decisions taken'. 
But not all cotton growers could afford to come to this meeting. For many 
peasants in the village, the period from May to July is a critical one, a period of 
heavy work, accompanied in many cases by a lack of food. The month of June! This 
is when maize, beans, and, to a lesser degree, yams are maturing in the fields while 
the storehouses stand almost or completely empty, depending on socio-economic 
situation, misfortune in previous months (post-harvest losses, sickness, funerals etc.), 
and on how successful one has been in coping with these events. There seems to be 
general agreement that the month of May begins a period of food shortage, to the 
extent that the Idaca name for this month (Ohanwio) is sometimes used as a syn-
onym for starvation. It is also the period when the new cotton plot has to be 
prepared, either by bedding the current maize field (if one wants to sow the cotton 
in the shortly to be harvested maize plot - within four to five weeks), or by plough-
ing a new plot. These land preparation activities go together with weeding and 
harvesting beans, maize, sometimes peanuts, and weeding yam fields, and in some 
cases sowing or preparing rice fields. 
Some peasants, especially those who are unable to mobilize sufficient family 
labour but have cash, take the option of hiring labour, but it is not easy to find 
labourers when they are needed. Even when labour is hired, people need to be there 
to make sure that they do the work properly. Others, who cannot afford to pay for 
labour, must do all the work themselves. Many simply do not have enough land 
and therefore can devote little (if any) to cotton production. They cultivate what 
little they have with food crops and do various other activities (not always related 
to agriculture) to meet the needs of their household. In short, this period is a very 
busy one for some categories of the population. Chocotheo is one of those. 
Chocotheo is a 30 year old married man with one wife and two children. He and 
his wife plough five small plots that altogether make up two hectares which he 
received from his uncle (his father died while he was still young) and various other 
persons. Almost every year by June, his storehouse is empty because his farm is too 
small and the soil too poor to produce enough food for the family for the whole 
year. Also, he earned too little from the cotton he sold this year to allow him to 
meet his various needs. His yield of 325 kilogrammes earned less than FCFA 25,000, 
which represents less than 10 percent of the so-called 'minimum guaranteed annual 
wage'. Therefore, he combines work on his farm with hiring out his labour or with 
retailing bicycle spare parts (which he buys from Nigeria or Cotonou). Last week, 
when it was his turn to receive labour from his labour exchange group, he brought 
the group to the field of a peasant from whom he had a maize loan two weeks 
earlier. His share of the labour exchange was therefore used as a payment for the 
food loan. 
At least for these categories of peasants, among whom are a lot of young men, 
this period is one of hard work. Hence very few of them are present here at the 
General Assembly of the GV under the arbre a palabre. Children are also involved at 
this critical period. Many of them do not attend school because they go and stay for 
weeks on the farm some six to eighteen kilometres from the village in order to help 
38 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
their parents. At the time of the meeting, many of the participants (if not all of 
them) had their children working for them on the farm. 
Today, 4th of June 1991, is Tuesday. Tuesday is rather incongruously called 
Satiday Gbomina, which means 'the Saturday before the day of Gbomina', the 
regional market, and is therefore considered as a week-end day devoted to feasting 
or resting. Nevertheless, Tuesday is almost never synonymous with a period of 
recreation for a large number of women. If they do not go to the farm to collect veg-
etable, fruits, wood and/or other farm products to sell in the market, many of them 
prepare products (wheat bread, peanut oil, different sorts of bean and maize cake, 
soap or cakpalo, the local beer made of millet and maize) to bring to the market the 
following day. From May to July, women perform these activities not just to earn 
money for themselves but to feed the family, especially when there is no staple left 
in the husband's storehouse. 
At some 300 meters from the public place where the general assembly of the GV 
is taking place, 25 year old Ochounsi, the wife of Chocotheo, has been busy for 
hours, baking bread with wheat flour in her locally-made clay oven. She obtains the 
flour on credit and therefore pays a much higher price for it. She uses part of the 
profit to buy goods which she retails in the village. She also has to purchase food 
for the family, enough for the whole week, if what she earns is sufficient. 
Not far from there, Rosalie, assisted by four women, is kneading an enormous 
quantity of peanut dough which she will transform into peanut oil and kluiklui 
(peanut cake) for tomorrow. The work started yesterday and will take the whole day 
and part of tonight and tomorrow. One of the women spent the whole week on the 
farm with her husband and children, weeding cassava fields and preparing land for 
cotton. She came to the village early this morning with chickens and vegetables 
which she will sell tomorrow in the market, and also because she had to work with 
Rosalie to earn cash. 
In the meantime, under the arbre d palabre, the general assembly continues, 
apparently far away from these multiple concerns and occupations, but in reality of 
concern to most, if not all, of those people attending the meeting. 'Rural develop-
ment', here at the meeting, is operationalised in two terms: cotton and GV. But, as 
I show later in Chapter 6, one cannot have a complete understanding of the way 
people deal with intervention (the external definition of 'rural development' and 
well-being) if one does not acknowledge the alternative, the connected but more 
independent and personal ways in which, in their everyday life, people like Choco-
theo and his wife, Rosalie and her four women assistants, the children working for 
their fathers on the farms etc. define and negotiate their well-being. 
Report, language and brokerage 
The Secretary is still reporting on the activities of the GV for the past year. He 
speaks a mixture of French and Idaca, displaying clear self confidence and a perfect 
mastery of all the operations related to cotton production and marketing and of the 
other activities of the GV. Most surprising is his sldlful use of the 'specialised' 
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bureaucratic language used in CARDER offices and by CARDER staff when discuss-
ing these issues. 
'Je vais prendre volet par volet': The report of the Secretary 
'We will present a report on our activities from 14-4-90 to 4-6-91. Je vais prendre volet 
par volet, (item by item) and you can interrupt me with any question you would like to 
ask. Otherwise, the questions will come after I give the whole picture. First, I will talk 
about seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs. 
We received: 
• 78,350 metric tons of insecticides for FCFA 7,443,250 
• 4,960 litres of pesticides for FCFA 7,936,000 
' 24 ULV (Ultra Low Volume sprayers) for FCFA 384,000 
• 570 kilogrammes of maize seeds for FCFA 99,750 
Total: FCFA 15,863,000 
'Difficultés rencontrées' (difficulties encountered): Between the secretaries in charge of 
the markets and me, there was no problem as to the distribution of the inputs (seeds, 
fertilizers). But between these secretaries and the peasants, there were problems. Inputs 
were not distributed on time, nor adequately. Also, peasants did not go to the secretaries 
to get their share of inputs. 
'Second, the marketing of cotton: We sold 676.17 metric tons of cotton, its gross value 
being FCFA 67,610,000. When we delivered the cotton to the factory, we had a surplus 
weight of 12,839 metric tons. As for our net income in the village, after the input costs 
were deducted, it amounted to FCFA 51,749,600. 
"The difficulties here were that we were not paid on time, which caused us losses by 
delaying our individual programmes. Moreover, some people sold their cotton in different 
markets to those from which they received the inputs, which made it very difficult for us 
to get back their debt for the inputs. Also, some peasants were paid more than they really 
earned from the cotton they sold, which provoked many disagreements. Other farmers 
could not be paid and therefore felt angry and frustrated. In those cases, we had to check 
the situation of the whole market and had to go to CARDER and SONAPRA's offices 
before we could repair the harm. ' 
And he continues, 'volet par volet' as he promised and ends with the literacy 
programme and the balance sheet of the GV. 
Discourse, rhetoric and development language 
I should emphasize that in their introductory addresses to the presentation of the 
Secretary, neither the President of the GV, nor the CARDER specialist of cooper-
atives mentioned the rubric 'difficultés rencontrées', but the GV Secretary does, 
which is typical of meetings at CARDER offices. The structure of the speech of the 
Secretary reveals a successful attempt to adopt bureaucratic schemes of presentation. 
Through this almost perfect reproduction of the language used at the lower level of 
the rural development bureaucracies in Benin, Baba demonstrates to both peasants 
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and officials the powerful position he is attempting to allocate himself and secure 
legitimation for in this cotton connection. It is not a plea to be assimilated to any 
category of bureaucrat, though it might sound so to some peasants and observers. 
According to Bourdieu, one practical function of the linguistic habitus is the com-
munication of identity through language style; the mastery of the 'authorised 
language' may yield a profit in terms of authority or distinction, since language 
'represents, manifests and symbolises authority' (Bourdieu 1982: 103-105, quoted 
by DeBernardi 1994: 875). As a specific field of social interaction, the field of rural 
development generates specific languages that contribute to some extent to the 
structuration of the field. Indeed, the roles social actors are legitimised or entrusted 
to play in different grounds and arenas of the field partly depend on their degree 
of mastery of the languages and of the material and symbolic elements that under-
pin the languages, which are developed and reproduced through time within the 
processes of intervention. 
Some authors have suggested that there are different kinds of development 
language: a normative language which originates from institutions (at policy-making 
level, through the modelling of reality, for affecting the agency and practices of 
clients); and an operational language that stems from development practice (the 
idioms, vocabularies and tropes) that are generated in the process of reshaping 
policy through practice (Arce 1994:5-6). Olivier de Sardan makes a slightly different 
differentiation when he distinguishes different dialects resulting from synchronic 
cleavages between 'schools', and diachronic cleavages between 'fashions' or 
'modes'. He argues that development language, though directed to the intervened, 
concerns only the intervenors and their own reproduction as social categories, and 
that even the operational form of development language does not communicate with 
the linguistic framework of the intervened, thereby producing the need for broker-
age roles at the social interfaces of development intervention (Olivier de Sardan 
1994: 4-5). 
In my view, the discourse produced by actors in various settings is determined 
according to the stakes and stakeholders present and reveals a compilation of 
various discursive practices manufactured during the institution's and actors' life 
trajectories in the course of development intervention. I would support the argument 
that an operational project language is different in its structure and even sometimes 
in its contents from a development policy language. For example, the notion of an 
'Integrated Rural Development Project' or 'Community Development Program-
me' is not presented to potential clients as an exact translation of these terms, and 
if it were, one can imagine it would hardly be of interest to the clients. Their 
enquiries then would be what is to be done and how, what can they expect (positive 
or not) and under what conditions etc. In their discursive attempts to operationalise 
the exercise, agents largely draw on previous intervention experiences (which they 
share to some extent with the clients), but also on their knowledge and experience 
of local culture. By discourse I mean following Wetherell and Potter, the actual 
production of texts and/or talks with symbols, idioms and references. In our case 
the latter are derived not only from development intervention/poUcy language, but 
also from the cultural and linguistic framework of the discourse performer (whether 
intervenor or intervened) developed outside of intervention contexts, though 
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perhaps related to issues of self-achievement and well-being. The rhetorical con-
struction of the discourse, that is the ways in which texts and talks are put together 
and which make a particular reality appear solid, factual and stable (Wetherell and 
Potter 1992: 95), or as Hauser puts it, the management of symbols in order to 
coordinate social action (1979: 3), varies according to the parties present and to the 
issues at stake. Therefore, the rhetorical constructions of development discourse 
(from development languages) are part of the social realities of development 
interfaces (i.e. the meeting places of different life-worlds and discourses, see Long 
1992: 270-272) and cannot be disconnected from the negotiations and struggles over 
boundaries, meanings and interests that make up these interfaces, in which stake-
holders, be they from local communities or intervening institutions, draw arguments 
to invest in the interactions. 
I would thus argue that, though development language (and practice) is discon-
nected from actors' worlds and everyday realities, the use of the language (through 
discourse and rhetoric) does largely draw upon the lifeworlds of the people present, 
and incorporates their linguistic assets necessary for them to take part in the actual 
negotiations and struggles. Indeed, they need to construct some concrete objects in 
their rninds (which they derive from existing cultural repertoires) on which to 
ground the discussions and the battles. The sequence of the 'first 10 minutes of the 
meeting of the GV and my analysis of it has already given some concrete 
examples, first, of the multiplicity of the discourses present at such social encounters 
and second, of how apparently abstract rhetorical constructions in a particular 
setting find relevent concrete ground in the everyday life of the individuals and 
groups of actors involved. This reinforces Olivier de Sardan's point concerning the 
importance of brokers at development intervention encounters - individuals able to 
draw upon many cultural and linguistic repertoires simulataneously. But it also 
shows that the discursive dimensions of development interfaces are much more 
complex in that it is difficult to define the borders between development languages 
(whether policy or operational forms) and the world of the intervened. Let me 
further illustrate this point with the case of Baba and his discursive performance of 
development language and his positioning for brokerage. Later in the book, especial-
ly in Chapters 5, 8 and 9,1 will return to consider specific contexts wherein develop-
ment languages reveal important dimensions of the field of rural development. 
Bridging gaps and positioning for brokerage 
Displaying a perfect mastery of cotton affairs in and outside the village (e.g. input 
distribution, cotton marketing, mamtaining contacts with SONAPRA, claiming 
growers' dues at CARDER and SONAPRA's offices, distributing cotton revenues), 
Baba reveals to his peasant colleagues and CARDER staff that they can hardly do 
without him. He appears indispensable to CARDER staff who care about sustained 
cotton production since that is the major, if not the only criterion, used by their 
bosses to assess their job performance.10 At this specific point, instead of opposing 
the CARDER staff taking part in the meeting (as they had on the ground of peasant 
organisation during the first 10 minutes of the meeting), the skills and actions of 
Baba in cotton production and marketing win their approval and play to their 
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interest, though interpreted differently by each of them: The RDV uses it to argue 
that the substantial increase in cotton production, coinciding with his arrival in the 
village, from 475 to 676 metric tons in one year, was the result of his actions and 
presence. The C/PACA always sees, in the 'good functioning' of the GV of 
Togoudo, an indication that he has done a good job for the past five years, while the 
RDR and the AVA attribute the increase in the yield (per hectare) to peasants 
adopting the technological packages offered them - an indication that the extension 
work (their work) was done properly. The incentives distributed to field agents in 
every district by the head office depend on the amount of cotton produced in that 
district. Within each district, every field agent is rewarded according to his grade 
and position in the hierarchy. Despite what they usually qualify as the stubbornness 
of peasants, Baba's actions contribute to sustain cotton production, which is 
'equally' beneficial to all the field agents present and does not provoke any dis-
agreement or struggle between them, at least not in this particular setting. 
Baba is also essential to peasants, for whom cotton is the main cash crop at this 
moment. For most peasants, the whole set of operations involved in cotton and its 
institutional organisation remains a strange world, with which they cope in various 
ways, but which they genetically criticise for the arrogance and cheating practices 
of the agents. The fact that there exists someone capable of bridging this gap and 
who, in some ways, takes care of their interests is, at least at first sight, engaging for 
them. It is on this ground of bridging the gap between peasant and 'outside' 
entities involved in cotton affairs that the secretaries of the cotton market and the 
Deputy Secretary of the GV (all of them new positions in the GV structure, inspired 
by the RDV when he came to the village) try to challenge Baba. Elaborating on his 
rubric of difficultés rencontrées, Baba shows the incompetence of the market secre-
taries and at the same time reveals his ability to settle the complicated situations 
created by these incompetent 'newcomers'. Elections are to follow the presentation 
of the report. Therefore, while his speech provides arguments for his supporters, it 
discredits his challengers, especially the market secretaries. 
After the introductory and legitimation-claiming addresses of the RDV and the 
C/PACA and the altercations between the young PCD member and the Agba Ilu, the 
presentation of Baba, the Secretary, though apparently technical and commercial, 
raises a ground other than those identified during the first ten minutes of the 
meeting. These had focussed on struggles more internal to the two social groups 
(CARDER staff and villagers) on the ground of the Groupement Villageois. Here we 
are at an interface where both groups seem to hold together, the main actor being 
the Secretary, speaking in the name of the GV council, using, as Law (1991) would 
put it, technical arguments to generate social structure. 
It is a characteristic of development intervention programmes to produce social 
discontinuities, segmented knowledge systems (Box 1989), communication gaps, that 
I have referred to elsewhere as structural ignorance (see Mongbo 1989b), and 
conflicting interests within and between the organisations and groups involved. We 
are here at what Norman Long calls social interfaces: those 'critical points of 
intersection between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where 
structural discontinuities based upon differences of normative value and social 
interest are most likely to be found' (Long 1989). In the case of cotton production 
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and marketing - within the frame of a state intervention - reciprocal misunder-
standings are a regularity. For this reason, intermediation between the different 
parties becomes necessary. Such intermediation does not entail a simple interpreta-
tion from one language to another of the issues at stake on both sides of the bridge. 
It involves brokerage that requires special competencies. In fact, for the various 
individuals, groups and categories involved (ranging from politicians dealing with 
development cooperation to the individuals and groups who are identified as the 
potential beneficiaries), a project in its daily operation is not just a matter of techni-
cal objectives as formulated in official documents and in formal presentations. It is 
a mixture of diverse elements - economic and political conditionalities, funding and 
financial procedures, aclministrative and bureaucratic formalities, technical packages, 
various types of material and non-material advantages, job opportunities - even as 
minor as night watchman or helper to the village project officer - new varieties, 
possibilities of having improved individual or collective facilities or infrastructures 
for the village where the project is implemented and so on. In other words, what 
happens is a complete dismembering of the project package, while each of the pieces 
that fall out engages differently (in time and space) with the various people con-
cerned. For example, in the case of cotton production, not all the social categories 
involved - including those connected to the village and the different agencies right 
up to the Minister of Rural Development - are equally interested in the numerous 
elements that go to make up cotton production - the supply of inputs, cotton 
production techniques, peasant literacy tjaining, market organisation, income 
distribution and processing. Namely, all those elements and stages in the process 
of cotton production and marketing that make up its biography as a 'good*. 
Intermediation here is a question of bridging the gap between social entities that are 
politically, economically and culturally distinct and that have different, even contra-
dictory, expectations. In the case of the GV Secretary, an important element in this 
intermediation is the GV revenue. It constitutes the most important contested stake 
between the CA of the GV (more specifically the President and the Secretary) and 
groups of peasants, and explains their persistence in wanting to take over from him. 
Let us return to the meeting at the point where the Secretary starts reporting on GV 
revenue and expenditures, which precedes the elections. 
GV revenue and expenditures 
The way in which the Secretary enumerates the various assets and liabilities of the 
GV is confusing and almost impossible for anybody to check, unless checked 
beforehand. Income for the past year is composed of savings from the year before 
(FCFA 410,610), subscriptions paid by GV members for the building of a maternity 
house (FCFA 424,000) and various fees paid to the GV by SONAPRA, the National 
Cotton Marketing Company (FCFA 773,223), the total amounting to FCFA 1,607,883. 
The expenditures included hosting guests, the restoration of the warehouse, 
transport costs of the Board throughout the year, desks and desk materials for the 
Secretary, literacy tjaining, various costs during cotton marketing, restoration of the 
water pump of the village and the various expenses of the Secretary. The total 
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expenses amounted to FCFA 1,584,477 which leaves a difference of FCFA 23,356. A 
strong sense of indignation erupted from the crowd. Then the Secretary explained: 
'SONAPRA paid us the expenses of the marketing and transport of cotton, which brings 
the total of our cash to FCFA 323,675.I must add that for the cotton we sold this year, 
our GV is expecting from SONAPRA a total of FCFA 2,410,577 for the various fees.' 
'Which will probably be spent the same way...', said someone from the crowd. The 
RDV then called on the three commissaires aux comptes, to give their appreciation of 
the Secretary's financial report. Two say they have no comment to make, that they 
had no way of checking his accounts. However, the third, Xakwe, who spent a lot 
of time, weeks before this meeting, checking the Secretary's papers comments: 
'It has been very difficult for me to check the accounts of the Secretary. First, he did not 
want to give me his books. When he finally did, he refused to explain things I did not 
understand. The RDV gave me some help. For the rest, I suppose that this is the oppor-
tunity for the Secretary to give a full explanation, because there are many expenses which 
I really cannot understand...' 
Xakwe first comments on the report in detail, demonstrating that there were 
irregularities in the ways in which most of the expenses were made. Then he argues 
the irrelevance of many expenses. The Secretary could hardly give any justification 
or answer. Xakwe is a PCD member. His group and many others seem very happy 
for his having given proof of the dishonesty of Baba, after demonstrating that the 
secretaries of the cotton markets were unable to do the job properly. Baba himself 
is apparently confused. From then on, one suspects that his chances of being re-
elected as the Secretary of the GV are nil. 
The elections: unexpected results 
By the time the elections take place it is three o'clock, and only 50-60 people are 
left. For hours now, the RDV has taken control over the meeting. He is heard to say 
'Give that question up! We are wasting too much time'. By so saying, he has just 
closed a heated debate on the amount that should be paid to the Secretary for his 
work. According to the agreements of last year, which he wrote himself, the Secre-
tary was to receive 10 percent of the revenue of the GV. Now the RDV announces 
very firmly that the 10 percent will not be calculated on the total revenue, but on 
25 percent of it. 
'If there is no other question' (which he does not really wait to check), 'I will move on 
to the elections. Beforehand, I thank the outgoing council members very much. They were 
not perfect in their work but they were alright... I give my congratulations to the 
'Commissaires aux comptes' especially Xakwe who was very meticulous and perspica-
cious in his control of the documents of the Secretary. He came many times to me for 
explanations. I thank him very much. That is how a Commissaire aux comptes should do 
his work. 
'Now there are new rules for the elections this year! The six main members of the 
council will be elected directly. These are the President, the Secretary, the Treasurer 
and the three Commissaires aux comptes. For each of these posts, volunteer candidates 
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will get out from the crowd and will stand here in the middle. The voters will queue 
behind the candidate of their choice. The nine other members of the board will not be 
elected that way. They will be chosen by the youth of the three wards, three young men 
for each ward, so that information can flow smoothly from the board to growers in the 
village. Please! One should not block the election of a candidate because of personal 
conflicts. Also, we have to be realistic and seek for efficiency. Not all the members of 
the outgoing board of the CA will be changed...' 
Protests burst out from among the 'officials'. The C/PACA reacted energetically 
saying: 'That is not the way things should be done!' Lots of participants were even 
more vehement. 'Never! Things will not go that way. Why now improvise new 
rules while everything was made clear to everybody last year!' The agitation 
continued for a while, full of general protestation against the RDV and the rules, but 
no-one attempted to suggest other rules. The President, supposed to chair the 
meeting, sat quietly in his seat. The RDV persists: 
'1 don't mean that you should reelect them all, but neither is it wise to remove them 
all, otherwise the GV will undoubtedly lose its efficiency. Now, the C/PACA is the one 
who will give you the eligibility criteria.' 
Willingly or not, the RDV has just dismantled what we might call here the 'opposi-
tion'. In fact, during the elections of April 1990, the rule was that the assembly 
should choose representatives for each ward. These representatives would gather 
separately from the general assembly and appoint the board from among their 
midst, supposedly on the basis of consensus. It was on the basis of these rules that 
the 'opposition' prepared itself for the present elections. Moreover, it had been 
decided last year that the present elections would complete the removal of all the 
former Board members, when everybody, including the RDV, was convinced that 
the whole board was corrupt. It is worth giving a short account of these agreements 
as they were achieved in 1990. 
By 1990, it was generally acknowledged in the village that the former CA cheated 
the farmers too much, especially over the marketing of cotton. But for the 1989/1990 
cropping season things were different. Cotton marketing in the village took place 
early in 1990 when most school and university students native to the village were 
at home. There had been general strikes that went on for months due to the tense 
political situation. Most of these students were said to be active in the PCD. They 
organised themselves in small groups, and controlled all the 15 cotton markets 
existing at the time in the village. Their objective was to ensure that the GV board 
members in charge of the operations informed every grower of the exact amount of 
cotton they had sold. Market secretaries were appointed to supervise the operations 
to the end. The RDV took an active part in this movement. He had then been in the 
village for a month and did not have a good foothold in the GV. While the students 
were criticising the board members for their practices, the RDV suggested that what 
was needed was a training session, so that people would know how such an 
organisation was supposed to operate. This would not be difficult to organise as it 
was, he claimed, exactly what he was trained for (i.e. four years training at the Pan-
African Centre for Cooperative Training in Cotonou). So right at the end of the 
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marketing period he organised a so-called training session for all the CA, the market 
teams and the GV members, on cooperative matters and on the bylaws of the GV. 
Regulations were proposed by the RDV for running the CA. Concerning the 
expenses it was decided that the Secretary would be paid ten percent of the GV 
revenue for the work he did for the GV. The other CA members would be refunded 
for their expenses on GV activities and the rest of the earnings of the GV would be 
used for public works in the village. Such an agreement was of course in the 
interests of the RDV who spent a lot of time trying to convince the CA to spend GV 
revenues on village infrastructure. 
During the same tjaining session, when participants learnt that there should be 
general elections every year, most of them requested one. A general assembly was 
then held during which the CA members were asked to give a clear account of their 
five years of management (i.e. since the arrival of Baba, the Secretary) which they 
could not do. People decided therefore to change them all except the Secretary. He 
held all the secrets of the GV, which he needed to pass on progressively to some-
body else before he left. A few weeks later, some of the participants at that meeting 
explained: 
'We did just as people did at the National Conference;11 we removed the whole govern-
ment except one member (the Secretary) to whom we appointed a deputy. The Secretary 
must introduce Ms deputy to the various affairs of the GV just as Kerekou (the Benin 
President) will introduce Soglo (the Prime Minister appointed by the National Confer-
ence) to the various affairs of the country. Then at the next general assembly, the 
Secretary will be dismissed and the deputy will take over, just as Soglo will take over 
from Kerekou.' 
The elections in 1990 were subjected to hard negotiations. Some Agba Ilu, some 
individual big producers, young PCD members as an organised group, and the RDV 
were selected by the participants in the meeting as representatives of each ward and 
were asked to appoint the CA board from their amidst. PCD members forced 
themselves onto this electoral body and took a leading role in the discussions. PCD 
members said they wanted to occupy all the posts on the board, arguing that they 
were the ones who instigated all the changes, that they wanted to make sure that 
GV revenues profited the whole village and that they were the only group capable 
of ensuring this. These were difficult discussions. None of them could be elected 
President because it was generally admitted that candidates to this post must yield 
at least three metric tons of cotton, which they were all too young to achieve. 
Finally, it was agreed that they would have half of the posts, including the post of 
Deputy Secretary and that of the Commissaire aux comptes. 
Those were the dispositions that guided the preparations of the people who 
wanted to 'overthrow' the CA. Days before the meeting, PCD activists met in 
secret at night to determine their strategy. My assistant managed to follow some of 
these meetings. Part of the strategy adopted was that there would be a clear demon-
stration of the malpractice of the Secretary in order for the new board to justify 
throwing out Baba. PCD members were prepared to influence the composition of 
the electing body, but the young activists were aware, or seemed to accept, that the 
post of President was out of their reach. Another group, less structured than the 
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PCD group and headed by two GRVC leaders, Tinkpo and Ekpemi, were also 
critical of the President, and had also promised to remove him from the board. They 
lived in two of the three wards of Togoudo and were sure they could count on the 
loyalty of most of the delegates from these wards to elect them onto the group that 
would appoint the new board. They relied partly on family relations, but mostly on 
the fact that the people (or their fathers) in their wards had obtained the land they 
were cultivating thanks to the mediation of Tinkpo and Ekpemi's parents. 
These, then, were the main social actors in this game. None had expected the 
possibility of a direct and open vote by all the participants. Their plan was to eject 
Baba from the board, accusing him publicly of dishonesty. As for the President 
against whom they had no such 'convincing evidence', they expected to reduce 
his power to a minority voice within the elected board. However, they knew that 
they could not exert such control over the elections if these were conducted by a 
direct vote as now suggested by the RDV. Thus, despite their protests, and ignoring 
all the weak attempts to propose counter rules, the RDV requested the C/PACA to 
read out the eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria are as follow: 
1 Being a good worker. Having sold not less than one and a half or two metric tons 
of cotton this year. 
2 Being of good morality, not having committed adultery. 
3 Being available and ready for hard work for the GV. 
And the RDV added: 
'We need a presidium of three persons to lead the elections: Two persons from the 
growers and one from CARDER.' 
In the end, two persons composed the presidium: the C/PACA and the Mayor of 
Togoudo. Nobody volunteered to become canditate for President, and so three 
persons were proposed, among whom were Dawe, the outgoing President, and a 
man proposed by the two GRVC leaders, Tinkpo and Ekpemi. 
'Do these candidates meet the ehgibility criteria?', one member of the presidium 
asks the participants: 
'That is useless!' says the RDV. 'And it will take too much time', adds the AVA. 
'Peasants know each other quite well. If any one does not meet the eligibility criteria, 
people will not vote for him. Also, we can check afterwards the eligibility of the one 
elected.' 
It turns out that Dawe, the outgoing President has the largest number of votes. The 
C/PACA declares: 
'Dawe is elected! May he come to the middle.' Then, facing the Agba Ilu, 'Old men, 
how do you find him?' One of them answers. 'We have a good impression of him. We 
agree that he is elected. Let him be the President.' 
Six to eight persons raise their hands. All of them except two disagree with the idea 
of having Dawe as President, especially Tinkpo: 
"This President is a dishonest man. He travelled to Banikoara in the name of the GV. 
Once back, he did not give any report to anybody. He just decided that everybody should 
pay FCFA 1,000 which he managed to withdraw from our cotton revenue. Also, for last 
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year's cotton marketing and without any consultation, he decided to raise the amount 
every grower has to pay to GV revenue. There is much more. We have had enough of 
him...' 
One middle aged man says: 
'Let's get serious! We like making too much trouble here in Togoudo. This man did not 
do anything wrong to us. Let us take him and warn him. If during this mandate, he does 
any single thing wrong, we will throw him out immediately and take another President, 
even before a year is up if necessary.' 
Then one 'wise old man' from the side of Tolidji takes the floor, apparently very 
angry and upset. He says energetically: 
'You the old men here are the ones to be blamed for all the things going on in our 
village, myself included. You are the ones who allow such disorder to take place in the 
village. You were there when these young boys (meaning the PCD members) started 
turning everything upside down in the village, and you said nothing. You even happen 
to support those misbehaving (an allusion to Goudali whose son is one of founders of the 
PCD branch of the village). This is enough! We, the old men, refuse the politics of the 
young folk. We want to maintain the former Board members of the GV. All of them!' 
At this point the RDV jumps into the circle and suddenly asks the participants: 
'This is the President who is elected. Do you want him as President?'. The inton-
ation of his voice conveys the message: 'listen you people, we are tired of long and 
fruitless discussions. Let us conclude this issue and move on to other things'. The 
old men and others queued behind Dawe shout, 'Yes! we take him', while the 
others keep quiet. Then the RDV declares: 'Right! He is therefore the President of 
the GV. Let's move on'. From then on, all the outgoing board members are re-
elected, the Secretary included. The 'opposition' seems to have 'given up the 
fight' after the unsuccessful attempt of Tinkpo to convince the meeting that the 
smaller cooperatives (the GRVCs) should each be allocated a post in the GV. 
Consensus, submission or consensual submission? 
According to Bourdieu, the very act of getting into the game (the field) is a subscrip-
tion to the 'meaning of the game', the collective belief that allows for consensual 
validation of its results (Bourdieu 1980: 111). Bourdieu rejects the distinction 
between conflict and consensus, arguing that in some 'real situations,... consensual 
submission is accomplished in and through conflict', indicating processes by which 
the dominated accept the reality of domination through an internalisation of the 
power structure, being, as it were, 'dominated in their brain too' (Bourdieu 1990: 
41). Discussing the issue of power from the angle of the power wielder, Villarreal 
contends that 'power is not a predetermined attribute which is possessed or not, 
but a fluid resource which is negotiated and used at all levels' (1994: 29). She 
argues that power entails a process of consensus negotiation whereby the power 
wielder wields power from others who yield power to him, while in this process, 
the power yielders win or retain some room for manoeuvre for themselves. But we 
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can also see from the foregoing processes that power can be grabbed and exerted 
spontaneously simply in the heat of the action, and not necessarily to serve any 
clearly thought-out interest: violence at the limits of gratuity, as in the age of princes 
and despots. In the present case, one can argue that the victims of this violence were 
the young so-called PCD members, the groups of Tinkpo and Ekpemi, and Goudali. 
But who actually were the winners? Was this violence exercised by the RDV (by 
imposing arbitrarily new rules for the elections and thereby restricting the range of 
alternatives left to the opposition) intended to yield the result it gave? And what 
was the particular project behind it? From my previous five months in the village, 
I knew that the RDV and Baba fought over almost everything, which would simply 
continue after the elections. And in the meeting, they clashed over the amount of 
cash which the Secretary was formerly supposed to be paid from the revenue of the 
GV. Baba was a close friend of the C/PACA, whom the RDV openly accused during 
his frequent disputes with Baba, of having facilitated the managerial malpractices 
of the GV, while the C/PACA viewed the RDV as someone stepping beyond his job 
prerogatives. After this meeting, the RDV appeared to me to be left with bitterness. 
I met him the day after the general assembly and greeted him, saying: 'Hey Boss! 
Congratulation for yesterday. The party was very hard for you. But in the end, your 
friends and you won it. Wonderful!' 
He reacted strongly: 
'They are not my friends and you know it very well! You were at the meeting and saw 
how we proceeded. Didn't things go very democratically? Anyway, those young men are 
lazy. One cannot work with them. They are keen on criticism but do nothing to build 
anything concrete...' 
At first sight, one might conclude that the RDVs ability to exert influence derived 
from his position as state agent and RDV in the village. But the room to exert a 
leading role was not just simply handed over to him in the name of his position as 
RDV. He first had to promote himself among the young PCD members and cotton 
growers as a specialist of cooperative matters. Then, he had to win over the 
C/PACA, the AVA and the RDR. In other villages of the programme, the RDVs did 
not gain such room. Also, by accepting invitations to various meetings called by the 
RDV since he was appointed in the village, the GV of Togoudo, as well as the other 
CARDER staff members present, seem to have, at least to some extent, 'subscribed 
to the sense of the game' led by the RDV. They seem to have yielded power to 
him, which he now fully exercises. I would say, following Goffman, that we are at 
the geometric intersection of actors bearing particular (and historically-constituted) 
social attributes (1972: 63). But I cannot fit into the present social situation a process 
of internalisation of the power structure (as argued by Bourdieu and supported to 
some extent by Villarreal in her treatment of 'subordination' in gender relations 
as a 'self-inflected condition') that would lead to 'brain domination' among 
cotton growers in general, especially the 'losers' of the present events to the RDV, 
or more broadly, to the organisational set up of the Community Development 
Programme. In other words, I wonder how self-inflicted were the results of the 
elections on the 'losers'. These issues will be discussed in the following chapters, 
where I explore the ways in which the 'losers', but also the RDV and the Secre-
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tary, operate with this 'consensus' in their everyday life after the elections. This 
case, and others, allow me to examine the role of consensus-making in the reproduc-
tion of rural development intervention and therefore in the reproduction of 'rural 
development' as a field of interaction between the social actors involved. 
Conclusion: the field of rural development as an object of social anthropological 
research 
My concern in this chapter has been to elaborate the theoretical notion of afield of 
rural development as a general framework for social anthropological investigations 
into matters of development intervention. As I hope to have made clear in the first 
chapter, my theoretical starting point was the rejection of all kinds of pre-packaged 
theories or general models with which reality might be approached and explained. 
I argued that my 'theory-free' research engagement consisted of two threads that 
became determinant for the type of situations I was exposed to, the experiences I 
shared with others and to the orientation of the present discussion. First was my 
desire to contribute to debates on rural development intervention. Second was my 
methodological standpoint, an 'actor-oriented approach'. Undertaking research 
from these standpoints, I came to the conclusion that the best way to do justice to 
the everyday complex life realities of the social actors involved in development 
intervention required conceptualising these realities as part of a social field, a histori-
cally constituted area of social activity where quite disparate systems of belief 
coexist. Such a conceptualisation allows one to situate present-day interactions in 
their historical development and thus to account more fully for their dynamics. 
This position takes us a step further in the rejection of linear and dichotomous 
analyses of intervention situations, where roles (of either intervenors or intervened), 
rules and meanings (supposedly dictated by powerful political and economic 
external bodies), and fates (winners/losers, or one leading the game and the other 
condemned to coping with or adjusting to coercion) are determined in advance. I 
have also stressed that field of rural development is not to be equated with Bourdieu's 
game field, where the rules and meaning of the game are set and closed in advance, 
leaving the players with no more room for maneoeuvre than that of escaping the 
attention of the referee to now and then bypass the rules without being sanctioned. 
I have argued that the field of rural development is made concrete and takes on 
manageable forms for actors in certain physical or symbolic 'grounds' and 
'arenas' and in specific time-bound situations, where actors, engaged in its rhetori-
cal and practical use, coalesce with or confront each other on concrete issues, 
interests and stakes related to rural development intervention and well-being, 
perhaps (though not necessarily, or always) in rural areas. And I proposed that it 
is in these encounters that roles, rules and meanings are rhetorically and/or practi-
cally worked out. 
But I also indicated that not everything is possible to the actors involved and that 
the latter are not fully rational, anticipating strategic beings. For social actors, the 
range of choices are limited in time and space and the outcomes of interactions in 
action-contexts cannot fully be anticipated. There are two main reasons for this 
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which I have already evoked in the foregoing discussion but which I will also do 
larger justice to in the rest of the book. The first concerns the fact that the field of 
rural development is the product of a specific historical process that has given a 
general frame (and therefore limited range of choices) to the actual operation of the 
field. I tackle this issue in Chapter 4 (where the making of the frame of intervention 
policies and practices in Benin is discussed) and in Chapter 6 (where I look at the 
historical development of the settlement patterns in the village of Togoudo). The 
second reason, which I tackle in the next chapter, is that the operations in the field 
of rural development take place in a macro-context, whose elements constitute 
integral parts of the micro-situations of social interaction among the actors. In the 
case of the Community Development Programme in Benin, the context is made up 
of recent socio-political and economic developments not only at the village and 
national levels, but also at regional and international levels. 
Notes 
1 Throughout I use 'peasant' to refer to men and women involved in productive activities in rural 
areas, including farming activities for home consumption as well as for sale. I use this term even when 
part of the means of reproduction is already commoditised. Hence, 'peasant' should not suggest 
anything about the importance of farming activities within the multiple occupations of the actors 
concerned. Some peasant men and women cultivate only a very limited area of land, earning most of 
their living from animal husbandry, small processing units, shop-keeping, retailing etc., while others earn 
most of their cash from export crop (cotton) cultivation. 
2 He defines populism as a 'certain type of social relation (ideological, moral, scientific, political) in 
which intellectuals engage, at least symbolically, with the 'people' and which produces knowledge, 
or action, or both' (Olivier de Sardan 1990: 476). 
3 The concept was generated from the 'knowledge battlefield' of the University Department named 
Agrarische Sociologie van de Niet Westerse Gebieden van de Landbouw Universiteit, Wageningen. In English, the 
Department was called 'Agrarian Sociology of Non-Western Regions' of the Wageningen Agricultural 
University until the early 1990s when it became 'Sociology of Rural Development' (Rurale Ontwikke-
lings Sociologie). 
4 In recent publications, the authors have made more explicit their distance with regard to predefined 
and deterministic notions of structure by stressing the emergent forms inherent in agrarian structures (See 
Long and van der Ploeg 1994: 74-75; 80-82). 
5 GRVC: Groupement Révolutionnaire à Vocation Coopérative. These are the socialist cooperatives promoted 
by the revolutionary government (1972-1989) from the mid-seventies, in line with its Marxist-Leninist 
agenda. Before reaching the status of Experimental Agricultural Socialist Cooperative, Coopérative Agricole 
Expérimentale de Type Socialiste (CAETS), the groups had to pass through one or two major phases of pre-
cooperative organisation such as Club-4D: Club déjeunes qui ont Démocratiquement Décidé défaire leur Devoir 
pour un réel Développement de leur pays, and/or GRVC. As I will later stress in this book, it is important 
to note that GRVCs did not earn as much success with peasants in Togoudo during the period when they 
were actively promoted by the former government as they now seem to earn. 
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6 'Marches de coton' is the denomination used to refer to the physical places where cotton growers, who 
have their farms in the surrounding areas, weigh their cotton after the harvest. There is at least one cotton 
market in every village where cotton is grown. In a given village, the number of cotton markets allowed 
(which used to be the decision of the CARDER) depends on the total amount of cotton produced and the 
distances between cotton farms. Generally, a place is designated a cotton market if it is accessible for big 
trucks and if surrounding peasants are able to market at least 30 to 50 metric tons of cotton. 
7 A few months after the programme started, the General Director of the CARDER advertised the 
programme at the local representations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other international organisations, asking 
for their support. In response, the UNDP decided to appoint United Nations Volunteers in two of the 
villages of the programme. 
8 This relates to the status of the researchers as perceived by the researched. Later in this chapter, I will 
come to this point. Suffice it here to indicate that most peasants linked the hierarchy with the status of 
the working place and mostly with its geographical location. As our working place (the University) was 
located in Cotonou (the capital city), we were allocated a status higher than that of people of the 
CARDER, even those coming from the head office. 
9 The registration list of cotton growers that one can get from the Secretary of the GV and from the local 
extension agent does not give a reliable account of the actual number of peasants who cultivate cotton 
in the village. The peasants officially registered have direct access to free cotton seeds and to credit for 
fertilisers, insecticides and other inputs which they pay back when the cotton is purchased by the 
parastatal company in charge of this operation. Nevertheless, many peasants, especially women, young 
men, and small peasants grow cotton without being registered on the list. They obtain these inputs from 
other peasants who are registered. Therefore, the number of people cultivating cotton is always higher 
than the number of peasants registered. 
10 Here there is a need to clarify the apparent contradiction between SONAPRA's attempts to reduce 
cotton production (through a reduction of the seed available) and CARDER staff's concern for sustained, 
if not increased production. From 1975 until the early 1990s, SONAPRA had a monopoly over internal 
and external marketing of cotton while CARDER held a monopoly over all technical assistance to cotton 
growers for the production and marketing of cotton. As both CARDER and SONAPRA are parastatals, 
the services of CARDER in the field of cotton production is paid in cash by SONAPRA, according to the 
amount of cotton delivered by growers. As this rule has not yet been changed, despite the actual 
difficulties faced by SONAPRA in the early 1990s for the processing and the marketing of the cotton sold 
by growers, it was still in the interest of CARDER staff to increase production. The situation changed 
around 1993-94 when the world market conditions became more favourable to cotton (especially with the 
devaluation by 50 percent in early 1994 of FCFA, the local currency) and when SONAPRA increased its 
cotton processing capacities. 
11 See Chapter 4 for discussions on the National Conference and on related political developments in 
Benin. 
3 The socio-political context in Benin and in the 
villages 
Te souviens-tu béninois? 
Dans ton sommeil, ma foi, 
Tu as perdu farine et noix, 
Rejoignant le concert des sans voix. 
Oseras-tu encore rêver 
à la magie des vers enlevés? 
De tes désillusions couvées 
Tu n'es pas encore levé. 
Veille béninois, attends le voleur. 
Prendra t-ïl les roulettes du donnateur, 
ou le manteau du promoteur? 
Attention tu ignores sa couleur. 
from: B. Gbado (s.a.) En marche vers la liberté: Préludes du renouveau 
démocratique au Bénin. Cotonou 
Introduction 
The events presented in Chapter 2 raise several issues of which I will draw out three 
that are of central importance to the argument of this book. First is the powerful 
activism of the Communist Party of Dahomey on the village scene and the resent-
ment of the vieux sages of this strong pressure from the young. By claiming the 
ability to put tilings in good order in the village, these young men contest and 
challenge the former state of affairs, mainly the local state adrninistration, the vieux 
sages, and the CARDER. Second is the Community Development Programme as a 
policy 'innovation' and the confusing and conflicting situations it created within 
the former setup of the CARDER, with its classic activities, and within the frame-
work it had established of interaction with the villagers and with other state or non-
state organisations. The last but more insidious issue that became transparent from 
the meeting is the sharp increase in cotton production during the previous two 
years. Though it was not self-evident from the scene described, one can assume that 
the doubling of cotton production as a cash crop from one year to the next would 
entail socio-economic, environmental and political realities, affecting household 
labour and paid labour management, resource allocation and rights and obligations 
within the household, cropping patterns and land use systems at household (domes-
tic) and village levels, that need to be examined. These sets of socio-political and 
economic phenomena do not arise out of the blue. They are historically produced 
and cannot be fully understood unless one looks into the specific contexts in which 
social actors produce them. This is the task of the present chapter. My point of view 
is that one cannot understand the stakes that are present within an encounter if one 
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does not refer to the broader contexts of its occurrence. Political and policy events 
in Benin cannot be considered as city-based debates and events out of the reach of 
people at local level. Also, socio-political contexts are not just macro phenomena 
with few relations with the micro and daily concerns of actors. They are made part 
of the 'realities' of local actors, in so far as such actors, in their own ways, incor-
porate these events into their interpretations and constructions of the immediate 
environment of their social, economic and political activities. Indeed, as Knorr-
Cetina argues, 
'though much of the physical setting of an encounter may be potentially available for 
attention, most of it will remain unnoticed. Furthermore, circumstances of action which 
transcend1 the immediate situation are continuously called upon by social actors.' 
(1981: 11). 
But I do not intend to treat these contexts as external macro-structures to which 
local actors adapt in micro-social situations. Of course, major shifts in national 
politics and in state policy for development intervention affect the range of alterna-
tives that local actors can draw on in their everyday life. Nevertheless, these patterns 
become concrete only in situated interactions where they are selectively and strategi-
cally attributed meanings by social actors. For example, though the job attributions 
of the CARDER agents present at the meeting (the C/PACA, the RDR, the RDV and 
the AVA) could be supposed to have been described more or less clearly in official 
documents and from previous experiences, the actual setting shows that they remain 
under permanent negotiation and redefinition. As Brittan puts it, 'situated interac-
tions ... are partially structured by past definitions and yet at the same time 'always 
open' to reinterpretations (Brittan 1973: 84). In these micro-reinterpretation pro-
cesses, local actors make concrete formulations of macro-phenomena, thereby 
creating or constituting macro-structures through micro-actions. This is what Knorr-
Cetina refers to as the structuring practices of agents, whereby the macro appears to 
become an integral part of the micro, residing within micro-episodes (1981: 34).2 
Everyday life in Togoudo is full of these micro-episodes, as clearly illustrated by 
the meeting reported in the previous chapter. For example, by the very fact that they 
claim to be PCD members, the young men, in their own way, translate in the local 
scene the developments in Benin national politics of the previous three to four 
decades. We need, therefore, to look at such developments for a thorough under-
standing of the situation. Also in itself, the Community Development Programme, 
initiated by the Minister of Rural Development in 1988, is the result of the economic 
and socio-political changes in the country from the early eighties onwards. Neither 
the CARDER agents implementing the programme in the villages, nor the peasants 
they interacted with, had cleared their minds of their former experiences of state 
interventions. The challenge now is to account for these contexts of social interac-
tion, not as external environments but as socially (re)constructed. 
In order to discuss the major political developments during recent years in Benin, 
I will first present two closely related dramatic events. The first, the overthrow of 
the Mayor of the Commune by the young PCD members of the village, occurred in 
Togoudo, while the second, the peaceful shift from a military, one-party, Marxist-
Leninist government system, took place at the Conference des Forces Vives de la Nation, 
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briefly called Conference Nationale and referred to in this text as the National Confer-
ence.3 Thereafter, I will draw on relevant historical events and developments 
(colonial, but also now and then pre-colonial events) that help us to understand the 
general patterns and specificities of the socio-political context of the late eighties and 
early nineties in Benin. Hence, this chapter aims at giving an analytical description 
of the socio-political context in which the Community Development Programme 
emerged and operated. This description cannot be extensive since I do not intend 
to write a monograph on Benin politics but just a selective picture of the political 
developments in the country since the colonial period4 that are, to some extent, 
relevant for the village and CARDER situations analyzed in the book. 
Unrest in Togoudo and the overthrow of the Mayor of the Commune 
Early 1990 in Togoudo, a group of young men conducted a demonstration and 
overthrew the Mayor of the Commune, accusing him of corruption. They installed 
a new Mayor; a young man of 28 years who had dropped out of school in 1984. It 
was no less than a coup d'Etat in the commune! The young men claimed to repre-
sent the local branch of the Communist Party of Dahomey (PCD). Members of this 
group were aged between 20 and 35. Some of them were university graduates 
without jobs, others were former students who had dropped out of school while 
others were illiterate young farmers. These young PCD members succeeded in 
enlisting some older men in their activities in the village, just as they did during the 
1991 campaign for the election of the adrninistrative council of the cotton growers' 
association or the GV (see Chapter 2). 
Popular unrest and 'improvised' overthrow 
According to witnesses, about 200 young people took part in the demonstration that 
ended with the changing of the Mayor, on the 5th February 1990. Most probably, 
many young villagers and children had joined the demonstration for the fun of it. 
This is how a young peasant who does not consider himself as a PCD member 
reported on the event one year later:3 
'When he was first elected, the Mayor was not that bad. But soon, he forgot that he was 
elected by the people in the village, not by those from outside. Do you know B...? that rich 
man who lives in Whao? Everybody here knows he became wealthy because he is a thief 
and organises robberies of goats, motors etc. in the village and nearby towns with a band 
of lazy young men. He would lend money to peasants at a very high interest rates, which 
they would fail to repay and he would refer the matter to the Mayor who would then help 
him to seize the peasants ' goods (animals, motor, bicycle etc.) or, in some cases, to jail 
them in Gbomina. The other problem was that the Mayor often called on the police to 
arrest people and force them to pay the taxes. And we never saw what that money was 
used for.' 
The impôt de capitation was a tax invented by the colonial power to generate local 
resources for the colonial adrriinistration while accelerating peasant incorporation 
into the market economy. Cornevin, quoting an adrninistrative report in the early 
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forties, comments that the head tax collected composed some 50 percent of the 
budget of the territory, and thus one of its most important assets (Cornevin 1981: 
431). Starting from the 28th June 1899, every boy/man and girl/woman above ten 
years of age was requested to pay an annual tax, supposedly on income and called 
impôt or taxe de capitation. This was locally translated as 'head tax' or 'the sleep 
tax', which you had to pay if you wanted to 'save your head or have the right to 
sleep in peace'. Most probably, these local denominations have a link with the 
previous experiences of the tax system installed by the Dahomean Monarchy. 
Indeed, a similar annual 'head' tax existed in the pre-colonial Dahomean Kingdom 
which was levied on every head of household at the 'Annual Customs', a public 
ceremony organised every year by the Monarchy (Law 1995: 54, quoting Norris 
[1789] 1968: 87 and Le Hérissé 1911: 83-4). One can imagine that any attempt to 
escape the payment of this tax would put a heavy risk on one's head. From the 
colonial period, the levying of the annual tax by local authorities was associated 
with a lot of violence against the population. From 1958, women were exempted. 
The amount paid increased through time. In 1899, the tax amounted to 2.55 francs 
per year for both men and women living in Cotonou, Ouidah, Grand-Popo, Agoué 
and Porto-Novo, but was 1.25 fr for people living in other places. In 1942, it was 
56fr for men and 40fr for women while a day's work earned about 3.5fr (Cornevin 
1981: 413-14,460). In the 1980s this tax amounted to FCFA 2,100 (about US $10) per 
year. The amount collected was given to the District, which was supposed to give 
back or spend 10 percent of it in the village where it was collected, which people 
claim was rarely done. Therefore, district officers were generally much more 
interested in the taxes than were the administrative authorities at commune or 
village level (Mayor, Délégué), though the latter were often suspected of not 
handing the total amount collected over to the district officer. Nevertheless, the 
decision to use the police force to collect taxes was often taken or incited by the 
district, not the commune. In its political campaigns, the PCD recommended 
peasants to rebel against the head tax system. Among the reasons evoked to support 
such a standpoint was that the total amount collected in this system was insignifi-
cant while the process of collection was dehumanising and humiliating for the 
population and diverted many peasants from their activities, thus reducing the GDP. 
But it was maintained until early 1994, when it was discontinued, following the 
devaluation of the FCFA on the 11th of January that year. 
There were other taxes people had to pay, for example when needing an official 
paper at the commune. According to the young peasant speaking above, all these 
taxes had already been suspended everywhere except Togoudo - which was not 
completely true. He continued: 
'One morning last year, B.. and the Mayor went to arrest a peasant for a debt of FCFA 
12,000 (4,000 loan and 8,000 in accumulated interests on the loan). The peasant said that 
he had already repaid B.. his money but B.. disagreed and asked the man to show the 
paper (receipt) that proved he had already paid. In front of the Mayor, B.. started to load 
into a car the bags of maize and other produce that the man had harvested from his farm. 
The people present became very upset. It was the period when the schools were closed 
because of strikes, and therefore most of our students living in Abomey, Bohicon, Parakou 
and Cotonou were here in the village. Two of them were the peasant's relatives. They 
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started to protest. People started to shout that B.. should leave the man in peace and give 
him his goods back. Apparently, they did not intend to overthrow the Mayor. The idea 
was just to rescue the poor peasant from his tyrants. But the Mayor started to threaten 
them, saying that he would call the police from Gbomina, that young students were 
causing too much disorder in the village etc. Then from the crowd, some voices shouted 
'Let's overthrow him. He and his friend B.. are thieves.' That was all. It was very 
funny the way things went then: Under the leadership of a small number of persons, the 
crowd forced the Mayor to go to the commune office, and took the keys from him. It was 
a Gbomina market day and many people were in the village. The Mayor got visibly afraid. 
Suddenly, people started to shout that Orogbo would be the new Mayor. Then the crowd 
sang all around the village, showing Orogbo as the new Mayor.' 
The end of 1989 - beginning of 1990 - was the period when the whole state appar-
atus in the capital and major cities was in severe crisis and subjected to strong 
pressures from socio-economic and political groups both within and outside the 
country. In the main cities, there were frequently street demonstrations, sometimes 
with violent confrontations with the armed forces. As the head of the District of 
Gbomina later explained, 
'We in the District were much too busy with national unrest (meaning demonstrations 
in the cities) to pay attention to village agitations.' 
Orogbo remained as the commune head for ten days before he was arrested and put 
in jail in Abomey (the capital city of the Province). Later, at the beginning of March 
1990, he was released, following the general amnesty proclaimed by the National 
Conference. At that time, the former administrative apparatus of the state was about 
to be dismissed as a new Government was established by the Prime Minister 
nominated by the National Conference. For the districts and villages, it was a non-
state situation. The internal administrative apparatus was almost non-existent and 
it was granted no authority by the population. Therefore, when Orogbo came back 
home, he simply sat at the Commune office as Mayor. Later at the end of the year 
when the communal elections were organised by the new Government under the 
new constitution, he was elected village Chief and Mayor. 
The version of the PCD members was the same as to the sequence of the events. 
The major difference was that, according to them, it was not just a spontaneous 
move, a one-time, short-lived popular uprising that brought Orogbo to the position 
of commune Mayor. They declared that they were preparing for the unrest for 
several months and were waiting for the appropriate opportunity to activate their 
plan. They had already chosen Orogbo as new Mayor, in close agreement with 
higher level authorities of the Party. According to them, the overthrow of the 
Mayors in many communes (as happened indeed during that period) was centrally 
planned by higher PCD groups as part of the strategy of that party to take political 
power, starting from village level.6 Nevertheless, though one might agree that such 
spectacular action would have required previous preparation and strong moral 
support or political back up from some formal organisation, I personally did not get 
the feeling, having talked to many of these so-called PCD members, that their 
various agitations in the village (including the overthrow of the Mayor) were 
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inspired by political conviction or resulted from their cornmitment to an extra-local 
political programme.7 Though some of them were obviously abreast of the political 
discourse of the PCD, they had to make this agenda locally meaningful. Most 
importantly, it appeared that references were made to this agenda to provide ex-post 
justification of actions or standpoints that could have been motivated by more 
immediate or personal interests. The life itineraries of the so-called PCD members 
sheds more light on the process of their emergence on the local political scene. Let 
me therefore begin by presenting Orogbo, whose case is to some extent representa-
tive for this category. 
Perhaps back in my village I would succeed: the life trajectory of Orogbo the new Mayor 
The idea one gets when recording the life history of the new Mayor8 is that he is 
young in age but old in his family and work experiences, his travelling inside and 
outside Benin and in his social experience within the village. As indicated earlier, 
Orogbo was 28 years old when he was installed as Mayor of the Commune of 
Togoudo. He is married with two wives (in 1987 and 1989). His first wife is from 
Togoudo, while the second comes from H., a nearby village. He has four children. 
Orogbo was born in 1962 from a peasant family in Togoudo where he did his 
primary schooling (from 1973 to 1979). He attended secondary school from 1980 to 
1984 in Dassa, Glazoué and Save, the three main Nagot cities of the region. He 
passed his BEPC (Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle: the diploma obtained after 4 
years in secondary school) in 1983, abandoned school in 1984, and tried to find a 
job. In 1984-85, he took part in a test for the recruitment of primary school teachers. 
He passed but was rejected by the examination board because he was considered 
to be less than 18 years old and therefore too young to be recruited as a school 
teacher. He said: 
'In fact, I was over 20 years old but in my papers it was written that I was 17. The 
reason was that in 1983, when I was to pass the BEPC, I was 21 years old, which was 
said to be too old for this diploma, especially if I wanted to continue with school which 
I then intended to do. Therefore, I made a jugement supplétif that reduced my age to 16 
years. One year later, I had the chance to be recruited as a school teacher, which required 
me to be at least 18. It was too late then and too difficult to change my age again.' 
In 1986, he went to Natitingou (northwestern Benin), searching for a job. He did all 
kinds of work to earn money (shop and account keeping, private tutorage for 
primary and secondary school boys, working in a petrol station). He returned home 
at the end of 1986/early 1987, passed a test, and was recruited as secretary and 
manager of an experimental farm in Ouègbo (Southern Benin). In September 1989 
that project ended and he once again returned to the village. Since then, he claims 
to have decided to remain in the village since none of the things he has tried to do 
outside the village have lasted for long. 
When he was at school, he claims to have visited Nigeria more than five times, 
during the holidays of 1978, 1980 and 1982. There he bought consumer goods 
(bicycles, spare parts for bicycles and diesel mills) which he sold in the village to 
make profit. It was with that money that he provided for his school needs and 
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pocket money. Like most people of his age, he obtained his farming experiences 
from working for his father and for other peasants as a wage labourer in the village 
during the school year. When he came home from Ouegbo in 1989, he tried to start 
farming. 'But I don't like the work' he said. And he added: 
'Nevertheless, as everything I tried outside of the village bore no fruit, what else could 
I do? I am not as successful as the others in farming but I'm doing my best. Last year, 
I sold FCFA 35,000 of cotton. I bought a second-hand bicycle for FCFA 15,000.' 
As for his political and associative experiences, Orogbo said: 
7 joined the Communist Party of Dahomey in 1982 on the invitation of some of our 
village brothers who were at the University. One of them was the head of the project in 
Ouegbo where I had worked for more than two years. In 1984, I took part in the 
organisation of holiday courses here in the village, as teacher. During the mornings, we 
taught and learned while, in the afternoons we did what we called cultural activities and 
civic lessons, where we mainly discussed Benin political issues before and since the 
revolution of 1972.' 
Orogbo also played in the football team of the village and was the lead singer in the 
cinkunmE10 group from 1978 when he was in his fifth year in primary school. The 
group was said to be doing very well and managed to save FCFA 38,000. But the 
treasurer, an old man, used all the money for himself and the group broke up. Later 
in 1982 he initiated a Toba group (a rhythm quite close to cinkunme and originating 
from the same area). The group continues to function. But he had withdrawn from 
singing after becoming Mayor. 
In all these experiences, Orogbo is not very different from many other young men 
of his generation now staying in Togoudo and claiming to be PCD members. Most 
of them have no more than secondary school education, have failed in their attempts 
to work outside the village and are now trying, with many difficulties, to carry out 
agricultural activities which some combine with small-scale trade, handicrafts, shop 
and barkeeping. They generally have some practical experience from combining 
school life with cash earning activities and from having taken part in the cultural 
life of the village. Most of those who attended school had to travel to Dassa, Save, 
Abomey, Bohicon or Parakou for their secondary schooling. But very few of them 
became involved in smuggling with Nigeria or Togo as did Orogbo. Perhaps 
because of his political experience (on which he did not comment much), he was a 
step ahead of the others. Like most of his comrades, he claimed to have become a 
member of the Communist Party of Dahomey while he was in college. It is difficult, 
however, to appreciate how far their involvement in the PCD went, apart from 
naively taking part in street demonstrations. But Orogbo, being close to a high 
ranking member of this party from 1987 to 1989, when he was working as secretary 
and manager of the experimental farm in Ouegbo, might have gained extra experi-
ence and a deeper insight into PCD's agenda. In fact, 1987-1989 was the hottest 
period in the recent political life of Benin. The impression one gets from discussing 
with these young men is that, having failed to find (white collar) jobs in the cities, 
they returned to their village, hoping to succeed there. In fact, they had, of course, 
never been completely absent from the village. They had worked as wage labourers, 
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played in the village football team and were involved in cultural activities in the 
village when they were students. Along with the students who came back to the 
village during the strikes of 1988 and 1989, they organised control of the cotton 
markets at the end 1989 in order, as they said, to protect the interests of their 
parents, which ended up in an attempt to take responsibility for the board of the 
GV, the cotton growers' organisation.11 They were open to external discourse and 
'development' events, which to some extent contributed to making them a social 
category and which they seem now to use in order to grant themselves a significant 
role on the village scene. One critical period, which provides a glimpse of how such 
national developments became an integral part of the daily life of people in the 
village, is the period from 1987-1990, which marks the end of the Marxist-Leninist 
regime. 
The end of the Marxist-Leninist regime and the emergence of a new political 
discourse: The Renouveau Démocratique 
The Benin Republic has been through a series of dramatic socio-political changes, 
especially at the end of the eighties, that deserves close attention within the present 
study. As mentioned earlier, the major political event was the shift from a military, 
Marxist-I^ninist, single-party based government system to a multiparty regime. This 
was a long process that culminated at a peaceful and innovative conference called 
the Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation that later inspired political groups, 
activists and leaders in most African countries South of the Sahara.12 Some 
observers tend to attribute the process of political change that took place through 
the national conference in Benin to the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist block in 
Eastern Europe and the downfall of the Berlin wall. Though one cannot deny a link 
between these world-wide phenomena and the political changes of 1990 in Benin 
only should not reduce these fundamental processes to the side-effects of the failure 
of the Marxist-Leninist system in eastern Europe.13 Most importantly, one cannot 
understand the historical relevance of the changes in Benin, nor understand the 
process of appropriation of these macro-political changes at local level as resources 
for confronting subsequent economic constraints at regional, national and local 
levels, if one assumes that these political changes are simply induced from 'out-
side'. 
The conference took place from the 19th to the 28th February 1990 with 488 
participants from various social sectors: farmers, students, representatives of trade 
unions, local organisations, civil servants, NGOs and so-called Sensibilités 
Politiques.14 Also invited were Beninese from the 'diaspora', that is so-called 
important personalities such as those who had held important national or interna-
tional positions (all the former Presidents of Dahomey,15 former high officials in the 
World Bank, the FAO, ILO, UN, IF AD etc.). The Christian Churches, Muslims and 
the local religions were also represented. 
Within ten days, the 488 participants at the conference, supported by on-going 
street demonstrations, the media16 and encouraging messages from all over the 
world, had completed a radical change in the political regime without any blood-
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shed. Only the President of the Republic escaped the tidal wave, interpreted as a 
necessary concession for preserving peace in the country, as he still enjoyed the 
loyalty of the BGP, the best equipped body of the army. Transitory institutions were 
given a mandate to install all the institutions of the new Republic (Constitution, 
Parliament, Presidential elections, Government..) within one year (see ONEPI1990 
for the main reports of the conference). A new political discourse emerged whose 
key words were Renouveau Démocratique, and Transparence (Democratic Renewal and 
Transparency).17 
Mayor overthrown in Togoudo and the Regime overthrown at the National 
Conference: the rational and historical background to the changes in the 1990s 
The unrest in Togoudo and the National Conference were unprecedented events in 
post-independent Dahomey (Benin). Many economic and socio-political crises 
accompanied by street unrest had occurred since 1960, mainly in 1963, 1965, 1967 
and 1975 (see Ronen 1975; Allen 1989). Nevertheless, as far as I know, none was 
reported to have reached village level, with the overthrow of the officially-estab-
lished administration. The establishment of Orogbo as Mayor through demonstra-
tion, his election a few months later, and similar village and commune-level upris-
ings reported in the Mono and the Oueme Provinces, showed that there were 
fundamental differences between this economic and political crisis and preceding 
ones. And most importantly, it indicated that there had been profound socio-
political changes in Benin under the so-called Marxist-Leninist regime. As for the 
Conference des Forces Vives de la Nation, though the idea was not completely new on 
the Benin political scene, no such meeting that had been held before had resulted 
in such radical decisions which had been put into effect by the acting President.18 
There was popular unrest from 1960-1972 but it was city-based, most of it resulting 
from dissatisfaction by civil servants about their treatment. While the shilly-shally-
ing of the political regimes of that period motivated the decisive military coup of 
1972, they also bore the seeds of the dramatic changes of the early 1990s, as I will 
briefly outline below. 
From 1960 to 1972: Instability within the tripartite urban-biased political system 
From 1960-1972 Dahomey was famous for its political instability, resulting most 
from economic crisis and from rivalry and short-lived shifting alliances between 
three leaders politically and morally supported by three different regions, each 
dominated by an ethnic group: Porto-Novo region in the southeast dominated by 
the Goun, supporting Sourou Migan Apithy; the Abomey region in the centre 
dominated by the Fon with Justin Tometin Ahomadegbe; and the North dominated 
by the Bariba supporting Hubert Maga.19 
About the economic crisis Evidently enough, in terms of standard macro-economic 
indicators, Benin is a poor country. The per capita Gross Domestic Product was 
US$380 in 1992, with changes of -0.1 percent from 1965-1973; 0.1 percent from 1974-
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1980; 0.0 percent from 1981-1985 and -2.2 percent from 1986-1992 (CMEP 1993: vi, 
157). There are hardly any mineral resources. State income is principally made up 
of duties (amounting to 40-70 percent of the total income), most being taxes on 
imported goods largely re-exported through smuggling to neighbouring countries 
(Nigeria, Niger, Togo). According to BCEAO statistics of the early 1980s (Seho 1991), 
this re-exportation constitutes up to 40 percent of the activities at the Port of 
Cotonou. The single agricultural product on which political leaders could count at 
Independence in 1960 as an export product was palm oil. Soon (and even before 
1960), French research institutes discovered that the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and 
Cameroun had a better climate for oil palm than Benin. Other products such as 
coconut and coffee were also found to be more adapted to Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast. In the end, and starting from the early seventies, cotton became almost the 
only export crop for a country (see Table 2) that relied on agricultural exports for 
about 40 percent of its Gross Domestic Product and 70 percent of its foreign cur-
rency earnings. The trade balance was constantly in deficit, the value of exports 
never being more than 60 percent of imports (see Table 3). 
Table 2 The weight of cotton in Benin exports 
1961 1965 1970 1975 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
per cent 
Cotton S 13 15 23 29 29 57 56 70 66 76 80 73 
Palm oil+cake 53 73 35 20 4 3 5 8 3 3 2 2 1 
Coffee 8 3 5 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Brut oil 0 0 0 0 41 18 32 32 23 25 17 12 16 
Others 34 11 45 54 26 49 6 4 3 6 5 6 10 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: A compilation of INSAE, IMF, BCEAO, UNDP, MF and Customs statistics by ER/FSA 
(1994: 26-28) 
Budget deficits were therefore constantly high and reached FCFA 7.3 billion from 
1960-1969, despite a French contribution amounting to FCFA 6.8 billion (statistics 
BCEAO). These deficits, in fact originating from the colonial period (the 1959 budget 
having a deficit of 209 millions FCFA) were worsened by various factors. To list a 
few: 1) the returning Beninese colonial staff from West and Central Africa after 
Independence, 2) a very weak taxation system together with a general anti-fiscal 
attitude among the population, 3) the ever increasing amount of clandestine trade 
with Nigeria, essentially based on smuggling and various anti-duty stratagems, and 
4) the rapid increase of civil servants due to the resolution to take control of the 
whole administration; the number of ministries increased from 8 to 12 between 1960 
and 1971 and from 16 to 23 between 1980 and 1984, which mostly required an 
increase in staff and materials: the number of civil servants increased from 9,600 in 
1960 to 13,444 in 1966 (Seho 1991: 69-70), to 29,000 in 1980 and 47,163 in 1986 (CMEP 
1993: 9) with the cost of salaries rising from 2.8 billions in 1960 to 36.2 billions in 
1987 (Djacoto an Hodonou 1991: 9-13). 
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Table 3 Evolution of foreign trade (services not included) 
Exports Imports Balance Coverage rate 
FOB CAF of imports by 
exports 
Years Millions FCFA per cent 
1961 3,579 6,275 -2,696 57 
1965 3,367 8,491 -5,124 40 
1970 9,062 17,660 -8,598 51 
1975 6,790 42,080 -35,283 16 
1980 13,272 69,969 -56,697 19 
1984 72,822 125,903 -53,081 58 
1985 72,680 160,134 -87,454 45 
1986 40,140 139,300 -99,160 29 
1987 29,600 139,200 -109,600 21 
1988 20,440 151,200 -130,760 14 
1989 29,780 101,000 -71,220 30 
1990 31,700 116,500 -84,800 27 
1991 37,100 160,100 -123,000 23 
1992 36,800 171,800 -135,000 21 
1993 31,900 178,200 -146,000 18 
Source: A compilation of INSAE, IMF, BCEAO, UNDP, MF and Customs statistics by ER/FSA 
(1994: 26-28) 
Except for the period from 1986 when attempts were made under pressure from the 
WB-IMF to reduce the number of civil servants, measures taken to limit state 
expenditure were confined to taxing the already low salaries of civil servants, which 
caused street demonstrations and strikes that mostly ended up with the intervention 
of the army to 'restore order'. According to statistics compiled by Ronen, the per 
capita Gross National Product declined from 21,000f in 1959 to 10,000f in 1968, while 
the average rural income dropped from ll,000f in 1959, to 10,000f in 1968. However, 
in that period, about 86 percent of all cultivated land was used to produce food for 
local consumption. Ronen concluded that this situation helps to explain why there 
was no general famine, complete economic breakdown or mass exodus to neigh-
bouring countries (Ronen 1975: 152). In short, the popular unrest of the 1960s that 
led to military coups and political instability (six coups d'Etat and eight Govern-
ments) resulted more from the bankruptcy of the state and its subsequent difficulties 
in meeting the salaries of civil servants that were an important slice of state expendi-
ture, representing 60-95 percent of state income during the first six years of Indepen-
dence (1960-1965) and from 1989-1993, and some 40-45 percent of state expenditure 
during the same periods (see CME 1993: 221). 
About the political instability As for the political rivalry and arrangements between the 
three regional leaders that caused military interventions, once again, these were city-
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based and remained the affair of the educated urban political elite. As Allen argues, 
the 1972 coup was a response to the instability of regimes based on the politics of 
clientelism and the spoils that it had produced. In his first speech, Kerekou drew 
attention to the 'inertia, ... congenital deficiency, ... notorious inefficiency... and 
unpardonable incompetence as well as threatening national unity' (1989: 31 and 
132). In fact, political instability based on short-lived alliances between political elites 
dated before independence and continued after. Between 1957 and 1963, there had 
been nine different civilian governments (no military coup d'Etat), each resulting 
from a reshaping of political alliances within the electoral body - made up of only 
the few literates, who at the time were the only part of the population allowed to 
vote (Ronen 1975: 187). Rural people's participation in national political debates, 
therefore, was practically to nil. Moreover, during the colonial and post-indepen-
dence periods, village chiefs were traditional (customary, mostly hereditary chiefs) 
or otherwise appointed by the central administration, with barely any consultation 
with the population of the villages concerned. 
When, in 1965, on the occasion of legislative and presidential elections the vote 
was extended to all adult citizens, campaigns for legislative elections were locally 
conducted with an appeal to historical or regional awareness. This was done in such 
a way that support for a candidate was not necessarily because of their ethnicity or 
regional origin, but because of fear of dornination by another ethnic group, should 
the other candidate win. As for the presidential elections, they remained dominated 
by the three previously mentioned regional leaders, a tripartite political system 
based on clientelism, prebends and spoils that operated in the fifties and sixties, and 
which excluded people in the villages from national political debate.20 
The emergence of a leftist-marxist political rhetoric and actions 
The political atmosphere in the sixties had also provoked the disgust of some 
unions, of intellectuals and student associations, mainly the Dahomean members of 
the FEANF, the Federation of African Students in France. These leftist groups 
started political activities, literacy programmes, and peasant mobilisation against 
bureaucratic malpractices - especially during their holidays. Some of these activists 
had relations with and became the intellectual supporters and political partners of 
the junior officers who carried out the 1972 coup that led the country to political 
stability21 (even if only apparent) with no further successful coup until the 1990 
National Conference. One key argument in their political rhetoric was: 'We must 
eradicate definitively the old regime and the people, structures and ideology that 
carry it'.2 2 The regime's programme, delivered one month after the coup (30th 
November 1972), was jointly prepared by these young political actors (military and 
civilian) and bore five main features: popular democracy and participation, radical-
ism (on issues related to culture, education, and health care delivery), egalitarianism 
(against the French elitist and urban-biased education and administrative systems 
adopted by preceding Governments), nationalism (against excessive involvement by 
France in Dahomean affairs) and self-reliance.23 
In this book I am not interested in whether these objectives were achieved or not. 
What is important as far as this study is concerned is that it was the very process 
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of implementing this programme, together with the context of its emergence, that 
made the political changes of February 1990 very different from previous ones, 
especially for people in the villages. In fact, starting from 1973 and for the first time, 
village councils and village head (délégué) were democratically elected by villagers, 
with very little, if any, interference from the state administrative apparatus present 
at district level. Also, vigorous campaigns against the myth that intellectuals were 
the only specialists of politics were conducted (Les intellectuels tarés) while the so-
called feudal system and witches were 'hunted', all involving a large part of the 
town and village population, especially the youth and women's committees (CO], 
COF). In brief, even though a process of power concentration in the hands of a few 
(in the Central Committee of the single Party created in 1975) had slowly started, 
the regime seemed to have worked, at least in its first years, to break the myth of 
intellectual political elites and enlist people's participation in political debates at 
village and national levels. The most immediate consequence of this bringing of 
national politics to the village level in 1972 was that for people in the villages, 
changes in the political system could no longer pass completely unnoticed and 
mostly touched them in one way or another. To give just a few examples: the 
reforms of local administration in 1973 and 1982, of the education system in 1975, 
the translation of the constitution, available in every single village in 1977, the 
referendum of 1979, the creation of women's positions on village councils and the 
various legislative elections (with peasants represented in the parliament) and the 
presidential plebiscites.24 All these made people in the villages more aware of 
national political debates and therefore concerned with the events taking place from 
1987-1990 that ended with the overthrow of the very regime that occasioned popular 
political participation. 
Political divorce, economic crisis and popular unrest 
Quite soon after the coup (1973-74), a faction of the students and unions separated 
from the Government, questioning its lack of radicalism and claiming that, in any 
case, political power taken from the 'top' by a few 'putchists' could never be 
really exercised by the masses at the 'bottom'. According to them, the masses 
would have to achieve their own and authentic revolution, from the 'bottom'. 
Most of these people were members of the UCD (Union des Communistes du 
Dahomey) who would later form the clandestine Communist Party of Dahomey 
(PCD) in 1978. This fell immediately after 1977 when a group of mercenaries led by 
the famous French mercenary Bob Denard disembarked at Cotonou airport (16 
January 1977) intending to overthrow the Government. But the confrontation turned 
to the advantage of the Benin army who shot some of the mercenaries and arrested 
others. The rest of them fled.25 As a result of this aggression, the regime became 
radicalised and began strong repression of the clandestine opposition, whether left 
or right. Nevertheless, the PCD became very active and successful as an opposition 
party among students, unions and also in the villages, especially with the Adja in 
the Mono Province, and the Daca region in the Zou Province where Togoudo is 
located, but also in villages of the Ouémé, Atlantic and Borgou Provinces, basing its 
campaigns on ethnic identity and the local political and economic difficulties facing 
66 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
Table 4 Evolution of population in major cities of Benin from 1961 to 1992 
1961 1979 1992 
inhabitants inhabitants per cent inhabitants per cent per cent of 
of(1961) of(1979) (1961) 
Cotonou 78,300 327,600 318.4 536,827 64 458 
Porto-Novo 64,000 132,000 106 179,138 36 180 
Abomey-Bohicon 26,400 72,900 176 148,485 104 462 
Ouidah 17,200 25,300 47 64,433 155 275 
Paràkou 14,000 60,800 334 103,577 70 640 
Djougou 9300 28,800 203 134,099 366 1311 
Total 209/100 647,500 209 1,166,559 80 457 
Source: 1979 and 1992 census. 
Second, in the seventies, there was the oil boom in Nigeria and favourable market 
conditions for Togolese phosphate and uranium from Niger. These countries were 
then importers of food products from Benin (maize, cassava, yam, sorghum, pep-
pers, see Igue 1985; 1992). The world economic crisis of the early and mid-eighties 
badly affected these countries and reduced access for Benin agricultural products to 
their markets. The Nigerian case was special in that the exchange rate of the Naira 
(the Nigerian currency) dropped sharply, which increased the cost of Benin agricul-
tural products on the Nigeria market. This reduction of the regional market was 
worsened from the end of 1987 by the crisis in Benin cities where the civil servants 
were no longer paid regularly and therefore had to reduce the food consumption 
of their families. In villages like Togoudo where the farming conditions were 
suitable for cotton, the way in which peasants coped with the situation was to 
increase their cotton production. The marketing of cotton has always been 
guaranteed by the state, but its low return (as compared to other crops such as 
yams, cassava and beans, see Chapter 6), the delays in the payments to peasants and 
the malpractices of agents had always made most peasants suspicious about this 
crop. Left with few cash-earning alternatives in 1987 and 1988, most peasants fell 
back on cotton production, as shown from the statistics presented below (Table 5). 
One cannot sustain that the increase from 1988 to 1990 resulted from an improve-
the population, all of which were attributed to the Government. To a large extent, 
the actions of the Government since 1972 had made village people more open to 
national politics, which was favourable to PCD political activism. Also in the 
seventies and eighties, contrary to the case in the fifties and sixties, many develop-
ments took place that increased the incorporation of village economies into national 
and regional markets, and therefore exposed farmers to national and regional 
economic crises. 
First was a rapid increase in the urban population (see Table 4), together with an 
increase in school attendance and a rapid increase in the number of urban civil 
servants. One can only assume then that the demands for food crops from the 
villages increased. 
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ment of the extension system, since this was exactly the period of absenteeism and 
strikes. Nor can the price paid to peasants explain it, as it dropped from HOf per 
kilogramme in 1985 and 1986 to lOOf in 1987, was raised to 105f in 1988, dropped 
to 95f in 1989 and then was maintained at lOOf for the following three years, before 
it was raised to HOf per kilogramme in 1993, and following the devaluation of the 
FCFA, 140f in 1994. 
Table 5 Cotton production in Togoudo and in Benin from 1987 to 1993 
Years 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
TOGOUDO 
Number of growers (*) 130 300 400 450 600 650 788 
Total area (ha) 70 180 350 475 450 525 900 
Total production (Tons) 78 233 330 700 495 668 1105 
ZOU PROVINCE 
Total area (ha) 15,087 22,790 20,330 28,037 37,295 29,620 
Total production (Tons) 13,921 18,898 19,066 35,095 32,697 37,092 
BENIN 
Total area (ha) 68,836 97,623 90,451 122,793 151,317 128,817 
Total production (Tons) 70,202 108,752 104,660 146,406 177,123 161,595 280,000 
Source: Records of the GV of Togoudo and of SONAPRA 
(*) The number of growers as recorded by the GV is always lower than the number of the people actually 
cultivating cotton. The GV records the growers who have direct access to credit, which mostly excludes 
women, and other growers who are only interested in cultivating small amounts of cotton. These people 
arrange to obtain seed, fertilisers and insecticides from those who are registered. 
Finally, many farmers have adhered to the idea, forcefully promoted by the regime 
of Kerekou since 1972, of putting their children in school, which, in connection with 
the systematic recruitment of university graduates started by the regime from the 
mid-seventies, developed expectations of getting white collar jobs. The end of 
systematic recruitment from 1986 onwards wiped out this hope, so that graduates 
or drop out students had now to live at the expense of their peasant parents. 
Moreover, with the closing of the schools in 1987, 1988 and 1989 because of the 
frequent strikes, most students went back home and had to live their everyday life 
at the expense of their parents, with the latter losing complete faith in the future of 
their children, especially outside agriculture which was generally considered to be 
slavery. 
All the events mentioned above contributed to the fact that the socio-economic 
and political crisis of 1987-1990 was not just city-based but was experienced in the 
remotest villages. It made the changes of that period experiences which most 
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villages such as Togoudo shared, and the basis on which political activists such as 
the PCD members of Togoudo elaborated their arguments and actions. 
The regime of Kérékou was fully aware of the widely spread nature of the 
crisis26 and they tried to deal with it. In the mid-eighties they launched what one 
could call the liberalisation of development intervention. In fact, since 1974, most 
independent civilian organisations, including most student organisations, were 
banned by the regime. Very few private initiatives survived, or were allowed to, 
especially in the fields of education, health care, and rural development. However, 
by the mid-eighties, budget deficits were rising and official development efforts had 
enlisted little enthusiasm among the rural population, while responsible bureaucracy 
was suffering in incurable sclerosis. Then in 1986, having realised all this, the 
President appealed to 'civil society' to launch private rural development initiatives 
in collaboration with local authorities. In the wake of this appeal, many Associations 
de Développement at commune and district levels were registered (Attolou 1989). 
They were Non-Governmental Organisations that were supposed to involve local 
populations. These associations were initiated by civil servants born in the com-
munes or districts concerned, most of whom were now living in the major cities (see 
Daane and Mongbo 1991; Mongbo 1993). In some ways, this opening of the field of 
development intervention from the side of Government represented a sort of laisser-
faire policy apparently calling for individual and collective initiatives for local 
development. It seemed also to be an attempt to fill in the gaps of the regime's 
failure in this field, while setting ways for future disclaimers of guilt. 
Many other attempts were made by the regime to 'occupy the field'. The mass 
organs of the Party (OJRB, OFRB, CDR, UNSTB) attempted some timid actions 
(public conferences on the crisis, renewal of their boards and a call for new mem-
bers) to gain back the loyalty of students and trade unions to the regime and to the 
economic adjustment policy, no matter what it cost politically. Attempts were also 
made in a few villages by young men and women, especially by the OJRB (the 
youth organisation) to start cooperatives for young producers. It was in this context 
of economic crisis, political agitations and survival strategies launched by the 
various organs of the regime, together with the increasing passivity and sclerosis of 
the development bureaucracy, that the Minister of Rural Development, most prob-
ably in his attempts to 'occupy the field', launched the Community Development 
Programme. 
The insertion of the Community Development Programme into a dynamic 
socio-political landscape 
Before closing this chapter, I wish to introduce briefly the socio-political landscape 
existing in Togoudo when the Community Development Programme started. The 
most visible actors, the potential interlocutors of the RDV, were the various commit-
tees and organisations. In its policy of enlisting village people into local and national 
politics, the regime of Kérékou favoured the emergence of a large number of these 
committees. 
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As a result of the motto of self-reliance, people's participation, popular health 
and education, of the early years of the revolution, Togoudo had (as most villages), 
an association of parents of school children (the APE: Association des Parents 
d'Elèves). The board of this association was supposed to participate in the manage-
ment of the school and to enlist all parents in helping to provide the school with 
necessary working materials. The main issue this committee was concerned with 
when the RDV came to Togoudo was the building of class rooms for the children. 
In the mean time, there was a health committee established with the assistance 
of health staff, members of the village and the District. The cornmittee was attempt-
ing to build a village health centre (UVS: Unité Villageoise de Santé), especially for 
childbirth. Another committee was the Comité Pompe in charge of the management 
of the village water wells. 
The Groupement Villageois, the cotton growers association, was one important body 
on the village scene, as already indicated in Chapter 2. It was supposed to regroup 
all cotton growers in the village and was, in the period starting 1987-88, the local 
organisation at village level that had the highest cash income. Attached to the GV 
were 18 cotton markets which were the places where cotton was purchased, but 
which in fact consisted of the group of peasants who sold their cotton at that 
specific place. There were also the GRVC (Groupement Révolutionnaire à Vocation 
Coopérative) that were in a state of lethargy when the RDV arrived. These groups 
suddenly woke up and started requesting a 'voice' in the management of the GV. 
There were also women's groups, some of which were formed by the social 
assistant of the area before the arrival of the RDV in the village. 
A more recent group was the young men's cooperative called Coopérative 
d'Action Economique des Jeunes (CAEJ). It was established with strong assistance from 
the OJRB as part of its campaign aimed at 'occupying the field'. The state adminis-
trative apparatus at Commune and District levels, as well as the CARDER, had been 
requested by the national president of the OJRB, who was the Minister of Informa-
tion and Propaganda, to give all the support needed to the newly established 
association. 
Another committee was the Association de Développement. The State President's 
appeal to civil society to launch private development initiatives in their villages 
(which I referred to above as the liberalisation of development intervention) was 
heard by the natives of Togoudo, who founded the association for the development 
of Togoudo, with a development plan and, of course, a Conseil d'Administration. 
As far as the village administration was concerned, there were three wards or 
quartiers in the village. Most villagers could hardly identify the borders of these so-
called wards. Nevertheless, they were adjriinistrative units from which the members 
of the village council were elected, according to the schema used under the Marxist 
regime. As mentioned, the intensive involvement of young people in public village 
administration after 1973-74 had weakened the position of elders, especially in 
localities such as Togoudo where no 'traditional' (customary) chief existed (see 
Chapter 6). This situation was made specific in Togoudo with the activism of the 
young so-called PCD members. 
The groups of actors presented above were those with whom the RDV would 
most probably negotiate the construction and implementation of the Community 
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Development Programme. All the people involved in these various committees and 
groups were potential 'partners' in the village redynamisation programme, each 
of whom tried to secure the position that was believed to be to the most favourable. 
Finally, one should not forget that the people to whom we are referring have in 
various ways interconnected family ties, which make this specific field of interaction 
much more complicated to move in, to observe and analyze than it might appear. 
Nevertheless, when the RDV came to the village to start the Community Develop-
ment Programme, he too had to establish another committee!! as prescribed by the 
programme, which was called Comité de Suivi du Développement du Village, in short 
Comité de Suivi (committee for monitoring village development). At the meeting held 
to introduce the RDV and the programme, this committee was presented as the one 
above all the others, because all other committees and groups were working in the 
different fields that contribute to the development of the village (health, water, 
school, agriculture etc.), while the present committee was to be in charge of the 
monitoring of all development endeavours in the village. The RDV seemed to have 
the flavour of the potential bargaining during the introductory meeting. Reporting 
on it later, he said: 
' When I first arrived, people thought that I came with a bag of money to solve all the 
problems of their village. Everybody wanted to be in the Comité de suivi. Its members 
were everyday at my house. When later they understood that they were the ones to search 
for the money, and here in the village from their fellow villagers, then most of them dis-
appeared.' 
But contrary to what the RDV stated, these actors did not really disappear from the 
scene. A process of local (individual as well as collective) appropriation of the 
programme had begun. The implications of this for Togoudo will later be dealt in 
Chapter 9. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter, we were interested in understanding more about 
two of the issues that appear in the second chapter of this book: The heavy activism 
of some of the young men on the village scene, who presented themselves as 
members of the Communist Party of Dahomey; and the issues concerning the 
Community Development Programme itself. It had been introduced by the Minister 
of Rural Development and presented by the agents involved as an innovation in the 
field of rural development. I argued that these phenomena did not appear out of the 
blue and to understand them we needed to look into the socio-political and econ-
omic contexts that produced them, and how the actors involved structured and 
transformed them in the everyday micro-episodes of their life. 
I hope I have made clear that, as a social category, the young PCD members drew 
their resources (identity, political discourse, audience and practices) from local, 
national and international developments. To some extent they shared these with 
fellow villagers, and made them concrete each time they attempted to deal with 
specific situations and to change the course of events to their advantage. The 
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diversified nature of the political landscape in the village, on the eve of the birth of 
the Community Development Project, had developed historically as local appropri-
ations and manifestations of attempts made by the Kérékou regime to put an end 
to the elitist political system of the colonial and post-independence period. Local 
socio-economic developments linked to the national crisis, but also to sub-regional 
and international phenomena, especially the crisis in the world market and its effects 
on the Nigerian economy (i.e. the drop in oil revenues and in the exchange rate of 
the Naïra) and on Niger and Togo export revenues (from uranium and phosphate 
respectively) were experienced locally in household and village affairs. The very 
presence of young school leavers in the village without any clear prospect for the 
future had been part of the political and economic experience of villagers for the last 
two decades. 
Actors (be they Minister, state agents or villagers) dealt locally with this situation 
in their daily occupations. In that sense, the Community Development Programme 
was not just an innocent innovation in the field of rural development. Though the 
people involved tried to appropriate it in various ways, it was for the Minister of 
Rural Development, one way of 'occupying the field'. As for the young PCD 
members, in their attempts to succeed at home (having failed to make a living in the 
cities) they made use of the discourse and practices of the PCD, reproducing 
national political debates in the village scene. But as I also shown in Chapter 2 and 
mentioned at the begirvning of this chapter, the Community Development Pro-
gramme was to be inserted into an existing culture of development intervention that 
is, in itself, the outcome of a historical process. Hence we need to look at this 
intervention culture in order to understand how state agents as well as villagers 
tried to appropriate the Community Development Programme. 
The insidious fight between the C/PACA and the RDV, the specialised language 
used by the secretary of the GV, and the strategies established by some villagers and 
the RDV within the programme will become clearer after some insight into the 
historical evolution of state intervention in rural development and into the trajec-
tories and motivations of the actors involved in particular modes of state interven-
tion. These issues are the focus of the next two chapters. 
Notes 
1 Author's emphases. 
2 Author's emphases. 
3 This latter event is presented in detail in the Appendix. 
4 For more detailed analyses of different aspects of socio-political developments in Benin, see Ronen 1975, 
1979; Allen 1989; Decalo 1979; Glèlè 1969,1981; Mongbo 1991; Bierschenk 1995 and also Bierschenk and 
Mongbo 1995. 
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5 In fact, the following story is the summary (and the average) account of pieces of the event by various 
people (men and women, aged between 20 and 50 years old) on different occasions. Their common 
characteristic is that none of them claim to be PCD members, though some show sympathy to the PCD 
group in the village. Some even do not believe in or know of the existence of such a group in the village. 
6 Many other spectacular modes of unrest and coups were reported in the same period especially in 
Southern Benin. The most outstanding were in the communes of Avrankou in the Oueme Province, and 
Houin, Atchanou, Come and Djakotomey in the Mono Province. For the latter case, the PCD group 
overthrew two Mayors and replaced them with only one, prodaiming a restructuration of the local 
administration scheme. PCD members willing to discuss these events with me declared that the move-
ment was launched in June 1989 with the motto of creating power dualities (dualité du pouvoir) at local 
level (installing PCD administrative structures that would report not to higher state structures but to the 
PCD Central Committee). This motto is said to have been maintained even after the National Conference 
in February 1990. This seizing of power at local level was aimed at preparing the ground for a popular 
armed insurrection and the overthrow of the Government. Popular demonstrations were still organised 
now and then by PCD activists. During one of these (the 16 of September 1990 in Dogbo-Tota in the 
Mono Province on market day), the police shot Bernard Kpomassi a PCD activist and high-ranking 
member. It was said that more shootings of PCD high-ranking members were planned and that this was 
part of the strategy of the new Government to force the PCD, either to implement the final stage of its 
plan (armed insurrection) without further preparation, or to simply withdraw its motto and therefore stop 
street agitations. Apparently, high PCD authorities had chosen the latter alternative, taking into account, 
as some of them said, the state of local and international political forces at that moment who were no 
longer in favour of an armed insurrection. 
7 Here, one should, however, take into consideration the account presented in the previous footnote, 
according to which the 'power duality' motto of the PCD had been withdrawn after the shooting of 
Bernard Kpomassi in September 1990 by the police force, while I had started my research in Togoudo 
only in January 1991. If things took place as presented in the previous note, one could then understand 
why I did not get from the so-called PCD group in Togoudo any feeling of loyalty to a centrally-planned 
political agenda. As the agenda was withdrawn, one assumes that local actors were left with a state of 
affairs that required other appropriate and manageable forms of action. 
8 Orogbo did not want to say much about his political experience. Getting him to speak about his life 
history was not easy. Portions of it were obtained on separate occasions. It was only in December 1991 
when discussing groupement de femmes that he had just started with a few others that we could complete 
his life history. 
9 This is an act of a local court that gives people, who were not registered when they were born, the 
possibility of obtaining a legal birth certificate stipulating an estimated age, without a date of birth. As 
in the case of Orogbo in 1983, when people registered at birth for one reason or another, request this 
certificate at the local court, they obtain another age. 
10 This is a popular rhythm made from a combination of two calabashes poised on water, two or four 
maracas, a big gourd, a 'gong' and a flute. The rhythm originated from Savalou (centre of Benin) 
where it was played at funerals. Nowadays, it has become very popular and is played in many villages 
in central and southern Benin and in most schools all over Benin. A modern version of it has been 
promoted since 1977 by Stan Tohon (a local musician), who calls it The Tchink System. 
11 It is a regular activity of leftist student organisations to try to protect peasants against what they call 
the exploitative practices that go together with export crop production and marketing. Attempts were 
made since the early sixties to discourage peasants from cultivating groundnuts, tobacco and cotton for 
sale, these crops being presented as the channels through which 'capitalism, imperialism and their local 
puppets exploit peasants'. This discourse has served as an entry point to the villages for these 
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organisations and it is interesting to note that, in the hands of the educated village youths, it served as 
entry point for playing active roles in village economic and political affairs. 
12 After the Benin conference, there were popular requests for similar conferences in Niger, Gabon, 
Congo, Togo, Zaire, Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroun, Burkina-Faso, Mali, Sénégal etc. They 
were given various names: Conférence consultative, Forum, Séminaire national, Table ronde. What people 
wanted to achieve through these conferences was generally the same: either the regime wanted to escape 
the fate of Kérékou's regime, and/or the opposition wanted the eviction of the regime and fair 
democratic elections. The fundamental mistake in these attempts to copy the Benin experience was that 
they became obsessed by the end-product of the process and failed to see that the political shift in Benin 
had been an object of negotiation and struggle between political groups for decades and that the National 
Conference was no more than the culmination of this very long process. 
13 It is evident that the end of the Cold War deprived many African countries (especially those like Benin 
making intensive use of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric) of the ideological and sometimes military support from 
Eastern European countries, which reduced their room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis internal opposition and 
the Western countries and international financial institutions. But there is not much indication as to 
whether the Benin regime of 1972-89 had been much further into socialism than the level of rhetoric, and 
whether this brought the regime any closer to socialist countries. Most interpretations of the Head of 
State's 1974 speech announcing Marxism-Leninism as the state's ideology "see it as attempting to 
create legitimacy for the new regime and as designed to placate and demobilize pressures from the left 
for further radicalisation' (Decalo 1979; Ronen 1979; Godin 1986, quoted by Allen 1989: 35). To take but 
a few examples, and as argued by Allen: 
'what has been nationalised (by the so-called marxist regime) exclude the commanding heights (trade and land). 
And while there are ties with Communist states, those with the Soviet Union are weak and even those with 
China or North Korea have none of the significance of ties with France.' (1989:129). 
14 This was the word used in place of 'political parties'. It included the state party as well as all 
groups who proclaimed themselves to have political tendencies, provided they handed in an analytical 
document on the state of affairs in the country and how this could be improved. There were 51 sensibilités 
politiques represented at the conference. The Communist Party of Dahomey refused to take part in the 
Conference. It was well known that this Party was the only well structured political group but it had 
placed the Regime in serious difficulties within the country for more than a decade. The Party had been 
subjected to brutal repression on the part of the police. Many PCD members or those associated were 
jailed, tortured and killed. It is acknowledged by many political actors outside the PCD that without the 
perspicacious actions of this party, the changes experienced through the National Conference could not 
have taken place, at least not at that moment. It seems that the PCD would have preferred a Maoist type 
of popular armed revolt that would lead to a spectacular overthrow of the Regime, as happened in 
Togoudo and in other villages. Indeed, according to some PCD members, the idea of the Conference was 
treachery. For them, 'It was an invention of reactionary forces to create an illusion to the people, 
especially for the petit bourgeois who, in essence, prefer ad hoc and illusive arrangements than radical 
and more effective solutions.' 
15 Dahomey is the former name of Benin, given after the Danxomean kingdom that fought against French 
colonisation. The name was changed by the socialist regime in 1975. 
16 The conference was broadcast live in full by the state radio and television. Also during the conference, 
many debates were organised on television on various topics (human rights, democracy and develop-
ment), at which different people debated their opinions. 
17 See the Appendix for details on the National Conference of Benin. 
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18 Andriamirado commented on it as follows: 'A liberty has been conquered, that of the word. Another 
independence is acquired, that of the people, and no longer that of the state, which was nothing but the 
independence of the Heads of State.' (1991: 16). 
19 Of course this is a simplification of a far more complex political landscape. In each region, there were 
supporters of the two other leaders, acting as opponents of the native leader. 
20 That is, if there was any such debate at national level at all. According to some analysis, 'Dahomey 
leaders were not motivated by ideology (as was Kwame Nkrumah) nor could they be pragmatically 
independent (as could Houphouet-Boigny), and they were as ambivalent about their economic future in 
independence as they were enthusiastic about its political aspect. The goal of the Dahomean elite was 
independence, the establishment of a sovereign state, because it is the modern framework for recognition 
of a free people; but they were also afraid of 'going alone". In the pre-independence period the 
Dahomean elite was under the aegis of French culture; few of them could have been suspected of wishing 
to abandon i f (Ronen 1975:157). 
21 Observers of Dahomean politics scene attest to the fact that the 1972 coup reflected the junior officers' 
distaste for what had happened to their army and their seniors as both became caught up in spoils 
politics (Allen 1989). None of the partakers in the coup was 40 years old and they soon isolated the 
seniors from major military command. Also, their political ambition was obvious. There was no statement 
or promise of handing over political power to a civilian Government after turning 'things right', as 
former coup makers used to declare. 
22 'Il faut liquider définitivement l'ancienne politique à travers les hommes, les structures et l'idéologie qui la 
porte.' During the first years of the regime, all the politicians who had participated in the former regime 
were purely and simply cast out of any political activity. 
23 See Discours programme Pour une politique nouvelle d'mdépendence nationale, 1972. 
24 In a recent study in five villages of South and North Benin where informants were asked to give an 
account of national political history as experienced by their villages, neither national independence day, 
nor the 1972 coup d'état were mentionned, let alone the multiple coups that were cained out between 
1960 and 1972 (see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1995). 
25 The case was brought to the United Nations which commissioned an enquiry that revealed the 
implication of former right-wing exiled Benin politicians, as well as officials from Togo, Ivory Coast, 
Gabon, Morroco and France which of course they all denied. There were rumors that the defeat of the 
mercenaries was not due to the Benin army alone, which was still then equiped with 1945 guns. It is said 
that the victory was the result of the involvement of the well-equipped body guards, housed near the 
airport, of the North Korean Prime Minister who was on an official visit in Cotonou in that time. 
26 The Government continuously campaigned against the PCD for its wide infiltration in schools, 
universities, trade unions and villages, and accused this party of being responsible for instigating disorder 
in the country. 
4 The making of intervention policies and practice: 
an exploration into the emergence of its general 
frame 
Introduction 
In Benin, one cannot really speak of comprehensive and coherent policy planning 
and implementation by the state in the field of agricultural and rural development. 
One finds instead an active and continual process of negotiation between various 
categories of actors in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of projects 
of various kinds. Such negotiations take place at many levels: in ministry offices; the 
offices and laboratories of research; in extension and other specialised services 
attached to the Ministry of rural development; in the local offices of funding 
agencies; and in the villages. A few major issues channel the specific domains of 
activities concerned in these negotiations, which give an indication of the categories 
of actors involved and shed some light on the policies thus induced. 
First, is the permanent need of the state to increase its earnings in order to keep 
its budget deficits within reasonable limits and to meet the salary claims of civil 
servants. This goes together with the state project to build a nation out of a hetero-
geneous and ethnically-diversified colonial territory, and to establish its authority 
over the whole country by expanding its bureaucracy while caring for regional 
balance in its interventions and the development of its institutional apparatus. The 
second major issue relates to the staff of the institutions involved in development 
intervention, their search for career development and material achievements, 
sometimes coupled with the desire to improve academic records or achieve scientific 
ambitions. Third are the funding agencies, and their ever-changing intervention 
policies, approaches and requirements. Finally, there are people's strategies at local 
level for appropriating and dealing with these various actors, or finding their ways 
through the stated and unstated agendas of the various categories of actors involved 
in development intervention.1 If there ever was a state policy for agricultural and 
rural development (beyond general statements about the role of agriculture in the 
economic development of the country), it must be sought for, not in written docu-
ments, but in the fields and arenas of bargaining and confrontation of the broad 
categories2 outlined above. 
Nevertheless, as Arce points out, 'the process of agrarian development .. (or 
following my conceptualisation, social interactions in the field of rural development 
and their outcomes) ..is a social construction of actors who, by linking different 
interactional settings and social zones, make practical use of government rules and 
conventions' (Arce 1993: 12). These interactional processes among government 
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officials and between officials and rural producers, together with the power pro-
cesses involved, generate what I will call a 'frame of action' that is given flesh and 
blood through a specific discourse or development language. By frame, I mean the 
organisational pattern together with the set of rules, procedures and social conven-
tions by which actors operate, and which they reproduce and change. Frame here 
is therefore close to what Bourdieu calls dispositions, or the crystallisation of 
meaning (1980:73). As Arce rightly puts it, 'relationships of power, the use of 
particular scientific knowledge and state organisational traditions, set within an 
administrative context, constrain the range of alternative courses of action open to 
the state' (1993: 23). 
In that sense, the Community Development Programme seemed to be at odds 
with the frame of intervention in the CARDER, though its language could find some 
ground within the development language used within the CARDER. As I indicated 
in chapter two, the activities of the RDV was seen as stepping over the domains of 
competence of the C/PACA, the RDR and the AVA. Also, it was hardly acceptable 
to the RDV, as a village agent, to carry the same title of responsable as the district 
officer (RDR) and not to have to report to the district officer but directly to the 
General Director of the CARDER at head office. But the very fact of the production 
of such a contradiction within the CARDER indicates that 'frame' here, and as I 
use it throughout the book, should not be considered as a rigid structure (a crystal, 
using Bourdieu's crystallisation metaphor), to which every actor and all actions 
have to fit. The continuous negotiations and struggles between C/PACAs, RDRs, 
AVAs and RDVs in the context of this programme, concerning roles, regulations and 
procedures shows that the frame I refer to is no more than the resource reference 
for negotiation and struggle, from which all the actors involved in this field draw 
arguments and weapons for the pursuit of their interests and projects. As the 
product of social interactions, the frame and the discourse of state intervention in 
rural development, with which those especially involved in the Community Devel-
opment Programme had to negotiate, cannot be anything but the product of a 
historical development. Therefore, one cannot have a complete understanding of 
what could be read as policy planning and implementation in the field of rural 
development in Benin without looking at how the frame, the language and the 
actors of this game have historically emerged and developed a culture of rural 
development intervention. In this chapter I will deal with the historical emergence 
of the frame and the actors. The next chapter will delve further into details about 
the actual motivations of the actors. 
The actual frame: the situation in 1990-1992 
The CARDER is a parastatal created in 1975 under the regime of Kérékou3 for each 
of the six provinces of Benin and is in charge of all operations related to agricultural 
and rural development. Its organisational structure is standard all over the country. 
Though this structure was changed regularly, one can broadly distinguish a head 
office with the General Director, assisted by Deputy Directors, responsible for agri-
cultural production, monitoring and internal evaluation, finance and acuninistration. 
PROVINCE 
General Director 
(DG) 
Directorate of 
Adrnmstration and 
Finance (DAF) 
Directorate of 
Production 
Directorate of 
Monitoring and 
Internal 
Evaluation 
Services 
Training 
and extension 
Quality 
control 
Cooperatives 
and literacy 
Rural 
engineering 
Animal 
production 
Water and forest 
management 
Responsable du Développement Rural 
(RDR) 
DISTRICT 
COMMUNES 
Sections 
Training 
and extension 
Quality 
control 
Cooperatives 
and literacy 
Rural 
engineering 
Animal 
production 
Water and forest 
management 
Chef de Sous-Secteur 
(CSS) 
VILLAGES 
R. D V. 
Agent de Vulgarisation Agricole 
(AVA) 
• ^ P E A S A N ^ 
Responsable de 
Dynamisation 
du Village 
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Each Deputy Director has assistants in relevant (technical) domains. Most of the 
experts (the subject-matter specialists) in agricultural production and animal hus-
bandry are concentrated under the directorate of production (training and extension, 
cooperatives and literacy, animal production, quality control, rural engineering, 
water and forest management, pest control, research and development). Every 
district has a supposedly decentralised unit of CARDER, headed by the RDR 
(Responsable du Développement Rural) and staffed with medium level trained subject-
matter specialists of the same domains of expertise as those of the General Director-
ate (especially those under the Deputy Director of Production). At the village level, 
the whole structure rests on the AVA (Agent de Vulgarisation Agricole), the village 
extensionist, for the implementation of the activities of the CARDER (see the 
organisational chart in Figure 1). 
The official mandate covers all assistance to peasants for agricultural and rural 
development. But, when I started this research, the core of the ongoing activities of 
the staff of the Zou CARDER was the Projet de Développement Rural Intégré du ZOU, 
the Integrated Rural Development Project, which had begun in 1983. It came to an 
end 1991. It was coupled with a Research and Development project that was 
supposed to feed it with relevant technological packages. Apart from these main 
activities, there were casual injunctions from the Ministry, with which the staff 
managed to keep going one way or another, until the minister departed from 
office.4 Also, since the CARDER's were the official state apparatus for rural devel-
opment in the provinces and had (at least until the late eighties) the monopoly of 
rural development intervention in the provinces, most national or international 
agencies resorted to them for the implementation of various programmes related to 
agricultural or rural development (see Table 5). This constituted the third side of 
CARDER's actions in the villages.5 
The ultimate goal of the Integrated Rural Development Project as stated in the 
project documents was to increase the income of peasants in the Zou Province by 
50 percent. In view of achieving this ultimate goal, three main areas of intervention 
were identified where specific targets were set. First was the improvement of 
agricultural production and animal husbandry at peasant level. Second was the 
improvement of their access to credit and a reorganisation of the marketing of 
cotton, and last, the improvement of their living conditions. For each goal, specific 
objectives were identified and the necessary means for achieving these objectives 
were defined (see the project chart in Figure 2). The assessment studies conducted 
during the preparation phase of the project resulted in the classification of peasants 
into four categories, according to their level of application of existing technological 
packages (sowing density and techniques, use of fertilizers and insecticides, use of 
animal traction etc.). These categories were called the four niveaux d 'intensification 
(levels of intensification). One primary objective of the project as stated in project 
documents was to bring farmers from level 1 to level 4 in the field of crops and 
animal production. This covered the domains of agricultural production (cotton, rice, 
maize, groundnuts, cowpea and tobacco), local processing techniques for cassava, 
yams and peanuts, rural infrastructures such as roads (pistes rurales), bridges 
(ponceaux), drinking water etc.) and production, especially the health of cattle, sheep 
and goats (see project chart). 
PROJECTS Objectives Projected 
duration 
Starting 
year 
Official 
ending date 
Budget Fundings 
Integrated rural 
development of 
the Zou province 
Increase rural producers' inco-
me and state currency earning 
5 years Sept 
1983 
Sept 1992 18 billions FCFA - World Bank 
- FAC 
- CCCE/CFD 
- Benin Government 
Research & 
Development 
Targeted agric technology devel-
opment 
5 years 1986 mid-1990 FAC-CCCE/CFD 
project 
-FAC 
- CCCE/CFD 
- Benin Government 
Crop protection Reduce pre and post-harvest 
losses 
10 years 1986 1996 GTZ nation 
wide project 
- BMZ (German Government) 
- Benin Government 
Inventory and man-
agement of low-lands 
Increase local rice production 
and reduce rice imports 
7 years 1988 continues UNDP/FAO 
nation 
wide project 
-UNDP 
- Benin Government 
Cassava project • Improve cassava production 
• Bio control 
Not fixed 1989 continues Recycling of 
Japonese fertilizer 
donations 
- Japonese Government 
- UTA 
- Benin Government 
Soja production Improve nutritional value of 
food diet 
5 years 1989 continues 8 millions fcfa per 
year for all Benin 
-UNICEF 
-CATWEL 
Sassakawa 
Global 2000 
Increase maize production 5 years 1989 continues 3,976 billions fcfa 
for all Benin 
Japonese Sassakawa Founda-
tion, Monitored by Jimmy 
Carter Foundation 
Pilot project for 
experimentation 
on tobacco 
Restore tobacco production yearly 
based 
contract 
1991 continues 2,8 millions fcfa 
per year 
ROTHMANS 
Agro-meteorological 
experimentation 
Make agro-meteo data accessible 
to peasants 
not fixed 1991 continues UNDP nation 
wide project 
UNDP 
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ULTIMATE GOAL GOAL OBJECTIVES MEANS 
50% increase 
in the 
income of 
peasants 
in the Zou 
province. 
Improvement 
of agricultureal 
production and ani-
mal husbandary. 
Improvement of cotton 
marketing and 
credit allocation 
Reorganisation 
and 
reinforcement 
of-Zou CARDER 
Increase of the pro-
duction for cotton, 
rice, maize, 
groundnuts, cowpea 
and tobacco. 
Development of 
local technics for 
cassava, yam and 
peanuts processing. 
Inprovement of the 
sanitary state of 
animals 
(cattle, sheaps 
and goats) 
Restructuration of exten-
sion service on T&V model 
Training of all the 
personnel 
Call for techn. Assist 
Seed production unit 
Support to cotton and 
food crops research 
Intensification of agric 
production. 
Increase of cropped area: 
Cotton: +6000 ha; Tobacco: 
+300 ha; maize: +1000 ha 
rice: +350 ha 
Extension of 
qnimal traction 
Reinforcement of agricul-
ture-oriented actions of 
Peasants groups 
not mentionned 
not mentionned 
Improvement 
of the 
living conditions 
Reparation of 100 
wells and execution 
of 50 borings 
By the national 
directorate of 
hydraulic 
Source : Project file (World Bank) 
Figure 2 Planned objectives and means of the Rural Development Project of the Zou Province 
(1983-1991) 
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The approach used was the Training and Visit extension system, basing all the 
actions on peasant groups (Unités de Suivi) or cooperatives, with a functional link 
to the Niaouli research station located some sixty miles south of the head office of 
the CARDER. Some programmes of the research station were also funded by one 
of the funding agencies of the CARDER project. The total budget for the project 
amounted to FCFA 18 billions, with credit from the World-Bank/International 
Development Agency (WB/IDA), the French government/Caisse Centrale de Coopéra-
tion Economique, Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération' (CCCE,FAC), the actual CFD (Caisse 
Française de Développement) and allocations from the Benin government. 
In the actual implementation of the project, only cotton and all its related activ-
ities (the distribution of inputs, quality control and marketing, rural roads to ensure 
easy access to the villages for input disposal and transportation,6 literacy pro-
gramme for local leaders) benefitted from the close attention of staff. The other crops 
(especially food crops) were expected to benefit from the by-products of the tech-
niques learned and used for cotton production (sowing in rows, applying fertilizers 
and insecticides etc.).7 
Furthermore, during the nine or ten years of the project, there have been five 
different Ministers of Rural Development, each with his ideas and orientations on 
the implementation of the project, but mostly with suggestions for the restmchiring 
of the organisational chart of the CARDER (which goes beyond the single Zou-
CARDER). This has been changed at least three times. But the most disturbing 
changes for the project are the changes of head staff and district officers. There have 
been four different General Directors and five different Deputy Directors of produc-
tion, most followed by staff changes at district level. New projects or approaches 
were started and presented as complementary to the main one. A major one from 
the French donor was the Research and Development project that advocated the 
differential assessment of farming situations (according to agro-ecological zones, 
socio-economic status of farm enterprise etc) so that adequate technologies could be 
devised and forwarded to each category of peasant. 
In fact, the context of this Rural Development project of the Zou Province at the 
time of my research provides some insight into what is conventionally called state 
policy in planning and implementing rural development. The major aspects of these 
policies can be outlined as follows: 
• They had to be placed in a project context, focus only on agriculture, with special 
working facilities and dual decision making structure (state and funding agencies 
and their representatives) before activities considered by the staff as significant 
were undertaken, and then conducted thoroughly and continuously over a 
significant time frame. They must not suffer major interruptions or re-routing of 
means from their targets at the whim or inspiration of incoming Ministers or 
General Directors. 
• Nevertheless, the staff had to be flexible enough to accommodate to new activities 
within the project: casual ones either initiated by a new Minister, or ones intro-
duced by some other state or non-state institution via the Ministry. 
» They had to yield 'concrete and measurable results' and generate immediate 
cash for both the state budget and the staff, to improve the income of the former 
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and reduce the budget deficit for the latter. Therefore, the main target crops were 
to be export crops. 
• Actions had to be directed toward cooperative types of peasant groups. 
These basic dimensions of state intervention in rural areas were progressively 
established at the beginning of the colonial period. They were, to some extent, the 
legacy from the colonial administration to the independent state. 
The emergence of the frame and the actors 
The historical processes that led to the emergence and reproduction of the frame, 
the actors and the language in the field of rural development intervention in Benin 
were (and still are) complex and composite processes that do not lend themselves 
to linear description. Nevertheless, for the sake of the presentation and discussion, 
I will first consider the emergence of the frame and the social actors. Later, in 
Chapter 5, I will elaborate on the actors, their motivations and the making of the 
development discourse and culture. Concerning the frame, I will examine the 
formation of the CARDER'S and of the state bureaucracy for rural development. As 
for discourse and culture, I will focus on two main elements that appear almost as 
unavoidable cornerstones in development intervention in Benin during the colonial 
period and since, that is, 'peasant organisation' and 'participation'. According 
to Dissou (1970), state intervention in agricultural development went through major 
changes over four different periods: the period of hesitation from 1906-1916; the 
period of the preparation and implementation of a policy for the development of 
export crops from 1917-1931; the period without much change from 1931-1952, and 
the development of peasant cooperatives from 1952-1960, which coincided more or 
less with the definition of the Regions Agricoles, which was later to be called 
CARDER (1975). I will now examine these periods and discuss in which ways they 
contributed to the emergence of the frame and the actors of intervention in agricul-
ture in Benin. 
From 1906 to 1916: the establishment of the agricultural and forestry service 
The Service de VAgriculture el des Forets de la colonie du Dahomey was first established 
after an order from the French Minister of the colonies, on the 6th of December 1905. 
The main concerns of the service as prescribed by the ministerial order and reported 
by Dissou (1970: 26-27) can briefly be summarised as follows: 
• to forward relevant information to settlers and native cultivators on matters 
related to agriculture and forestry, 
» to conduct research on possible improvements in existing farming patterns by 
organising experimentation when needed, 
• to search for the markets and ensure the quality of the agricultural products 
exported to Europe, 
• to stimulate tree plantation and deal with all questions related to the develop-
ment, conservation and exploitation of forests, including problems relating to 
forest land and ownership, 
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• to take part in the organisation and functioning of the Sociétés indigènes de 
prévoyance for mutual savings and credit allocation, and to control the quality and 
quantity of food and seed storage of these societies, 
• to provide agricultural teaming. 
Based on this ministerial order, the agricultural policy of the government in charge 
of the colonies was three-fold: 
• to provide 'European settlers and native cultivators' with an efficient instrument 
for an increase in agricultural production in the colonies, 
• to ensure the mise en valeur of uncultivated lands, by giving land concessions to 
farmers acquainted with improved cropping patterns, 
• to organise satisfactory conditions for the marketing of agricultural products to 
Europe (Dissou 1970: 29). 
In the Colony of Dahomey, the official agricultural development intervention 
programme derived from this policy is to be found in the official correspondence 
of the 31st July 1908 of Lieutenant-Gouverneur ai. Gaudart addressed to the staff 
of the agricultural service. The ultimate goal of the programme was the 'improve-
ment of agricultural production in order to meet the food needs of the natives and 
to provide France with the tropical agricultural products needed by its industry'. 
The note indicated the major steps to be followed for the implementation of the 
programme and set a few specific targets. 
Concerning the steps for implementation, they included assessment studies 
followed by the extension of cropping techniques, together with the installation of 
trial fields that would be located near paths (so as to attract the attention of passing 
natives). 
As for the specific targets of the programme, they concerned: 
• In the short run the development of export crops (cotton and maize), food crops 
(millet, cassava, yam), and special attention to the palm groves and to the pro-
cessing of palm products, 
• In the medium term the starting of agronomic research on other crops that might 
be interesting for Europe, 
• The improvement of animal husbandry for milk and meat production and for 
animal traction, with more rational feeds, improved breeds. 
A local corps of indigenous (native) staff in the service was created in August 1913 
in order to give official status to the indigenous assistants/interpreters for the 
French agricultural staff, while a professional agricultural school was started in June 
1914, which marked the birth of the local agricultural bureaucracy. 
Therefore, in Dahomey, as probably in most former French colonies in West 
Africa, the period from 1906-1916 corresponded to the period when the basic 
concepts and instruments used to date by the state, the staff, the producers and 
other actors involved in the 'field of rural development' were established. The 
official note of the 31st of July 1908 carried the two components of what would later 
constitute (and still remains) the core of policy in agricultural and rural develop-
ment in Benin: agricultural production for food self-sufficiency, exportation and 
industrial development; and the ministerial order of the 6th of December 1905 that 
set in motion, or at least officially marked, state involvement in the field, and laid 
down the major domains in which the service would operate. It established the basic 
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structure of state imtruments for mtervening in rural areas, that are still somehow 
being reproduced. These domains were: agricultural information (now called 
vulgarisation agricole or training and extension), experimentation (agricultural 
research), land reclamation and irrigation (rural engineering), protection of waters 
and forests (now called natural resource management), packaging and quality 
control of exported agricultural products, peasant organisation, savings and credit, 
and agricultural staff training. The option prescribed then was a simultaneous 
development of crops and livestock for the interest of both the native peasants and 
the metropolis. But, as shown in the presentation below, export crops became of 
central interest for the agricultural service and the colonial adrninistrative staff. 
From 1917 to 1931: The agricultural service and the development of export crops 
The period from 1917-1931 was a period during which a policy for the development 
of export crops was carefully elaborated and implemented. Apart from palm oil, 
already considered a basic export crop, six other crops were selected (coconuts, 
maize, cacao, coffee, cotton and tobacco) where attention would be given to effi-
ciency (Dissou 1970: 34-35). Stimulating conditions were set for the development of 
these crops: easy access to land and credit for settlers, technical assistance which 
included the opening of various research stations on maize, coffee, cacao, oil palm, 
coconut and cotton.8 The geographical regions that were suited best for each crop 
were delimited and four agricultural regions or circumscriptions were created, each 
specialised in certain crops.9 It became clear that all the services delivered for 
agricultural development were primarily intended for an improvement of export 
crop production, including maize which then ranked high in the exports of the 
Colony. Maize cultivation was the object of much attention during the first years of 
the colonial period as it was greatly in demand in France, the United Kingdom and 
Germany for use in the army and industries. According to the journal African Mail 
of the 13th November 1908, 'the increase in the maize exports from that French 
colony (Dahomey) is really remarkable over the past four years: In 1904, 207 tons, 
in 1905, 2.059 tons, in 1906, 7.282 tons and in 1907, 7.839 tons' (quoted by the 
Journal Officiel du Dahomey of 1st February 1909 reporting on the December 19th, 
1908 meeting of the Chamber of Commerce). Efforts were especially oriented 
towards storage techniques. But all these fell short because in 1916 and 1917, after 
long discussions, it was concluded that the quality of the maize was too poor to be 
improved (it was too readily infested by weevils and there were many other 
agricultural products with which the Dahomean colony could accomplish its duty 
to contribute to the parent state (see exchange of mail between the Service de 
l'utilisation des produits coloniaux pour la défense nationale du Ministère des Colonies and 
the Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française about the maize of Dahomey 
from 1914 to 1917.) 
The research stations, the extension services, the service for packaging and quality 
control, were operated more on signals from external markets, and controlled in 
some way by formal state channels. It should be mentioned that the strategy to 
develop export crops did not contradict the clearly stated colonial policy of mise en 
valeur. The literature is abundant on the social, political and economic motives of the 
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colonial adventure, beyond the mission civilisatrice rhetoric. However, I am not 
interested here in these aspects of agricultural policy development. What I am trying 
to establish are how the processes by which the colonial instruments, used to 
achieve the colonial project in the first years of this century, ended up by being 
appropriated by the local elites and used as the armature, the frame of state inter-
vention in agricultural development in the last years of the century. 
Problems arose with the first organisational set up for agricultural development 
because the agricultural areas or circumscriptions did not coincide with aclministra-
tive ones (Cercles). There were six adxninistrative cercles as against four for agricul-
ture. Therefore, the heads of the agricultural regions did not have report to any 
Commandant de cercle, but only to the head of the Service de VAgriculture in Porto-
Novo, the capital of the colony. This caused the former to complain of not being 
informed of what was going on and not being able to control this category of staff. 
This situation gave rise to conflicts between these two categories of colonial officials 
(agricultural technocrats and administrators) at ail hierarchical levels, which was at 
the root of the major changes introduced in the colonial apparatus, and marked the 
next period of intervention in agriculture. 
From 1931 to 1952: the period of active intervention by the state in rural development and 
the bureaucratisation of agricultural staff 
In 1941, the colonial administrator Lieutenant-Governor Truitard criticised the 
agricultural service for being technocratic and more interested in pure scientific 
achievements than in a practical programme of extension services for agricultural 
products, for farming techniques and 'taming' the natives for better cropping 
patterns in view of improving yields. 
This argumentation took place during the period 1931-1952 which Dissou (1970: 
47-49) considered as one without much change. In fact, it appeared from the previ-
ous period that very few European settlers had bothered to start farms in Dahomey, 
despite the fact that access to land and credit had been made easy for them by 
colonial regulations. Trading companies and the colonial administration would 
therefore have to count on small-scale peasant production to increase agricultural 
exports. This implied that peasants in any given area might need the services of 
different specialists because of the diversified nature of their farming systems. 
Truitard therefore suggested that instead of having one specialist (for just one or 
two crops) in every region, generalist agricultural technicians should be appointed 
in every administrative district, with the obligation to report to the local aclministra-
tion. 
In a report sent to the High Commission in Dakar about the reorganisation of the 
agricultural service in Dahomey, following two joint meetings of administrators and 
agricultural staff held on the 24th February and 15th September 1941,10 he wrote: 
'Each cercle should have a European Agricultural Officer who is not only 
specialised in cotton, coffee or palms but is also a technician placed at the disposal of 
the commandant of the circle who would give the necessary instructions for the execution 
of a general agricultural service.' (my translation and emphasis)11 
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In my view, and contrary to the opinion of Dissou, this period was a deterrnining 
one that posed for the first time in Dahomey the problematic issue of the role of the 
state in agricultural production and the subsequent issue of its relations with the 
peasants, the staff, the intervention organisations and with other actors involved in 
the agricultural sector. 
According to Truitard, who was then the highest colonial authority in Dahomey, 
agricultural development should be adrriinistered through instructions from the 
administrators of each of the administrative regions. Instead of sticking to the 
regulations and legislations that facilitated agricultural production as laid down 
during the previous periods, the state should become the active deviser and 
implementer of agricultural development programmes. During the previous periods, 
regulations that attempted to attract European settlers into agricultural production 
did not yield much interest from white settlers, and there is not much evidence as 
to the reasons for such results. One might question whether there was no other 
alternative to this lack of interest from potential settlers than the direct intervention 
of the state in native agriculture via its adrninistrative structure, and thus the 
creation of a state bureaucracy in this field.12 If an improvement in the efficiency 
of the agricultural service was its main concern, the option suggested by Truitard's 
project also seemed to tackle the problem of the conflict of power and authority 
between the agricultural service and the administrative apparatus. Since then, a field 
of control and power negotiation was acquired (in some sense accidentally) by the 
central state which, even 35 years after Independence, it is not yet ready to give 
away. To a large extent, nowadays, the aciministration of agricultural matters by the 
state is no longer in the hands of the territorial administrators (who are now placed 
under the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs). Agricultural aciministration is 
now the business of bureaucrats under the Ministry of Rural Development and 
constitutes the prerogative and part of the raison d'être of the Ministry.13 From this 
perspective, one may doubt whether the policy statement of May 1991 of the new 
government on the withdrawal of the state from certain fields of rural development 
has much chance of being implemented.14 
Another aspect of Truidard's project was the creation of the attitude of 'func-
tionary' (officials) for the staff of agricultural services, and the creation of a perma-
nent agricultural bureaucracy at national, provincial and district levels which here 
I designate the bureaucratisation of the agricultural services. They are considered 
glegan (head/specialists of farm affairs), people 'sent by the head of state or by the 
Government'15 for agricultural matters in the village. This, I assume, must have 
played an important part in the building of the mental dispositions16 of the field 
staff and the peasants that support the top-down approach that governs develop-
ment intervention, be it by state or non-state organisations. Most probably, during 
the colonial period prior to Truitard's project, peasants already considered the staff 
of the agricultural service as messengers of the 'whites' (i.e. the power) and would 
have continued to do so whether Truitard's project had existed or not, though 
peasants most often identify field staff with the institutions for which the staff work: 
SATEC, CFDT, CATTA, CARDER etc. Nonetheless, the project seemed to have 
legitimised top-down state intervention to both peasants and staff (especially to the 
latter), and to have set the basis for a culture of state intervention in rural develop-
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ment in Dahomey/Benin.17 A very good indication of the fact that for most intellec-
tuals in Dahomey/Benin, state intervention in rural development is taken for 
granted is that Dissou considers the period during which this fundamental step was 
made, as a period of non-events, one without much change (Dissou 1970: 47-49).18 
Truitard's project for the régionalisation of agricultural services argued against 
the practice of the moment, which consisted in specialisation for each geographical 
area, and special organisations to deliver a specific service. He asserted that peasants 
did not just grow maize, or cotton, or coffee etc, but managed complex farming 
patterns, and should therefore be assisted by generalist technicians. However, from 
the changes later introduced in the organisation of the Service, it appeared that 
organisations or institutes structured vertically around one, or a very limited 
number of specific crops persisted. This was the case of SONADER for oil palm 
SATEC, CFDT, IRCF for cotton, CAJTA for tobacco, most of which were private 
enterprises or parastatals. Even within more recent so-called Integrated Rural 
Development Projects implemented by state organisations (such as the one in the 
Zou Province from 1983-1991), attention is often given to one or two export crops. 
As for the so-called 'generalist service', it turned out to be 'a service with insuffi-
cient staff confined within the limits of administrative territories, having no clear 
activities and hardly any means to achieve any, and finally subjected to heavy 
bureaucratic rules' (Dissou 1970: 73). The service seemed to have operated as a 
reservoir of manpower from which staff were recruited when specific operations 
tuned to specific crops or a limited range of activities were started within other 
organisations, which remains largely the case today. For example, to be moved to 
the head office of the Ministry or an intervention organisation (i.e. out of the scope 
of a specific project) is like being assigned punishment or being 'garaged', while 
waiting for the first opportunity to be moved to a project. No project, no work. 
From 1952 to the sixties: The state opened up to private cooperatives 
This period is characterised by a sharp increase in the number of cooperative 
organisations. But the development of these so-called cooperative-type 'move-
ments' started as early as 1919 in Dahomey, with the creation of the SIP (Société 
Indigène de Prévoyance) by the state (see Daane and Mongbo 1991). Peasants were 
obliged to be members of the SIP, and the membership fees were simply added onto 
the head tax. The SIP was under the control of the local representative of the 
colonial adrninistration. The official objectives of the SB? were: 
• to constitute a seed stock to be distributed to members in due time 
• to buy agricultural implements that members could borrow or have free 
• to help members in case of illness or accidents 
• to protect members against the consequences of drought, flood and other natural 
disasters (Agoua 1984: 14, quoted by Daane and Mongbo 1991). 
Later, and within the SIP, peasants were requested to join and cultivate 'public 
farms' in every village and sub-district, the products of which would provide funds 
for actions of public interest.19 In 1946, because of controversies over the term 
Indigène from the growing number of African intellectuals, the SIP became SAP or 
SP (Société Africaine de Prévoyance or simply Société de Prévoyance). Also, the period 
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starting from 1952 must also be put in its wider context. It was the post World War 
II period in Europe and one of reconstruction under the Marshall Plan, with a large 
contribution from the United States of America. This gave political groups from 
these countries the room to engage in discussions about colonial regimes and the 
values of liberty, human rights, etc., arguing for the independence of the colonies. 
It was also the period when the elites of the colonies were voicing a wish to claim 
their rights to be part of the political affairs of their countries. These political 
discourses and struggles were activated and/or stimulated by the Bandoung 
Conference of 1955. The various reformative decisions taken by the colonial adminis-
tration during that period on the involvement of private cooperatives in agriculture 
cannot be fully understood outside of this context. 
In Dahomey, whether because of this international context, or aside from it, 
measures were taken by the colonial administration that stimulated the development 
of private cooperatives. The 'Ramadier law of 1947 on French cooperatives' was 
promulgated from 1955 in the colonies. It was decided to give more autonomy to 
the Service d'Assistance Technique aux Cooperatives that was created in 1955 and to 
the FASC (Fonds d'Aide et d'Assistance aux Coopératives) created in 1938. Also, 
agricultural credit facilities created in 1931 (Caisse Centrale de Crédit Agricole du 
Dahomey) were reinforced, with support from some French funding institutions such 
as the CCCE (Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique). This environment favoured 
the emergence of many private cooperatives in the agricultural sector around 1958-
59 (Yèbè et al. 1986: 38). In the Zou Province, unions of mutuals emerged around 
1955 as SOPA (Société de Production Agricole d'Abomey), UMAS (Union des Mutuelles 
Agricoles de Save), UMAD (Union des Mutuelles Agricoles de Dassa), UCODA (Union 
des Coopératives Dahoméennes) etc.20 
While there seemed to be an opening of possibilities by the state for the creation 
of cooperatives in agriculture, the SAP (Société Africaine de Prévoyance) remained 
locked into the state bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, the name and the structure of 
this organisation changed from 1953 to 1956 and 1957. It was called successively 
Société Mutuelle de Prévoyance Rurale (SMPR), Société Mutuelle de Développement Rural 
(SMDR) and Service de Modernisation Agricole (SMA). From a peasants' risk-preven-
ting cooperative, the organisation seemed to have been moved to become a public 
(state) service for agricultural modernisation and 'rural development' in general, 
stepping then toward options that were apparently under the competencies of the 
state Service de l'Agriculture, probably in line with the restructuration forwarded by 
Truitard's project. From 1959 to date, the SMAs were turned into SDR (Secteur de 
Développement Rural), the district extension agency. The supposedly peasant or-
ganisation was then turned into an adrmrvistrative service definitely placed under 
the general administration of the state. 
Conclusion 
The final step in this state takeover of v/hat was declared to be a peasant organis-
ation coincided with the establishing of the Republic of Dahomey (4th December 
1958) and the proclamation of Independence on 1st August 1960. By then, the frame 
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(i.e. the major elements of what could later be called the state policy on 
agricultural/rural development intervention) was in place and the new Government 
was not apparently interested in starting fundamental debates on agricultural and 
rural development issues. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, and 
according to one analysis, 'Dahomey leaders were not motivated by ideology (as 
was Kwame Nkrumah) nor could they be pragmatically independent (as could 
Houphouet-Boigny), and they were as ambivalent about their economic future in 
independence as they were enthusiastic about its political aspect. The goal of the 
Dahomean elite was independence, the establishment of a sovereign state, because 
it is the modern framework for recognition of a free people; but they were also 
afraid of 'going it alone'. In the pre-independence period, the Dahomean elite 
were under the aegis of French culture; few of them could have been suspected of 
wishing to abandon it' (Ronen 1975: 157). The main components of the intervention 
frame inherited from the colonial administration were as follows: 
1 The involvement of the state in the administration of agricultural development 
was already taken for granted, while the state's important budget deficit inclined 
it to place emphasis on and give priority to export crops. From the SMDR to the 
SMA (Société Mutuelle de Développement Rural, Service de Modernisation Agricole), 
and with the interchangeable designation of Circonscription Agricole and Secteur de 
Développement Rural, rural development seemed to have been made equivalent to 
agricultural development/modernisation. 
2 Basing actions in the field of agricultural development on so-called peasant 
organisations was becoming habit. As mentioned by Dissou (1970: 64), agricul-
tural policy on the eve of Independence leaned essentially on cooperatives. That 
is how the Dodja cooperative (the first to have been established by the indepen-
dent state) and the Cooperatives d'Aménagement Rural Obligatoires21 were estab-
lished. 
3 The structures of the Service de l'Agriculture were established according to the 
organisational structure of internal administration (Provinces and Districts). There 
were the Régions Agricoles with the Chef de région at the province level, the Circon-
scriptions Agricoles or Secteurs de Développement Rural with the Chargé Agricole or 
Chef Secteur at District level. Together with the structure, a local agricultural 
bureaucracy was created, which would naturally struggle to survive as a distinc-
tive branch of state bureaucracy after Independence, hence ensuring its own 
reproduction and that of the structure. But in the early sixties, the service was too 
poorly staffed to give meaningful technical assistance to a significant number of 
peasants in villages. 
4 Therefore, operating in parallel to the Service de I 'Agriculture were the SONADER 
(Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural) in charge of palm production and 
the management of the Cooperatives d'Aménagement Rural, the CFDT specialised 
in cotton production and marketing, and CATTA providing the same kind of 
services for tobacco. In the Zou Province, the Région Agricole-Centre for example, 
UMAD and UMAS were structured in such a way that they had collectors in 
charge of marketing groundnuts and of allocating credits to peasant groundnut 
growers in the villages. 
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Notes 
1 All these phenomena are by no means special to the Benin State. Similar phenomena of development 
policy planning and implementation have been identified in various parts of the world and documented 
by different authors. See, for example, Grindle 1980; Long and van der Ploeg 1989; Arce 1993. 
21 have already mentioned in earlier chapters that these categorisations are no more than indicative since 
the actual interplay between the actors in the field makes it far more complicated and difficult to draw 
clear-cut social boundaries. 
3 Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the idea of such a centralising approach to rural development 
existed before the advent of the revolutionary Government in October 1972. The first version of the 
CARDERs was tried out as a pilot project in the Mono Province in 1968. 
4 For example, by mid-1990, the hot issue was the installation of the Chambre d'Agriculture (the Chamber 
of Agriculture). In the Zou Province, the issue was handled by the General Director himself. It concerned 
peasant organisation, which was a permanent feature of state intervention. It was an order from the new 
Minister (with the transitory government that was established in February 1990 after the National 
Conference). The Chambre d'Agriculture was expected (according to the Ministry's plan) to be one of 
these platforms through which peasants would express their wishes, would influence the decisions of the 
state and intervention institutions in matters of agricultural and rural development, and therefore would 
act as a countervailing power to the state. The device was expected to support the IMF-WB restructura-
tion project of the CARDERs whereby peasant organisations (GVs) would take over some of the 
Starting from 1963, contracts for conducting specific rural development operations 
in given provinces were signed with private companies: SATEC and CFDT in the 
Zou province, CFDT in the Borgou and BDPA in the Atacora province, while the 
national company, SONADER, was in charge of palm production development in 
Southern Dahomey. Not all the staff of the agricultural service were involved in 
those projects. Those involved enjoyed better working conditions and salaries than 
others in the province or district agricultural offices confined to bureaucratic 
routines (mainly agricultural statistics), hence the attitude of 'no project no work' 
which I noticed when I started this research. 
The CARDER (Centre d'Action Régional pour le Développement Rural) created in 
1975 was very close to the Région Agricole. The main difference between it and the 
Région Agricole was that from its creation at the end of the eighties, and contrary to 
the Région Agricole, the CARDER was given monopoly over any operation aimed at 
agricultural and rural development in the province, and did not share its sphere of 
rural development intervention with any other private organisation or companies 
of the type of CFDT, SATEC, CATTA etc. Also, there were clear statements of 
expanding activities beyond the single sector to all relevant domains of rural 
development. But the CARDER'S have inherited most of the staff of these organis-
ations and companies, together with their routines, bureaucratic procedures and the 
mental dispositions of the staff as well as the rural producers with whom they 
interacted. This situation, together with the further locking of the CARDER into the 
state adrninistrative apparatus, completed the prolongation22 and adaptation of the 
frame of state intervention in the field of rural development that begun in the 
colonial period. 
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CARDERs activities such as the disposal of inputs and the marketing of cotton. By this period, the mid-
1990s, the establishment of the Chambre d'Agriculture was a national, hot issue for the new Minister, and 
it was understandable that the General Director took care of it himself. With the previous Minister, the 
dominating issue had been the Community Development Programme while the one before him advocated 
the 'Pilote Village' project in the Mono Province. 
5 One such issue in 1990 was the spreading of improved cassava varieties in the province. It was a 
national (even sub-regional) programme launched by the ETA (International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture) in collaboration with the Niaouli research station. The cassava programme of the UTA 
included the selection of high-yielding and pest-resistant varieties, biological pest control etc. It covered 
all the West and Central African countries. In Benin, the CARDERs were resorted to as channels through 
which peasants could be reached. 
6 Concerning the rural roads construction rubric of the project, not all villages could be covered. Selection 
was made on the basis of a few criteria, one of which was what staff called Village gros producteur (of 
cotton). 
7 In 1983 and 1984, when I was conducting field research for my engineer's degree, I spent seven to 
eight months in the province. I was then offered quite incidentally the chance to get a glimpse of the 
implementation of the project as it started. I had a few discussions now and then with staff and I was 
given the opportunity to join teams from various specialisations (training and extension, rural engineer-
ing) on field visits. I also got the opportunity of free discussions with the staff in a few villages, at sub-
district and district levels, and at the head office. I was not interested in the project per se. Nevertheless, 
for the glimpse I got, I can now acknowledge that at the beginning, at least for the staff present on the 
project at that time, cotton was not the only important focus. I was on field trips with a team from the 
rural engineering department for the identification of villages where drinking water could be installed. 
The team never once asked about the cotton production capacity of the villages. Also, the seed production 
farm of the CARDER was very active in the production of maize, groundnut and cowpea seeds, which 
had nothing to do with cotton. But that was at the beginning of the project. It remains to be seen how 
cotton turned out to become the central focus. It should be mentioned that it is the only crop that allows 
agents to get special remuneration according to the total amount marketed. 
8 The first research station established seemed to have been the Niaouli station in 1905, primarily for 
research on maize, later on coffee and cacao. Research on cotton started in the South (Abomey) and also 
Savalou in 1920 with the IRCT. The oil palm station of Pobè (IRHO) was created in 1922, while a coconut 
research station was established in Cotonou in 1949. 
9 Maize and palm for the first agricultural circumscription located in the south-east (Porto-Novo), coffee, 
cacao, coconut and palm for the second, including the middle-south and the south-west (Allada, Ouidah, 
Cotonou and Mono province itself), cotton for the third, situated in the Zou province, and tobacco for the 
last, comprising the two northern provinces of Borgou and Atacora. 
10 From the archives of the Service de l'Agriculture, as reported by Dissou (1970:48). 
11 'Il faut que dans chaque cercle soit affecté un fonctionnaire européen de l'agriculture qui ne soit pas 
uniquement le spécialiste du coton, du café ou des oléagineux, mais bien le technicien placé à la disposition 
du commandant de cercle qui pourra lui donner les instructwns nécessaires pour l'exécution du service général 
agricole' (my emphasis). 
12 It is noticeable that this type of development - the state becoming directly involved in the administra-
tion of the sector - did not occur in other fields such as trade, handicraft, small industries etc. Yet in the 
field of agricultural development, the possibility for private entrepreneurship in agricultural extension 
was not considered. 
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13 Nevertheless, during the regime of Kérékou, the District extension officer (the RDR. Responsable du 
Développement Rural) was the second Deputy-President of the CRAD (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Administra-
tion du District), the administrative board of the District. At provincial level, the General Director of the 
CARDER held a similar position in the CEAP (Comité d'Etat d'Administration de la Province). Both 
officials held therefore important positions in the local administration which most of them enjoyed at least 
occasionally and were to some extent under the authority of the local state administrator. 
14 See the letter of policy declaration by the Benin Minister of Rural Development on May 1991 in 
Washington where three main domains were identified: One reserved exclusively for state intervention 
(policy orientation, monitoring and evaluation), one domain that is not exclusively reserved for the state 
(extension, training, peasant organisations) and finally a field from which the state should withdraw, 
namely that concerning the marketing of agricultural inputs or outputs. 
15 In Fon (the most spoken local language) To ' xosu, Togan, Acekpikpa'. In the Yoruba and Nagot 
language, 'Ijoba ilu'. 
16 'Dispositions' is used here in the same way as Bourdieu, indicating the structuration of meaning 
(through social and economic processes) which structures human social behaviour and actions (Bourdieu 
1980: 73, 84) 
17 It should be mentioned that this state involvement in agriculture was to come any way, through 
Truitard or some other initiator. It corresponded to the trend of the moment. See the evolution in the 
ideology of agricultural development in the Third World in the fifties and sixties. 
18 Dissou has played a significant role in state intervention in agriculture. Among other appointments, 
he was the head of SONADER (Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural), the Head of the 
Department of Economy and Rural Sociology and the Dean of the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences of the 
National University of Dahomey. He retired in 1991 and is the President of UFP Union des Forces 
Progressistes, the political party that was created in 1990 on the ashes of the former state party, the PRPB 
(Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin). 
19 As one might expert, the results of the implementation of this policy were far from the objectives thus 
stated. The whole set up became a power instrument at the disposal of local chiefs and administrators, 
while peasants experienced these structures as a further taxation (the SIP membership fees) and a further 
forced labour contribution exerted by the colonial power and later by the post-colonial state (see Daane 
and Mongbo 1991). 
20 Note that these cooperatives did not necessarily provide peasants with better farming and marketing 
conditions for their products. Instead, some of them turned into groups of violence threatening and 
robbing peasants (see Daane and Mongbo, 1991 for the case of UMAD), while most of them ran into big 
management problems, which was the case of UCODA. This cooperative was created in 1951 and 
specialised in the marketing of palm products but did not live long, despite the fact that it seemed to 
have become quickly popular with palm producers and within one year, had acquired a significant share 
in the marketing of palm products in the colony. From 1952 to 1953 the number of member cooperatives 
rose from 13 to 18 which corresponded to an increase in individual membership of 6625 to 8915. In 1952, 
UCODA marketed 5318 metric tonnes of palm products of the value of FCFA 97,720,000 which made up 
30.7 percent of the total palm product marketed in the colony. Despite this, UCODA was reported to have 
registered an enormous deficit due to 'bad management conducted by a Director who was not that 
honest and who misused the funds of UCODA, which led to the declaration of bankruptcy of the 
cooperative union by the Territorial Assembly' (see Dissou 1970 :56). 
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21 These specific types of cooperatives were established in areas identified as being suitable for palm oil 
production, and where the government had decided to plant large palm groves, because 'the population 
was lacking in taking initiatives' (Dissou 1970). For the installation and management of these palm 
groves, and in order to avoid being charged for the land and manpower, the government decided to 
oblige all those owning land in these areas to become members of a cooperative for the production of 
palm oil (see Dissou 1970, Mondjanagni 1977) 
22 From 1972-1989, the revolutionary regime made every RDR automatically second Deputy to the Head 
of the District in the local administrative committee, and gave the General Director of CARDER a similar 
position at province level. 
5 The actors and the making of development 
language and culture in a context of state 
intervention 
Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, one can identify four main categories of 
institutions or actors operating in the field of rural development in Benin: the state, 
the staff of intervention agencies, the funding agencies, and the rural producers. 
However, as I mentioned earlier, such a categorisation is not so useful. For example, 
confining the analysis solely to these categories and ignoring those related to the 
market would be perilous. Also, any attempt to differentiate one category from the 
other, even for the sake of general analysis, is soon revealed as rather arbitrary 
when we examine these actors in action. In their daily production of the discourse 
and practice of rural development, the actors do not lend themselves to any pre-
packaged linear model whereby the state elaborates the policy, and the staff of the 
intervention agencies implement it among rural producers, with the financial and 
technical assistance of funding agencies. Nor should we conceptualize these actors 
from a neo-liberal or neo-marxist functionalist perspective that views the state as a 
social body distinct from what is called 'civil society'. 
This present chapter then introduces the reader to the motivations of two cat-
egories of actors involved in the field of rural development: the staff of the interven-
ing agencies, and the experts and representatives of funding agencies, though the 
latter category is treated rather superficially for lack of empirical data. I explore, 
especially for the first category, the background of their unthematised assumptions, 
their implicit expectations and individual know-how, showing how the background 
resources on which they draw for action, indeed their lifeworlds (see Benhabib 1986: 
239), are built during the course of their life trajectories. But because of the diffi-
culties in considering state staff as actors in their own right within the framework 
of the state, there is first the need to give some clarification, very briefly, on the 
notion of 'state', as used here in this book. This, at the same time, sheds light on 
the interlacing nature of both social categories. The discussion is followed by an 
illustration from the case of the burial of the Community Development Programme 
in the Atlantic Province, the best research case I recorded on the making (or ending) 
of a project by staff in order to suit their own interests, yet in the name of the state. 
Finally, a more systematic exploration is carried out through examining the life-
worlds of different categories of actors. 
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The 'state' and its logic 
The debate on the state, especially in the African context, is moving us away from 
attempts to seek a universal theory of the state, and from the conceptual opposition 
that many social scientists have made between 'State' and 'Society' (for example 
Chazan 1989; Azarya 1978; Fossaert 1981 quoted by Bayart 1989; Shaw 1987; Parpart 
1988). Alternative perspectives suggest that we should conceive of the working of 
'society' outside of the 'state' as 'excrescences of the state' (Geschiere and 
Konings 1993:13), while Bayart advocates the concept of Etat rhizome to account for 
the complex and underground ramifications of the state in society whereby the state 
works as a feeding or nurturing substratum for its large clientele within society 
(Bayart 1989,1993:220-221). Though I find these perspectives more fflurninating than 
previous ones on the nature of the relations between 'State' and 'Society', the 
argument needs to be taken a step further. We should not limit ourselves to just 
documenting the manifestations or ramifications of the state in the interstices of 
society. This seems to portray the 'state' as the centre from which socio-political 
processes start and develop toward 'society' that is thus situated on the periphery 
(the idea of excrescences or rhizome). We need to uncover the ways in which actors 
not only take advantage of being connected to the state, but create, use or contest 
state power, prerogatives and policies in their everyday lives. Indeed, when one is 
faced with the daily manipulation, creation, and contestation of state power by 
social actors within specific contexts, a question which readily comes to mind is 
where precisely is the 'state', where does it begin and end?' The categories of 
actors labelled as representing the 'state' or exerting state power vary according 
to the positions of those who attribute the label. The 'state' is socially and contex-
tually defined (which may simply be a conscious or unconscious denial of its 
existence or social reality). Also, this definition varies in time and space. The 
perceptions, expectations, and claims that, for example, Benin students have on the 
Benin state are probably not those that Dutch or French students have on the Dutch 
or French state, and the image of the Benin state as provider of guaranteed employ-
ment for school graduates has profoundly changed since the mid-eighties. In the 
course of one day, the status attributed by villagers to a village extension agent can 
change according to context, from representative of state power to simple expert on 
some specific agricultural technique, or he may be coopted as a 'son of the village' 
who helps deal with various situations, including coping with state power. 
In short, the notion of 'state' remains quite vague and hard to grasp empirically. 
In Benin, some categories of people or societal positions are quickly included no 
matter from which position one attributes the labels. These are the central govern-
ment, made up of the Head of state and his Ivllnisters and other central bodies of 
the regime (legislative, judiciary and the repressive1 apparatus), or as Skocpol puts 
it, the 'set of administrative, policing and military organisations headed, and more 
or less well coordinated by an executive authority' (Skocpol 1979: 29). It is the 
authority against which civil servants, students and their organisations would go on 
to the street to demonstrate for better working or living conditions. In fact, in the 
Benin context, as in many other African countries, the logic of the state - as a 
minority of so-called intellectuals who seized the political power and who are in 
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search of economic anchorage - cannot be fully understood without taking into 
account its dialectical and conflicting relations with these categories of citizens 
(represented by students' organisations and trade unions) who have always posi-
tioned themselves as the central concern and bottleneck for that 'state'. To a large 
extent, these latter categories, and the elite defined here as being the state, have 
hijacked the state apparatus (i.e. the ability to control a big share of national 
resources and wealth and to exert supreme power, coercion, violence and 
repression) that was artificially and arbitrarily installed with colonisation and later 
awarded sovereignty and legitimacy at independence through various violent or so-
called democratic artifices. 
In the Benin case, these categories have often been the source of political instabil-
ity particularly since 1957 (see Chapter 3). Even the apparently quiet Kérékou era 
(from 1972-1989) was one of permanent 'fights' between the regime and the trade 
unions or students, with the consequence (or the excuse) of regular attempts by 
factions in the army to overthrow the Government. In that sense, particularly 
stressful years for Kérékou's regime were 1975, 1977, 1979, 1983, 1985 and 1987 to 
1989. As indicated in Chapter 3, the claims of students and civil servants often 
concerned salary or bursary increases, or protests against the reduction of salaries 
or staff, but they sometimes turned into requests for political change as was the case 
in 1963,1967, 1979 and 1989. Thus, since 1957, these 'forces', mostly inherited from 
the colonial period2 drove the different regimes into a continuous search for budget 
equilibrium, not so much through a reduction of state expenses, but via an increase 
of its internal and external earnings. With almost no mineral resources and a very 
weak fiscal system, export crops became of vital importance as far as internal 
sources for state income. These would be complemented by various forms of 
development aid, which gave funding agencies an important role in Benin political 
affairs and in the actual design and implementation of so-called development 
policies, including rural development.3 These elements explain (at least partly) why 
a dominant feature of state policy in the field of rural development is the appropri-
ation of the wealth produced, much more than what some neo-marxists call the 
'surplus'. Therefore, the overused rhetoric of 'agriculture is the basis of our 
development and industry its motor' (L'agriculture est la base de notre développement 
et l'industrie en est le moteur) does not bring the state much further than 
emphasising the development of export crops - a sort of commitment to, or repro-
duction of the mise en valeur policy of the colonial period. It shows very little, if any, 
will to consciously develop or expand the internal consumption market by increas-
ing the incomes of rural producers, or by increasing their share of export crop 
revenues or by any deliberate support for the local economy. Such processes have 
taken place in most West and Central African countries (in Senegal with ground-
nuts, Ivory Coast with coffee and cacao, Mali with cotton, Cameroun with cacao, 
palm oil etc.) and have been analyzed by various authors (Amin 1973; Dumont 1966; 
Dumont and Mottin 1980; Meillassoux 1981; Rey 1971; etc.), mostly with neo-marxist 
paradigms of dependency, centre/periphery, or the articulation of modes of produc-
tion. 
But still, we need to go beyond these interconnected phenomena - the hijacking 
of state power by a small but expanding city-based elite and the focus on export 
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crops that structures the interactions between village staff and rural producers. We 
need to look more closely at the ways in which the state is made (or not made) 
concrete in the everyday operation of rural development - without this being a 
simple prolongation or excrescence of a central state but the creation of the state 
here and now. We need to examine how policies are negotiated in the whole process 
of specific development actions and to explore what the motivations are for the 
different actors involved. This, then, is what I attempt to do in the remaining part 
of this chapter. Since I believe that discussions on the motivations of actors and the 
daily making of policy and the state cannot be undertaken efficiently in an abstract 
way, I start by reporting on an episode of the 'burial' of the Community Develop-
ment Programme in the Atlantic Province of South Benin. 
The burial of the Community Development Programme in the Atlantic Province 
The Community Development Programme survived two years after the departure 
in February 1990 (after the National Conference) of the Minister who initiated it. It 
came to an end all over Benin in 1993 when the IMF-WB project for the restructur-
ing of the CARDERs started. The main funding agency (the World Bank), the 
experts and most probably some high-ranking Benin staff involved in the prepara-
tion of the new nation-wide project did not find the Community Development Pro-
gramme relevant enough for rural development. All the RDVs were appointed to 
new positions within the new structure, which ended the assistance given by the 
CARDERs to the various activities of the RDVs, without providing for any follow 
up. But though there was no official preparations for it, the decision to stop the 
project did not fall without warning on the heads of the RDVs and villagers. 
Rumours and gossip took care of this. Since early 1992, rumours became more and 
more persistent over the restructuration of the CARDERs, particularly on the likely 
dismissal of 60 percent of the CARDER staff and on the activities that would be 
kept. It became clear that the Community Development Programme was not on the 
list of activities to be maintained and that therefore the position of RDV would cease 
to exist. In that situation, as most RDVs said, 'everybody is running. It lies in your 
own hands to save your head', which meant making as many contacts as one could 
with friends, protectors (Godfathers), relatives etc in the hierarchy in order to save 
a place for oneself in the new structure.4 
In April 1993, the GTZ cornmissioned a project appraisal mission in the domain 
of 'natural resource management' with a view to funding a new project in the 
Atlantic Province. The German government had financed a regional rural develop-
ment project in the Atlantic Province through the GTZ since 1977, but discontinued 
it after an evaluation in 1989. Negotiations had started since 1990 to design a new 
project but the Benin and German Governments did not agree on the form of the 
new project until 1993. Some suggestions were made. The present appraisal mission 
was meant to investigate the possibility for further cooperation between the German 
Ministry of Development Cooperation, the GTZ, and the CARDER Atlantic. The 
team of the mission was made up of two freelance German consultants, one of 
whom had six months fieldwork experience in the Province on smallholders and 
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poverty, and one junior female staff member of the GTZ. The GTZ in Benin asked 
me to participate in the mission as their 'local expert', mostly for the fieldwork, 
not much in the discussions and document preparation. The mission was given a 
mandate to suggest any option on which the German and Benin governments could 
reach an agreement so that a new project could finally start. During the mission, a 
review of all the former activities of the Atlantic CARDER was made. The German 
members of the appraisal team became seduced by the Community Development 
Programme after visiting one of the villages where it was implemented. We were 
brought to the village by Omioke, the former RDV of the village who had been 
appointed fishery expert in an another area.5 At our request, the villagers were 
informed in advance (the day before) of our coming. We spent the whole day in the 
village, discussing with men and women, young and old. There was a Development 
Committee representing all the cooperatives with which we also had discussions. 
We were introduced to the village from the perspective of the Community Develop-
ment Programme. Therefore, what we really saw and heard were the activities 
initiated (or presented as such to us) together with Omioke while he was there as 
RDV. The style of cooperative work introduced here by the RDV was different from 
that usually promoted in Benin. There were groups working on specific activities 
(farrning, animal husbandry, food processing etc.), but instead of working together 
and sharing the products or the revenue, members of each group had in common 
only equipment, a common place for the activity and a flexible time schedule. For 
the rest, in most groups, things were done individually and everybody managed his 
own affairs. It was expected that this would induce competition among members 
and shame those lagging behind and not taking proper care of their activities. It was 
also expected that this would develop a sense of professionalism: going to the 
'workplace' would be seen as going to the 'office' (which only intellectuals with 
white collar jobs had had the privilege of saying). If things went well, they might 
purchase some common labour-saving implements. But the RDV said this was not 
established as an objective, because similar attempts had proved irrelevant in other 
places. In short, in this village, cooperative work was a sort of 'working apart 
together'. Also, there were some original activities such as raising snails, aulacodes 
and fish, and speculation on food products by the village Development Committee. 
Some implements were designed and made by group members for the storage of 
maize and processing of cassava. 
During the discussions, very clear invitations were made by the members of the 
cooperatives and the Development Committee to help them solve problems relating 
to their activities: enlarging the snail, aulacodes and fish raising enterprises by 
building more accommodation; facilitating the connecting of producers with the 
appropriate technicians for advice, and with potential consumers including restaur-
ants and hotels in Cotonou; providing for credit for the speculations on food crops; 
improving food processing equipment. We were particularly impressed by the 
discursive skills of many groups and committee members in the presentation of 
their activities and in forwarding their requests. 
' We know what our needs are and we have already found the way to tackle our problems 
and improve our conditions. We now know that you can solve your own problems. The 
RDV has helped us very much in finding ways. Nevertheless, in our daily struggle to get 
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out of poverty, our knowledge falls short. We have our hands stretched out trying to reach 
the goal but their length is not always enough. We have managed to get our loads up to 
our knees, in some cases even up to our foreheads but we lack that extra bit of strength 
to put them on our head.6 That is why we need you. Not to start or to do the job for us, 
but to help us finish it.' 
Though the main heading of our mission was about natural resource management, 
we all agreed that it was relevant that the mission recommend the GTZ to support 
the programme. We discussed the issue with Omioke. 
'That would be very good', he said enthusiastically. And he added: 'These people work 
in very hard conditions, their soils are exhausted, but they keep going. If they could be 
helped... They don't even need a lot of money. If the GTZ can rescue this programme, 
it will be wonderful...' 
I knew Omioke before. We had met a few times in 1991 and 1992 over the Com-
munity Development Programme. Two days after the visit of the mission to the 
village, I discussed it with him in a more relaxed, informal context. He expressed 
his doubts as to whether the CARDER would be interested in starting up this 
programme again. In any case, he himself was no longer interested in it and did not 
like the idea of going back to live in the village again, even part time. 
'I prefer my present work time schedule ' he said. 'When I was RDV, I did not have 
any real time schedule. Peasants could drop into my house at any moment and engage 
me in endless discussions. Now, my work days finish at 4pm at the latest. This allows 
me to take care of my own affairs'. Then he added. 'But I trust you. You cannot be part 
of group that would attack my interests.7 If your mission manages to rescue this pro-
gramme (which I doubt), it is good. But make sure that it does not fall on my head.' 
Indeed, his elder daughter was 15 years old and had just started secondary school. 
He decided to pay more attention to her because he did not yet feel ready to 
become a grandfather. Also, he has just built a house for himself and his family. But 
the land he had built on was declared public property, meant for a zoological park. 
All the people had been requested to move and they ran the risk of having their 
houses destroyed without any compensation. The people had formed a committee, 
chaired by Omioke, to be in contact with the authorities at all levels in order to 
solve the problem. He complained that the very day of our visit to the village, the 
committee had an appointment with the Head of the District to discuss the matter. 
'Because of your mission (from which I earned nothing), the appointment was 
cancelled and we have not been able to get another date out of the District Head' 
He said. And he concluded 'I don't want this business of Développement Commu-
nautaire to poison my life any more. I have had enough'. 
On the other hand, he was in contact with a Canadian University (which he had 
already visited once) and was trying to start a PhD degree. He had started on the 
lowest rung of the ladder of the agricultural bureaucracy and had moved upward 
to the engineer level through short and long term in-service training. At this very 
moment, apart from his family and house problems, this academic achievement 
seemed far more important to him than anything else. But none of this became 
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transparent during the day of the field visit. The day after the visit in the village, 
he joined us at a meeting with the Deputy Director of Production when we were 
reporting on what we saw and on our idea of suggesting to the GTZ that they 
support the programme. In a long discussion with the Deputy Director of Produc-
tion the mission tried to check whether the Commumty Development Programme 
could fit into the new operational chart of the CARDER. 'Rien n'y fit'. The Deputy 
Director of Production held an ambiguous position. What was transparent from the 
discussions was that there was no room for this programme in the new context. I 
suspect that he thought if it had been resuscitated, the Community Development 
Programme would then have become an innovation again!!, probably involving a 
lot of preparation, monitoring and coordination work for him. After having been 
weaned for years, this CARDER staff member seemed to view the new IMF-WB 
project as a lifeline and apparently did not want to take any risk of sanctions from 
the IMF-WB experts, the funding agencies of the new programme. The Deputy 
Director knew very well that GTZ has been the main funding agency for the 
CARDER Atlantic since 1977. He is an engineer and had been RDR in various 
Districts of the Province and had obtained enough knowledge about the previous 
German project to guess that he and his colleagues would win something from it. 
But obviously, the German Agency for Development Cooperation arrived too late 
(or too early) on the scene of the post-revolutionary era rural development policies 
in Benin. The restructuration rhetoric was too far established within the frame of the 
CARDER and had shaped the way in which the staff were managing their daily 
lives, to open them up to another approach or to seize the opportunity the GTZ 
might offer to the Commumty Development Programme. Also the new project had 
not been under way for long enough for the staff to find ways to house other 
opportunities within it. Notice that the Deputy Director did not oppose or openly 
reject the proposition. He never actually rejected our idea. On the contrary, he kept 
praising it as a very good suggestion. Nevertheless, while we were asking how the 
programme would fit into the organisational structure, if it were to start up again, 
he kept on explaining the new chart to us, the job descriptions and the linkages 
between the different positions, showing us indirectly but skilfully that he could not 
find a place for inserting the Community Development Programme. 
During these discussions, Omioke did not say much to support our idea, despite 
his apparent enthusiasm of the previous day when we discussed the matter with 
him on our way back from the field visit. At the time, I thought this was the 
traditional silence of some staff in front of their boss. Later, after discussing with 
him, I discovered his motivations and understood that on that specific topic, and 
most probably for quite different reasons, he shared the same position as the Deputy 
Director about the fate of the Community Development Programme. 
But the senior staff member of the General Directorate in charge of the monitor-
ing of the programme had a different position. When we met him, he declared that 
it was vital for the image the villagers had of the CARDER, that the programme 
continue in one way or another. He had always made this point at head office 
meetings, especially for three villages that were particularly enthusiastic about the 
programme. 'But people don't listen to me. When I make this argument, I only 
hear the echo of my own voice.8 I wonder if they think that I have a wife or a 
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particular interest in one of these villages.' He continued by saying that in those 
three villages people had started various things with the RDVs who were appointed 
there. And suddenly, from one day to the next, the RDV installed in the village with 
trumpets playing had to leave silently, on tiptoe, without being able to say anything 
to the peasants as to what the fate of their activities would be. "They would never 
trust us again if we leave the programme just like that, at least in those three 
villages' he concluded. We asked him if the CARDER was able, with its restruct-
uration programme, to fit this programme again into its activities. He asserted that 
the CARDER had always been able to fit anything into its activities as soon people 
wanted it. And there was a new position in the structure called Spécialiste de Organ-
isations Paysannes, SOP, at district level that would fit perfectly into the work. But 
this man was unwilling to contact the General Director on the issue right then even 
though they had been classmates during their studies. The reason was that he had 
some ongoing arguments with him at the time that he did not wish to explain, 
except to say they had nothing to do with the work. But in any case, he did not 
want to go knocking at his door, although in normal situations he did it without any 
protocol. He might do it in a few weeks time, after the Director has established the 
case, but for the time being, it was out of question. 
We did not succeed in discussing the matter with the General Director of the 
CARDER himself. We met him at the beginning of the mission and he told us that 
we could discuss every thing with the Deputy Director to whom he had given full 
powers to do so. When we managed to visit him to report on the proceedings of the 
mission, he had little time to devote to us. He had to go to the Ministry for an 
urgent affair and assured us that the Deputy Director would keep him informed 
every day on the proceedings of the mission. For my German colleagues on the 
mission, the General Director had been informed of the issue of the Community 
Development Programme by his Deputy Director and therefore we had to close the 
case. 
The final report of the mission that was officially presented to the Ministry of 
Rural Development did not even mention the Commumty Development Programme. 
It covered only the natural resource management project covering a small area of 
the Province. It was suggested that the project would not be implemented by the 
CARDER but by the PGRN (Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles), another 
nation-wide project of the Ministry of Rural Development partly funded by the GTZ 
and to which a GTZ technical assistant had already been appointed.9 At the end of 
the meeting, I went to one of the Ministry officials, whom I had known before and 
had met many times earlier on different matters, including the Community Develop-
ment Programme. We commented on the meeting. He declared. 
'Now we know what they (GTZ, the Germans) want to do. They have retained only one 
sixth of the Province. It is OK. We agree - they can start, but that does not solve our 
problems. We can now approach the German Government for what we think should be 
done in the whole Atlantic Province'. 
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Comments 
We have here a concrete process of policy making. Though it might be interesting 
to comment on the ways in which the various actors involved took part in the 
making of the project on natural resource management, for the objectives of this 
chapter I look at how, intentionally or not, these actors contributed to the burying 
of the Community Development project. What were the interests that governed this 
burial and how were these interests put forward? 
The villagers involved in the cooperatives and in the village Development 
Committee succeeded in making their points clearly. They succeeded in seducing 
the mission into believing in their activities. They had mastered the use of 'partici-
patory' rhetoric which they made attractive to outsiders by packaging it in local 
discursive assets (metaphors, proverbs etc.). The mission gave the Community 
Development project in the Atlantic Province a chance to be rescued on the IMF-WB 
restructuration wave. But this did not happen and was not the decision of any 
central institution or state. The decision was negotiated at local level where the 
mission somehow attributed the status of state representative to the Deputy Direc-
tor, who was obviously operating from a different register or standpoint. While 
focusing the discussions on the new chart of the CARDER, his motivations were 
about securing what had already been gained from the IMF-WB project, and 
preventing the mission from opening a new working file for him entailing prepara-
tion, monitoring and coordination. There were probably many other private reasons 
which I could not access. For example, the Commumty Development Programme 
had not been under the Deputy Director of Production's responsibility when it was 
running. He might, therefore, have thought that if the GTZ had funded a project 
from such a perspective, then his directorate would be sidestepped. The motivations 
of Omioke, the former RDV, were related to his career, his family and other private 
problems. They related to where he perceived himself in his life cycle. He needed 
space now to manage his life quietly, the way it had been since the programme had 
ended. His action was to keep silent, like the other senior staff who had refused to 
introduce the matter to the General Director. Their reason was apparently a 
conjunctural conflict with the General Director, that had probably not existed a few 
weeks before the mission and might have been settled a few weeks afterwards. But 
it was too late to serve our idea of hirning the dying Community Development 
Programme into an integral part of what would then (later) be considered and 
rationalised as state development intervention policy in the Atlantic Province. By a 
simple chance (I assume), the General Director was too busy during that period, 
called, as he frequently is, to the Ministry for 'urgent affairs'. He probably never 
heard of the plan to fund the Community Development Programme, of which he 
was probably unaware too.10 
Those were the little, apparently insignificant and chaotic events that had no 
obvious link with each other but ended up in making a big difference to the 
direction that CARDER (state) actions in the field of rural development in this 
Province would take during the following years. The very personal and different 
motivations of these actors were glued together by the mission team who attributed 
to them the role of official representatives of the CARDER, of the General Director 
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and, to some extent, of the state who were negotiating development intervention 
policy and action. As for these officials - looked at in terms of their personal careers, 
family, social relations and other practical interests - the mission team were not 
perceived as negotiators of development policy, but as trouble makers who were 
intruding on their quiet and already smoothly regulated life (at least for the two 
years duration of the new project). We have here a situation where people arguing 
from different perspectives and dealing with very different issues end up making 
a common decision. A consensus built, that is, out of cacophonic, non-dialogical 
social interaction. The mission team did not or were not willing to push the matter 
further. After all, it was not their problem. They were free-lance consultants who 
would probably have no further commitment to the intervention and therefore, to 
some extent, were unlikely to be much concerned by its ultimate results. If the team 
had been made up of people who would have been part of the implementation team 
of the project, then probably the dialogue might have been of a different nature. In 
any case, these anomalous circumstances combined to produce a decision that 
would later be rationalised as the state's (or at least CARDER's) decision to stop 
the project for reasons of the new political orientation. 
As for the villagers, one cannot say that the project was over. There is evidently 
a time sequence as to the coming and the departing of the RDV from the village but 
such a sequence cannot hold as far as the activities covered by the project are 
concerned, as well as the discursive and practical skills it helped to develop among 
villagers. What really happens is a stocking, an entangled accumulation of the 
activities, languages and practices induced within different projects at the village 
level. 
From this case, we learn that staff played a determining role as social actors (not 
just as state agents) in the making of decisions in intervention for rural develop-
ment. Other actors on the scene credited them with state roles and power. However, 
it would be very misleading, to consider the staff or the organisations in which they 
work, or both, as the only 'instruments' in the elaboration and implementation of 
rural development programmes in accordance with any given state policy. If we 
want to know about intervention policy making and implementation, it becomes 
necessary also to look to the motivations of staff, as read from their relations with 
each other, their career perspectives and their private and family lives. It is necess-
ary to examine how, depending on their specific situations, they succeed in simulat-
ing or denying state power. We also need to look at the vagaries of everyday life 
that produce ad hoc social structures that become instrumental in the directions that 
affairs might finally take. In the rest of this chapter, I explore crucial aspects of the 
role the staff play in what is generally referred to as state policy-making. 
The staff of intervention institutions: different categories and career perspectives 
By 'staff I mean not only agricultural bureaucrats in the Ministries and in inter-
vention institutions but also field workers - thus lumping together those called 
'bureaucrats' and the 'technicos'. These people, as shown in the Mexican case 
by Arce are 'members of an epistemological community since they share a lan-
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guage, degree of knowledge and behaviour that somehow distinguishes them from 
other communities' (Arce 1993: 49). But, as the case above shows, the staff are not 
the same. Providing some insight into the frames of reference of the staff of an 
organisation such as CARDER brings one very soon to the conclusion that a mini-
mum of categorisation is needed. The staff sitting in the office (also divided into 
different and changing factions for different reasons) obviously do not have the 
same preoccupations as those working in close contact with farmers. Also, as 
illustrated by Omioke, moving from one situation (in contact with farmers) to the 
other (an office) can change one's preoccupations. At the outset, if we consider the 
geographical or vertical structuration of the organisation (or vertical/geographical 
location of the staff), we can distinguish three main groups: the staff working in the 
'field', which means in the rural areas, at village, commune or district levels; those 
working at the head quarters of the main intervention institutions, mostly based in 
the capital cities of the Provinces; and finally those working in the ministries or 
national directorates. 
In any case, the most fruitful categorisation is that which derives from the various 
criteria and indicators staff use themselves when referring to each other. For 
example, not only those working in rural areas are considered as 'working in the 
field' (sur le terrain). The staff at district offices consider those at commune and 
village levels as field staff and the staff of the head offices of CARDERs in the 
provincial capitals would include the district as well as commune and village staff 
as 'field staff. In the same vein, bureaucrats in the rninistries and national direc-
torates consider the various directors of regional organisations as 'those in the 
field' (les gens du terrain). Being 'in the field' is therefore not a power-free 
attribute. It is enabling and at the same time constraining for the person who bears 
it, whether he claims it himself (which often happens) or when he is attributed it. 
Being in the field implies being the person who knows the 'facts', knows the 
réalités du terrain' and therefore is able to play with and manipulate information. 
On the other hand, being in the field implies carrying the bulk of responsibility on 
whose head most of the jobs, requests, threats and also the blame falls, though the 
load is somewhat reduced by the capability of the field agent to manipulate the 
information. 
Among themselves, the staff members distinguish many categories using two 
main characteristics. First are the qualifications and schools of training, and second, 
seniority. Regarding the qualifications and the schools of training, four main 
categories can be identified:11 
Category 1: These are staff with no more than 5-6 years of primary schooling, who 
were recruited and trained on the job by private marketing boards and intervention 
companies in the early sixties and seventies (CFDT, SATEC, CAITA, SODAK...), or 
by the CARDERs in the mid-seventies and early eighties. In the Zou Province, they 
were mostly recruited as collectors (to buy agricultural produce in villages), 
'animateurs ', 'encadreurs ', surveyors etc. In the same category, can be included the 
staff who have completed primary schooling and have passed the entrance exam to 
the first level of agricultural school (CFR Porto-Novo or Ina) where they get two 
years basic agricultural extension training in agricultural production, animal hus-
bandry and health, forestry, and cooperatives. 
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Table 7 The rural development staff of the Zou Province 
Categories Male Female Total 
1 Lowest level, basic training (primary school level) 139 15 154 
2 Medium level (secondary school) 157 5 162 
3 High level (High school and first level University training) 13 2 15 
4 Highest level (Masters level, University training) 41 0 41 
Total 350 22 372 
Source: MDR 1993: Compendium des statistiques agricoles et alimentaires (1970-1992) Cotonou, MDR 
On the salary ladder of civil servants, the categories are ranked from rank A 
(category 4), downwards to rank E (category 1). People can move from a lower 
category to higher ones. Some even succeed in moving from category 1 to category 
4 by internal examinations, and short or long term in-service training. Upward 
Category 2: This category is composed of staff who have completed secondary 
education and passed the entrance examination to agricultural secondary school 
where they receive three or four years of training at intermediate level. There is to-
date only one agricultural secondary school in Benin. It was formerly called Lycée 
Agricole Mèdji de Sékou and now Collège Polytechnique Agricole Niveau II de Sékou. 
Category 3: This is the staff trained in agricultural high schools or level one in 
agricultural institutes or universities as Ingénieur d'agriculture or Technicien supérieur 
in various fields of agricultural production. Most of them were trained outside 
Benin, in agricultural high schools in the Ivory Coast, Senegal or Cameroun. Since 
the early eighties, some staff of this category, especially those in the field of animal 
husbandry and veterinary sciences have come from the Collège Polytechnique Univer-
sitaire of the National University of Benin. 
Category 4: This category is of the IDR (Ingénieur du Développement Rural), com-
posed of those who had university training in agriculture as Ingénieur agronome or 
Docteur vétérinaire. Notice that the veterinary doctors always refuse to be considered 
as agricultural engineers. They claim to be 'doctors', while the others are no more 
than 'engineers'. This issue becomes important when engineers specialised in 
animal production and veterinary doctors have to work together in the same service. 
Conflicts then arise about who should head the service, and how the work should 
be shared, which is strongly linked to fights about control over the working means, 
especially transport, but also housing when available. Most of the staff of the first 
generation of this category were trained in Belgium and France while almost all 
those recruited between 1978/79 and 1986 (when staff recruitment by the state 
ended) were trained in the Faculty of Agriculture of the National University of 
Benin. Table 7, presents the number of male and female staff for each category up 
to 1992. The total for the Province was 372 staff,12 as compared with a total of 
338,953 agricultural workers in 1992 (see MDR 1993: 48-56). 
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mobility is considered as a very important target for most staff of low or medium 
level and is stimulated by various factors: first is the increase in salary. Second, the 
hierarchical position one can occupy in the institution or negotiate, using its social 
networks. The hierarchical position one can attempt to negotiate has become more 
and more correlated with the qualifications one has and the total number of staff 
belonging to that category. Most people want to be as high as they can in the 
hierarchy, not only because of the material advantages attached to such positions 
but also to the social status it gives, and to the fact that then 'one not only receives 
orders but gives them'. Third is coming into an office or organisation of young and 
newly graduated staff, at a higher level than those of one's own generation. In the 
sixties and early seventies there were very few Beninese trained as agriculturalists 
at medium or high level. A local corps of the native staff of agricultural services was 
created in August 1913 but was composed of half literate personnel trained on the 
job, or people who graduated from the Benin professional agricultural school of the 
primary level created in June 1914. The Lycée Agricole Médji de Sékou then called 
Centre National des Techniciens Agricoles de Sékou was created much later, in 1961, 
with funding from Switzerland, while those trained at university level received their 
training abroad. The Benin University Faculty of Agriculture opened in the early 
seventies. 
Thus in the sixties, people who graduated from the Sékou agricultural school or 
from similar ones in Africa were appointed at district and even higher levels in 
intervention institutions. By the mid-seventies and early eighties, more and more 
young agricultural engineers began to be appointed at district level, taking over 
from the earlier staff. Then, many staff of category 2 and 3 of 30-40 years of age 
attempted to upgrade to category 4. Among this latter category, therefore, staff make 
further distinctions, which, although only used at the level of informal labelling and 
never mentioned officially, might possibly influence crucial official decisions. For 
example, there are those who have been directly recruited as such. They are called 
'Ingénieurs authentiques ' and are mostly trained in Belgium, France or at the Benin 
University Faculty of Agriculture. Other engineers who started the job in lower 
categories, some even at category 1, are referred to as 'sac-au-dos ' (coming from far 
away, with a rucksack on his back). What one learns from this search for mobility 
is that the primary concern of most staff is career and position. As I show later in 
this chapter through cases from the Community Development Programme, an 
appointment is assessed by the advantages it provides and by the extent to which 
it gives the individual concerned the chance to upgrade within the hierarchy and 
then achieve a 'good career'. 
As mentioned above, the second main characteristic which staff members use to 
categorise each other is seniority. No matter what qualifications a newcomer has, he 
calls doyen or senior, the others who were on the job before him. As there are doyens 
of doyens, some even suggested they be called anciens. Seniority can be a very 
important criteria in the negotiation of a position when candidates belong to the 
same category. This criteria often counts more than the extra short-term training one 
might have received, even if this training makes the junior candidate more prepared 
for the job. At least, protests from other staff will use the seniority argument to 
criticise the appointment of a junior. 
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These were the more obvious categories used by the staff. But less apparent ones 
exist, which are not used when interacting with each others or when speaking of 
their training and working experiences. But on issues concerning working and non-
working relationships with other staff members or bosses, categories such as fellow-
graduate, trade union member, family relation, same or similar ethnic group, 
religion, philosophical or mystic group, and most recently political party member-
ship will be evoked. But one should not exaggerate the importance of these cat-
egories in the self-achievement strategies of the actors. During this research, I 
recorded various conflict situations between people sharing one or more of these 
categories. Sometimes, the very fact of belonging to some common category can 
worsen a crisis situation when one feels denied the favour that belonging to a 
common category leads one to expect from the other. Nonetheless, these more 
diffuse categories provide the people concerned with additional social space when 
they meet at church, during week-ends, or back home or elsewhere, where they 
speak the same native language etc. and they might talk about the contentious issue. 
Another label which I found very confusing was what staff at all levels called 'the 
CARDER'. This appeared in formulations such as 'A quoi sert le CARDER?' or 
'Que fait le CARDER au juste' - what purpose does the CARDER serve, what does 
the CARDER do exactly?'. A district extension officer (RDR) might say this as much 
when complaining of the way staff under him do their job in the field as he might 
when his bosses above him give contradictory orders or instructions or again when 
there is a lack of follow up in actions or in the way resources are allocated. But most 
confusingly, he might say the same when referring to himself, when complaining 
of how he has to manage his days under such conditions.13 The same thing holds 
for people at higher or lower hierarchical levels. I noticed that this was a formula 
mostly used to neutralise criticisms against one's hierarchical chief during dis-
cussions with him. On these occasions, it is common to hear the lower level staff 
claiming 'the CARDER should do this or that' which in fact might well mean 
'boss you should do this or that'. 
Among the so-called medium or high level staff engaged in the implementation 
of the Community Development Programme in the Zou Province, most of the four 
categories described above were represented, of which I hereafter present three 
different cases. There were always three main aspects in the information I then 
obtained, which I will use to structure the presentation. These aspects concerned the 
training of the staff, their professional experiences and career perspectives, and 
finally the relations with the immediate and/or highest hierarchical boss, which 
most often were presented as being somehow conflictive.14 These factors appeared 
to determine the way the staff saw their appointment as fitting into their own 
projects and explained to some extent the type of interactions engaged in with 
villagers as well as bosses. 
Case 1 Tinguedjo the sac-au-dos: I don't mind being in a village as long as it is in my 
native Province 
Tinguedjo is in his forties. He is married and has six children. When, during one of 
our conversations, I asked what training he had, he answered straight away: 
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'I am an IDR Ingénieur du Développement Rural Al-4 (relating to rank and salary) 
with 15 years of working experience. I started working for rural development in 1975. I 
was only a CDR Conducteur du Développement Rural' (which corresponds here to 
category 2). 
He was born in Abomey and was 20 years old when he passed the BEPC (Brevet 
d'Etudes du Premier Cycle) in 1968, because he 'started school too late'. But he was 
then too old to have a fellowship from the Government and continue up to the 
baccalaureate (entry level to university). Because he could not rely on significant 
support from his parents, he could not 'follow the direct path from the BEPC to the 
baccalaureate within three or four years and start University and finish as Ingénieur 
Agronome' he said. Then he added. 
'But not everybody gets things easily in life. I had to struggle a long way, but I suc-
ceeded to get to the same end: Ingénieur. Yes! You know that here in Benin, if a training 
or job opportunity arrives, it is not enough for you to have the most adequate qualifica-
tions or potential to expect to be selected. You must be involved in the political system 
yourself5 or you must have some people in it and have a solid back (les reins solides).' 
After passing the BEPC in 1968, since he could not benefit from a fellowship to 
follow 'the direct path', he thought it better to enter a professional college where, 
no matter how old you were, you could have a state fellowship. So he took part in 
the entrance examinations of many professional schools (for post-office staff, medical 
staff etc.). He succeeded with the Lycée Agricole Mèdji of Sékou, entering the college 
in 1970 and completing the training in 1974 with a degree in Economie Coopérative. 
He was recruited in 1975 to the Atlantic CARDER. From February to December 
1977, he attended a training course on 'Cooperative management in Africa', at the 
Centre International d'Agriculture in Cairo (Egypt). From June to December 1980, he 
attended a short training course on the organisation and management of cooperative 
enterprises at the Centre Panafricain de Formation Coopérative (CPFC) in Cotonou. 
From January to July 1982, he got the chance to go to Bulgaria to the Karl Marx 
Economic Institute in Sophia where he studied the management of rural enterprises. 
From all this training, he got certificates that allowed him to register for the 
DESCOOP programme of the CPFC16 in 1985, which he completed in 1988. 
'I now have the 'Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures en action Coopérative'. I am a full 
IDR, even higher than that because the degree is internationally recognised as equivalent 
to a post graduate degree from an Agricultural University.'17 
When he started working in 1975, (after completing 4 years of training at the Lycée 
Agricole Mèdji de Sékou), he was appointed Conseiller coopératif, cooperative counsel-
lor, in the Ouidah district. From 1976-1985 he was the head of the Division Action 
Coopérative at the head office of CARDER Atlantic in Cotonou. Among other duties 
and responsibilities which he had then were those regarding cooperatives, youth 
groups, credit, literacy training and rural media. He also said he had conducted 
some activities related to extension, development action planing, project manage-
ment, project evaluation, adult training etc. 
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7 joined the Zou CARDER at the end of 1988. I worked in the 'Service Etudes et 
Synthèses ' at the Directorate of Studies and Internal Evaluation (DSEI). From Septem-
ber 1989, 1 was appointed RDV. Coming to the Zou Province was my own choice. I 
wanted to come back home. I'm not a regionalist, but if the Zou Project (the WB Project 
conducted from 1983-1989) had been executed under the leadership of people native to 
this Province, I am sure that the results would have been better. 
Myself, with all my experience, I did not suspect that I should be appointed at village 
level. The former General Director thought I should fill this assignment as a punishment, 
but I didn't worry. As long as I am in this Province. He was prescribing activities we 
should undertake in the villages, but I said that nothing could be decided before we had 
discussed it with the people themselves. What the CARDER could now master and plan 
well were our living and working conditions in the village. Look where the Engineer of 
the village is living!' 
Tinguedjo was staying in a hut with two rooms, each no larger than 2.5 to 3.5 m 2 
area. Neither the floor nor the walls were cemented. For a table, he used a piece of 
wood of about lm x 50cm, placed on four wooden supports of about lm in height. 
He hardly had any utensils in the hut.18 
'But the General Director did not like my opinions and got very angry. He said to me: 
'I will step on you until you run away from this Province'. He said that to me on a 
Friday and went to Europe on a mission the following Tuesday. Before he came back a 
few days later, he had been moved from the Province. And I am still here!!'19 
Comments 
Three interrelated remarks can be made on the case of Tinguedjo. One concerns his 
training and the ways in which he managed to achieve his qualifications to become 
an engineer, which he presents here as being set right from the beginning of his 
professional training. The second aspect concerns his career development and the 
position he occupied, and his working conditions, which he relates to his qualifica-
tions. The third concerns how he presents his relations with his bosses and the ways 
in which he deals with the rules. 
The case of Tinguedjo is typical as far as his training and qualification itineraries 
are concerned. Many similar stories were reported to me from those recruited in the 
mid-seventies, a few months or years after the creation of the CARDERs. Tinguedjo 
pretends that his target was to become an engineer from the moment he entered the 
Sékou agricultural school. Training for upgrading (to engineer level) did not seem 
to have been a major target for agricultural staff before the early eighties, when the 
number of Ingénieurs agronomes coming straight from universities, the so-called 
Ingénieurs authentiques, started to increase so significantly that they were appointed 
in the districts as extension officers (RDR), heads of the district subdivision of 
CARDER, a position that up to then had been occupied by those who had graduated 
from the Lycée Agricole Mèdji de Sékou. The coming into the CARDERs of a new and 
younger generation of engineer agronomists had awakened the young staff of lower 
categories to the need for further training. The presence in Cotonou of a training 
centre for short and longer duration courses on cooperative studies made it possible 
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for the staff with basic cooperative training such as Tinguedjo, to try and reach the 
level of Ingenieur Agronome. Of the eight CARDER staff appointed as RDV in the 
villages of the Corrtrnunity Development Programme, three had attended most of 
the short term courses of the CPFC and of other schools outside Benin, two had had 
the opportunity to follow the four year post-graduate course (and were therefore 
classified as Ingenieur Agronome), while a third had passed the entrance examination 
to the CPFC in 1991 and had therefore quit the Community Development Program-
me. 
Corning to the issue of the position and occupation attributed to Tinguedjo within 
the CARDER, it should be mentioned that the pursuit of the engineer's degree is 
not an abstract wish to bear the title of agronomist. Apart from the hope of a salary 
increase (T am at Al-4'), it signified an expectation to have access to the position 
that engineer agronomists occupied at the time of deciding to pursue the qualifica-
tion. This brings us to the question of how this category of staff perceive themselves 
as village agents in the Community Development Programme, how the assignment 
fits into their own projects or how they adjust when it doesn't, or try to divert the 
programme so that it does serve their objectives. According to Tinguedjo, this 
assignment was a punishment from the General Director, to which he became 
resigned psychologically, since his being in the Zou Province was his most import-
ant objective and thus the rest was relatively unimportant. This type of discursive 
resistance to what some staff consider gratuitous brutality from the bosses, makes 
for a whole culture, mostly shared among staff of the same training level or who 
speak the same native language or adopt similar mystical practices. One finds the 
hope and the energy to withstand the brutality from statements such as Zaan be yio, 
zaan Se non wa ('cloudy mornings turn to clear evenings') or 'the office is for us 
not for him at Head Office, who will sooner or later be moved away by someone 
more powerful'. While such statements as these may remain passive resistance (as 
perhaps is the case of Tinguedjo), they may also indicate real action taken to get the 
boss, be he the General Director, or the District extension officer, removed from his 
post. These actions might involve networking or mystical types of prayers and 
practices. We cannot judge the efficacy of such actions for the end pursued, but 
what seems important is that they represent real social weapons for the people con-
cerned, who spend their time, energy and means on them. Most importantly, the 
boss (the officers) to whom these weapons are addressed are not indifferent to what 
they feel as a danger, since they adopt similar practices to protect themselves and 
escape the threat. On such occasions, they may resort to alliances and partnerships 
within their offices, but then qualifications will be of a very different order. For 
example, drivers, nightwatchmen, home gardeners or village agents might turn out 
to be the most efficient allies for a Minister, General Director or District officer. 
These situations end up influencing to some extent the working relations among the 
staff and thus show the statement of Tinguedjo to be an integral part of the culture 
of rural development intervention. Statements like that of Tinguedjo are often mixed 
with regionalist arguments, suggesting for instance that results would have been 
better if the Zou project had been executed under the leadership of people from the 
Province. The point about this ethno-regionalist type of argument is that it will be 
used, whether or not the officer in question belongs to the particular ethnic group 
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or comes from the region. Hence it can be used to make negative as well as positive 
comments. In this way, an official might be accused of not remembering that he is 
native of the area where he is working. In short, it consists of a kind of political 
argument that lends itself to usage in most situations. 
Also, Tinguedjo openly challenged the ministerial instruction and his bosses in 
the hierarchy for not living in the village, but just camping there. The bosses just let 
his comments go, either not being willing to enter into confrontation or simply not 
seeing the relevance of executing such an order that emanated from the Ministry. 
Nevertheless, even this silence enters into the routine of staff management practised 
by the bosses. As the hierarchical boss of the RDVs declared when I asked about the 
fate of a RDV who would not settle in the village: 
'It is not easy for everyone to comply with this prescription. Nevertheless, I have taken 
precautions to protect myself if a Ministry official, or the Minister himself happens to 
discover the case. In the report of every meeting, it is mentioned that I have reminded the 
RDVs that they should live in the villages otherwise they run the risk of severe sanctions. 
For the cases I know, I have sent memos to them, with a copy to the General Director, 
inviting them to settle in the village. I know they are not going to comply but as far as 
I am concerned, I have done my job.' 
As we shall later see with Asuka, the RDV in Togoudo (the second RDV of the same 
category as Tinguedjo), this was an opportunity for him to experiment with what 
he had learned in the previous years at the CPFC. He completed his cooperative 
training there in 1989 by submitting a thesis which was a project planned for 
peasant organisations. The third specialist of cooperatives declared that this was a 
good opportunity to read his previous notes on cooperatives and to try a few things 
directly with peasants on matters concerning peasant organisations, without having 
to apply for authorisation from any boss. Therefore, this appointment helped him, 
as he said, to prepare for his coming entrance examination to the CPFC. As I already 
indicated, he passed the exam later in 1991 and succeeded. 
It appears therefore that this category of staff have accepted and internalised in 
varying degrees their assignment as village agents on the Community Development 
Programme, even though it was only temporary. For Tinguedjo, the acceptance was 
rather passive, with resistance to the rules. As for the two others, they considered 
themselves in favourable positions where they could experiment with what they had 
learned at school. For the rest of the staff operating as village agents on the Com-
munity Development Programme, the situation was quite different, as is shown in 
cases 2 and 3. 
Case 2 Gbèdjèmin the cool: Should I quit or stay in this programme? 
Gbèdjèmin is much younger. He was born in 1958. He graduated from the Complexe 
Polytechnique Agricole de Sékou (the new name for the old Lycée Agricole Mèdji de 
Sékou) in 1985, in plant production. He was then recruited by the Ministry of Rural 
Development and was appointed at district level in the Zou Province where he 
worked on home gardens and nutrition. He obtained training on these matters at 
the Ouando training centre in 1986. He was in charge of the nursery of the CARDER 
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in the district, for the use of young gardeners, men and women, mostly organised 
in groups. These activities were linked to the Division of Food and Applied Nutri-
tion (DANA: Division de I 'Alimentation et de la Nutrition Appliquée) of the CARDER. 
They were not included as part of the project of Integrated Rural Development of 
the Zou Province and therefore Gbèdjèmin did not receive any allowances from the 
project, unlike all his colleagues in the district office. But things changed for him: 
'Later in 1987, 1 was moved to another district as head of a sub-district unit. There, I 
was paid allowances by the project. The amount paid was fairly good. But I do not know 
what I have done to them. They have just moved me from my position and put me at the 
DSEI, Direction du Suivi et de l'Evaluation Interne (the Directorate of Monitoring and 
Internal Evaluation). This was a joint action of the Deputy Director of Production and 
Head of Training and Extension Service. They brought one of their people from the 
Atacora Province directly to the sub-district unit which I was heading and to take over 
from me.20 Then, I was just sitting at the head office of the CARDER in Bohicon, 
without any job specification and so, again, without any advantage from the Zou project. 
From February to July 1989,1 was lucky that a DANA project came to the Zou Province. 
I was then detached to the project to take part in a nutritional survey in Abomey. After 
that, I was appointed to the Community Development Programme.' 
Gbèdjèmin seemed continually to have problems with the General Director. At 
RDVs' meetings, the Director would call to him while some other RDV was 
explaining the situation in his village: 'Eh Gbèdjèmin! what have you been doing 
since our last meeting?' More or less coherently and with shaking voice, Gbèdjèmin 
would then report on a women's group starting a garden, mothers of young 
children being trained in nutritional matters, discussions being conducted with 
villagers for the building of storehouses, markets etc. The General Director would 
not let him finish. He would scold him: 'Do you think these are the things you are 
sent to the village for? People in those villages earn lot of money from the cotton 
they produce and what is expected from you is just a question of helping them to 
spend their money properly, not to hide it underground and forget completely 
where it is, or keep it in their hut so that it burns whenever the hut burns by 
accident, or use it for getting more and more wives.' 
Gbèdjèmin explains that this animosity against him started when he was head of 
a sub-district unit. Then, the General Director of the CARDER was the Director of 
Monitoring and Internal Evaluation (DSEI) and used to visit the staff in the field to 
check whether they were doing the job according to the project plan and according 
to the internal plans of each district and sub-district unit. On those occasions, he 
used to mock and threaten staff that he would cut their allowances. But Gbèdjèmin 
says that he argued with him, because decisions of this kind had to be taken on the 
basis of technical indicators that were well known to everybody. And if he did not 
accept and stick to the guidelines, Gbèdjèmin would resort to the Deputy Director 
of Production, the hierarchical boss of Gbèdjèmin and who was at the same hier-
archical level as the DSEI. Also, if need be, people could complain to the General 
Director. 
'But now, he is the General Director, which is a political position. Now, he can take any 
decision he wants against you, because he is the paramount chief of the CARDER. That 
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is why I do not react to his provocations. In fact, he does not have any idea of what is 
happening in the villages. People here are suffering and he is sitting over there taking his 
dreams for reality, speaking of helping peasants to manage their incomes while many of 
these peasants operate their farms at a loss and lack food at some critical periods of the 
year.' 
Gbèdjèmirt says he has kept good contact with people in the Direction of Food and 
Applied Nutrition (DANA) and will go back there sooner or later, whether he gets 
allowances for working with them or not. He explains: 
'People have to think about tomorrow. I am still young and it is now that I have to 
prepare my future. I don't mind staying here in the village working with the people, so 
long as they find my presence useful. It is not a matter of allowances.' 
Comments 
At first sight these two cases depict confrontation between the field staff and the 
Director as to which activities are important in the programme. In most situations 
I have witnessed within this Community Development Programme, the General 
Director reacts to the reports of field staff with strong criticism, though there is in 
fact usually no direct confrontation on activities. Actually, one finds hardly any 
communication, let alone real argumentation on activities designed to improve 
institutional performance. My impression then was that what the bosses thought 
were important activities played no major role. Furthermore even when the subordi-
nates were to be doing exactly what the bosses thought best, the latter would still 
come up with alternative ideas, and criticisms. It was not so much the substance of 
what they said that was important, but rather the fact that criticising was considered 
necessary in this hierarchical relationship in order to underline authority relations 
and to keep subordinates in their place. Yet not all the criticisms of the General 
Director were simply gratuitous violence vis-à-vis field staff, as appears from the 
case of Gbèdjèmin. Obviously one comes to doubt the efficiency of some field staff, 
not just at reporting sessions (those are not really the places where one can obtain 
good insight into what is being done), but in the field. Nevertheless, from what I 
have witnessed of these altercations, a remarkable aspect was that the degree of 
violence exerted by the General Director depended more on the nature of the staff, 
their ability to react and argue with the bosses (or on other more concealed 
elements), than on the actual performance of the staff in the field. Hence we are here 
faced with a situation where, as van Dijk puts it, (technical) discourse is used for the 
(re)production and challenge of dominance (van Dijk 1993: 249). 
Van Dijk argues that the link between discourse and dominance passes through 
the social cognitions of dominated people. Some elites who have access to particular 
communicative means (in this case, situations in which the staff had to listen to the 
bosses), use these to produce texts and models that are stored and memorised by 
the dominated and which end up influencing their cognitive patterns such as their 
opinions, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values. Van Dijk conceives of social 
communication and power relations as entailing situations in which elites produce 
discourse and power while receivers worship the discourse and effectively internal-
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ize it. None of the cases presented above fit with such analysis. Though it is obvious 
that the production of such discourse stems from a will to express domination, I 
could not see in the staff any attitude akin to being passive receivers, even in the 
case of Gbèdjèmin. Contrary to the point made by van Dijk I could find no evidence 
for his suggestion that 'social representations deriving from discourse sustain domi-
nance' (1993: 263). Instead, what we see here from the two cases presented is the 
production of passive or active resistance to authority. 
Another point that seems important to my view, and clearly shown in the case 
of Gbèdjèmin, is the issue of extra allowances paid by the project. These are of 
different sorts - 'prime de responsabilité, prime de suggestion, carburant et entretien 
moyen de transport, complément de salaire etc. '. Within the Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Project these provided the means by which a supplement to the salary was 
paid to those staff involved. The same scheme was used for offering incentives to 
RDVs. Such incentives usually play a major role in the realisation of their life 
projects, an element far more important than the normal salary of the staff. Indeed, 
as staff used to stress (and I personally have some experience in this), the regular 
salary is hardly enough to meet current basic needs (i.e. food, health, clothing and 
children's schooling), let alone for investment in the purchase of houses, cars, and 
so forth. To achieve these requires being involved in a development project and 
holding on to a position that guarantees access to these extras, although at the same 
time, such strategies conflict with the prospects for future career development, 
especially for younger staff. The apparent ambiguity in the statements of the RDV 
in case 2 concerning his willingness to remain in the programme, and at the same 
time, being prepared to join DANA ('because people have to think about tomor-
row') point to the degree of uncertainty faced by this specific category of staff 
about the future. The following case sheds more light on how this category of staff 
experiences what I personally see as a dramatic situation. 
Case 3 AniSie: I want to quit... but is that good for the career? 
AniSie graduated in 1985 as Ingénieur Agronome in the field of animal husbandry, 
after six years of training in agricultural science at the National University of Benin 
(Faculty of Agricultural Sciences) and the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. He was 
then 27 years old. In the Community Development Programme he was the only one 
to have studied straight through from primary school to the engineering degree (of 
the Ingénieur authentique category). He was recruited in 1985 by the Ministry of Rural 
Development and appointed to the animal production division of Zou CARDER. 
Among other activities, he organised training sessions for the animal health and 
husbandry field staff. In 1987, he had the opportunity to attend a training session 
on milk processing in Bostswana, and in 1988 he followed a one-month course on 
rural extension and cooperatives in Canada.21 During the same year, he showed 
some interest in the Research and Development project of the Zou Province and 
participated in some workshops organised by the project team. In 1989, apparently 
against his wishes, he was appointed to the Community Development Programme 
as RDV. During the first weeks of our contact in the village in which he was 
working, I got the impression that AniSie was proud of his work and was deter-
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mined to do his best for the success of the programme in the village. A short time 
later, when we were better acquainted, I received a very different impression.22 
When our contact became close,23 he tried to explain to me that being at village 
level was too low a level to make any significant contribution to the development 
of the area, and that he could be more effective if he was RDR (head of the district 
extension office). Then, once he felt that I was convinced by his reasoning, he 
suggested that I contact the Minister of Rural Development on his behalf.24 A few 
days earlier, during one of our conversations, I got to know that Anioie's wife was 
the daughter of an elder brother of Mr.X, a high ranking and influencial staff 
member of the Zou CARDER. So when he asked me to contact the Minister for him, 
I said: 
'But Mr.X, is your in-law. You shouldn't worry at all. I suppose he can appoint you 
to any post you like. You just have to ask for itl' 
He replied 
'Things are not that simple. This man is unpredictable and can say that I am lazy. He 
is my in-law but he is also my boss and one never knows what position he will occupy 
in the future in the Ministry. I don't want to give him the impression that I am 
incapable of executing missions he gives me or that he cannot trust me. The problem is 
that one cannot do much in this village without minimum access to external funding and 
an adequate means of transport. Whenever I organise a trip for peasants, I never obtain 
a car from the head office or the district office. In the end, peasants here don't trust me 
any more and I feel that I am wasting my time. 
So you want me to contact the Minister whenever I can. Perhaps I could tell him that a 
zootechnician colleague of mine is misused in the Zou Province and then I could ask him 
if he could do something about it.' 
He agreed. I was to go to Cotonou a few days later. But the very day of my depar-
ture he came to me and said suddenly: 
'In fact, it is question of efficiency, my suggesting to be moved from the village. You 
should know that most young zootechnicians complain about the veterinary doctors. But, 
according to older ones who already have good positions in the Ministry, the younger 
zootechnicians complain because they don't want to work. I wouldn't like the Minister 
to put me in that category. He might also send me to a zootechnical service that lacks 
working means, and where I would certainly have to fight against veterinary doctors. I 
am getting old and that would be another waste of time for me. I suggest that you don't 
speak at all about this problem to the Minister. I prefer to stay here in the village, in my 
'hole'.' 
During the following days and weeks, we talked about activities in the village, 
concerning discussions he was having with peasants on various issues (e.g. food dis-
tribution, decisions over the use of the communal resources of the village, and 
construction of the village road) and about many other things. But I was surprised 
that he no longer complained about being in the village. In the meantime, his wife 
had left for Cotonou and Porto-Novo, for a 'mission for me over there', he said, 
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which could have been anything (including contacting people in her own family for 
the career situation of AniSie). Later, I had the opportunity to discuss the issue with 
Cewe, the CARDER staff member working at head office and who was in charge of 
the monitoring of the Community Development Programme. I had followed him on 
a week's tour around each of the RDVs in the eight villages of the programme. We 
had ended the tour with AniSie. AniSie and Cewe had a long discussion on the 
assistance that the CARDER should give to the programme.25 On our way back to 
Bohicon, I asked Cewe what impressions he had of AniSie. He replied: 
'The problem with AniSie is that he won't make a clear decision as to whether he wants 
to stay in the programme or not. His wife also exerts strong pressure on him. She is 
taking courses on computer software in Cotonou, and it certainly won't be in this village 
that she will find a job. She grew up in Porto-Novo, so for her village life is simply 
unbearable. But Anièie does not know which position would give him the best prospect 
for his career. But a man should not be blown this way and that by the wind and chance. 
You have to make a decision and stand by the consequences.'21' 
A few months later, AniSie was moved to the Borgou Province (a Province known 
for being prosperous for its cotton production, actually the biggest cotton producer 
in Benin) on a FAO-UNDP project for the development of animal production in the 
province. 
Comments 
AniSie felt frustrated by the role the 'CARDER' (meaning the bosses of the 
organisation) were playing in the Community Development Programme. If one 
considers the training opportunities AniSie had already had after no more than four 
years of working experience and his family connections with the General Director, 
one could suppose that he had significant support at a high level of the bureaucracy 
in the Ministry of Rural Development (the gossip mtimated this also). With that, and 
the fact that he was the only so-called Ingenieur authentic among the RDVs of the 
Zou Province, one could assume that his appointment as RDV was not forced upon 
him as had been the case with Tinguedjo. We might then assume that AniSie had 
most probably been enthusiastic about the programme when he first started in the 
village. His frustrations originated from his discovery that, contrary to what had 
been promised, no support could be expected from the 'CARDER' apart from 
monitoring and control. Despite his many visits to the head office to invite subject 
matter specialists to the village (located at some 90 kilometres from the head office, 
which he had to cover on his motorbike, 'rain or shine', he said), none of them 
ever arrived, though they always made firm promises and booked precise appoint-
ments with him. He felt that he no longer had any credibility with the villagers. 
'They don't trust the CARDER any more' he said. The General Director was 
aware of these difficulties faced by the RDVs which had to do with the management 
of the staff at the head offices. But apparently, he did not take this seriously, though 
it was contradictory to the monitoring pressure he put on the RDV. In fact, this 
points, apart from the chaotic staff management style27 in the CARDER, to the 
conflicts, the difference of priorities and therefore, the different and contradictory 
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ways in which the Community Development Programme was used by the different 
actors involved. Field staff became discouraged and pessimistic. Anioie had the 
feeling that he was wasting his time, which seemed typical for younger staff. 
Contrary to the impression one got from Cewe, AniSie was not special at all in 
his hesitations or his apparent shilly-shallying about his career after he became 
disillusioned with the programme, and its fit with his interests (technical as much 
as material). Similar preoccupations are found at high levels of the bureaucracy and, 
in most cases, such people appeared to be at a loss, without any idea of where to 
go and what to expect, even those who have 'godfathers' in the system. In his 
attempt to handle this situation, AniSie argued about efficiency, the geographical 
scope of his action and subsequent working means, suggesting that with the 
experience he now had, he could perform well if he was appointed as RDR (District 
Extension Officer). This better suited his career and material expectations (apart 
from housing and a few other advantages, RDRs were allocated a car). 
The process described above (involving the political and gymnastic management 
of staff to the disillusionment of field staff and the reworking of their interests) 
shows that the personal interests of staff get entangled with technical arguments in 
shaping the everyday reality of policy making and implementation in the field of 
rural development. But now it is time to turn to the experts and the representatives 
of funding agencies for an appreciation of their role in these processes. 
Funding agencies and experts: The money and the language 
First, it is necessary to emphasise that no funding agency or external expert was 
involved permanently in the Community Development Programme. A few small 
field activities had been supported very marginally by some agencies but the 
programme remained mainly an affair of the CARDER. Also, the UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme) had appointed three United Nations Volunteers 
in three villages of the programme. There was little interaction to record therefore 
between CARDER staff and experts or representatives of funding agencies on which 
to ground the following discussions. Nevertheless, one cannot fully treat the issue 
of policy making and implementation in the field of rural development in Benin 
without looking at the significant role played by funding agencies in the allocation 
of means and in the making of the language and rhetoric used in development 
intervention. 
As I explained in the previous chapter, at Independence the state inherited and 
appropriated the colonial frame of rural development and made few attempts to 
change it. In fact, the room for such change was very limited. The state did not 
possess the tools for such a policy change. In the colonial period, native agricultural 
officials were confined to auxiliary positions. Furthermore, the agricultural education 
system provided no chance for higher agricultural training than the one year at 
primary school level. The first agricultural secondary school was created in 1961 
(after Independence) with the assistance of funds from Switzerland, while the Benin 
Faculty of Agriculture opened only in the early seventies. At the same time, access 
to the regional agricultural schools of Ivory Coast, Senegal and Cameroon was very 
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selective. Also, in terms of agricultural research in the French colonies, all the local 
research stations were antennae of metropolitan research institutes whose main 
offices were located in France, where research policy was set and research pro-
grammes designed, according to French interests and priorities. Research develop-
ment thus largely depended upon the metropolis. And this situation persisted for 
more than a decade after Independence (see Mongbo 1988). In any case, as indicated 
in Chapter 3, until 1972, the ruling elite were not really willing to take any initiative 
or risk of stepping away from the Mère Patrie. Another situation inherited from the 
colonial period was an overmanned administrative apparatus, with the return of the 
Dahomean auxiliaries from other African countries where they had served as 
colonial functionaries. The numbers more than doubled during the revolutionary 
period, from 9,236 in 1972 to 29,000 in 1980 and to 47,163 in 1986 (CMEP 1993: 9). 
The salary costs incurred put the state under constant pressure to earn revenue to 
meet at least part of these expenses. 
Like their counterparts in the general state bureaucracy, the staff of the agricul-
tural services developed quiet, easy-going and risk-free attitudes, with the prospect 
of no less than 30 secure years of work.28 The general culture is one of clinging to 
the state in order to benefit from the wealth it redistributes, and the other opportun-
ities and perks that may be derived from holding government office. Since very little 
wealth is generated by the national economy, attention is turned more towards 
external development aid. In such conditions, the funding agencies and their 
representatives play an important role as providers of, or intermediaries for, access-
ing external sources of revenue. 
In the field of rural development, financial assistance is usually associated with 
development intervention to which the staff must adjust and whose language and 
practices have to be incorporated to some extent into the rituals of the organisation 
involved. One such example, since the early eighties, has been the notorious World 
Bank Training and Visit system in most CARDERs, due to the presence of a World 
Bank financed project. The T&V system was (and still is) presented as a good 
extension system for technology transfer that brings existing technologies to farmers 
in relevant technological packages, while providing a feedback channel through 
which farmers' assessments of the packages can reach subject matter specialists 
and, if needed, researchers. The T&V was also seen as an efficient and powerful 
management tool in the hands of senior staff for the monitoring and control of the 
activities of field staff.29 
In addition to the T&V system, the GTZ (Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammen-
arbeit, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation) was operating in the Atlantic 
Province and in many small-scale projects in the country, with the famous ZOPP 
(Zielorientierten Projektplanung, Objective-Oriented Project Planning). This is assumed 
to be a method for participatory and comprehensive project planning. The problem 
at issue is analyzed from all angles (using a problem tree), possible solutions and 
interventions are identified together with hypotheses as to their relevance in solving 
the problem and then negotiated among the parties involved (see Venghaus 1993 for 
a critical analysis of the Zopp method). 
The mid-eighties saw the beginning of Farming Systems Research (FSR) in Benin, 
with the launching of one such programme of research by the Faculty of Agricul-
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tural Sciences on the Adja plateau in the Mono Province, and the SAFGRAD projects 
in the North. The FSR process starts with the diagnosis of farming situations and the 
identification of 'recommendation domains' (i.e. groups of male and female 
peasants considered socially, economically and technically homogenous for a given 
problem). Possible solutions are then looked for in research stations (locally or 
abroad), tested in researcher- and in farmer-managed trials, before the technical 
package is designed for extension campaigns. This new research approach was 
expected to bring changes in the organisation and practices of agricultural research 
in Benin, while helping to devise more relevant technical packages for peasants. 
The staff of the Mono, Atlantic and Zou CARDERs, as well as the researchers of 
the DRA (Direction de la Recherche Agronomique), incorporated both the good and the 
bad aspects of this new approach into the organisational chart and operation of their 
institutions, using the terminology suggested by the experts, who also acted as the 
intermediaries for fund raising and/or as technical advisers for the implementation 
of the projects. In the Mono Province, the project was called RAMR (Recherche 
Appliquée en Milieu Réel), in the Zou Province, R&D (Projet de Recherche-Développe-
ment), and in the Atlantic Province, ESYCTRA (Etude des Systèmes de Cultures 
Traditionnelles). Each of these projects were differently anchored to the national 
research system and to the extension system of the Province where it operated (see 
Mongbo 1989; Floquet 1994). All these projects were closed by 1989, with the 
exception of the RAMR project that had established a Cellule Nationale de Recherche 
Développement at the Directorate of Agricultural Research. RAMR even expanded its 
activities all over the Zou Province (taking over the closed Zou R&D project), with 
extra funding from the World Bank. 
From 1993, after the closure of most previous projects and the beginning of the 
IMF-World Bank project for the restructuring of agricultural services in the country, 
the staff became rapidly used to the new organisational chart and to the new 
denominations of the hierarchical positions of the organisational structure, as well 
as the extension methods. Like the previous ones, the new organisational charts 
were designed to be the same for all six Provinces, as also were the activities and 
the approaches. According to the planners of this restmcturing, there was to be a 
completely new and different organisation for intervention due to changes in the 
assignment of the CARDERs. The new orientation stipulated that the CARDER 
would give up all cash-earning activities (e.g. cotton marketing, seed production) 
and stick to extension, assisting peasant organisations and advising on rural equip-
ment and aménagement. Hence, a new organisational chart was designed to fit to the 
new orientation. But for the CARDER staff, what happened was apparently more 
a change in denomination than any thing else. Time and again, the new structure 
was presented to me in the following way: 
"The denomination of most of the various positions have changed: the DSEI (Directeur 
du Suivi et de l'Evaluation Interne) became DPSE (Directeur de la Planification, du 
Suivi et de l'Evaluation). The DPro (Directeur de la Production), became DVAOP 
(Directeur de la Vulgarisation et de l'Appui aux Organisations Paysannes), the DGR 
(Directeur du Génie Rural) became DAER (Directeur de l'Aménagement et de 
l'Equipement Rural). The C/SS (Chef Sous-Secteur) became Sup (Superviseur) while the 
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AVA (Agent de Vulgarisation Agricole), the village extension agent, became APV (Agent 
Polyvalent de Vulgarisation).' 
In most cases, and to reinforce the confusion, staff members remained in their 
positions (the former Director of Production was the new DVAOP, and so forth). As 
for extension methods, the former GCE (Groupes de Contact et d'Expérimentation) 
became GC (Groupe de Contact) while the PV (Parcelle de Vulgarisation) became PD 
(Parcelle de Démonstration) etc. These became standardised all over the country. The 
most astonishing aspect of the whole thing was the ability of the staff to shift from 
one dmomination to the other. Within no more than one to two weeks, people were 
using the new terminology as easily as one would say 'dad' or 'mam'. Contrary 
to what I first thought, it was not just a matter of simplifying the presentation to me 
(as an outsider) by making reference to the former structure. It entailed the staff 
simplifying the new arrangements for themselves, incorporating them into their 
frame of reference and operating with them. Also, they had already assimilated the 
'new' T&V approach, adopting the renewed rhetoric of 'participatory diagnosis' 
and 'peasant organisation'. 
In this process of assimilation, staff mostly sought ways to reproduce and adapt 
their practices, while using a new terrrtinoiogy inspired by a different approach. The 
process seemed to work as well for village field staff as for the bosses at head 
offices. For example, at field staff training sessions on new approaches conducted 
by staff of a higher level (whose mastery of the new approach was mostly doubtful), 
it was often reported that when some field staff (especially those on the job for years 
already) asked questions on how the new methods could best be applied (mostly as 
a subtle way of criticising the approach and mdicating its lack of feasibility), trainers 
ended up by saying: 
'You are not newcomers in this business and you know very well how these things 
work... The newly recruited staff should be the ones asking such questions, while you 
should be those advising them.' 
The staff working at the various hierarchical levels of the CARDERs (from the 
Directors to the village agents) seem to have developed, of course each of them in 
his own way, the skill of absorbing, processing and retrieving any intervention 
rhetoric from above, especially those from the experts and the representatives of 
funding agencies. In this process of language manipulation, local staff did not limit 
themselves to the internalisation and the reproduction of a cognitive order that 
would maintain them under the power and dominance of expatriates and funding 
agencies (van Dijk 1993). Rather their assimilation and reproduction of intervention 
approaches and practices became strategic in the sense that it allowed them to match 
their career and life projects with those of the individual experts, and therefore to 
profit from these circumstances for their own interests, at least during the life-time 
of the project, and in some cases longer. As shown above, they were particularly 
prolific in recent years in rhetoric, intervention approaches, methods and devices. 
For the staff of intervention organisations, funding agencies and their representatives 
were seen as 'new means and approaches'. Indeed, this was apparently a charac-
teristic of this specific category of actors,30 justified by their direct exposure to so-
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called scientific comrnirnities and the like, and therefore to the general and changing 
trends in development debates. In the end, with their requirements, conditionahties, 
intervention approaches and devices, funding organisations and their experts have 
obtained an important share in the development of rural development language and 
practice. This has been used in intervention organisations and often presented by 
the staff of intervention institutions since the early sixties as 'state policy' for rural 
development. 
It is worth noting here that the phrase 'funding organisations and their represen-
tatives' is used in its very broad sense. In fact, for most staff, there is hardly any 
difference between the expatriate expert (mostly white), be he technical assistant or 
head of project, and the funding agency. It does not seem to matter whether the 
expatriate acts as a local representative of the funding agency or belongs to a 
contracting agency or is simply an individual recruited for the implementation of 
the project. As long as he is an expatriate in the project, whether or not the one 
deciding on (or administering) the allocation of the project's means, he is assumed 
to have more direct (or indirect) contact with the fund providers. When the expatri-
ate is aware of this power position attributed to him, he manipulates the rules set 
by the funding agency in order to negotiate the direction of the operations and try 
to get things done the way he wants them to be done. In both cases, the project staff 
simply consider him as the bailleur defonds. That expatriates (and through them the 
organisations they represent in the projects) have played important roles in what can 
now be considered as Benin rural development policies, is not a statement out of 
nowhere. Let us briefly consider just two indicative elements. First, as individuals, 
the expatriates are not fundamentally different from local staff. Like the latter, they 
are concerned with career and with material and non-material achievements. They 
too have their own 'projects' (Bierschenk 1988), and hardly have to negotiate them 
in the arena of the formal project, since staff at various hierarchical levels are aware 
of the types of cornmitments these experts have to the projects and their moral 
obligation towards the project, their organisation or their employer. Second is about 
the funding organisation or the consultancy or technical assistance organisation that 
has contracted the implementation of the project. Just as the CARDER, this organis-
ation is in search for self-reproduction and staying in the field of rural development. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the staff of these organisations happen to take 
leading roles in the intervention, to make sure that it serves their own development, 
thereby influencing the strategies used by the local staff for adjusting to the new 
rhetoric and approach. In this way, all these actors (experts and locals of all levels) 
experiment and create in the field the practices of rural development, while operat-
ing in the context of the frames and structures historically produced in the process 
of state formation in Benin. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to highlight three major elements (institutions, categories 
of actors and circumstances) involved in the making of intervention policies for 
agricultural and rural development in Benin. First was the state, its need to 
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materialise its authority throughout the country, and its increasing need for revenue 
to pay for the heavy salary and overhead expenses, which makes it dependent on 
two main traditional sources of revenue: export crops and funding agencies.31 
Second were the staff of the institutions involved in interventions for agricultural 
and rural development, and their search for careers and self-achievement. Third 
were the funding agencies, their representatives and the experts, together with their 
ever changing rhetoric. They are also concerned with surviving in the field of 
development intervention and with their career and self-achievement. Not much 
empirical material was provided to illustrate the part played by experts and repre-
sentatives of funding agencies in the field of rural development in Benin. Instead I 
have tried to show the ways in which the everyday making of discourse and 
practices by Beninese staff involved different and complex layers of the social 
realities of intervention contexts, in which expatriates have a significant role. It 
appears that what is rationalised by the various actors as the rural development 
policy of the institution or state results from a consensus built out of cacophonic, 
non-dialogical social interactions between various categories of actors. Their personal 
interests (for power, career, material resources, room for manoeuvre, coping with 
family pressure, life projects etc.) become entangled with technical arguments, which 
together shape the everyday reality of policy discourse and practice. The previous 
chapter underscored how these three elements evolved historically, with the frame 
for social interaction in matters of rural development being largely set before the 
end of the colonial period. But, as I have indicated above, I question the link, sug-
gested by some scholars preoccupied with the critical analysis of discourse, between 
discourse and dominance. I disagree, to some extent, with the thesis that elites, who 
have access to particular communicative means, use them to produce texts and 
models that are stored and memorised by the dominated that end up influencing 
their cognitive patterns such as opinions, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values. 
But to take this a step further, I will explore in the following chapters the actual 
implementation of the Community Development Project in a village context, looking 
more systematically at the interactions of the project scheme with the lifeworlds of 
stakeholders, including those of the state agents in charge of the implementation. 
Notes 
1 This specific category (the military) might not be considered an important one or as a separate body 
at all in modern Western European States. In most Third World countries, however, the military are a 
determining factor which any political actor must take account of, one way or another, which again 
underlines the need for a culturally contextualised approach to the concept of the state. 
2 Dahomey was famous for the numerous administrative auxiliaries it produced and 'exported' to the 
other West and Central African countries for the expansion of colonial administrations in these areas. 
They were involved in territorial administration but were also teachers, medical auxiliaries, doctors and 
engineers. The success of Dahomeans in integrating and miming the colonial auxiliary bureaucracy in 
West Africa earned them the flattering qualification of the 'Latin quarter of Africa'. A few years after 
the independence of those countries, Dahomean workers were repatriated back to their country and most 
of them were absorbed by the state as civil servants. The French government promised to contribute 
yearly to filling the budget deficit caused by returning colonial civil servants (see Ronen 1975). 
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3 According to some compilations, development aid to Benin is as high as 75 percent of official resources 
of the state. This ratio is 90 percent for Burkina Faso and only 2 percent for Nigeria (see Bierschenk and 
Elwert 1993: 12). 
4 A common saying of the RDVs who had the possibility to make such contacts was 'Zinwo 80 meta meta 
WE Un y'ayi gbo me' which means "The monkey says we will go as a troupe to harvest the bean field, 
but each must look to his own head if the bean field owner appears'. But not everybody had skills or 
protectors to help them on that particular occasion of restructuration. And if they had, not all of them 
wanted people to know that they were running, or the precautions they were taking. Those people then 
play the hard done by, the fatalists, saying 'Nature did not provide all animals with a tail. For those 
who have no tail, Nature itself takes care of chasing flies from their back' (kanlin emaSo sia eyo, gbe we 
no yan sukpo ninyi). 
5 This former RDV (Omioke) completed, about 15 years ago, a basic training in fishery at secondary 
school level but had hardly ever practised it. After his basic training, he received some in-service training 
on cooperative matters, which he practised for more than 10 years, always in areas where there was no 
fishing activity. With the restructuring of the CARDERs, the authorities tried to rescue as many staff as 
possible from being pushed out by the rules set by the IMF. Once the new structure of the CARDER was 
established and the job descriptions drawn up for each post, anyone without the required profile would 
be dismissed. The strict requirement of the IMF and World Bank before funding the project was that from 
the 4,916 people in jobs in the six CARDERs in 1990, 3,202, under different headings (more than 60 
percent) would have to go by 1993 (retirement: 271; voluntary redundancy with some compensation: 341; 
closing of short term contracts: 398; leaving the CARDERs but remaining state agents: 298; forced to quit 
so that the efficiency of these agencies could be improved, départ ciblé: 1,894). But these rules were suitably 
twisted, to the extent that someone who had worked for 17 successive years as an accounting agent, now 
exhibited his school diploma in extension and was appointed as a specialist in ox-ploughing. As the 
budget of the new project provided in-service training, these staff were expected to catch up with the 
necessary skills. For the 3,202 staff who were supposed to quit jobs by 1993, the bargaining continues to 
the present day, especially with regard to the category of départ ciblé. 
6 The metaphor here is of the water carrier who fetches water from the river or the well in a clay pot on 
the head. But the pot is generally too big to put it on the head without help. No helper wants to bend 
to the ground to give help, so the water carrier (usually a woman) manages to take the pot from the 
ground up to the knee or hip, before people help to put the pot on her head. This metaphor is very much 
used by village agents in the presentation of projects or activities for which so-called 'participation' 
of the 'target-groups' is requested. 
7 A na 8'ahuan me Vena wa gba mi a, he said, which translates as 'you cannot be in an army that 
would invade me'. 
8 Which means that people remain silent about the issue, wait for a few seconds after the man has 
finished speaking and then start a different subject. This is one of the ways junior staff deal with seniors 
when they don't agree with their point of view. 
9 At this meeting, on the Benin side, were the two most high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Rural 
Development, together with the General Director of the Atlantic CARDER. The GTZ was represented by 
its Benin-stationed staff and two officials who arrived from Germany for the purpose. The Deputy 
Director of the CARDER who monitored the mission in the field was not there. He was probably not 
high-ranking enough to attend. The General Director did not really try to argue the proposition to pass 
the project to the PGRN, and the Ministry officials did not comment on it. After all, for the latter it was 
no loss, as long as the project remained within the Ministry of Rural Development. For the General 
Director of CARDER, it was a big disappointment. 
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10 He was new in the CARDER. He had worked for the past 10 years (or more) as a researcher in plant 
production at the Institute of Agricultural Research. He was appointed General Director of the Atlantic 
CARDER only in 1992. 
11 Official classification of the Ministry of Rural Development distinguishes 18 different categories 
according to level of training and domain of specialisation (see MDR 1993). But, for a(irrdnistrative 
purposes (appointments, financial affairs etc), the categories used do not exceed four or five: Ingénieur 
du Développement Rural (IDR), Inspecteurs du Développement Rural, Contrôleurs du Développement 
Rural (CDR), Agents Techniques du Développement Rural (ATDR), and Assistants du Développement 
Rural (ADR). 
12 The number of administrative support staff (administration and financial affaire, secretaries, drivers 
etc) has not been counted in this total. There are 129 in this category. 
13 In this respect, I found the Mexican case of agricultural bureaucrats described by Alberto Arce very 
similar to the Benin agricultural staff. Discussing bureaucratic culture, Arce presents the routine in a 
District office over a 'normal working day' (Arce 1993: 54-57). The rhythm of day there (time and 
occupation sequences) is almost the same (except for the official working hours), including the content 
of the staff meetings, the gossip and the jokes. For the Benin case, one thing can be added about memos 
coming from the Head Office. Most District officers complain that all these memos claim to be urgent and 
required that 'toutes activités cessantes', that all other activities cease until the request is satisfied, and 
always within a prescribed time limit (48 or 72 hours, usually never more). Most District officers would 
say 'Some days, you receive one of these orders in the morning that has to be replied to in 48 hours, 
'toutes activités cessantes', and in the afternoon, you receive another order, also from the same Head 
Office, again 'toutes activités cessantes'. You really feel like dropping the first request for the second but 
you can't. You keep on operating like a fireman with an eternal fire'. Sometimes these memos ask for 
the same records or are simply contradictory in their requests, 'ordre et contre ordre'. Another difference 
with the Mexican case is the care field staff take in sending non-contradictory records to the Head Office. 
For the situations I have documented in the Zou Province, the field staff do not bother at all. But this has 
probably something to do with the fact that the project there was no longer in its hottest phase when 
things had to be done carefully to avoid being fired. The project was over and the production of coherent 
documents was no longer considered important, either by District staff, or by those at Head Office. 
14 The question I generally asked was: 'what training did you have?' (Quelle est votre formation?). The 
question was asked in different contexts: sometimes I would simply accompany the staff member in a 
specific activity with some villagers concerning agricultural techniques or organisational matters such as 
clearing the path to the farms, the village drinking water well, sanitation in the village etc. In other cases, 
I might talk to staff who would tell me how they started the job in the village, what activities they were 
carrying out with the villagers and why. In many cases (especially with those who were recruited at a 
lower qualification level than their present one), this single question was enough to obtain a full 
curriculum vitae of the interviewee: basic training, work experiences, and on the job training. These latter 
data were normally presented with a lot of pride, indicating that the achievement had been a challenge. 
Most probably, my very person, as an graduate engineer from the Benin University Faculty of Agriculture 
and member of the teaching staff of the same Faculty, played a role in their prolixity. Sometimes, I got 
the impression that the person was not speaking to me as a researcher, but as one of the so-called 
'Ingénieurs authentiques ', emphasising the qualifications that made him a full engineer, and his seniority 
and experience that made him more efficient in the field (sur le terrain) than the so-called authentic ones. 
Every time this happened, I tried to avoid the debate and take distance with regard to the issue. 
15 One criterion introduced by the revolutionary regime for the promotion of civil servants in general 
was 'militantisme révolutionnaire'. For many persons this meant that you had to become a member (at 
least formally) of one of the local structures of the party or the government (CDR, UNSTB, OFRB, OJRB 
CRAD, etc.). A common saying used in CARDER then was that 'if you want to eat with dogs you have 
to bark as they do' (Il faut aboyer avec les chiens pour pouvoir manger avec eux) 
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16 DESCOOP stands for Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures en action Coopérative: a four-year university level 
training in cooperatives that is conducted in the CPFC, the Centre Panafricain de Formation Cooperative in 
Cotonou, Benin. 
17 According to him, this was a decision taken by the CAMES: Conseil Africain et Malgache pour 
l'Enseignement Supérieur that had approved the DESCOOP diploma as equivalent to DUES: Diplôme 
Universitaire d'Etudes Spéciales or to DEA : Diplôme d'Etude Approfondies , post-graduate diplomas, 
preparatory to a doctorate degree in French universities. 
18 Later I understood that, contrary to the instructions received from the Minister through the General 
Director of the CARDER, he did not live in the village, which is some 30 kilometres from Bohicon, the 
city where the head offices of CARDER-Zou were located and where he was working before he was 
assigned to the village. He was living in Bohicon with his family and used to visit the village daily. I 
visited him a few times in Bohicon. Once I asked him: 'But look, you are not going by the rules of the 
Ministry. What if your bosses get to know that you don't live in the village as prescribed?' He 
answered sharply, 'Do you think they don't know that I am not living in the village? With my age and 
working experience I should not be tortured anymore. I have a family and, you can see, children at 
primary and secondary schools. E non kpo bo non yifa a, meaning that it is not when one grows old that 
one should receive rules and interdicts from the Fah (the divination) on how one has to live one's life. 
19 I do not think Tinguédo pretended that he had contributed to the moving of the General Director out 
of the province. For the staff, these types of concours de circonstances are instead attributed to fate or 
invulnerability. 
20 These kinds of situations were rather exceptional and did not correspond to the known rules. But they 
did occur and were object of much comment and argument among the staff, especially when they 
happened to engineers in sensitive job positions. From 1975 (when the CARDERs were created) to 1984 
the assignment of any staff at any level to any position in the CARDERs all over the country was done 
at the ministry level. After 1984 only General Directors and Deputy Directors of CARDERs were 
appointed by the Minister. It was up to the General Director to ensure internally the management of his 
staff, especially those at sub-district levels. The Minister could appoint staff to a CARDER but no further. 
He would not appoint the staff to specific positions within the CARDER: that was the responsibility of 
the General Director. Therefore, for a staff member to come from a province and be appointed directly 
to sub-district level and take over from another staff member who had not requested to move, was quite 
unusual. 
21 People commented that he was too new to the job (only three years) to be given such opportunities 
when there were staff with the same qualifications who had been working for more than five years who 
had not yet had the chance to attend courses abroad. 
22 I was probably predisposed to thinking well of AniSie on my first encounter with him in the village 
for the following reason. In the section involving my encounter with the Community Development 
Programme in Chapter 1,1 mentioned that I met some young men who were on their way to the Covè 
rice production training centre. One of these young men asked me if it was a new trend for akowe (white 
collar intellectuals) to work in the villages. He asked if I knew AniSie. Of course I did. We had graduated 
the same year from the same Faculty and had met again in Wageningen, Holland, in 1988 when we were 
both following postgraduate courses. The young man told me that AniSie had chosen to live in the village 
and work with them. He voiced great enthusiasm and optimism and said how appreciated he was by the 
whole village. Therefore, when I first visited AniSie, my attitude and questions must have reflected this 
positive impression of his presence and work in the village. He went along with this and showed me the 
notebook/diary he kept for recording the major happenings of the village. I later sent him an encouraging 
letter commenting that he was going through a very special experience from which he would learn a lot. 
Later I realised that if I had shown more neutrality or if I had been negative about his being in the 
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village, his game of presenting himself as a determined and enthusiastic RDV might not have taken place, 
or, at least, it would not have lasted so long. 
23 I often stayed in his house for days, then followed most of his contacts with the villagers. His house 
was his office and the people in the village had made an appatam right in front of the house for his 
meetings with peasants and visitors. We also drove to Cotonou together now and then. 
24 This was late 1990. The National Conference had already taken place and Kerelcou's government was 
out, and so was the Minister of Rural Development who had initiated the Commumty Development Pro-
gramme. The transitory government was established, with the former Dean of the Faculty of Agricultural 
Sciences, under which AniSie had graduated, as Minister of Rural Development. Moreover, the Minister 
was a zootechnician like AniSie and knew him well. But AniSie did not dare to go directly to the Minister 
himself. The reason why he hoped I would be able to intervene was that the Minister still remained at 
that moment the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture of the Benin University. As a junior lecturer in the 
Faculty I had a direct informal access to the Minister for issues regarding the faculty. What AniSie 
expected was that I could use one of these occasions to introduce his problem to the Minister. 
25 According to AniSie, there were three types of role that the CARDER could play: control, monitoring 
and finally technical and financial assistance. 'But, the CARDER limits itself to control and hardly does 
any monitoring. As for financial assistance, it is nil'. 
26 At the time, I did not pay attention to the fact that Cewe might know the family situation of AniSie 
in detail. I thought his informed comments came from their working in the same CARDER for some 
years. But later, I was to discover that Cewe was a close friend of Mr.X, and originated from the same 
area as he and AniSie's wife. 
27 The account of Gbedjemin, in case 2, indicates the chaos at staff management level in the CARDER, 
and the playing off of one director against another by lower-level staff. Gbedjemin said that when the 
Director of Monitoring tried to sanction him, he would resort to his own boss in the hierarchy, the 
Director of Production, who was at the same level as the Director of Monitoring. One of the reasons why 
the subject matter specialists could afford not to keep their promises to the RDVs was that they came 
under the responsibility of the Director of Production, while the Community Development Programme 
was responsible to the Director of Monitoring. The story of the specific location of this programme within 
the CARDER is itself a complicated one, involving conflict between two Ministers, that affected relations 
between field staff - explained later in Chapter 9. Nevertheless, this location gave the subject matter 
specialists some room to decide on whether or not to assist the Programme. If a visit coincided with their 
own interests (visiting family, buying cheaper food supplies, or escaping other obligations in the 
CARDER), then they found good arguments to convince their Director, who was not in favour of the 
programme. On the other hand, a sanction from the General Director on staff under a Deputy Director 
was generally seen by the latter as a reflection of his authority over his people, and could make him come 
to the defense of his staff to some extent. 
28 In the sixties and seventies, to be a functionary was equivalent to being guaranteed a monthly salary 
whether one worked or not (see Dumont 1966). Such an attitude is, to a large extent, still the case today, 
though it was threatened by the severe economic crisis of 1987-1989. 
29 In its official formulation, the process starts from the village agents. They hand in their plans two 
weeks in advance (visits of plots, training of peasant groups, demonstration of technical package, report 
writing etc) to their immediate boss. The latter would plan his own two weeks for visiting (monitoring, 
control, assistance) all the village agents operating under him. He would send the plan to the district 
extension officer (RDR) who would make his monthly plan accordingly. Copies of the plans, from the 
villages to the district, would then be sent to the head office to the Director of Production (for monitoring 
and technical assistance) and to the Directorate of Monitoring and Internal Evaluation (for monitoring, 
control and evaluation). In addition, every field officer (at village, sub-district and district levels) should 
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have his planning of the day in a very visible place so that any senior staff member who might drop in 
would know where the field agent was and could visit him. The other component of the T&V system 
concerns the training caBsdformation par cascade, whereby the District extension officers (RDR) are trained 
by subject matter specialists on a two-weekly basis and are expected to train their field staff once back 
in the district every week, the latter having a weekly appointment with the contact peasant groups (US: 
Unité de Suivi, GCE: Groupe de Contact et d'Expérimentation) for the transfer of the technological package, 
which would have then been channelled down from the Director, and would perhaps get feedback from 
the peasants on previous packages. As one might expect, things do not work like that in practice. For an 
assessment of T&V applications in Benin, see v.d. Luhe 1991 on the case of the Atlantic Province. 
30 This topic has not been a focus in the present research. The discussions presented here are rather 
hypothetical. The subject has been touched on by other authors (Bierschenk 1988) but rather superficially. 
Hence, the field deserves much more thorough empirical investigation. 
311 have also indicated in the earlier part of this chapter that other equally important aspects of state 
budget deficits have been deliberately left out of the discussion. These are, for example, the practices, 
common to most African states, of exerting political control over the productive apparatus, based on the 
rationing and selective distribution of goods and services to reward the most loyal subjects and to 
entertain the hopes of others, thus developing an economic model of 'non-accumulation' (See Bates 
1983; Mbembe 1988 and also Daane and Mongbo 1991). 
6 Togoudo, the farm that became a village 
IZe Baba mi nil 
Bi unba ju gbo 'ngbo n 'inu omi 
OSun igboo 
Koni 8i kini un kabi edja 
Gbo'ngbo ni n'kodje 
HE Baba mi ni!1 
Introduction 
The implementation of the Commumty Development Programme in the villages, 
and the different types of activities entailed, are not the result of preconceived 
notions of the RDV, derived from the project documents and instructions given by 
the bosses. They are the outcome of complex interactions between the intervention 
agents and local social actors of various trajectories. The attempts made by these 
local actors to decode and incorporate the programme into their own frames of 
reference and strategies for self-achievement tell us about the nature of their 
involvement in the reproduction of the rhetoric and practices of rural development 
and its links to the complex realities of their everyday life. In order, then, to put 
these attempts at appropriation into context, we need to look more closely at the 
everyday life realities of local actors, and at their indigenous definitions of 'rural 
development'. This is best done, not by analysing their discursive interpretations 
of it, but from looking at social practice, at the daily negotiation and struggles over 
the ecological, economic, social and political opportunities and constraints encoun-
tered in pursuing their own projects. Here I concentrate on the village of Togoudo, 
which, like so many other villages, is not a homogeneous commumty, voicing or 
defending common interests vis-a-vis 'external actors', though it does, of course, 
display its own distinctiveness. I will argue that Togoudo's heterogeneity in social 
attributes, income generating activities, and importantly, its discordant styles of 
collective management of community resources, owe much to its being a residential 
composite, an ensemble of farmer groups each clairning a different identity, scat-
tered in the woods and later brought together by external circumstances to form a 
village, without any traditionally rooted and legitimately accepted institutional 
structure at the village level. In this chapter, I develop this argument, looking at the 
settlement process and patterns of the various groups now Jiving in Togoudo. There 
are two reasons why it is relevant and important to examine these issues. First, as 
I have already mentioned, one cannot fully understand (or one might misinterpret) 
the games and strategies of the people in the community development project 
without this background information. The second reason is that Togoudo is not an 
isolated case, but typical of most Yoruba farm settlements of the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, from western Nigeria (Berry 1985) to Benin. Due to the very ways in 
which they were created, these settlements now face the challenge of developing 
and defending a village identity and of surviving against so-called landowners, 
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which they seem unprepared for. They also have to develop sustainable farrning 
systems and modes of interaction with state or nonstate organisations. The stakes 
are many - the control and management of natural resources, and the tapping of 
external opportunities. Furthermore, the region is one of the last reservoirs of 
natural resources in Benin. Hence we are dealing with the making of agricultural 
policies at grassroots level, whose consequences can affect life in the area for many 
decades to come. A discussion of the settlement process of the various groups Uving 
in Togoudo will give us a broader perspective on these stakes, the stakeholders and 
local politics. I first set the scene by giving a general picture of its social, demo-
graphic and ethnic composition, as well as its ecological situation. 
A first view of the village of Togoudo 
Togoudo is located in the North of Zou Province, 250 kilometres inland and some 
7 kilometres west of the main Cotonou-Parakou-Niamey road that crosses the 
country from north to south (see map). I first visited the village at the beginning of 
November 1990, one early afternoon. The small road to the village was a succession 
of potholes and bumps and it took me about half an hour to cover the seven 
kilometres from the main road. It was a hot day and everything was quiet. I thought 
people were resting, as I saw nobody under the big trees in front of the first houses 
I passed, except for one or two old men and a horde of pigs fighting over a piece 
of cassava tubercle. A few pupils were playing in the big yard of the school which 
is located at the entrance of the village, next to the cemetery and facing the rather 
large Catholic church and the shrine of Zangbeto, a traditional God originating from 
the Porto-Novo area of south-east Benin, which is worshipped in almost all localities 
of southern Benin for the protection it is said to offer at night against thieves and 
evil spirits. Another shrine is located not far from the church. I was told later that 
it was to Sakpata, the God of the earth and smallpox. 
The night was also very quiet. Early in the morning, together with the RDV and 
the secretary of one women's group, I took a walk around, along the very tiny 
paths that meander between the closely-built houses. There appeared no spatial 
organisation to suggest distinctive household units, or wards. The village was 
desperately empty and looked as if it had been abandoned for weeks, with pig 
excrement everywhere. Nevertheless, the houses did not look neglected. Most of 
them had their roofs covered with corrugated iron. The walls were cemented and 
marked with drawings. But the doors were all firmly closed. I shouted in some 
dismay to the RDV: 
'Look! Statistics have it that 2,500 people live in this village, 50 percent of them under 
15 years old. From your reports and from the CARDER staff in Bohicon, one gets the 
impression that the village is the most enthusiastic and active in the Community Develop-
ment Programme. But where are the people you actually work with?' 
He laughed and replied: 
'They are out until around the 20th of December on their farms some 10 or 20 kilo-
metres from here, harvesting cotton and preparing for its marketing which starts in early 
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December and mil hopefully be finished by the end of December or beginning of January! 
The farms are spread out all over the area and the paths sometimes don't even allow for 
bicycles. If you want to meet these people, make sure that you are herefrom January to 
March. End of March, they will be gone again!' 
In this off hand way, I had just been briefly introduced to one of the major issues 
that structure social life within the village of Togoudo and its relations to the 
outside: the farming patterns and their associated labour management, access to and 
control over land, and marketing. At first sight, more than 90 percent of the inhabit-
ants of Togoudo are engaged in agriculture and other related activities, and in 
almost the same proportion, agriculture provides adults with their first, second or 
third income generating activities. It goes without saying therefore that agriculture 
has a structuring effect on the ways in which household patterns (resource alloca-
tion, rights and obligations) are negotiated among members, and on the perceptions 
that the people of Togoudo have of the 'village' as a community dwelling place 
and aclministrative unit. Thus the relevance of the socio-economic infrastructure 
related to this administrative status, that links the village to external situations, 
cannot be disconnected from the particular circumstances in which the people in 
Togoudo practice their main activity - agriculture. The distant location of their farms 
and the state of the roads and paths that lead to them, oblige peasants to spend 
several months of the year living on their farms. 
The territory of Togoudo is located on a formerly woody plateau covering about 
45 km2' criss-crossed by six or seven small rivers, most of which quickly dry up at 
an early stage of the dry season. In the rainy season, some rivers rise high and have 
a strong current. The territory is a narrow valley, two to three kilometres wide east-
west and some 20 kilometres south-north. The landscape is irregular and beautiful, 
with low, flat areas and higher land ridged here and there by water erosion. In a 
few areas, the low land, that is sufficiently extensive and has adequate clay and 
water supply, has been used previously for rice cultivation. Other areas are rocky, 
especially in the beds or along the sides of the rivers. The soil of many fields along 
the main pathways to the farms looks exhausted and invaded with Imperata Cylyn-
drica, an indication that the land has been cultivated for many successive years. Jh 
the surroundings of the village, there is some bush fallow (Andropoganae) dotted 
with a few small trees (Byrsocarpus coccineus). Far away on the farms, perhaps 15 
kilometres from the village, there remain huge wooded areas which farmers are still 
clearing, leaving skeletons of dead but still standing trees on hectares of land.2 In 
general, the soils are fertile, virgin alluvial soils with a fragile physical structure and 
a low clay content. This provokes quick exhaustion and facilitates depletion once 
they are put under cultivation, especially in soft areas, causing in some places the 
appearance of ferruginous blocs. Within a few years of cultivation, the clay is 
washed away and the soil turns to a poor sandy soil. 
The area cultivated by peasants extends northwards from five to twenty kilo-
metres from the village. Most of them build a dwelling on their farms, as they are 
difficult to reach, especially from May to the end of October when the rivers rise, 
making it dangerous to cross them, either on foot, bicycle or motorbike. Then the 
pathways become even more muddy or rocky while the ravines running down the 
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the slopes are enlarged and deepened by the flowing water. The land close to the 
village (within two kilometres) is not usually cultivated because crops there are 
destroyed by the pigs. These are raised in substantial numbers by almost all the 
households in the village, mostly without shelter. However, a few old people, some 
women and young men who either do not have the strength or any better land, 
produce what they can from it, on plots more or less protected with loosely planted 
tree fences. 
Village infrastructure includes a communal health centre, a maternity unit, five 
water pumps, a primary school, a nursery school, a Sunday market, two stores for 
agricultural inputs and a project shop run by the GV. 
The populations of Togoudo and their settlement processes 
Togoudo is one of those Yoruba enclaves created in Mahi or Nagot territories by 
Idaca groups coming from Dassa3 and its surroundings during and immediately 
after the French colonial war and victory over the Danxome kingdom at the end of 
the 19th century. More recently (late 1970s), a few Fon migrant labourers from the 
south and Ditamari (locally called Somba) from north Benin, succeeded in obtaining 
land and settling in the village. Two different Fulbe groups (called Fulard) estab-
lished themselves near the village some sixty years ago and are specialised in cattle 
herding, which they do for the other groups on a contract basis. 
Despite the presence of these different groups, Togoudo remains dominantly an 
Idaca village - comprising 85 percent of the population. The other groups are less 
visible, the Ditamari making about 5 percent, the Fulbe 7 percent and the Fon 3 
percent of the population. They play only a marginal, if any part in the public 
affairs of the village. As the Idaca put it 'the Fon and the Ditamari are 'on the 
farms', while the Fulbe are 'in the bush'. In fact, that is how the Idaca present 
what they like to see as an ethnic specialisation in the village: the Fon and the 
Ditamari being farm labourers while the Fulbe are the herdsmen, all of them 
working for the Idaca, who are presented as farm entrepreneurs. Of course the 
people from the other ethnic groups have a different perception of themselves. They 
do not consider themselves as any less entrepreneurial than the Idaca. They too, as 
we will see below, engage in new ways of mobilising and organising resources, 
mainly land and labour for the majority of them, but also through the activation of 
marketing networks back home for the most successful Fon migrants. The difference 
is that they include wage labour for the Idaca as a preliminary strategy. As far as 
specialisation is concerned one might draw a line between the Fulbe and the Fon 
and the Ditamari. The Fulbe are the only group specialised in cattle herding. They 
came to the area in search of herding work, but with a view to developing herds of 
their own. As a second occupation (nowadays a major occupation and main cash-
earning activity for the younger generation), they started cultivating for home 
consumption and for sale, as well as raising sheep, goats and chickens. On the other 
hand, the main goal for the Idaca, Fon and Ditamari in settling in the area was to 
farm, though they often had to begin, especially the case for the Fon and the 
Ditamari, by selling their labour to those already there. 
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The settling of the Idaca 
Idaca people are primarily yam cultivators. In general, yam needs new forest land 
every year to yield well. On a newly cleared plot, yam would be cultivated first, 
followed by maize (once or twice), cowpeas, cotton, maize, and groundnuts. 
Depending on the number of successive years cultivated, the land would need to 
be left fallow for 5 to 10 years before the yam would yield well again. Yam cultiva-
tors therefore mostly practice a system of farming that does not readily lend itself 
to their being sedentary. They are continuously in search of new woodland, and are 
obliged to search farther and farther from the village. 
During the first years of this century, information slowly spread to the numerous 
villages surrounding Dassa that good land suitable for yam cultivation was available 
in the area now called Togoudo, some 30 kilometres to the north. In Dassa, land was 
scarce because of the rocky terrain, soil exhaustion and population growth. Agricul-
tural production could barely keep up with the growing food needs let alone the 
accelerated commoditisation process of the early colonial period due to taxation 
measures and the introduction of new consumer goods and new market opportun-
ities. First came the hunters, well known for their capacity to spend weeks in the 
bush, a long way from home. Idaca hunters identified the area and testified to its 
suitability for yam cultivation. The news spread in different directions, among 
relatives, friends, youth groups, and to various clans and villages. And so people 
gradually started to visit and to settle in Togoudo. In the first years, they stayed 
there only for the cropping season, rehmung to their villages in the dry season. 
Later, within two or three years, feeling less lonely because more settlers had 
arrived, they stayed for longer periods. The men came first, in small groups of kin, 
friends, and entrepreneurs who used wage labourers. Later they brought their wives 
and children.4 They asked permission to cultivate and to settle there from the people 
of Ayinonxwe who were considered to be the owners of all the land. Indeed, dis-
putes over land are still brought to them for settlement.5 Idaca peasants kept links 
with their native villages, where, until the early eighties, they continued to bury 
relatives who died in Togoudo. New settlers arrived through the networks of every 
individual settler (friends, relatives, and labourers) and requested permission from 
the people of Ayinonxwe to plough the land as their own; others, after a few years 
working as labourers for the first settlers, simply settled without permission. As old 
man Tolidji said : 
' When I protested, these people would argue that I myself did not buy the land from 
anybody and that I could not claim any right of ownership. Some of them built their 
house right in my courtyard! And there was nothing I could say. Now we are neighbours. 
I have left it to God.' 
The first to arrive were able to find land adjacent to the village and live in the 
village. Those who came one or two generations later had to travel up to 17 kilo-
metres away to cultivate, and, depending on the networks through which they had 
arrived in Togoudo, they kept a residence in the village or on their farms, visiting 
the village now and then. Others simply moved further to the north, or to the areas 
surrounding Savalou and Bantè in the west or Save and Ouessè in the east. Given 
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this settlement process, only the first 10 to 15 settlers and their descendant farnilies 
now own the land within five kilometres of the village, but even members of these 
farnilies have land at distance from the village. First settlers generally encouraged 
their descendants to search for land further in the bush, so that they themselves 
could continue cultivating plots closest to the village. Many, especially the relatives 
of the first settlers, now have two or more farms, one in a five kilometres zone and 
another in a more distant zone. In this way the settlement patterns of the 1920s, 
1940s and 1950s still affect the range of alternatives available to succeeding gener-
ations. The following cases of two different settlers provide some insights into this 
issue. 
'He looked after me like a son': the settling of Tinkpo's father in Tigoudo. 
Tinkpo considers himself to be from Togoudo and takes an active part in the public 
affairs of the village. But neither he nor his father were born in Togoudo. Tinkpo 
was born in 1939 in Kamaté, a village close to Dassa, some 30 kilometres south-east 
of Togoudo. Tinkpo's father (3.1 on the genealogy - see Figure 3) migrated from 
Kamaté to Togoudo in 1957 and he told me the following: 
'There was not enough land available for me in Kamaté, and the parcels I received from 
my father were too exhausted and rocky. I visited Togoudo a few times, years before 1957, 
with my elder son and Dossou, the son of an elder brother of my wife's father (2.3 on 
the genealogy). Dossou's maternal grandfather (1.3 on the genealogy) cultivated land in 
Togoudo and offered some land to his son-in-law, Dossou's father, who then settled in 
Togoudo. When the grandfather became too old, he returned to Gome and Dossou was 
asked to go and stay with the old man and look after him.61 was complaining of the poor 
fertility and size of my lands to Dossou when he told me of me of Togoudo and offered 
to bring me here. He introduced me to his father who looked after me as though I was his 
own son, and helped me through.' 
When Tinkpo's father (3.1 on the genealogy) brought his family to the village (wife 
and four children, two boys and two girls), Dossou's father gave him land next to 
his own house on which to build a house. He also lent him arable land not far from 
the village. Before the following cropping season, Dossou's father and one of his 
friends who had settled in Togoudo in the same period, brought Tinkpo's father 
to the people of Ayinonxwe to ask for land to start a farm. He did not have to bring 
money - just some sodabi (the local alcoholic drink) and kola nuts. They accepted his 
request and showed him where he could farm. All the area surrounding the village 
was already occupied by the first settlers. Tinkpo's father and his family obtained 
about 30 hectarees of heavily wooded land in Akpantan, about 17 kilometres north 
of the village. Tinkpo's father built a second house on the farm but came back 
frequently to the village, especially when Dossou's father started to grow old. The 
former felt a son's responsibility for him. As shown on the genealogy, apart from 
Dossou, who stayed in Gomè, the man had three other boys who had all left 
Togoudo. The first had settled in Bethel, 30 kilometres to the north-east. The others 
left for Ghana. One stayed, while the second came back in the mid-sixties after 15 
years abroad to start trading in Dassa. In order to take care of Dossou's father, 
134 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
Tinkpo's first wives were allocated land near the village, in the area formerly lent 
to Tinkpo's father when he first arrived in the village. 
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1.3 Father of Dossou's mother. Used to cultivate in Togoudo (late 19th and early 20th century). Later, 
he invited 2.3, his son-in-law (Dossou's father) to settle in Togoudo, while the latter was 'given' 
to 1.3. 
3.1 Tinkpo's father was brought to Togoudo and introduced to 2.3 by Dossou. 
2.3 Hosted 3.1 'as his own son' and helped him settle with his family and obtain land from the 
Ayinonxwe people. When 2.3 grew old, Tinkpo's father (3.1) took care of him as if he was his own 
father. 2.3 died in the early seventies. 
3.4 Moved farther and settled in Bethel (about 30 kilomtres) North-East) 
3.5 and 3.6 migrated to Ghana where 3.6 stayed and 3.5 came back and started trading in Dassa 
4.3 Came back to Togoudo in the mid-seventies and settled on part of the lands formerly cultivated by 
2.3. 
During peak cropping periods, most members of Tinkpo's family stayed in 
Akpantan, but the wives and their younger children remained at home. This 
allowed them to start developing off-farm activities, like the women from first settler 
families (in animal husbandry, small trade and later food processing, which gave 
them acquaintance with marketing). In other words, in mllllling their social and 
moral obligations to Dossou's father, these women of the fourth generation of 
Tinkpo's family, diversified their activities and developed assets7 that are import-
ant for men and women of their families in the present economic life of the village. 
They continued with farm activities but at the same time obtained a foot in process-
ing and petty trade. Another reason which encouraged their entry into non-agricul-
tural activities was that the descendants of Tinkpo's father could not rely on always 
having the land cultivated by Dossou's father, who died in the early seventies. 
Indeed, a son of a brother of Dossou who settled in Bethel to farm, came back to 
Togoudo in the mid-seventies and claimed part of the land, five hectares of which 
he is now farming. Jh contrast to the case of Tinpko's family, things went different-
ly for the family of Agbegui, presented below. 
The grandfather of Agbegui, the lonesome settler 
The land cultivated by Agbegui, now 55 to 60 years old and married with three 
wives and 15 children, covers about 25 hectares. He is said to have been farming 
this for more than 20 years. His grandfather was the one who settled in Togoudo 
(see the genealogy Figure 4). He did not come directly to Togoudo but left his native 
village around 1915 to settle in Sowé (six kilometres south-west of Togoudo) with 
a friend of his. He took Agbegui's father who was then about 5 years old. They 
cultivated there for a few years but when it became obvious that the land in Sowé 
was not going to be sufficient and was becoming exhausted, they began to think of 
moving into the Togoudo area. They then tried to make contact with landowners in 
Ayinonxwe which, according to Agbegui, 'finally happened by simple chance': 
'It was my father, then only 15 or 20 years old, who found the way. He had a friend 
whose parents were from Sowé. The father had relatives in Ayinonxwe who were arrang-
ing land for him. My father caught a conversation about the issue one day while eating 
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at his friend's house. He told his father (my grandfather), who asked the man to mediate 
on his behalf also, and on behalf of his friend whom he presented as his brother. And it 
all worked out!' 
All of them (Agbegui's grandfather and his friend, and the father of the friend of 
Agbegui's father) obtained authorisation from Ayinonxwe people (around 1925-
1930) to work land some 15 kilometres north of Togoudo, the place they later called 
Atinkpayi, where Agbegui's farm is now located. But it was a very difficult area, 
with huge trees that were very hard to chop down. The grandfather's friend, it was 
said, found it too difficult and decided to go farther north, to the village of Assante, 
while the other man also gave up and went back to Sowe his native village. There, 
he took over the land formerly ploughed by Agbegui's grandfather and his friend, 
and farmed this and his own land - in the end a large area for him alone.8 
'My grandfather decided to stay in the place', said Agbegui. 'He and my father 
started to chop down the trees with machetes and fire, and over a period of years devel-
oped large fields. My parents settled, worked and lived there, and I was born there. Other 
people joined us in the area. But the problem was that during the dry season there was 
no water. People had to go to Togoudo to fetch water. Also, it was difficult to reach the 
market of Gbomina. The other people who had built their houses in the area after us, 
started moving back to Togoudo. Finally, my grandfather brought us back also.' 
Nowadays, Agbegui's family have one of the most organised farm settlements in 
the Togoudo area. It caters for their household necessities with a large number of 
poultry and other animals, medicine plants planted as fences on one side of the 
compound, permanent vegetable gardens for home consumption, and many fruit 
trees such as mango, lemons, oranges, guavas. Two houses have been covered with 
corrugated iron from which rain water is collected for human consumption in big 
jars and drums. 
When he first obtained the land from the Ayinonxwe people, and before moving 
onto it, Agbegui's grandfather received from Tolidji (one of the earliest to settle in 
Togoudo) a piece of land where he built his hut and dug a well. He had not 
previously known Tolidji but was introduced to him by the Ayinonxwe man from 
whom he got his farm. So when he returned from Atinkpayi with his family to 
Togouda, they settled in this compound and decided to give the place the same 
name - Atinkpayi. They arrived back in Togoudo around 1950, after some 20 to 25 
years in Atinkpayi. Some of the people who were living in the neighbourhood of 
Atinkpayi farm obtained permission to build their houses in the same ward as the 
family of Agbegui. But many others established themselves wherever they were 
able, mostly on pieces of land between 200 to 400 m2, given to them by families they 
had met in various ways. I have traced back 15 families whom Agbegui knew from 
Atinkpayi, and who now have their houses in Togoudo. Four of them live in the 
same neighbourhood as Agbegui and were authorised to do so by both the grandfa-
ther of Agbegui and the father of Tolidji. Six others obtained a place to live (on 
average around 400 m2) from people with whom they had formed labour exchange 
groups on the farm who had houses in Togouda. Of the remaining five, three are 
linked to their host families through conjugal relations. They have more space (from 
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400 to 600 m2). The two others received space to build from people they used to 
work for as wage labourers. They have the most restricted space (200 to 300 mz). But 
for all these 15 families, as is generally the case in Togouda village, there is no 
difference in the ways in which the houses of the late-comers and those of the host 
families are spatially organised or integrated. Houses of different families may 
happen to open onto the same courtyard and face each other, while the houses of 
the same families may face back-to-back depending on when the houses were built. 
In some cases, because the space available in the 'compound' was completely 
occupied, descendants had to move elsewhere in the village to build their's. 
Of the seven living 'sisters' of Agbegui (see genealogy; actually two daughters 
from his mother, two from the other wife of his father and the three others from the 
brother of his father), four are married in Togoudo, one in Ayinonxwe and two in 
Sowé, into the family of the friend of Agbegui's father who helped them to obtain 
access to land from Ayinonxwe people. Neither the sisters living in Togoudo, nor 
the wives of the third generation married into the family through men of the third 
generation, conduct any off-farm activity. They claim they never had the chance to 
learn any though it would have been useful had they done so. Two of these sisters 
have difficulties in meeting their needs and work for other women for cash now and 
then in their processing units, fetching water and wood, and cooking. The youngest 
wife of Agbegui, the wife of the third generation in household 4 and a married girl 
from household 3, are members of a women's group, supported by the RDV. They 
are learning how to process cassava in order to do it later on their own. As for the 
other women of the family, apart from animal husbandry, small maize and cowpea 
processing units at a trial stage, whose products are sold in the village, none of 
them conduct any real off-farm activity. Occasionally, especially during the dry 
season, they sell their labour to women involved in processing groundnuts, brewing 
sorghum/millet and maize. 
The Ton' and the 'Somba' wage labourers in Togoudo: the other trend of migration 
The Fon started visiting Togoudo in the early 1970s. People in Togoudo use the term 
'Fon', for all seasonal labourers corning from the south. Though most of these 
labourers arrived from the plateau of Abomey and Bohicon (the Fon area of the 
province), some were Adja people corning from the Mono province in south-west 
Benin. These people (the Fon and Adja) come from densely populated areas (some-
times over 200 inhabitants per km2) where the soil, though much less fragile than 
the soils of the northern part of the province, is quite irreversibly exhausted since 
it has been under permanent cultivation for the early 17th century (see for example, 
Cornevin, 1981) with shorter and shorter fallow periods. 
Among the Fon coming from the Abomey and Bohicon plateau are two sub-
groups, with distinctive cropping patterns. Those coming from the southern part of 
the plateau (Agbangnizoun, Za-Kpota) cultivate mainly maize, cowpeas and ground-
nuts, which do not necessarily need virgin forest land. Those coming from the 
northern part of the plateau (the Djidja) specialise in yam cultivation and have 
cropping patterns very similar to those of the Idaca. Most of these Fon, were unable 
to settle in Togoudo or in its surroundings and went farther to the north of the 
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province, to Bante in the west, and Save and Ouesse in the East (see Floquet and 
Mongbo 1992).9 The father of Severin (who is now a Goxonon, a sort of landlord in 
Dani, in a settlement named 'Severingon', after himself) arrived in Paouignan with 
some Mahi cultivators, some 30 kilometres south of Dassa, where he obtained a few 
hectares of land for himself and his followers.10 From the late 1970s. SeVerin rode 
north on his bicycle, in reality in search of land, but pretending that he was looking 
for agricultural work. He visited Togoudo for two successive years and soon 
decided there was no chance of obtaining enough land for yam cultivation. He 
searched farther to the north and obtained permission to settle on the territory of the 
Nagot of Save in 1981 after some Idaca who settled in the area (Dani) 10 years 
earlier. Nowadays, Fon yam cultivators from Djidja occupy land along 30 kilometres 
tract, extending south-east from Dani to the Oueme river (see Map 2). 
The other Fon labourers (those from Agbangnizoun and Za-Kpota with more 
sedentary types of cropping systems) were used to cultivating the same plots of land 
for many successive years with short fallow periods. When they started visiting 
Togoudo, they mostly held onto their plots back home (see also Roesch 1992). They 
had a good knowledge of the climatic differences11 between the north and the 
south of the province (200-250 kilometres from south to north from Bohicon to Bante 
in the west or to Save and Ouesse in the east) which they followed to keep their 
own farm at home, to sell their labour in areas such as Togoudo or to cultivate a 
few hectares there - depending on how much family labour they could mobilize. 
When they succeeded in obtaining enough land (they needed two to three hectares), 
they settled in the village. But the early nineties, they were still returning each year 
to their native village (mainly during the dry season which coincides with Christmas 
and the New Year). They also returned to bury relatives who died in Togoudo. 
Among the Somba there are various ethnic groups (including the Ditamari) 
coming from the Atacora province, in the north-west of Benin. They come from too 
far away - and north-western Benin has poorer travelling infrastructure than the 
south - for them to engage in the gymnastics of the Fon. The five Somba peasants 
I briefly conversed with declared they came from the rocky part of the province (the 
Atacora mountain chain) where they cultivated on terraces. Hence they have a good 
opinion of the sandy and relatively deeper soil of Togoudo. Even when thought to 
exhausted by Idaca yam cultivators, the Somba nevertheless consider the land still 
suitable for yam cultivation. They settle as permanent wage labourers, specialising 
in yam cultivation, working for one or two Idaca peasants with whom they establish 
patron-client relationships. Later, the Idaca patron would provide them with a piece 
of land on which they could grow yams, maize, cassava, millet and sorghum. Most 
of them settle on the farms with their wives and children. When one walks around 
on the farms far away from the village, one finds now and then Somba 'house-
holds' living in isolation even during periods of light work load. 
In general these 'foreigners', as the Fon and Somba are labelled by the Idaca, 
do not need to resort to the landowners of Ayinonxwe to have the land they need. 
The Idaca in Togoudo are aware of their importance for their own activities as 
available labour and do not consider them to represent a threat to their position as 
'landowners'. As Agbegui declared when asked whether he ever lent land to an 
Idaca in need of it: 
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Figure 4 Genealogy of Agbegui's family 
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'Never! You cannot lend land to Idaca people. To foreigners yes! When you lend your 
land to an autochthon (Idaca), he would plant trees on it and turn the land into his 
property. People in charge of settling the case (mostly from Ayinonxwe) would ask to 
whom the trees belong. In general, the one who planted the trees would win the case. The 
foreigners don't do that and you can keep your eyes on them and trust them. I don't 
think they intend to stay for ever, so they cannot take the land away. Our Idaca people 
would try their best to knock you down.' 
As I indicated earlier, none of these 'foreigners' took part in the public affairs of 
the village, at least not in the early nineties. None of them was a member of any of 
the various committees (administration, water, health centre, school, church,12 
cotton). They rarely show up at any kind of village meeting, but are counted as 
members of the cotton market or the peasant cooperative, which gives the leaders 
of these bargaining units, some weight in their negotiations with the Board of the 
GV, with the RDV, the VNU and other intervention organisations visiting the 
village. 
The Fulbe: a local bank in the bush 
Walking around in the village of Togoudo, one comes across young Fulbe girls 
selling locally made cheese, which they carry in calabashes marked with beautiful 
decorations. These girls look different from the village girls, especially in their dress, 
jewels and make up. To each other, they speak their own language, the Fulfulde, but 
with the villagers they speak Idaca. When asked where they come from, they point 
their finger to the south. If one inquires near Togoudo people about where they live, 
one receives an answer that is not surprising: 'in the bush'.13 They visit the 
markets to sell their cheese and buy consumer goods. Social distance persists 
between the two groups, which shows through the clear separation of residence and 
almost no inter-marriage. Both groups look down on each other. In the case of 
Togoudo, the Idaca consider the Fulbe as those 'in the bush', while the Lamido 
(chief of all the Fulbe in the northern-Dassa area, some 40 kilometres away), and the 
head of another camp, referred to the villagers who owned the cattle and the land 
they grazed, as haabe, which in their social classification is the third and last 
category down the Fulbe social ladder.14 There are three of these 'bush camps' 
around Togoudo. The Fulbe herdsmen camp there with their cattle and the cattle of 
people from Togoudo, especially the Fulbe of the biggest camp situated less than 
one kilometre south of Togoudo, which can be reached only through a very small 
and hardly visible path. These Fulbe came to the area in search of jobs, which for 
them meant herding. The men led the movement, bringing their wives and children 
with them, and settled on permanent sites. Members of three Fulbe patricians live 
in the camp. The first to arrive and settle was the father of Djato Kadeeri, the head 
of the camp who is also the Lamido. He is between fifty and sixty years old. Djato 
and his brothers were born in the camp. Their parents arrived and settled there 
some 65 years ago from the north of Berlin, because, as the mother of Djato 
explained, all their animals died from drought. The Idaca people allowed them to 
settle there and later gave them cattle to herd. The two other groups came to the 
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village much later (between 10 and 5 years ago) and were hosted by the group of 
the Lamido, without the need to ask authorisation from the Idaca, as long as they 
remained in the same camp. Those from the other camps, though under the jurisdic-
tion of the Lamido, arrived independently and settled with the permission of the two 
other villages that together with Togoudo form a commune. 
From farm settlement to village status in Togoudo 
As demonstrated in the foregoing account, the village as a residential place was 
constituted by different flows of migration composed of individuals and groups of 
people who happened to be informed about the availability of land or pasture in the 
area. Initially they considered the locality as made up of farms, and not as a village 
to live in (compare Mondjannagni 1977: 135 and 160). Even within the same ethnic 
group, their origins were different with persisting strong links with kin back home. 
In the following discussion, I concentrate on the Idaca, leaving aside the Fulbe, Fon 
and Somba for three reasons, two of which I have already mentioned. First, the 
Idaca make up 85 percent of the population, and so the village is considered an 
Idaca village. Second, apart from their role in the economic life of the village, neither 
the Fulbe, Fon nor Somba have much presence in village politics, at least not 
actively in the various adventures of the Community Development Programme. 
Third, the single Idaca group offers sufficient ethnographic material for iUustoating 
the rmnimum level of social cohesion of a farm settlement like Togoudo that was 
forced, in one way or another, to turn itself into a village and establish the basis for 
some collective life. As Agbegui put it, 
'This village! It is a mixture of different families of different origins. We never can speak 
with one voice. There are people from Paouignan, Tankossi, Sokponta, Kamati, Lema, 
Gome, Kabole, Oguinrin, and so on. Some were even former slaves in Danxome and were 
freed only after the French war had destroyed the kingdom. Many of us still have our 
houses and rights over lands back home. We all speak Idaca, but we are not the same. 
And it is difficult to have a chief here.' 
An indication of the diverse origins of Togoudo people is the diversity of the patri-
cians (Ako) to which they claim to belong, namely, the Omon-Djagoun, Omon-Aro, 
Omon-Ako, Omon-Ila, Omon-Sankpan, Omon-Alami, Omon-Ignim, Omon-Itcha, 
Ayato, Adjanu, Oguiju, Akrivisodonu, Ijehoun, Iloti, and Otcniilokeado. Jh these clan 
names, 'omo' means 'children of, signifiying either the home town, or the 
ancestor who founded the clan. Hence since there has been tremendous migration 
of Yoruba people from lie lie all over the area from the 12th century onwards (see 
Smith 1969; Cornevin 1981), different clan names based on origins and ancestors 
might well designate the same group of descendants. And there are other ways in 
which the origin of some of these clans might overlap; for example, people start to 
bear a prestigious matrilateral name for political reasons in a host environment, 
thereby creating a differentiation within their natal patrician, or they adopt a 
protecting God that entails the use of new names and affiliations. In short, there are 
many opportunities for the complex interlocking of histories among these various 
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groups who from time to time claim to be different from one another. I did not 
investigate this issue fully, but the claim by the various informants to belong to 
different clans is an indication of their search or need for an identity different from 
that of others, despite the fact that they speak the same language and have shared 
the same living area for more than three quarters of a century. But, though it serves 
as a discrirrunating argument, clan membership may also be used as a unifying 
argument in some bargaining contexts, even across ethnic groups. I will not delay 
with examples of its use among the Idaca, which can be taken as self evident. The 
most interesting I recorded is its use to turn Mahi and Idaca into the same groups: 
'We are the same people, we have the same origin'. Indeed, Adjanu and Akrivisodonu 
are Adja-Fon spellings where 'vi' means children of (a person) while 'nu' means 
children from (originating from a place). Nevertheless, these are supposed to be the 
clan of some Idaca people who belong to Yoruba society. Either they derived this 
from their mother's side, or from an earlier migration in Adja land probably prior 
to the foundation of the Danxomean Kingdom in the mid-17th century, or they 
acquired it from a change of affiliation after a conversion to a new religion (or God). 
Other clan names indicate specialisation, such as Ayato which refers to people doing 
metal work, whose God protector is Ogoun in Yoruba, Gou in Fon. By extension, 
Ayato refers to people whose main worldng tools are made of metal as, for example, 
hunters. Therefore, these latter clans I have enumerated existed in both Adja-Fon-
Mahi and Yoruba-Idaca societies. When the family of Goudali, one of the first 
settlers asked for land from the people of Ayinonxwe, an argument that favoured 
them the most, according to Goudali, was that they were Adjanu, which was the 
clan of the mother of the Ayinonxwe chief of the time.15 But one should not be 
misled by such arguments as used in this specific event. They do not necessarily 
indicate an internalisation of the same social conventions, norms and values as the 
clans of the Ayinonxwe Chief. It may have helped the Ayinonxwe Chief to solve 
that specific problem within his chieftaincy, or perhaps they did not really consider 
themselves as 'owners' of the land in any case. But Goudali often uses this 
argument to show that he and his family are closer to Ayinonxwe people than 
anybody else in Togoudo, and therefore they are less strangers to this land than the 
others. As noticed by Sara Berry from her study of two Yoruba communities in 
Western Nigeria, 
'People living in the same compound sometimes trace their descent from different 
lineages or different towns. Traditions of origin are remembered for long periods of time, 
even among people settled together in the same compound for several generations. 
Differences that arise may exacerbate divisions and conflict among neighbours or even 
kin. Such traditions are just one of many overlapping expressions of Yoruba social 
identity which may be used both to pull people together and to divide them, when 
questions arise concerning access to property, power, or prestige' (Berry 1985: 45). 
Apart from the social distance in the clan argument (distance which, as shown 
above, is shortened or widened according to the use one wants to make of it), there 
were physical distances that reduced the chance for social interaction between the 
settlers in their everyday life. Even for the groups who came together in Togoudo, 
though their huts were built in the same area, their need for land (the specificity of 
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slash and burn practice, particularly with regard to yam cultivation where new land 
is needed almost every year) resulted in their scattering in the forests. 
Through this process, small hamlets such as Agbegui's were created all over the 
area, which, from the late fifties, merged into the three wards that now form the 
village, each made up of a composite set of migrant families of diverse origins. The 
reasons for coming to live in Togoudo were many: well water construction was 
easier there, more and more people were settling there and it was better to leave the 
bush and live among people. Another important argument was that access to 
Gbomina, the regional market located seven kilometres to the south-east was better, 
and there was another important market five kilometres to the south-west. Thus the 
formation of a village identity among the settlers, especially the Idaca, started later, 
around the fifties and sixties, compared with the beginning of settlements in the area 
in the late 19th/early 20th century. One crucial moment in that process was the 
legislative elections that took place in the mid-sixties when the settlement was 
offered the 'opportunity' to change its administrative status, from farm to vil-
lage.16 Incorporation into the national administrative structure obliged the people 
of Togoudo to establish a minimum base for formalised collective life. A village 
chief was needed and so the colonial adnurustration appointed the founder of the 
farm. That provoked a quarrel between two families who both claimed that their 
fore-fathers were the ones to first cultivate and settle in the village. The consensus 
reached then was to appoint counsellors among the elders from the three wards of 
the village. They would jointly appoint the village Chief, after consulting the Fah 
(divination). In the same process, they decided to give a new name to the settlement 
and Togoudo was agreed.17 Until then, the name of the metropoly of the people of 
Ayinonxwe. The name was Savalou-Agban. It was said that the first Idaca who 
arrived there found large populations of a palm species in the area. Therefore, the 
place was named on the basis of the supposed owners (Savalou), and the vegetation 
that attracted the attention of the first settlers. But until 1968, many people com-
plained that the mail sent by their migrant relatives from Ghana and the Ivory Coast 
were mistakenly sent to Savalou and got lost, because the village was not known 
(and did not belong) to the administration of Savalou but to that of Dassa. That was 
the official reason given to justify the need to change the name. But apart from this 
explanation, readily given by many informants, another argument presented by the 
'leaders' of the time to the villagers concerned their resentments against the name 
'Savalou-Agban', resentments that came from the consciousness of being Idaca 
(Yoruba) in Mahi (Fon) land and in a settlement that carried a Mahi (Fon) name, 
which was then presented as unacceptable. 
In this way, the process of incorporation of this new, and what I would call 
residential, composite into the wider poHtico-adrrunistrative apparatus of the state, 
generated new identities and new roles (for the wards, for example) and new fields 
of bargaining and struggle among various groups regarding local affairs and 
relations with the state. This process excluded the Fulbe, despite their early arrival 
in the area and their economic relationships with the Idaca,18 but also the Fon and 
the Somba. I use here 'residential composite' as opposed to 'residential unit' to 
highlight the absence of a traditionally rooted and legitimately accepted institutional 
structure at the village level. I do not mean that where these exist, they enjoy 
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unanimous compliance from the population. But they structure to some extent the 
resolution of social, organisational and even technical conflicts or constraints of 
various sorts, including, as pointed out by Drinkwater (1988: 265) in a case in 
Zimbabwe, agricultural production. In fact, as far as Togoudo is concerned, there 
seems to have never been an attempt or a serious need to create a structurally-
defined residential unit, even at the simple discursive level. Indeed, the potentials 
for this were few if one looks at the settlement process of the inhabitants. As 
Agbegui puts it, and commonly acknowledged by people, the village is a mixture 
of different families 'To eloo, ako jo kple to WE', an expression that gives the idea of 
an incoherent mixture of different clans (ako): a sort of Russian salad. In fact, many 
Idaca and Fon villages in these Nagot and Mahi territories in the northern part of 
Zou Province in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had this in common, unlike 
other parts of the country and in earlier times when new villages were founded 
when a split or breakup within a family grouping occurred. One branch would 
leave and establishing a new residential entity, with some centralised organisation 
and a God or mythical-based legislation to control natural and human resources. In 
most of these cases, even where broken relationships were later restored, the 
departing group would sever contact with its origins and organise itself indepen-
dently. In other cases, groups of different origin but Jiving in the same territory 
managed to set up land cults that functioned, for a time, as an institution for setting 
land issues (see Lombard 1994:43-44). In the case of Togoudo, almost no traditional 
religion was introduced, no rituals for caring for the land or for the ancestors, except 
two annual rituals whose relevance is contested by many people, young and old. 
One is the annual hunting ritual performed by the descendants of hunters. It was 
supposed to protect hunters in the bush and bring them luck in killing many 
animals. Critics say that hunting feeds no-one any more; and these criticisms are 
even stronger within hunting families. The reason is that the first hunters who 
arrived in Togoudo were not interested in agriculture and therefore did not retain 
more than one or two hectares for themselves, leaving little chance to their descend-
ants to earn a living from agriculture. Also, with expanding farming activities every-
where, there are few wild animals left in the surrounding bush. Even the aulacodes 
(a variety of big rats) are chased away or killed by the large cattle herds that cross 
the area every year searching for water and pasture. 
The second annual ritual is that of Sakpata, the God of earth and smallpox, a half 
day ritual meant to protect the village against smallpox and at the same time to 
remember the first settlers. This ceremony was first performed in the early sixties 
after a smallpox epidemic, when the elders of the settlement met and decided to call 
the Mahi priest of Sakpata to save them. Since then, the elders of each ward (later 
the selected or elected members of the village council) have performed this ritual 
every year, which requires a goat and two hens. A purifying infusion is prepared 
and every villager living in the village or on the farms is requested to smear the 
infusion on his body and contribute a symbolic 5 FCFA. Many of the literate young 
men contest the use of such a ritual, arguing that smallpox has been under control 
for years now. Nevertheless, most of them and almost all peasants come in from 
their farms to perform the ceremony. Some young men say that they comply, not 
to protect themselves from any accidental infection, but to avoid the anger of the 
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Sakpata priests who are suspected of still holding samples of the virus which they 
could throw on anyone who contests their authority. 
Apart from these two rituals, traditional village rituals were performed in the 
many different native villages of the settlers. However, as noticed by Sara Berry, 
who observed similar phenomena among 20th century Yoruba migrants in Western 
Nigeria, such traditions do not entail the continuing active participation of emigrants 
in the affairs of the community of origin (Berry 1985: 47-49; Peel 1978 quoted by 
Berry, 1985). In fact, in the case of Togoudo, these traditions are being progressively 
eroded as settlers go back to their homes of origin less often now they have started 
to bury their parents in Togoudo. At the same time, the absence of such traditions 
at village level in Togoudo deprives settlers from opportunities to socialise. Christi-
anity has to some extent filled the gap. First contacts with the Catholic church 
started most probably in the 1930s or 1940s. A first wattle and daub church was 
built in 1954 and the stone building was erected in 1988. The first school in Togoudo 
was the Catholic one, opened in 1963, when the Catholics ran a weekly health 
service from 1968-1974 before the public health centre was built. Now, 85 percent 
of Togoudo inhabitants claim to be Catholic, six percent are Protestant and nine 
percent are Muslim. Adepts of local religions do not exist, apart from a handful of 
young men around Zangbeto, who they apparently use as a night hobby (CARDER-
Zou 1991: 2). But these statistics say nothing about the individual religious beliefs 
and practices of people in Togoudo. The fact that there is no indigenous religion 
largely and openly practised in the village does not mean that the practices and 
beliefs related to these religions are not widely shared by many individuals in the 
village. One finds traces of such practices and beliefs in people's houses (various 
sorts of idols), on their body (rings, chains, scarifications), on the farms (statuettes, 
palms hanging on trees, traces of animal sacrifices etc.), and in expressions and 
invectives of normal daily interaction. But there exist no organised religious prac-
tices such as one finds in their places of origin that might influence the conditions 
of production and self-achievement strategies. And that is one aspect on which there 
is no contradiction between individual beliefs and practices and the declared 
commitment to Christian churches. Indeed, within Christianity, there are no 'con-
straining' rituals related to land fertility, entreaties for a good rainy season, pre-
yam consumption, thanks givings for good yields, with the need for priests to 
mediate in one way or another the process of production. In their villages of origin 
these rituals would mostly take place in connection with a landlord and a hierarchy 
of related social positions passed on to following generations through hereditary 
systems within the same family or among a group of families (Lombard op. cit). 
Also where they do exist, such positions are not hard and fast but function as 
symbols subjected to negotiation and transformation. 
Indeed, we have here among the Idaca in Togoudo, good evidence for what 
Klausen calls a high convertibility of money (Klausen 1968, quoted by Long 1977: 
116), although we should not assume that such a unicentric system derives from the 
conversion of Idaca peasants to Christianity and the adoption of new values, but 
rather from the fact that they do not reproduce in their host environment the 
religious values and hierarchical social organisation of their native places. A signifi-
cant indication of the absence of such symbolism in Togoudo is the lack of a 
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landlord. As Goudali, Tolidji and other early settlers complained, each of them 
separately: 
'There is no Bale (someone responsible for all the land, a sort of landlord or chefde terre) 
in this milage. Everybody can do anything he likes in the 'bush' without having to 
report to anybody. He can plough new land, sow, harvest and eat new agricultural 
products at any time, without any of the ceremonies our ancestors used to perform. Most 
importantly, he can host anybody he wants to on his own patch and give him land as he 
likes. There is nothing you can say. They will tell you that you did not buy the land 
yourself. They seem to have forgotten that the land on which a village is established is 
never a good but a gift to the founders by Orisha (the supreme God in Yoruba pantheon). 
If you are not careful, they will come and settle on your own land.' 
The situation is more structured with regard to land in other settlements (for 
example, Gobe, Dani, Katakou near Save) where a landlord', a Bale for the Idaca 
or a Goxonon for the Fon, is appointment by the landowners, usually those who 
first asked for authorisation to settle, and who is in charge of controlling access for 
new settlers and organising the payment of a rent on the land. One notices here that 
such organisation does not serve so much internal interests but rather acts to exert 
external control on people's movements into the settlement. In the case of Togoudo, 
the gate remains wide open for negotiations and the battle for self-achievement. This 
has, I believe, an important influence on the decision-making process at village level, 
especially in relation to external matters, for example, in contexts of state interven-
tion such as in the Community Development Programme. 
Stakes, stakeholders and local politics in the village of Togoudo 
As appears from the foregoing discussion, there is no heriditary chieftaincy, no 
inherited, legitimated institutional power for any category of the Togoudo popula-
tion. People have to acquire status through their own efforts and strategies and in 
this sense are self-made men, but not in the sense of Melanesian big men as presented 
by Sahlins (1963), nor the political entrepreneurial African big men analysed by 
Medard (1992). Big men in Togoudo or those holding leading positions in village 
affairs are apparently not in search of social recognition and prestige by investing 
the wealth they have accumulated in social enterprises, as Melanesian big men do. 
Nor are they highjacking pre-existing institutional political authority that facilities 
them to accumulate and invest in the maintenance of power, as in Medard's 
analysis of African big men. As we will see in the next chapter, access to any 
politically influential position in the village depends on several complex factors 
related to the various stakes and interests that make up the economic web and the 
everyday life of men and women that shape local politics in Togoudo. The positions 
are used to develop or maintain social networks within the village, but mostly in 
order to have access to external opportunities, from state or private channels, that 
become functional for mobilizing resources for further accumulation, developing 
what I would call externally oriented self-achievement strategies. Although it might be 
analytically possible to make clistinctions between these stakes, one is soon halted 
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by their intricate, interconnected and mtermixed nature. Also, one needs to search 
beyond their manifestations to deline the inner logic of the grounds on which these 
stakes and the stakeholders operate. 
An obviously primordial stake is the access to and control over land. As I show 
in the next chapter when discussing income generating activities, apart from the 
general insecurity related to this, the land tenure situation seems closed because 
there is no land market. The option of moving farther in search of new land is less 
and less feasible. People seek ways to mitigate this constraint by intensifying their 
cropping systems or animal husbandry, trading in agricultural products, starting 
small processing units, quiting agriculture and migrating to town, or by trading in 
manufactured products. People also invest in social and family relations or manipu-
late clan identities to obtain access to land.19 The stakes for earning a living from 
these alternatives in Togoudo are unequal and their chance of success depends on 
the assets one has to invest in them (such as literacy, migration experience, family 
labour, and insertion in the right networks). 
Another important arena concerns cotton production and marketing. Chapter 2 
gave some hint as to the complexity of this arena and to the stakeholders. I indi-
cated that cotton is a social good through which 1) social structures are generated 
within the village (e.g. cooperatives at village to district level, seed distribution, and 
quality control arrangements, markets, and brokerage positions), 2) household 
patterns are elaborated and negotiated among members, and 3) the village economy 
and politics is linked to the market economy to state policies. But it is not only the 
history of cotton in the village, introduced in the mid-sixties, that carries (or repro-
duces) peasant-state relations. Indeed, searching beyond cotton for the logic of this 
specific ground of coalition and confrontation brings one to other crops such as 
yams, groundnuts, tobacco, pepper, cassava and cowpeas. As we later see through 
the life histories of a few actors, these crops have played a decisive role in cash 
earning and in bringing the advantages (and other consequences) of incorporation 
into the world economy to the village. Each of these crops has necessitated the 
development of forms of brokerage which peasants have more or less shared in 
elaborating. This stock of experience is now largely invested in bargaining over 
cotton but it will also influence the strategies people will adopt in the future for 
dealing with other opportunities after or alongside the cotton era. 
Another stake closely related to agricultural production in general, to alternative 
sources of income, and to cotton is labour management. The influence of the labour 
requirements of income generating activities on household patterns is self evident. 
But an additional aspect of labour in Togoudo is its relation to wage labour and the 
control of migrant labourers. Wage labour, particularly specialised labour from the 
southern part of the province is not always available on the free market. In recent 
years (since the late eighties), brokers have emerged who travel down to Bohicon 
or up to the north to the Atacora Province to organise the recruitment and transpor-
tation of labourers to the village. Such people hold firm control over the allocation 
of this labour, including the labour of their wife and independent children. And 
access to this labour can have an important impact on production result. 
Access to external interventions is a stake ground closely related to the previous 
one. From the late eighties into the early nineties, the main intervention product 
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searched by peasants for was short-term credit to pay for wage labour and longer-
term credit for animal traction. The brokers involved are state agents of different 
hierarchical levels (depending on the source of the intervention), NGO agents, and 
literate children from the village, organised (or not) in development associations. 
The objectives pursued through access to external interventions are also related to 
prestige, that is, the status or the image of oneself which one wants to project to 
fellow villagers. 
'It does not matter if what we are trying to gain in the group does not work. We are 
already glad that we are known from outside. People come from a long way to visit us'. 
As we have seen, some of those fighting for leading positions in the different sorts 
of organisations that provide access to the material and non-material advantages of 
external interventions do not exclude, at least in their arguments, the underrnining 
of village level structures such as the GV. 
One particular ground for external intervention concerns the state, whether in 
respect to public administration or development issues. The stake here is to obtain 
a position which enables one can take a share in the advantages (not only material) 
that might derive from state channels. Various committees are formed (involving 
cotton producers and health, school, church, community development, public 
administration groups) that are the battlegrounds for actors who have the will and 
necessary capacities (discursive as well as material) to enter into this arena.20 
This brief sketch of the arenas and coalition grounds involving individuals and 
groups in Togoudo serves to underline how certain social relations, rules and values 
are historically produced and continually negotiated, locally but also in close 
relation to external factors - the settlement of the village itself being a voluntary act 
of constructing a composite social 'order' in an alien world. 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced us to the different processes of settlement of the various 
groups in Togoudo. I discussed the influences of these on the range of opportunities 
open to the descendants of the original settlers and pointed to the multiplicity and 
interconnected nature of the various grounds and arenas generated by people in 
settling and creating a basis for individual, group and collective life within the 
village and vis-a-vis outside contacts. These grounds and arenas are social spaces 
in which people negotiate and struggle for self-achievement, and what they define 
as 'development' or the pursuit of 'well-being'. 
We have now reached a point where we need to remind ourselves of the theoreti-
cal discussions earlier in the book. I argued that defining the actor requires investi-
gating the grounds of the action, the social encounter, but also, going beyond this, 
how present encounters are articulated with other space-time locations. I suggested 
that this required focusing the analysis on the multiplicity of stakes and the complex 
interlocking of their histories. I argued that the concept of a 'field of rural develop-
ment' might help overcome this problem (see Chapter 2), charmelling the investiga-
tion and analysis, and assisting in the selection of the most relevant stakes, stake-
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holders and grounds. But here one should be careful not to miss the point. From the 
discussions in Chapter 4 and 5, we saw the making of a 'field of rural develop-
ment' as spaces for social interaction which cannot easily be equated with the 
model of 'rural development' as perpetuated by policy makers and external 
institutions. The main similarity between the two is that they are both the products 
of long histories of social interaction that are partly shared. But, after the discussions 
just conducted, we should be wary about merging these contrasting images and 
interests at work in Togoudo into a single 'field of rural development' as it 
emerged from the preoccupations of the state and the sorrows and worries of 
bureaucrates discussed in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, that is exactly what 
the different actors involved in the Community Development Programme at the 
village level seek to do and achieve in the everyday implementation of the pro-
gramme, thereby manufachrring consent to and reproducing 'rural development'. 
But, before we come back to the logic of these reproduction processes, the following 
chapter explores more deeply the apparent absurdity of these local realities, starting 
with a discussion on the productive activities and the self-achievement strategies of 
men and women in Togoudo. 
Notes 
1 'This is the land of my forefathers! It is your problem if you have forgotten where your parents came 
from. A tree trunk should never forget that it comes from the woods. Living in a river for 80 years would 
never turn it into an alligator nor a big fish. It would eternally remain a tree trunk. Yes! just a tree trunk! 
This is the land of my forefathers.' That was the reply of a young Cabe home-man and landowner to an 
old Idaca man of more than 70 years old, born in the settlement, who was protesting that he was still 
considered a foreigner in a place in which he had been and which he had never left, while he no longer 
had any roots in the place from which his parents had come. This discussion took place in 1994, some 
30 km North of Togoudo. 
2 The technique for killing the trees consists of cutting a tommy-hole around the trunk close to the 
ground, until the axe reaches the inner part of the tree. They are then set on fire until the tree dies, 
standing. The interest in killing but not chopping down the trees is that living trees compete with yam 
plants for sunlight and soil nutrients, while the dead trunks serve as trainers for the crawling leaves of 
the yam plants. 
3 Dassa is a Yoruba kingdom created in the early 18th century. It is one of the many Yoruba kingdoms 
(e.g. Abeokuta, Oyo, Ketou, Save) created after the long migration started in the 12th century from lie 
(in today's Nigeria. See Smith 1969; Cornevin 1981). All the area from the Abomey plateau to the north 
of the province was apparently occupied or controlled by Nagot (Yoruba) groups, or subjected to regular 
attacks from these groups, until the mid-17th century when the Fon kingdoms of Danxome and the Mahi 
kingdom of Savalou were established. 
4 Idaca are a patrilineal and virilocal group, practising a homogeneous inheritance (though arrangements 
exist whereby female members of a family may inherit men's goods). In this system, the bridewealth 
passes from the bridegroom's side to the bride's male kin. 
5 In my view, searching for the nearest village and asking for permission to settle produced in the 
villager's mind the notion of 'ownership' while producing in the applicant's an attitude of respect. 
The process was reinforced by the continuous trail of settlement applicants and their eventual call on the 
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so-called owners for help in settling their (the Idaca settler) land disputes. In fact, the first Idaca cluster 
in the area is separated from the Ayinonxwe village by no less than 7 rivers, mostly considered as natural 
borders to territories. When asked how it was possible that the Ayinonxwe people situated so far away 
could be the 'owners of the lands', some Idaca informants asserted that the Mahi of Ayinonxwe was 
established in the area and given right over all the lands by the Danxomean Kings. This does not 
correspond to any historical record I know of. I cannot enter into the details here except to say two 
things: 
First, no Mahi settlement is known to have been established with any 'benediction' from 
Danxomean Kings, but out of conflictive situations. One famous case is the break in friendship between 
Gbaguidi, a friend of Houegbadja the founder of the Danxomean monarchy. Gbaguidi then moved to the 
north-west and founded Savalou around 1645. Another is the succession dispute within the King's 
family between Agbo-Sassa (the prince promised to the throne after Akaba his father) and Dossou, his 
younger brother, who seized the throne under the ruling name of Agadja. Agbo-Sassa and a few 
followers then left for the north-east and founded Ouesse, around 1760, in Nagot territory. Permanent 
tension and an atmosphere of war persisted between the two brothers and their followers until 
colonisation. 
Second, the settlement colony created by the Danxomean King and which is the farthest north from 
Abomey seems to be Gbedavo, located not more than 50 kilometres south of Ayinonxwe. In the end, it 
seems to me that the first Idaca settlers were misled by two factors. First, the Mahi language spoken in 
Ayinonxwe is a variant of Fon and they can hardly have noticed the difference. This might have led the 
Idaca to assume that those people were from the Danxomean kingdom. Second, the Idaca were coming 
from a densely populated area and might have lost the notion of 'no man's land' from their frame 
of reference and therefore felt the need to find the 'owners' of the land. In any case, this historical 
process is likely to become a hard bone of contention for governments in the coming years, since agrarian 
law is poor in Benin and for thousands of Idaca peasants in this whole area their status is precarious as 
far as land ownership is concerned. 
6 A child (boy or girl, of whatever age) may be 'given', without much forewarning, to a male kin 
member of his mother, for example, at the moment of the marriage (see den Ouden, 1987 for similar cases 
in Cameroon). In the present case, Dossou was 'given' to his mother's father as a sign of gratitude 
for earlier favours. This is a form of social security to the elderly when they are no longer able to do 
much farm work. The question here is how far could Dossou meet the needs of his own family and those 
of the old man in an environment deserted by most as being too exhausted to farm. The question could 
not be tackled within the scope of the present research. 
7 The wives declared that at the time they did not like the idea of remaining in the village for months 
while their husband was 20 kilometres away in the bush. They still believe that the way Tinkpo's father 
arranged things was to the advantage of Tinkpo's third wife, who was the youngest and allowed to 
follow the group to the farm. But they no longer regret this as it gave them the opportunity to 'become 
themselves' (with some flourishing commerce), which the third wife never achieved. 
81 did not manage, nor did I find it relevant, to record the versions of the descendants of the two other 
men on their settling in and moving out of this farm. Nevertheless, the peaceful process described by 
Agbegui could well have hidden conflict situations, the exploration of which might inform us on other 
dimensions of the settlement dynamics in the area. For example, we know nothing of the first processes 
of negotiation over land rights among the settlers, of the political processes involved in inter-household 
relations, or of labour management and the social and economic organisation of the settlements, which 
might have later been incorporated into the social organisation of the village of Togoudo. 
9 The migration movements of those Djidja yam cultivators started also in the late 19th early 20th 
century. They first went west through Togoland where the land and climate were appropriate for yam 
cultivation, and also where the German colonial administration exempted women from paying head tax. 
They turned back to the areas of Dassa, Glazou6 and Save in the late sixties and early seventies. 
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10 Notice that when the Idaca started migrating in the early years of this century, they did not search in 
the south, which they assumed to be closely controlled territory of the Danxomean Kingdom. 
11 The rains of the first season move from south to north while those of the second season go the other 
way (following the movement of the Inter-Tropical Front). For the first season, they would sow their plot 
at home, or sometimes leave the sowing to wives and relatives, move to the north where they would 
catch up with the rains and work there for cash. If they were quick enough or less in need of immediate 
cash (and had contacts with people in the area) they might cultivate a piece of land there on their own 
account. They would then return home to harvest and then go back north to harvest or do other jobs 
related to the second season (mainly associated with the cotton crop). As the rains then start in the north 
they remain there to do the sowing, again returning south to cultivate their own plots. 
12 In Dani, most Somba are members of the Assemblée de Dieu Church. One rarely sees any other ethnic 
group (Idaca or Fon) attending. The Idaca there are predominantly protestant, the pastor being the second 
settler in the village, and actually the first Idaca literate who came in the area. 
13 Most ethnic groups in Benin consider that the Fulbe camp in the bush with their cattle (even when their 
camp has been established for decades) and do not like to live in nucleated settlements with other people. 
14 According to van Santen on a case from Cameroon, one of the Fulbe social categorisation uses three 
words: The Fulbe (themselves), the Juulbe (those who are islamised but who are not ethnically Fulbe), 
and the Haabe (those who are neither Fulbe nor islamised). The latter are considered very much inferior 
to the Fulbe (van Santen 1993: 47-58) which they consider the Idaca people to be, at least according to 
those Fulbe who show a strong sense of disgust for the widespread rearing of pigs and hence their 
excrement found in the village. 
15 According to Goudali, in those days family names and surnames were less used as introductory 
parameters of alien individuals and parties than clan references. When applying for the land in 
Ayinonxwe, his father brought drinks and kola nuts, and after the usual greetings, asked for land 
explaining that he was a farmer in search of means of survival. The first question asked was 'where do 
you come from and what is your clan?' And Goudali added 'When he said it, the Chief just bowed 
his head. He could not refuse such a request from someone who was from the same clan as the woman 
who gave him life. After a short moment, he raised his head and said: you are not in an alien place. You 
are at home'. 
16 This event is presented as 'an opportunity', but I do not believe it was felt as such by many people 
at the time. One of its consequences was better control by the state administrative apparatus over the 
peasants for tax collection and various forms of labour contribution, though the candidates for the area 
made many promises regarding education, health, roads etc. 
17 Togoudo is a fictitious name. As for the real name, the people agreed on the name which the hunters 
who first arrived in the area, gave to the little river which they noticed they never crossed until they had 
hunted sufficient wild animals. The name means 'Don't cross me'. The fictitious name Togoudo that 
I use here retains the same symbolism. It means 'on the other bank of the river' (i.e. the place you do 
not need to go). 
18 The Fulbe are probably not interested in these intra village bargains. Being cattle herders on natural 
pasture lands they are more interested in the management of larger geographical areas than a single 
village. They have their own administrative organisation that covers an area of some 40km radius, where 
Djato Kadeeri of Togoudo, the Lamido, is the authority through whom the Fulbe interact with other 
groups and with the state apparatus for setting conflicts and other issues. 
19 Recently, a form of access to land has emerged whereby land is lent in exchange for a specified labour 
force (4 to 6 adult persons for one or two full working days) to the lender. 
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20 Closely related to getting into a position from which one get access to external opportunities is that 
of the prerogatives attached to every position. On this issue and in various matters, as shown in chapter 
2, the so-called wise men (Agba flu) oppose or unite with the young men, depending on the matter at 
hand. Similar situations are found between the GV council and the Mayor, the secretary of the GV and 
the RDV, the AVA and the RDV, the RDV and the Mayor. 
7 Productive activities, household, land and labour 
in Togoudo 
Introduction: The bicycle and the market economy 
Trekking down from their Dassa hills to the Togoudo woodlands in the early years 
of French colonisation, the Idaca people found the land and space necessary to 
cultivate for food and cash, and eventually were able to buy new consumer goods. 
A consumer good that became central to peasants' projects in that period - even 
today - was the bicycle. In fact, bicycles were not a luxury item nor simply a status 
symbol for people, they were necessary to cover the very long distances from their 
native village to the new settlements, or simply to get to their farms, often located 
far away because of their frequent need for new land for yam cultivation, at a time 
when public transport was non-existent. The necessity for new and better land was 
not only due to food sufficiency problems. It was stimulated by increasing incorpor-
ation into the colonial adrninistrative system and into the local, national and world 
market economy from the end of the thirties. New roads were opened and railways 
built in the 1930s, taxation was increased during the Second World War, and 
tobacco, cotton and groundnuts were grown for export. The import of manufactured 
goods grew from the mid-forties onwards. A bicycle was very useful for prospecting 
new land and reducing travelling time. The new lands were fertile and could yield 
up to 30 tons of yam or two tons of maize per hectare (Roesch 1992). The transporta-
tion of agricultural products from the farm to the villages or to market places was 
on foot and carried on the head. An adult man or woman can carry no more than 
30-50kg at any one time, while on a bicycle one can carry 100 to 150kg, cover the 
distance twice to four times as fast and still find it less tiring. A bicycle was thus an 
important investment and represented one of the key assets for peasants to become 
incorporated into the market economy during that period. The French colonial 
aciministration even levied taxes on bicycles, which continued until relatively 
recently. For the early settlers in Togoudo, anyone who did not own a bicycle was 
'simply nothing' and 'lagging behind'. This indicates that the market-oriented 
nature of the local economy in Togoudo was already part of the realities of settle-
ment creation in the early years of this century. 
In this chapter and elaborating from the results of a quantitative survey con-
ducted in early 1995, I provide a short description of the local economy, 
emphasising the central role played by the control over land and particularly over 
labour in the self-achievement of men and women in Togoudo. But first, a brief 
word on how the survey was designed and conducted. 
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The survey 
The survey data were collected and analyzed in early 1995 on the basis of hypoth-
eses formulated from my research on the diversification of the local economy, access 
to and control over land and labour - important factors for how household patterns 
are negotiated among members and for how decisions on resources and product 
allocation are taken. This requires some attention to the local definitions of 'house-
hold' and 'units of production' which I explore later in the chapter. The survey 
was conducted with 24 extended households randomly drawn from a list of the 
members of Groupement Villageois (GV). These 24 households were composed of 
some 60 heads of units of production (26 men and 34 women), each of whom were 
interviewed.1 
Three levels of data collection in the survey were relevant to the discussions in 
this book. The first level was the identification of the members of each of the 24 
extended households and an investigation into how some of their basic needs for 
staple foods, relish,2 health, clothing, and schooling are met. The second level con-
cerned all the productive activities (agricultural and non-agricultural) of each 
member, the ways in which they mobilised resources within or outside of the house-
hold, the constraints faced in these activities and their views on future perspectives. 
The last level concerned a rough estimation of the annual income of the informants, 
carried out with 10 women and 11 men randomly selected from the 60 sample units. 
The aim was not to obtain a precise and reliable figure on individual incomes, 
which is, in any case, difficult to achieve, but to have an idea of the variation among 
informants and to appreciate better the relative importance of each activity in the 
composition of incomes. The income generated from cotton production was precise 
and reliable as records exist for it with the GV. For the other agricultural products, 
the estimate of the net revenue was calculated on the basis of the approximate yields 
declared and the average market value of the inputs and products in question for 
the year. For each non-agricultural activity, a calendar was drawn up with the 
informant, showing the different degrees of intensity of the activity (four scales were 
taken into account) throughout the year. The return on the activity was then 
estimated for each of these periods. Finally, questions were asked on occasional or 
irregular income during the past year (i.e. unusual sale of animals, recovery of 
savings over a long period, and gifts from relatives living outside the village). 
The results of the survey, as presented below, remain largely descriptive on 
income generating activities, access to land and labour, household patterns and 
income. Nevertheless, they function as background information on the economy in 
Togoudo and to contextualise the case studies of survival and self-achievement 
strategies discussed in the next chapter. 
Productive activities 
As already indicated in Chapter 6, the main occupations of men and women in 
Togoudo are farm activities, carried out in an area extending up to 20 kilometres 
north of the village. Farm activities are coupled in many cases with animal hus-
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bandry and non-farming activities. There is no irrigated land in Togoudo and 
therefore farm activities are conducted during the two rainy seasons broadly 
spanning March to June and August to October. Nowadays, the main crops culti-
vated are yam, maize, beans, peanuts (groundnuts), cotton and pepper. The animals 
raised are mainly chickens, pigs, goats, cattle and sheep. All the cattle are herded 
by the Fulbe (see Table 8 for the figures in 1990). 
Table 8 Crop and animal production in Togoudo in 1990 
Crops Area covered (ha) Yield (ton) 
Maize 481 542 
Sorghum/Millet 180 216 
Rice 11.20 11 
Beans 196 125.96 
Groundnuts 127.50 123.1 
Yams 315 2,520 
Cassava 35 420 
Tomato 70 700 
Pepper 138 55.2 
Okra 75 225 
Cotton 475 676 
Total 2068.7 
Animals Number 
Chickens 2,760 
Pigs 1,400 
Goats 800 
Cattle 275 
Sheep 40 
Source: Carder-Zou, 1991 
Since the early 1990s, farming activities have been dominated by maize and cotton 
crops. Maize is a staple food in the village but also a cash crop. On the farms, it 
combines better with cotton than cowpeas and groundnuts for coping with labour 
needs between the first and second cropping season, when the first season crops 
(maize, cowpeas, groundnuts etc.) are harvested, while those of the second season 
(mainly cotton) are sown. With maize as the first season crop, peasants manage 
more to avoid the overlap of needs (harvesting one crop and sowing the other) than 
with cowpeas and groundnuts. In addition, it allows them to provide food for 
household consumption. 
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Table 9 Area coverage by main crops in 1994 in Togoudo (percentages) 
First cropping season Second cropping season 
Crops Coverage Crops Coverage 
Maize 63.2 Cotton 74.2 
Cassava 1.7 Cassava 1.6 
Cowpea 19.5 Yam 11.5 
Yam 12.5 Pepper 1.3 
Pepper 1.4 Okra 1.5 
Okra 1.7 Groundnut 7.9 
Voandzou 0.6 
Sorghum 1.5 
Total (%) 100 Total (%) 100 
Total (ha) 63.3 Total (ha) 68.8 
Source: field Survey, 1995 
Figure 5 shows the general trend of agricultural production in Togoudo since 1990, 
while Figure 6 illustrates the rapid increase of cotton production since 1987. In 1994, 
for the first cropping season, 63 percent of the area cultivated in the village was 
sown with maize while 74 percent of the second season area was cultivated with 
cotton (see Table 9). A further illustration of the importance of these crops in the 
cropping system is given in Figure 7. 
Apart from farming and animal husbandry, other activities in Togoudo include 
various sorts of trade (e.g. retailing of manufactured products and the trading of 
agricultural food products from Togoudo to Gbomina), processing of foodstuffs for 
sale (e.g. meals, cakes, bread, cakpaio brewing, relish, and oil), artisan activities (e.g. 
carpentry, masonry, haulage, mechanics, sewer works, and hair dressing) and 
transport and shopkeeping. 
As the area of coverage shows, seasonal crops, particularly cotton since the early 
1990s, play a major role in the local economy. From the 60 heads of productive units 
surveyed (26 men and 34 women), 56 percent of the women and 45 percent of the 
men declared cotton cultivation to be their main productive activity, while 24 
percent of women and 38 percent of men indicated this to be maize cultivation (see 
Figure 8). The idea of a main activity varied from one respondent to the other. 
According to 42 percent of male respondents, the classification of the crop is based 
on its role (be it in food or cash) in meeting the household's food needs, while the 
percentage of women basing the classification on this criterion does not exceed 30 
percent. Another criterion for ranlcing crops is whether the crop is income generat-
ing. 46 percent of men and 65 percent of women used this measure (Figure 9). 
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Figure 6 Area cropped with cotton in Togoudo 
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Figure 7 Cropping patterns in Togoudo 
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Figure 8 Relative importance of productive activities of men and women in Togoudo 
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Figure 9 Criteria for classifying activities in Togoudo 
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For 77 percent of the 34 women and 71 percent of the 26 men surveyed, cotton 
represents the first income generating crop and, in even higher proportion, the most 
labour consuming activity. The other activities - (petty) trade, food processing, 
brewing, animal husbandry, and making artifacts - are declared as first income 
generating activities for only 15 percent of women and 15 percent of men. But these 
activities constitute the second income generating activity for 35 percent of women 
and 20 percent of men, and the third for 25 percent of women (Figures 10 and 11). 
160 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
Access to land 
The rights of the Idaca settlers over land in Togoudo, that is supposed to belong to 
the people of Ayinonxwe, are not clear. There are some indications of daims of so-
called 'owners to the land'. For example, in many cases, land conflicts are brought 
to the village Chief of Ayinonxwe for settlement. Moreover, since 1989, people from 
Ayinonxwe have been requesting that Togoudo people pay a rent on the land, 
especially for the farms cultivated with cotton. From time to time, there are meetings 
between both parties but no consensus has been reached that I know of. In the 
meantime, Idaca people occupy the land, pass it down from one generation to the 
next in the patoiline, lend it now and then to autochthones (Idaca), and to foreigners 
(Fon and Somba). They seem to exert full ownership of the land in its everyday 
management, but, significantly enough, do not sell, or at least no such a case has yet 
been noted.3 In fact, no Idaca would accept buying the land from another, since 
they do not consider themselves as ultimate owners. 
The dominant place occupied by cotton in the cropping system of Togoudo is 
rather recent (see Figure 6 for the growth in the area under cotton from 1987 to 
date). As I argued earlier, this indicates the world market-oriented nature of the 
local economy in Togoudo. Indeed, apart from the usual food crops, there have been 
various trends in cash crops at different periods. There was first the era of the 
oleaginous, mainly groundnuts and castor-oil, up to the early 1960s. Then tobacco 
and cotton were added in the mid-sixties and seventies. From the mid-seventies to 
mid-eighties, Togoudo peasants marketed most of their cash crops in Nigeria and 
these were mainly peppers, cassava, yams and cowpeas. Maize marketing in Benin 
towns rose sharply from the late seventies and, since the mid-eighties, cotton has 
ranked first in cash crops, though 50 percent of the men interviewed in the present 
survey said they earn as much from their other crops, such as maize, cowpeas, yams 
and groundnuts, as they earn from cotton. It is noteworthy that no statistical records 
are kept in Togoudo about the evolution of any crop except cotton. The parsimoni-
ous records kept at district level are unreliable because of the conditions in which 
they are collected (see Mongbo 1985). In the present study, I have preferred to 
interview peasants individually and in small groups on this issue of the general 
trend of export crops in Togoudo since the colonial period. What is indicated, 
therefore, is local public memory, supported by material indicators such as the 
investments various people made at different periods of time with the cash from 
such and such a crop (e.g. in houses, bicycles, motor bikes, wife, and land in 
Gbornina). 
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Figure 10 Sources of income for men and women in Togoudo 
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Hence land rights of Idaca people are very insecure, though they appear to have 
largely contributed themselves to this state of affairs, as discussed in Chapter 6. A 
new development that renders their situation even more fragile, is that of Idaca 
people settled in Dani and Gob£, some 40 kilometres north, where the so-called 
owners have been selling the land to estate agents and traders from the city who are 
now settling as farmers, without giving notice to the person actually working the 
land. No such case is yet known in Togoudo, and it is difficult to predict how things 
will evolve. For the time being and in their everyday use of the land, the Idaca 
appear as the owners and are treated as such in this account of access to land. 
The average land availability in Togoudo is five hectares per adult male, of which 
two are left fallow. But, in fact, land is unequally distributed, 25 percent of men 
owning less than three hectares while 25 percent have more than ten. Most women 
cultivate less than one hectare. Only 25 percent of the women interviewed cultivated 
between two and six hectares. Here, too, land distribution is highly unequal (a fact 
related to the land ownership of the family and to the labour management style of 
the head of household). 80 percent of the women, who put agriculture as their first 
or second income generating activity, work on 46 percent of the total land cropped 
by women of this category, while the other 20 percent crop 54 percent of the land 
(Zounon 1995: 37). The mode of access to land for men is completely different from 
that of women. Men generally work on land which they have inherited, collectively 
or individually, while women work mostly on land freely lent to them by their hus-
band or relative (see Figure 12). It is remarkable that about 50 percent of the land 
cultivated by men is done on collective inheritance. This does not relate to any 
feeling of insecurity about the land but rather indicates a style of household labour 
management, as discussed later in this chapter. 
Land constitutes a limiting factor to economic expansion for 31 percent of men 
and 18 percent of women, either because it is simply impossible for them to obtain 
land (8 percent of men and 11 percent of women) or because they would have to 
move much farther away from or out of the village, which is now more and more 
difficult. The distances from farms to the village already oblige 54 percent of men 
and 33 percent of women to spend weeks and months of the year on their farm 
during the cropping seasons. People think it is still possible to be lent land free of 
charge, especially on farms where the inheritance is collectively used, but the plots 
sizes are generally not enough. This obliges some to plough land in different and 
distant locations. Most of the 18 percent of women who cannot obtain land indicate 
that this is due to the fact that the head of household thinks that the land is not 
enough for his needs. A new mode of access mentioned by eight percent of men and 
three percent of women (for not more than two or three years) is to borrow land 
from a landowner in return for the labour of four to six strong men, for two real 
working days, to cultivate for the landowner, which can be up to four hectares. No 
man complains of the low fertility of the soils, except for yam cultivation (23 
percent). On the other hand, 20 percent of the women complain of the continuous 
exhaustion of the plots they are given by their husbands or relatives, either because 
they are stationed on the same, small plot of land, or because they are allocated land 
after it has been cultivated for some seasons by the relative. 
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Labour requirements, household patterns and income 
The major crops of the farming system in Togoudo are said to be labour corauming 
and require household exchange as well as wage labour for land preparation to 
harvesting and transportation of products. Yam cultivation is further constrained by 
the fact that it requires specialised labour for making the mounds, mostly given by 
the Somba who come from the northern part of the province. This labour is in short 
supply. Labour requirements, more than land availability, remain the most limiting 
factor to economic expansion in Togoudo. 58 percent of men and 47 percent of 
women were said to be willing to extend their farm but lacked the manpower to do 
so (see den Ouden 1995 for similar findings on the Adja Plateau in southern Benin). 
The control of manpower and access to cash for wage labour are determining factors 
in self-achievement strategies in Togoudo. This has an impact on the way in which 
household patterns are negotiated among members. 
Household patterns 
Idaca people build virilocal and patrilineal communities, where inheritance remains 
with the group of patrikin. Apart from this general characteristic, there is no stan-
dard definition into which one can fit all the different basic Idaca corporate groups 
concerned with domestic functions - here labelled 'households' - who live and 
work in Togoudo. The 24 households surveyed ranged in size from 3-28 members, 
29 percent of them containing less than seven members, 37 percent from seven to 
ten, while the other 34 percent counted 11 or more members, half of which had over 
18 members. The total population of the 24 households surveyed amounted to 251, 
Figure 12 Land tenure of men and women in Togoudo 
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of whom only 60 (24 percent: 26 men and 34 women) were more or less autonomous 
in their production and consumption decision-making, the other 76 percent being 
more or less dependant on the former for anocating their time and needs. These 60 
making their own decisions and negotiating productive resources, mcluding labour, 
primarily though not exclusively from within the household, form what I call here 
units of production. Generally, people in Togoudo would claim that women and 
adult children or relatives Hving in the same household mostly conduct their own 
economic activities, making major management decisions in terms of resource 
allocation and use of the products. When this really happens, as is the case for the 
60 persons indicated above, I refer to them as 'units of production', enjoying 
relative autonomy, although some mutual obligations might remain between these 
units within the household. 
Heads of households are generally men, except in cases of divorce and the 
absence or death of the husband. It was found that 45 percent of heads of household 
were married with one wife, 25 percent had two, while the remaining 30 percent 
had three or more wives (up to five in some cases). Though always having one or 
more wives, with children, the person referred to as the 'head of the household' 
is not necessarily the eldest of the family, although it happens in some cases. There 
are kin groups where the grandfather is present and considered 'head of the house-
hold', in others, it is one of the sons. In general, the head of household is expected 
to provide members with grain, which then gives him some right to the manage-
ment of resources of the household, including labour. He can request, more or less 
successfully, the help of all members at peak periods on the farm. In general, the 
son is supposed to establish his own household when he gets married, even though 
he remains in the same compound as his parents. In fact in Togoudo, these general 
rules of household management do not hold. As I already indicated in the previous 
chapter, one cannot identify a household from the spatial organisation of the 
residence of its members. The fact that a son with his wife and children, or a wife, 
have their houses built apart, even far from the house of the head of the household, 
hardly says anytiung of the style of management of the household. As the figures 
show, there are many big households in Togoudo, 34 percent counting more than 
11 members with the head of household, his wives, their children and the wives and 
children of the latter. In some cases a son might already have two wives but still, 
in varying degrees, be dependant on his father, all of them operating in one unit of 
production under the control of the head of household. In exchange, the latter 
provides staple food needs, housing, clothing, means of transport, and bride wealth 
for one or more wives for the sons. Of the 24 households surveyed, six (25 percent) 
are made up of one unit of production of 10-28 persons while the 18 remaining 
households include, on average, three units of production. The multi-generation 
households/units of production correspond to a strategy of these heads of house-
hold to control the labour of their wives, their children and their children's wives 
and children, but this has some costs, which I discuss below. 
Productive activities in Togoudo 165 
Rights and obligations between women and head of household 
The large majority of women (80 percent), including those managing their own unit 
of production, help their husband with the harvesting of cotton, maize and other 
crops. But only 35 percent of women are involved in weeding, and even fewer in 
sowing. General statements indicate that women take care of all household chores, 
mcluding cooking at home and on the farm, while the husband has a duty to 
provide for the core part of the meal (maize, yams, cassava) and in some rare cases 
the condiments. The man is also supposed to be responsible for health care, ceremo-
nies and assistance to the wife when needed. Another general statement is that 
when just married, the woman remains within the unit of production of her hus-
band for two to five years before 'she is liberated'. A man with three wives told 
me: 
'When I take a wife, she remains subservient to me for two years. When she respects me, 
is docile, I give her - but only in the third year - a piece of land where she can develop 
her own activities.' 
In fact, only the first wife of this man underwent this rule. According to her, the 
husband liberated her in the third year of her marriage, after he married his second 
wife and then wanted the first to look after her own personal needs (such as clothes, 
kitchen equipment, and jewels) herself. As for the second wife, she was 'liberated', 
not because she proved docile, but by her own account precisely because she was 
not: 
'It was four years after I came here that my husband gave me a piece of land which 
allowed me to start working on my own and stop having to hold out my hand to him. It 
was two years after his third wife came. That woman was not a hard working woman, 
but it was at me that he shouted on the farm, to which I always reacted. Finally, he said 
he had had enough of my work, that I should separate, and I don't regret it now.' 
Women receive help from their husband only for spraying insecticides on cotton 
farms, for building storehouses or for transporting agricultural products from the 
farm to the village on their bicycles. Girls work for their mother who take care of 
their clothing. But their health care and other training costs are at the father's 
expense. Young girls start their own activities by the age of 15. These consist of 
cooking porridge (for breakfast), cooking akassa, and growing vegetables in a corner 
of their parents' plots to sell at the market. It is said that this early involvement of 
girls in market activities is necessary since it teaches them to 'know money quick-
ly'. For their labour needs on their farms, liberated married women will go for 
wage labour (some even have to pay for the labour of their sons), or mobilise a 
different network of relatives than those sought by the husband (i.e. the mother, the 
sisters, the married daughters and their children, and other female relatives). Some 
belong to labour exchange groups. 
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The sons: the returns for remaining 'dependent' 
Sons are supposed to be liberated on marrying, but in many cases they continue to 
live and work under the authority of their father, together with their wife and 
children. I use here the words 'dependent', 'independent', 'liberated' as locally 
used by any person in the area who speaks some French . But I did not investigate 
how emic these concepts are. They could be simple appropriations of the first 
translation interpreters made of a phenomenon widely shared. How people lived 
and coped with this situation remains to be seen. I deal here only very briefly with 
the question. In the survey, eight men of this category were interviewed on the 
types of work they do for their father, what they get from their father and what 
their future plans are with respect to relations with their father and their own self-
achievement. 
Apart from working on the farms of their father, they also take care of transport, 
and wage labour recruitment from surrounding villages. One is a miller for his 
father, while another, in addition to helping him on the farm, acts as his apprentice 
mason. In return, all these men and their wives and children (for the six who are 
already married) are fed by their fathers who give them pocket money. Seven of the 
eight have been given means of transport by their father, one of whom has a 
Yamaha 50. Six of them had their houses built by the father, another received 
significant help from him when building his house, while the last said he was not 
yet in need of a house but would surely be given one by his father as soon as he 
expressed the desire. 
Most of these young men find their situation 'natural' and quite enjoyable. Only 
one of them (the one with the Yamaha) complains that his father thinks he is lazy 
and that he might quit his father if this continues. All of them have a little private 
activity (afternoon farming mostly), but declare that they do not find time to work 
on it as they would like. As for their future projects, some plan to extend their farm 
slowly until they become totally independent but would help their father in return, 
when he grows old. One was put to retailing bicycle spare parts by his father which 
he expects to expand, while another is planning to start trading in food products 
from Togoudo to Gbomina and Cotonou. For the rest, apart from having material 
goods, the future project is to take over from the father the management of his 
affairs when he grows old: 
'For the future, I think that after all I will remain with my father (this is the one who 
was threatening to leave him) to help him because I am the only one now here to help 
him. All my other brothers have gone abroad to Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. When my 
father is completely old, I will take over his affairs' 
Wage labour 
81 percent of men and 80 percent of women use wage labour during peak periods: 
land preparation and sometimes weeding for maize; and land preparation, harvest-
ing and destroying of old plants for cotton. This has led some peasants into 
organising the 'import' of wage labour from nearby villages, but also from the 
Abomey plateau in the south and from the Atacora Province of the north-west of 
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Benin, the latter being specialised in yam cultivation. This imported labour arrives 
mostly in teams of 8-10, sometimes more, whom the 'importer' houses and feeds 
during the time of their stay on his farm, in addition to the wage they get, which 
is indexed to the work they do. In order to pay for this labour force, men and 
women are in constant need for cash, which they find from loans at 25-50 percent 
- or even as high as 100 percent or 150 percent - annual interest rates, or by selling 
animals or crops (mainly maize and sorghum). Those who complain of not being 
able to extend their farm because of a lack of labour present it as a 'lack of cash to 
pay for labour'. When looked at in detail, the need for cash affects 69 percent of 
men and 59 percent of women for preparing a cotton farm, 54 percent of men and 
38 percent of women for harvesting it, and 18 percent of men and 38 percent of 
women for maize field preparation. 
Figure 13 Sources of income for men 
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About income 
From the sample I randomly selected 11 men and 10 women for an analysis of the 
structure and approximate size of their income.4 
All eleven men have an annual income that exceeds 200,000f with 50 percent of 
them earning more than 822,000f and 75 percent more than 450,000f (see Figure 13). 
The income that women generate from seasonal crops rarely exceeds 100,000f per 
year. Only one of the ten women surveyed earned more than this amount. 75 
percent earned less than 53,000f on cotton, and less than 31,000f on other crops. 
Unfortunately, and for various reasons - ignorance of the activity, lack of time 
because dependent, distance from farm to the village and so forth - less than 50 
percent of them practice or earn income from petty trade or food processing (see 
Figure 14). In total, women earn far less than men (see Figure 15). The income of the 
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25 percent most prosperous women is less than the income of the lowest earning 
men. It is noteworthy that for both men and women, the 50 percent less fortunate 
among them are those who do not combine agricultural production with other 
activities. 
Figure 14 Sources of income for women 
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Conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the economy of Togoudo is essentially 
a market-oriented one, with a high potential for diversification. Although relatively 
few of those surveyed combine agriculture with other activities (around 30 percent), 
the fact that successful people, men and women, are those who do combine activ-
ities, leads one to believe that diversification will most probably accelerate during 
the coming years. The size of the village population (2,500 inhabitants), together 
with the important and traditional production of cash crops, creates a valuable local 
market for various food processing, brewery, retelling of manufactured products (of 
which bicycles and motor bike spare parts are important) and artisanal activities. 
These guide the strategies for self-achievement which I discuss in Chapter 8. In 
addition to the local market, the important regional market of Gbomina, situated at 
the crossroads between south and north, and east and west Benin, gives access to 
market opportunities to the people of Togoudo for cities in Benin, Togo, Niger and 
Western Nigeria, depending on the state of the economy in those areas (see Igue 
1992). 
A productive factor for which it is difficult to make any projection is land. It 
would be a mistake to assume that people from Ayinonxwe will not further press 
their claim over the land in one way or another. The cases of Dani, Gobe, Katakou, 
for example, are illustrative of the insecurity of settlers who let themselves become 
engaged in the logic of so-called landowners. The educated children of Ayinonxwe 
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might well start selling land to the rich traders of Cotonou and Porto-Novo and one 
cannot know what that would then bring, since land legislation is rather weak in 
Benin. Nevertheless, interacting with people in Togoudo, one gets the feeling that 
this issue is not an everyday preoccupation, although this should not be taken as an 
indication of the level of gravity of the situation. People in Dani are as much, if not 
more, easy-going on land the issue, but risk everyday coming to their farm to 
discover it has already been sold to a new settler and that they are no longer 
allowed to even harvest their crop. 
Figure 15 Incomes of men and women at different quartiles 
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Labour is another critical means of production. Though networks are established for 
the recruitment of wage labour from outside the village, household labour remains 
an important resource and attempts to control it are made through a rather 
centralised mode of household management by some heads of household. Similar 
situations are found on the Adja-Plateau in southern Benin (see Fanou 1992 quoted 
by den Ouden 1995: 32), where the people Fanou calls 'charismatic' accumulators 
- heads of household specialised in agriculture - use the labour of as many wives, 
children and dependants as can be mobilised. Den Ouden's research in the same 
area, on people who want to expand their businesses, reveals that these 'big men', 
as he calls them, now rely much less on domestic labour but still have difficulties 
in fully working with wage labour because of the low or negative return from it. As 
for domestic labourers, they are becoming distrustful of the promises made by the 
'big man' as to the future redistribution of the gains made from the domestic 
labour used (den Ouden op. cit). The present situation in Togoudo seems to give 
much more room for manoeuvre to heads of large productive units, while the 
household labour under their control seems still to have reasons to hope for a fair 
redistribution of the wealth produced: house, wives, motor bikes, radio-cassettes, 
with, in some cases, the starting of trade with the help of the father. Also, some sons 
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expect to take over from their father when the latter grow old. But, as we will see 
from the case of Tinkpo discussed in the next chapter, this way of solving the labour 
problem is not found to be fully satisfactory and other strategies are tried, mainly 
through the control of migration networks and the acquisition of the ox-plough. 
Notes 
1 The survey was conducted in cooperation with the UNIHO-G5 research project, and with the active and 
valued support and assistance of Anne Floquet, head of the project, to whom I express my sincere 
gratitude. 
2 In many cases in Togoudo, the husband provides the staple component of the food (maize, yam, 
cassava, sorghum), and the relish - the vegetables, spices and perhaps fish and meat - most of which is 
purchased, is the responsibility of the wife. The husband might help now and then. 
3 I should mention here that I did not seek information on land patterns and transactions in structured 
or even unstructured interviews, knowing quite well the critical nature of the land issue in Southern 
Benin. The issue was explored indirectly in various informal situations and with great tact. 
4 Notice that this sample was drawn from the GV list, which means that all interviewed households were 
cotton growers, which gives some advantages as far as income and accountability is concerned, especially 
after the latest rise in the price of cotton (30 percent), following the FCFA devaluation of 11 January 1994. 
8 Survival and self-achievement strategies of men 
and women in Togoudo 
Introduction 
My objective in this chapter is to continue the discussion begun in Chapter 6 on 
locally-built ways of defining 'rural development', and on the ways in which 
people earn a living. I assume these are based on long standing and socially-shared 
experiences in dealing with ecological, political and economic factors, both local and 
external. From the previous chapter, I showed how Togoudo is characterised by a 
relatively large and diversified span of productive activities. Furthermore, discrep-
ancies in the scale of these activities, resulting from the intrinsic capacities of 
individuals and groups, from the settlement patterns and access to and control over 
the major means of production, indicate that there are indeed many different ways 
for coping with life's constraints and for taking advantage of opportunities. In this 
chapter, I want to discuss these differential strategies in order to examine later how 
far the discourse and practice of the Community Development Programme has 
relevance for the different categories of people it is supposed to serve. My concern 
here is to underline the different logics that shape the well-being and development 
seeking of the intervenors and the intervened, in order to see at which points these 
logics interlock, allowing for the reproduction of development rhetoric and practice. 
There exist ready-made solutions to analyzing life-circumstance problems, based 
on so-called 'objective' or quantitative approaches to the identification and 
definition of poverty/wealth or inequalities.1 These represent various arbitrary ar-
tifices designed to appraise hierarchically what is commonly called 'the level of 
development' or 'welfare' of individuals, groups or nations. Using these devices, 
one can distinguish different categories of peasants based on economic indicators 
such as the size of the farm enterprise, its technical trajectory, the consumption 
patterns of the farm/household, and its access to health services and education. One 
can go even further, tabulating the type of production with working conditions, or 
working conditions with Jiving conditions.2 A poverty line might also be defined in 
relation to the cost of the minimum food needed for survival in the area, to which 
a so-called Engel factor is indexed to take into account of clothing, transport and 
housing costs. When these latter costs are not taken into account and the line is 
calculated only on the basis of food needs, one has what is called the indigence line. 
The percentage of a village or country population that falls under these lines 
represents the poverty or the indigence indicator of the village or country considered 
(see Salima and Valier 1994:25-27, and Lipton 1988 for further details). When school 
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attendance, access to health services and literacy are added as discriminatory factors, 
then we have what is called a series of human development indices. 
Though the advocates of such an approach mostly claim it to be objective, the 
methodology poses some problems, of which I wish to raise three. First, is the 
assumption of the universality of the development path. That is, it sets fixed 
standards and normative world-views in matters of development against which 
people's everyday lives are to be assessed, implying from the start the types of 
actions that should be engaged in in order to alleviate poverty. Second, is the 
blinkered nature of such 'objective' observations vis-a-vis the diversified and 
dynamic meanings people attribute to events and things, and according to which 
they act, thus giving different, changing and sometimes contradictory meanings to 
poverty, well-being, self-achievement and development. A third related problem 
with this etic tool is its incapacity, when applied to people living in precarious 
material conditions, to reveal and account for the diversity of the strategies with 
which people define their situations, struggle for survival and keep their head above 
water. For these reasons, I have preferred emic definitions of these concepts, folk 
views and classifications which can be summarised in terms of notions of survival, 
self-achievement and well-being. Emic categorisations, I believe, enable us to define 
more relevant categories than any economistk categorisation can achieve.3 Also, as 
Grignon and Passeron mention concerning food patterns and material conditions, 
'the exclusive reconstitution (with economistic devices) of the limits which material 
conditions impose on popular taste and consumption brings:., nothing new as 
compared to the spontaneous knowledge that a good informant, a housewife avertie 
or expert in coping, can have on his/her universe of practice' (1989: 126). 
Emic definitions of 'survival', 'self-achievement' and 'well-being' 
My choice to focus on survival, self-achievement and well-being as representations 
of everyday life conditions is not neutral. It is a result of my attempt to account for 
the different levels of socio-economic status generally referred to in the area of 
study. According to these emic definitions, some people strive just for survival, for 
keeping their head above water, struggling for daily subsistence, not for life projects 
of supposedly higher social status. They live from hand to mouth. Not that these 
people do not have any dream of self-achievement or well-being but their actual 
preoccupations based on their present negotiatory power are believed to be confined 
to the daily search for survival. In the meantime, others deploy strategies beyond 
the simple quest for survival, with a view to achieving specific life projects, gaining 
a 'personality' in the society, becoming a 'person who deserves to be Patron-Saint 
(ME djo ms.)'. Those that are successful might then be referred to in terms of 'them 
belly full' or 'they live at ease' or 'enjoying well-being'. 
But one should not exaggerate the particularity of emic concepts for local people. 
Though I stress here the advantages of emic over etic definitions, I do not wish to 
give the impression that emic definitions are locally produced, in isolation from the 
external world and from the channels through which external norms and values 
produced by the dominant 'development' culture feed into local perceptions. 
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Although I do not believe in the existence of a world global culture of development 
imposing itself on passive and receptive, or reluctant peasants, dictating the ways 
in which they define well-being and seek it, we should not expect local definitions 
of well-being to be totally disconnected from the world-wide human search for well-
being driven by dominant cultures and means of communication, from which 
people at local level might learn. It is with this kind of awareness that I have 
approached the problem of identifying the differential ways of survival and self-
achievement. But before coming to the findings of this exercise, it is worth presen-
ting first the method I used. 
The method used 
As a first stage, I looked at the living and working conditions of people in general, 
discussing informally their immediate and longer term projects. But in doing so I 
did not place people on a ranked scale. Nevertheless, I cannot pretend to have 
completely avoided categorising them on the basis of my own experiences and 
world-views, especially in extreme cases of what I considered to be precarious con-
ditions or self-evident well-being. I mostly draw assumptions from external signs 
(e.g. apparent health, clothing, housing), checked against the living conditions of the 
households (in respect to diet, child care etc.). At a second stage, and separately for 
men and women, I asked four informants to rank their fellow villagers (each 
informant individually) according to what they considered as being a 'successful' 
or a 'non-successful' person. Fifty adult men were randomly selected from a list 
of 957 established for the purposes of collecting the head-tax which I obtained from 
the Mayor. Then I added the names of 15 others to the 50 selected. These 15 were 
people whose daily activities I had already followed and whose life trajectories I had 
documented. For the ranking, each of the sixty-five names were written on a 
separate card. The list was read out to the informant to make sure that she or he 
recognised the names of all the persons, which was not always the case. Some 
further indications were then necessary before all 65 persons were identified by the 
informant. Thereafter, I invited the informant to sort the cards into different groups, 
according to her or his perception of the situation of the person concerned and each 
time explaining why she or he chose to put the person in one category or the other. 
The same process was conducted with women.4 
At the beginning of each ranking exercise, it was always necessary to ensure the 
informant that none of what was said about the persons would be disclosed to any 
villager. I made sure that the ranking exercise was conducted in private and, further, 
I encouraged the image of privacy by lowering my voice, thereby mdicating the 
'secret' nature of it. I introduced the ranking exercise by saying: 
'We have already been in the village now for a few months (my assistant and I, who did 
all the rankings together), and we have noticed that things are not running for everybody 
in the same way. But we think that is quite normal. It happens everywhere! Not all the 
fingers on the hand have the same size. Here now, we would like to review the situations 
of these 65 persons, those for whom things are running approximatively the same way 
and those for whom the situations are different. Though we know these people and others, 
we don't know much of their everyday life and how things come to be as they are now. 
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Also, we don't know much of the village and surely we don't have relevant knowledge 
on the people whom we think we know. You have a saying in this village that 'strangers 
have big eyes but do not see much'. Therefore, we would like you to help us in this work. 
We will start reading the names. Could you please compare these people and see who are 
alike and who are different in the ways things are going for them, and each time could 
you please explain to us why you think they are the same or different, and why things 
are as they are to them.' 
The strategy in this technique was to introduce the informant to the idea of inequal-
ities in living conditions without suggesting, even implicitly, any definition for 
living conditions, differentiation, classification criteria, or any explanation of these 
inequalities. I introduced the idea of inequalities between fingers without giving any 
suggestion as to the sense in which the fingers are unequal and why. Not a single 
time in these introductions were the words 'rich' or 'poor' used, neither in Fon, 
in Idaca nor in French. For each list (male and female), the exercise was carried out 
separately with four different informants, two men and two women (thus in total 
eight informants), all adult heads of household or carrying out activities on their 
own. They were of different generations, trajectories and levels of accumulation as 
we judged from our observations during our stay in the village. We selected them 
for the good knowledge they had of the village and of the people, and for their wil-
lingness to cooperate. 
After the introduction and the agreement of the informant to participate in the 
ranking exercise, each name was read out while the corresponding card was handed 
over to the informant who was expected to make different piles, each time ex-
plaining why a specific card (a person) should be placed in one lot or the other and 
why not in others. Generally, the informant would hold the card, watch it carefully, 
turn it around, and repeat, as to himself, the name of the person concerned. Some-
times, we had the feeling that the informant held the person in his or her hands. 
During the ranking exercise, each informant created, merged or split the different 
piles. The number of categories formed by each informant varied from three to six. 
The first three informants made four categories (in the end five of the eight infor-
mants built four categories). Therefore, from the fourth informant, when the number 
of categories created exceeded (or was less than) four, we engaged in discussions, 
following their rankings, suggesting that they merge or split categories, in order to 
arrive at only four. At the end of the ranking, informants were asked to give short 
descriptions of each of the four categories, that is, brief statements that would apply 
to the people of the category in question. In the end these turned out to be more 
eloquent descriptions of these categories than universal qualifications such as 
'rich', 'leading', 'middle', 'poor' or 'indigent' peasants or people. 
The previous knowledge and impressions we ourselves had of the everyday life 
of people in the village helped us to ground the information thus collected into 
some daily realities of the people in question. Indeed, 15 of the men were closely 
known to us in advance. From each of the categories identified by the informants, 
two or three persons were researched concerning their working and living con-
ditions, their perceptions and rationalisations of their situation, and the ways in 
which they were managing their affairs. The features I captured from these different 
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levels on the local ideologies of development were useful for me later during 
informal group discussions at the village bar, Cakpalo (local beer) and relish parties,5 
games and other social interactional situations with the villagers. I could follow the 
discussions more easily and efficiently, and even provoke now and then debates on 
issues related to local norms and social values, for more clarification and alternative 
versions and visions. One of these debates revolved around the cultivation of a large 
cotton farm as an indicator of 'well-being' or 'good potential' or 'entrepreneur-
ial decision-making for accumulation'. Many people challenged this point of view, 
arguing that cultivating a large cotton field was a stupid decision for a farming 
enterprise, since one takes too much risk for little return. First was the climatic risk: 
'Nobody protects you when the rains turn bad and the yields are low. The price of cotton 
will remain the same. If this happens to you with yams, you have a chance that it is 
general, and therefore yam prices will rise in that year.' 
Another risk mentioned concerned labour requirements at the moment of the 
harvest. Harvesting has to be done within a limited time period to avoid outbreaks 
of fire, and, most importantly, dust on the cotton fibres which could result in the the 
cotton being declared second quality: 
'You will run after the children, women, and Ton and Somba labourers who are mostly 
insolent and very difficult to get during these periods, in order to harvest your cotton on 
time. And many of these labourers will request to be paid immediately after the work. You 
will then be looking for loans if you do not have, for example, millet or cowpeas to sell. 
Some people may even obtain money from the women, promising to pay them back with 
maize from the next year's harvest which they haven't yet sown. With a yam field, you 
can just harvest each time as much as your hands can cover (they mean family labour). 
It is true that with yam you cannot earn at once the money you can make with cotton. 
But if people need a lot of money at once to put into something (for any investment), why 
don't they simply join immediately a rotating credit organisation? People must be stupid 
to put so much trust in cotton cultivation. Besides in reality, many of these so-called big 
cotton growers are just caught in a vicious circle of credit and can no longer get out of 
it.'6 
Another of these debates was about building a house in Gbornina and renting it out 
to civil servants or merchants. Some people said that was a good way of securing 
one's retirement from agriculture while many others contested that it was the most 
senseless investment a peasant could ever make. People argued that it was better to 
invest in a herd of cows or to spend the money on the children, giving them 
opportunities to learn something other than agriculture. Potential clients for house 
renting in Gbornina are said to enjoy much higher bargaining power than peasants, 
especially those who would soon be too old and weak to claim their rent money in 
the event of default. Moreover, civil servants, for example, can be moved to any 
remote village in Benin at any time. Then how can an old illiterate peasant from 
Togoudo manage to find the person in order to claim his money? The misfortunes 
of people with similar experiences were evoked. 
The final step in the ranking exercise consisted of pulling together the 
classificatory statements used by each informant concerning the four categories 
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Men Women All together 
Low status 15 (23%) 22 (34%) 37 (29%) 
Medium-Low status 18 (28%) 17 (26%) 35 (27%) 
Medium-High status 22 (34%) 20 (31%) 42 (32%) 
High status 10 (15%) 6 (9%) 16 (12%) 
Total 65 (100%) 65 (100%) 130 (100%) 
Before concluding the presentation of the method, let me point out that the various 
steps adopted in in this exercise combine to form a complete set7 of operations and 
precautions we had to take before we could reach the level of insight attained into 
local definitions of 'development' as presented below. In this respect, the method 
used does not have much in common with 'wealth ranking' techniques used in 
rapid rural appraisals.8 Much closer to the approach adopted in the present work 
are the methods developed by Long for prestige rating (1968: 146-51) and by Seur 
for identifying differences in farming practices (1992: 28-31 ) 9 although these latter 
methods defined beforehand the issue on which inequality was to be based (social 
status for Long and farming for Seur) and the categories present (social positions in 
the work of Long). 
About the results 
As mentioned, the aim of this ranking exercise was not simply to draw up a list of 
peasants ranked from the 'richest' to the 'poorest'. I was interested more in the 
emic descriptions of socio-economic situation and status and in how to analyze this. 
Moreover, I was interested in how local people perceived their living conditions and 
'development', and how they appreciated individual and collective actions and 
strategies supposedly targeted at achieving an improvement in these living condi-
tions and development. The findings later helped me to understand the nature of 
people's involvement in the Community Development Programme. As I indicated 
earlier, what I obtained was a three-fold scaling in living conditions, although four 
categories were identified by the informants. These three levels related to 'sur-
obtained and the descriptions and analysis they made of them. Each category was 
scaled with a mark from 1 to 4 (lowest to highest status in that order). Not all the 
persons listed were each ranked in the same category by all the informants. There 
were even a few cases where large discrepancies existed between the ranks of two 
informants, due to differences in level of acquaintance or information about them, 
one placing the person in medium to low status, the other in high status. Notice that 
we have eight informants and thus eight rankings (four for each list). Therefore, 
each person listed had four marks out of which a mean was calculated. Table 10 
below gives the results for the men, women and the total. 
Table 10 Distribution of the status categories 
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vivaT, 'self-achievement' and 'well-being'. While those considered as surviving 
'struggle not to be drowned', those indexed with well-being are said 'to have dry 
feet' and described as 'people who deserve to be a Patron-Saint (MedjomE)'. The 
others, somewhere in the middle, would probably succeed 'once freed from the 
creepers that tighten around them', or have already a promising future, in which 
case it is said that they are 'banana leaves that can never shrink to the size of 
lemon leaves'. 
The texts produced by the informants in such circumstances constitute cognitive 
social maps of stocks of experience and world views, shared to some extent with 
others in society. Such texts are, on the one hand, a stock utilised in facing life 
circumstances and, on the other, are themselves transformed by such circumstances. 
Therefore, when ranking their fellow men and judging their trajectories and situ-
ations, and more importantly when producing discourse out of these, informants 
engage in discursive performance centred on their own lifeworlds, their socially 
endorsed interpretations of the world. Yet a clear limitation of this method concerns 
the discrepancies between interpretations (that can change over time and space) and 
social practice.10 Furthermore, while the researcher intends to project local folk 
classifications of socio-economic situations and trajectories, informants can only 
portray their own ideals and views. I sought to overcome this limitation by selecting 
various informants (contrasted in terms of their social attributes such as age, sex, 
socio-economic achievements) in order to explore alternative local ideologies on 
development, including the views of those persons ranked in the exercise (who were 
interviewed before or afterwards). Also, informal group discussions were of vital 
importance to open up debates concerning the norms and values inherent in 
survival, self-achievement and development. The informal nature of the groups with 
which the debates were conducted was decisive to the reliability of the information 
and the arguments developed. I did not play any role in the organising of these 
debates as social events (for example, forming the groups, making appointments for 
holding the debates, choosing topics, or launching the discussions). I simply took 
advantage of bars, cflfcpa/o-and-relish parties and other social gatherings and then 
followed up the discussions. In these conditions, the topics I introduced for debate 
depended largely on the directions of the discussions of the people present. 
The method allowed me to avoid static categorisation. The informants mostly 
presented the process through which a given status or situation was attained. They 
often indicated the concise decisions and organisational strategies the people con-
cerned had made in their life trajectories, giving a normative judgement of what 
were 'good' or 'bad' decisions, strategies or status. The definitions or 
categorisations were not straight forward but ambivalent, as the following example 
suggests: 
'He is a very good peasant, a hard worker. His grainstores are never empty before the 
next harvest. Nobody starves in his home and he takes his people to the health centre 
when they are sick. When he passes, you feel that someone is passing... But he is not 
honest with workers. He does not pay his debts. He uses wage labourers but it takes 
people time and trouble before they get paid. Now many people refuse to work on his farm 
and he has a bad reputation.' 
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Sometimes, the informant would give a quick critical assessment of what he knew 
of the life trajectory of the person, offering his interpretation of the ups and downs, 
and using economic as well as social indicators: 
"This man was one of the eyes of the village. Though he is not old (about 45), he has 
already been admitted into the circle of the wise old men for years now. He could stand 
on his own feet, hold one head of household on his back, one on his head and one other 
in each of his arms and still walk}'1 But within three or four years, this man was com-
pletely knocked down. The misadventures started when he ordered a motor in Nigeria that 
was confiscated by the customs. He spent a lot of extra money to get it back and then, a 
few months later, the motor was stolen here in the village. He spent so much time and 
money on this affair that his farming activities dropped. And two years later one of his 
oxen for ox-ploughing died. His misfortunes started with his last marriage. That woman 
is a malediction. Since she entered his house, the man's situation has turned upside 
down. Now, they hardly have enough to eat and he is weighed down with debts.' 
An important aspect of the method was that it offered further insight into the 
economic activities of people in Togoudo. It provided an overview of these ac-
tivities, the management problems they entailed and how people coped with them. 
In short, the ranking exercise helped me to expand my perceptions of the economic 
web of the village. 
The socio-economic categories and their description 
In general, the categories used to differentiate persons and to appreciate their socio-
economic status indicate the prevalence of the capability of the persons to meet their 
basic needs and those of their people. This capability is partly attributed to the 
organising potential and strategies, as well as to the hard-working nature of the 
person ('She or he is hard working and knows how to handle things'. 'She or he 
does not sleep full ears' [(sleep late and wake up early)], 'she or he is clever', 'he 
has good hands on his people', i.e. good control over the family labour). But this 
capability is attributed first and foremost to the access and/or control the person has 
over what are considered to be the basic production assets in the village: land and 
manpower ('he has land and he owns people', which means that he has a large 
household). But in some cases, this manpower potential is considered as an immedi-
ate social environment of the person: her or his household patterns, his or her 
labour exchange group, etc. Successes or failures are partly attributed to husband, 
wives, children, relatives or friends, the quality of which might have deterrnined in 
one way or the other (positively or negatively) the actual status of the person. 
Finally, it was remarkable that for most informants, and even within informal group 
discussions, people seem to give more value to the assumed potential socio-econ-
omic security than to actual everyday living conditions. Within such a framework, 
land and labour assets of people get high value and state agents and their wives are 
granted higher status than peasants whose households might evidently enjoy higher 
material status at that moment. The same thing counts for peasants who own cattle, 
a grain mill (even when the mill is not yet in service), or have children well placed 
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in the state administration or 'on migration' who take care of them or are believed 
to do so. On the other hand, people who have built a house in Gbornina which they 
have rented out are not automatically ranked as being of high status. In the fol-
lowing part of this chapter, I present the results of the exercise, giving full accounts 
of the categories identified from the ranking of women, limiting the presentation of 
male categories to the two extreme ones, just to complete the picture of the eco-
nomic span of the village and the appreciations local actors have of it. The cases 
presented below are elaborated using ethnographic material collected directly from 
(and from the social environment of) individual actors ranked by the key informants 
in the various categories 
The categories of women 
The women ranked low: 'life is hard' or 'It is a matter of life' 
The above were typical comments about such women. There were 22 women ranked 
low. Among them were: 
• Widows or divorced women without grown up or living children, or whose 
children were away from the village and did not take good care of them. They 
were seven in total. 
• Adult girls not yet married but who had not learnt how to to do anything (mostly 
meaning trade or food processing for sale) apart from farming. There were four 
of them. 
• Young girls just returned from migration, where they were either Uving with 
some elder sister or brother in the Ivory Coast or Cotonou, or were working as 
maids in Cotonou. They had either not brought anything back, or their parents 
were too poor and had 'eaten' all the money they had saved. There were seven 
of them, 
• Young girls of alcoholic parents, not old enough to be judged on their own 
achievements and, in any case, not having achieved anything. Two of them. 
• Two women who do not do things on their own: 
'She is a lazy woman, not well raised by her parents and wanting too much from her 
husband. Since her husband married two other wives, her mouth has gone to sleep (she 
has stopped vaunting herself) and we see her around much less. The man feeds her. That 
is all. For the rest, she has to manage herself but she was not prepared for that. If she 
learns fast, that would be ok. Otherwise, her poverty would be cheap' (i.e. she will not 
even be able to hide her problems, they will be too great and bring her close to 
indigence). 
Informants describe the realities of these women of low socio-economic status in 
various ways according to the person considered: 
• "They (the households headed by the women) never miss the annual appointment with 
Ohanwio' (the month of May when some households are out of grain until the following 
harvest in July). 'It is not a big harm for adult persons to starve now and then during 
the year. But when children never eat a belly full.., you get what I mean...' 
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• "The house roof is covered with straw that is crumbling, and walls falling apart.' 
• 'She does not take part in any rotating credit organisation and when she does, it is 
always the small ones (50 or lOOfper week). She would probably fail some weeks to pay 
the money herself, putting the rotating credit organisation straight into difficulties.' 
These persons engage in various sorts of strategies to survive. Apart from a few 
cases of 'wait and see' referring mostly to old women (widows or divorced), or 
'time will tell' status for young girls starting something or not yet old enough to 
try anything on their own, these women are said to be 'killing themselves to 
survive'. They try many little tilings with little money, sleep on the farms for wage 
labour opportunities, move from one processing unit to the other helping the 
owners to fetch water, wood etc. for cash, but cannot start these things on their own, 
at least not on a significant scale because of lack of money or support or simply 
because they do not know how to work it out. It is remarkable that apart from wage 
labour as a source of income (mostly on farms), the exclusive or main income 
generating activity of these women at present is agriculture when they still have the 
strength to do it. The case of Yofoun presented below shows but one example of the 
process through which a potentially active woman falls into this category of 'it is 
a matter of life'. 
The case of Yofoun: 'It's a matter of life' 
Yofoun is in her sixties. She is from Tankossi like her husband and is now living in 
Togoudo with two grandchildren of 10 and 13 years old, a boy and a girl. Their 
mother is Yofoun's daughter who is living in the Ivory Coast. Most informants said 
spontaneously of Yofoun's household, "They don't eat in that house, and the 
house itself is falling apart'. She does farm work, though with lots of difficulties, 
and a chaotic retailing of soap, canned tomato, cigarettes etc. Sometimes, she cooks 
a few handfuls of rice which her granddaughter sells around the village. But they 
frequently eat the capital from these ventures (no more than 3,000 to 5,000 RFCFA) 
and have to wait for the cotton harvest to find a job to earn some money. The other 
source for investment capital to start again are the sporadic allowances her daughter 
sends her when she finds someone coming and has cash herself. Yofoun said: 
'Nobody can run any business in the way I am doing it. You eat from it every day. 
When you are sick it is in the same box that you look. But the business itself does not 
work every day.' 
Indeed, there are a few periods in the year in Togoudo during which cooking rice 
for sale in the morning and the afternoon makes an acceptable business for a 
woman of the situation of Yofoun. The best period is from December to February, 
which marks the end of the second rainy season and the earning of revenue from 
the marketing of maize, sorghum, millet and cowpeas. People have already mar-
keted their cotton. Though they will not be paid until April, they already know 
what revenue to expect. It is a holiday and feast period (Christmas and New Year). 
Ranking second to that period is the end of July beginning of August, after the 
launching of the second season. The third good period, but less interesting is mid 
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to the end of April, which marks approximatively the end of the first sowing and 
the Passover Feast. Yofoun said: 
'During Christmas and New Year, when I manage to find money, I cook up to five or 
six kilos of rice every two days and sell it all. When I have enough money for myself, I 
buy all the necessities for cash (rice, chicken, guinea fowls or cow's meat, oil, tomatoes 
etc.) and they are less expensive than when I buy for credit or when someone lends me 
the money, with a 50 or 100 per cent or even higher interest rate on the credit. Also, 
many people buy from you for credit, of course, without any interest rate. And it is 
difficult to make up the capital if you do not have twice or thrice of it to start with.'12 
She used to process groundnuts for oil and kluiklui but now no longer has the health 
nor the capital necessary to do it. She holds a plot of three hectares of exhausted 
land some five kilometres from the village. Neither she nor her grandchildren can 
manage to get much from the land and she does not have the cash to pay for 
labourers to cultivate it. She sometimes tries to give part of the land for share-
cropping to young men of the village, but they cheated her in the end, complaining 
that the land was too exhausted and that they could not even get back the money 
they had spent on paid labour. Nevertheless, she manages to grow something on the 
land every season (maize, cowpeas, cassava, groundnuts). 
The land belonged to her husband who obtained it from one of the first settlers 
when he arrived in the late fifties. He did not succeed in getting more and decided 
to move with his two wives and children to Gobé (35 kilometres further north-east) 
15 years ago, where he was offered more land. Yofoun refused to join him because 
her groundnut processing was doing well. But, since then, she has had to take care 
of all her needs. 
The women ranked medium-low: 'The tree could relax. It wasn't so tightened by creepers ' 
These are all women 'in charge' of themselves, whether they are married or not, 
young or adult. They are not living from hand to mouth, nor bringing empty hands 
now and then to mouth as happens in the previous category. They more or less earn 
well from their activities but do not manage to achieve food self-sufficiency. There-
fore, one should not be misled by their external appearance and any assets they 
might have, which might give the impression of well-being: 
• 'She has clothes on her hips and, on some occasions, she enters among people (which 
means that she appears as of higher status). Her children are clean. She could be better 
off if she was not so caught in problems.' Or for some others 'She is not naked but 
does not have clothes on her hips.' 
• 'Her sons do not find anything to do (or do not want to do anything) and remain round 
her neck.' 
'Her in-laws are not good. They did not give her the opportunity to use the assets of her 
husband when he was away from the village (especially the land)'. Or 'the family 
constitutes a weight on her husband and on herself so that anything she does vanishes' 
(that is, she cannot accumulate). 
• "The problem in that house is sickness. The woman works well, as does the husband. But 
it all goes to the If a priests or health centres.' 
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Of the 17 women of this category, 10 practice agriculture as their exclusive source 
of revenue, five as the main income-generating activity, one as the third after petty 
trade and animal raising while the remaining one, Sabine, whose case is presented 
in detail below does not practice agriculture at all. For the 10 women practising 
exclusively agriculture, the main reason is the long period they have to spend on 
the farm every year at some 10 kilometres or more away from the village, which 
prevents them even from raising pigs as their fellow women do.13 The second 
reason is that they don't know how to go about processing on a large scale or 
undertaking petty trade (six of them), while the four others declared they had tried 
a few times and failed, covering themselves in debt. 
For this category of medium-low ranking women, informants are quite sceptical 
as to their capacity alone to move out of their vicious circle, unless luck helps them 
out. "They are trying. Maybe one day... It is already encouraging that they will not 
die of poverty'. Even Sabine, who seems to enjoy some room for manoeuvre, and 
is able to combine various activities and is not obliged to work for a husband, is not 
doing particularly well. She appears to suffer (as shown below from the cases of 
higher ranking women) from the fact that she is not doing agriculture that could 
function as a supportive activity to her petty trade and food processing for sale. 
The case of Sabine: 'Maybe one day...' 
Sabine was born in 1962 in Gbornina. As her two sisters and brothers, she was 
raised by her mother in Gbornina without much support from her father, a police 
man from Cove (150km south) who worked a few years in Gbornina where he met 
her mother. He retired in 1964 and went back to Cove with his family but after a 
few years there, Sabine's mother came back home because relations with the 
husband and his three other wives was unbearable to her. She settled in Gbornina 
and continued with her trade. 
After three years in secondary school, Sabine dropped out in 1977, and learned 
to sew. She got married to a school teacher in 1981, broke up with him in 1986 and 
settled in Togoudo, her mother's natal village. Now, she is in charge of her three 
children (10, 8 and 6 years old) and one of her junior brothers (17 years old). The 
husband migrated to Niger in 1986 and has never asked about her since. She does 
not do any farm work because she was not raised in it she says. 
'I sew and do petty trade (which here includes cooking food for sale). Sewing works well 
in the periods before the feasts, but does not earn well. For the last feasts and after a full 
month of sewing, I saved only 30,000f which I invested in my petty trade. Besides, that 
was how I first started when I came here in 1986. Now, I mostly cook and sell the food 
in the mornings. In the afternoons I sew if I have orders and my apprentice goes selling 
imported products in the village. As for the drink, people pass by the whole day and 
buy.' 
For the petty trade, Sabine retails various imported products such as canned 
tomatoes and sardines, maggie cubes, cigarettes, medicines, toilet and make-up 
products etc. She sells some of the products from her house, and, now and then, her 
apprentice goes to Togoudo and nearby villages, mainly during the periods when 
services are closed and workers are at home, at midday, in the afternoon after five 
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o'clock and during the week-ends. A good period is at the end of the month when 
they have been already paid. 
It is hard for Sabine to have any idea of the returns from this trade though she 
thinks it is beneficial. She replaces the stock of each product as soon as it reduces, 
and she buys new products, but never separates the accounts of the products. Also, 
the money circulates from one activity to the other. 
The sodabi and other drinks are much easier to follow. A man from Abomey 
comes to the village every week or two with a large quantity. Sabine is registered 
with the man (as are a few other women in the village) and receives from him 40 
to 60 litres every two weeks for 325 or 350f per litre, which she retails for 400f per 
litre or preferably for 25f a small glass so that the litre is sold for 550f. 
For the rice, she buys a 50 kilogrammes bag every five or seven days in Gbornina 
for 7,000f. She cooks eight to ten kilo every day with tomato sauce and beef or 
guinea fowl meat. She does not have to move from her home to sell it all and can 
sell for 3,000 to 4,000f. And all the household takes lunch from it. 
As for the relish, it goes with the sodabi or with cakpalo which people could buy 
from a neighbour of Sabine. It is a simple goat relish highly spiced, which people 
buy and take with sodabi or cakpalo. Sabine cooks that relish during the week-ends, 
especially in the periods when people sleep at home. The goat can cost 3-4,500f or 
up to 7,000 in feast periods, and she sells the whole of it the same day. She makes 
a profit of 1,250 to l,500f. 
But not all these activities turn out well all the time. It depends on the period of 
the year. The following table and graph give an indication of the relative importance 
of the activities all through the year in making her income. 
Table 11 and Figure 16 indicate that Sabine conducts all the activities mentioned 
during only four months. The eight other months are periods of very low level 
activities and low income. Concerning these periods, Sabine said: 
' When these periods come, I just pray that nothing happens to the children I am taking 
care of, and that nobody in my family has any sickness. The size of my various activities 
during the selling period depend very much on what happens in the low activity periods 
and on how I succeed in getting through them. When I run out of capital and buy rice 
on credit, the return is very little. I am a member of two rotating credit organisations, 
one of 52 people for 500fper week and the other, 1,000 per month with 25 persons. But 
it did not help me to get through these bad periods. Now I have requested to take my turn 
at the end of October.' 
The period from December to March is one when relish becomes expensive. The 
women who cook relish dishes and in addition grow vegetables profit largely from 
the situation. They sell some of the vegetables at a high price, and use the rest for 
their relish. Then they have the choice, either to sell relatively cheaply and therefore 
quickly, or simply stay at the same level as the other women. In both cases they 
make a good profit. Women like Sabine face double disadvantages. She claims not 
to be raised in farming and does not grow anything. Furthermore, she does not 
always have enough money to meet the costs and cook enough when the price is 
high. The people who give her sewing mostly pay her when they are paid for their 
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Table 11 Combinations of mcome-generating activities by Sabine through the year 
Period Major events Activities Relative 
conducted importance 
December-January End-of-year feasts. Cotton is sold, Sewing **** 
people are paid or know already how Petty trade **** 
much they expect. Rice ***** 
Sodabi ***** 
Sauce ***** 
February-March Dry season, peasants have already Sewing * 
received their cotton revenue and are Petty trade ** 
staying in the village. Rice *** 
Sodabi *** 
Sauce *** 
Mid-March to Mid-April Beginning of the first rainy season. Sewing -
Most people stay on the farm. Petty trade * 
Rice * 
Sodabi *** 
Sauce * 
Mid-April to Late April Passover feast Sewing *** 
Petty trade ** 
Rice ** 
Sodabi *** 
Sauce *** 
May to July Intensive farming period. Peasants Sewing * 
stay on the farms Petty trade * 
Rice * 
Sodabi * 
Sauce ** 
August End of first season and launching of Sewing **** 
second season. National pilgrimage to Petty trade ** 
Dassa1 Rice *** 
Sodabi *** 
Sauce *** 
September-November Second season, peasants stay on the Sewing -
farms Petty trade * 
Rice * 
Sodabi ** 
Sauce ** 
1 This is a regional Catholic Church feast. People come from Benin, Togo, Nigeria and even Ivory Coast 
every year in August and stay over night at Dassa mountain where the Virgin Mary was said to have 
appeared. For all the villages in the area, it is a big social and economic event. New clothes are bought, 
people come down from their farms, and women skilled in food processing, process within these two 
days as much as they do during the whole period of the end-of-year feast. 
cotton (or the labour they do on the cotton farm) which might happen to be only in 
April. 
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Source: Field survey 
According to village gossip, she was supported by a hard-working peasant who was 
her boy friend. Sabine has tried to keep the relation secret because her mother has 
warned that her husband has not yet voiced any intention to abandon her and she 
therefore must wait until she gets a clear message from him. Now it is the headmas-
ter of a school in Gbomina who is her boy friend. People contend that this woman 
always eats her capital and that it is thanks to her friends that she can always start 
up again. 
Sabine is now the secretary of a women's group that started with the objective 
of growing soya for sale, though she herself says she has not been raised in farm 
activities and does not conduct any. She is not interested in learning it either. Apart 
from the soya field which is no larger than 800 m z for 25 women, that is, ten times 
less than each individual woman does on her own farm, the group has initiated a 
rotating credit organisation and expects to obtain a credit from a United Nations 
foundation operating in Benin. 
The women ranked medium-high: 'Their future is promising' or 'their head is definitely 
out of water' or 'Banana leaves can never shrink down to the size of lemon leaves' 
One cannot differentiate this category from the previous one on the basis of social 
attributes such as age and family status. Moreover, there remain some uncertainties 
as regards to food security and material status. 'She feeds herself though..., and she 
is not naked'. Also, economic activities are not different in their nature (encom-
passing farm and off-farm) though their combinations are different. These women 
rely far more on non-agricultural activities as the main or the first income-genera-
Note: The dots indicate the relative importance of the activity in terms of its weighting in the making of 
the income. 
Figure 16 Sabine's combination of income-generating activities through the year 
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ting activity. Of these 20 women, none has agriodture as her exclusive activity and 
only five have it as the main source of income. All the others practise agriculture as 
a supportive activity, which allows them to develop peasant networks and retail 
their agricultural products (see the case of Pélagie below), or to grow part of the 
agricultural produce needed for their food processing activities. 
Apart from the difference in the importance of agriculture to their incomes, there 
are two differences with respect to the women ranking medium-low. First, is the 
stability of their multiple activities and their skills in managing them. 
'She knows how to do things with her hands on top of farming. She brews cakpalo (11 
of them) and/or she raises animals. She processes groundnuts (6 in total), sells maize or 
millet porridge, makes maize or millet cake (5 - some combining many of these activ-
ities) '. 
'She works well, does not stay at home and does not sleep full ears (does not sleep too 
long, or wakes up early).' 
The second difference between this category and the previous one concerns the 
quasi-absence of 'free riders' and of negative social judgements on the persons 
ranked here as, so-called, lazy affines kin to support, (young) children unable or 
unwilling to earn a living, incapable or alcoholic husband or one unwilling to take 
a share in the expenses of the household). 
'Her husband has a large farm and his hands cover his problems and his own affairs very 
well (he is capable and faces his responsibilities)'. 
'She has one, (or some) well-off children (in the village or abroad) who help her now and 
then.' 
The stability of the activities does not mean here a continuous performance of a 
given activity over the whole year, but the capacity of the woman to switch from 
one activity to the other according to the market, closing down off-farm activities 
when time is needed for farm activities, but returning to the off-farm activities in 
good time, without any need for credit, which most of the time has too high an 
interest rate. These women manage 'not to eat up their capital out of hunger or 
social problems' or they succeed in replacing it from farming activities or subsidies 
from children. For this category, informants did not put much emphasis on assets 
like the state of the house as indexed earlier, especially for the first category. None 
of them was said to have built any. Pélagie's case is illustrative of this category of 
medium-high women. 
The case of Pélagie: 'late to bed, early to raise...' 
Pélagie was born in Togoudo in 1964. She went to the village primary school until 
1983 when she quit after failing three times to pass the secondary school entrance 
examination. Now she is married (in the village) and has three children of eight, six 
and four years old. She has a farm of her own, raises animals, especially pigs, and 
processes groundnuts into oil and cake. But her main activity is petty trade (retailing 
of various consumer goods, sale of agricultural products from her own farm and 
from that of her husband, and from other peasants). She is said to have developed 
her trading skills since she was at school. She says: 
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'When I was 12 years old and attending primary school, 1 started cooking toffi (sweets) 
for sale with the money I managed to save on my breakfast. In 1981, my father lent me 
3,000fwith which I started selling bottled beer in the village. Within two years I paid my 
father back and bought myself clothes, jewels, shoes etc. I got married in 1984 and have 
continued with the trade since then.' 
She says she has not received money from her husband to continue with the trade. 
She has received a piece of land from her father (one eso, i.e. one fifth of a hectare), 
which her husband helped her to plough after she had her first baby. That was in 
1985. She harvested maize and groundnuts which she sold for 18,000f. With this 
money, she started again in trade. To date, she has continued cultivating maize, 
groundnuts and some cassava on the same plot, has not extended it though she 
could have, and does not want to move from there though the soil is exhausted. The 
land given to her by her father is close to the village, while her husband's farm is 
ten kilimetres away. She thinks that would harm her trade. As for the quality of the 
soil, it does not matter for her because it still yields well with groundnuts which she 
keeps until there are expensive on the market, before she sells or makes oil out of 
them. The products she retails - her real business - change over time. She used to 
retail soap, maggie cubes and kerosene which she bought from Gbomina or Save. 
But since 1987/88, many people have started retailing these products so she has 
switched to gasoline, canned tomatoes, canned oil, copy books, pens, rice and so 
forth. 
The particularity of Pélagie as compared to Sabine is that she knows how much 
profit she makes on each of the products she retails and on her other activities, 
including farm work. For example, from 200 litres of gasoline which she buys for 
17, 18, and sometimes 24,000 (when there are problems in Nigeria), she makes 
2-3,500 profit in one week. On the cans of oil, 2-3,000f, on the rice, 2-3,000f a week. 
With this knowledge of the relative return of each product, she is able to reduce or 
increase the quantity of a product according to its market. For example, sometimes 
it was better to buy 100 litres of gasoline every week than 200 litres. She said: 
'Even when the market of a product is low, it is not good to stop selling it completely. 
I continue on a low scale for a long time before I decide to stop. That was what I did for 
the kerosene. If you stop completely and start again, say a few weeks later, it will take 
you a lot of energy to get your clientele back. It is better to tell them 'my stock is over, 
come back next week' than 'I don't sell it any more'. But in the case of the kerosene, 
when I noticed that too many people in the village had started selling it, I decided to stop 
completely.' 
Pélagie sells agricultural products too. She started with her own farm products and 
discovered that it is possible to earn much from them if one chooses the right period 
to buy and sell. She began offering the service to her husband who was once in 
need of cash to pay for wage labour. She bought maize from him and stored it. The 
following year, her brother-in-law and a cousin of hers obtained money from her 
during the Ohanwio period (food shortage) and later paid it back with grain. Now, 
she has up to eight or ten clients of this type, who take cash or grain in the hard 
period, which they pay back with cash or grain later. In any case, within a three 
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month period, this activity returns 1.5 times as much as she invests. And she could 
wait and sell later, when the products are even more expensive. 
She began with animal husbandry in 1984/85 with two small pigs which she 
bought for l,250f each. Now, she owns six small pigs (two males and four females), 
and two big ones (a male and a female). She keeps one pair for reproduction. She 
also has three sheep, but no chickens because they were all stolen. Animal hus-
bandry is vital for her trade because when she sells all her goods on credit, and 
while waiting for her clients to pay her back, she can still renew the stock after 
selling a few animals, She says: 
'My husband never suspected that people could earn much raising pigs. I could sell pigs 
for as much as 6,000f. When I sell three or four of these at once, I can help one or two 
households cross Ohanwio... and it is not for free.' 
Her last activity is horticulture, which she does together with her husband. In fact, 
she does very Uttle of it. The place is quite far from the village, more than 5km. 
People cultivate here from August to March-April. The fact is that as she works now 
and then in the area and is involved in trade, she is entrusted by many people 
doing horticulture there (including her father, brother, cousin, brother-in-law) to sell 
their farm produce in general and vegetables in particular in the market in 
Gbornina, Dassa or Save, depending on the period, without making any profit. 
Pélagie said: 
'People don't need to buy and sell everything before making money. Trust is more 
important than anything else. All these people trust me. They check now and then as to 
the price of the market. I never cheat them. But because of this trust, they would never 
sell their maize, groundnuts, beans and sorghum (she does not sell yam, saying it is 
beyond her financial capacities) to any body else without asking me if I want or am able 
to buy, or to lend them the money they need, from which I earn more than I could have 
made from the vegetables.' 
But what she did not add, until I asked her later, was that the peasants who give 
her their vegetables to sell, pay for the transport costs, not her. Her other trade 
profits from this because then she does not only sell vegetables and she does not 
return empty handed. Also, with this and over nine months of the year, she has 
direct access to the cash of her husband who allows her to take money from his 
vegetable revenues, right there in the market, to purchase spices and other necessary 
products for relish for the household. During the other months, he contributed 
nothing, the general practice of men in Togoudo. 
The women ranked high: 'They live at their ease' or 'c'est les doyennes' 
Most informants declared this spontaneously, referring to their food consumption 
status in comparison with that of the previous category. 
'People eat (with emphasis on 'eat') in that house. There, it is not as for other people 
for whom it is a matter of 'we eat whatever we find, and as we always find something 
we never starve'. In that house, it is a matter of 'we eat whatever we like to eat'. That 
is so for the children and for the adults as well.' 
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Some of these women are said to be 'doyenne de la maison ', which means that they 
look after things, and sometimes feed the family. They have built houses and own 
bicycles and clothes of high quality (wax hollandais). Their activities cover a wide 
span, including, for most, agriculture products bought from their husbands and 
other peasants and sold wholesale. They also act as heads of saving-and-credit 
groups (rotating credit organisations), and are said also to give credit to people out 
of their own money. 
'She has accumulated and is able to give credit without being disturbed in her own 
affairs. Knock at her door at any time. She is right present and ready (she always has cash 
to lend).' 
There are six of these women in total out of the 65 women ranked. One is the wife 
of a teacher at the village school. She is around 35 years old and retails various 
manufactured products. Of the other five, only one (Florentine) is less than 40 years 
old. The others are aged above 50. One has two sons of a high rank in the State 
administration and another son who has been working for years in Ivory Coast. 
These children are said to take good care of her. She understates a minimum of farm 
work and retails cigarettes. Apart from this woman and the teacher's wife, who 
have a relaxing life, all the other four are hard-working women and have obviously 
accumulated certain items, such as bicycle, houses, animals, clothes, jewels, and 
household equipments. Of these four hard-working women, three (including Floren-
tine the youngest) are intensively involved in cakpalo brewing, which they all claim 
to have learned from their mothers. The last (Ayaba) has similar activity and 
trajectory patterns compared with Pélagie described earlier and ranked medium-
high, except that she is much older (about 60 years old), has never been to school 
and no longer goes very frequently to market. She keeps a farm enterprise with 
animals, including two cows, and she collects agricultural products, mainly maize, 
cowpeas and yams, which traders come with cars to the village to buy. Of the three 
cakpalo brewers only one (Valérie) trades agricultural products on the scale of Ayaba. 
The two others combine this with active involvement in agriculture. 
I now present the case of Florentine, the youngest, who combines all the activities 
conducted by the women of this category (farm, brewery, trade of agricultural 
products and management of a rotative credit group), although here I place empha-
sis on her brewery. 
The case of Florentine: "Them belly full' 
Florentine is the daughter of one of the first families to settle in Togoudo and to 
acquire land near to the village. But neither her husband nor herself obtained land 
in the village domain 'because there are too many men in that family. The land 
available there is not yet enough for them' she says. She received one hectare of 
land from her husband on his farm, some 10 kilometres from the village, and she 
sometimes sleeps there. She grows maize, groundnuts, tomato, okra and pepper 
which she sells together with the other farm products purposed from her husband 
and from other peasants. She also grows millet and sorghum which she processes 
into cakpalo and some yams for home consumption and for gifts for her parents. She 
uses wage labour for the difficult work (ploughing and weeding) but does the 
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sowing and harvesting herself. Her book-keeping is very precise. Now and then her 
husband helps her transport the products on his Suzuki motor bike, including 
calabashes of cakpalo to Gbomina. 
She brews cakpalo throughout the year, the most intensive period being during the 
dry seasons, especially from December to March/April, when she brews 100 to 150 
Idlogrammes of rnillet every week. The price of the millet varies according to the 
season. When harvested in November or December, each 100 kilogrammes bag is 
sold for 3,000 or 4,000f. In April, the same quantity costs 5,000, rising to 7,000 or as 
much as 9,000f in July, August and September. No peasant rnillet grower likes to 
sell on credit. Florentine says: 
'Peasants here mostly cultivate millet or sorghum in order to make cash for specific 
farming operations. The harvest of millet and sorghum occurs around November and 
December. When they sell it they use the money to pay for labour for the harvesting of 
cotton. The rest of the revenue is used for end-of-year feasts, so that the cotton revenue 
is kept for investment in housing, bicycles, and bridewealth for the marriage of a son or 
for the peasant himself. During the other periods of the year, either it is a matter of 
meeting labour costs (March, April, June, August), or to survive Ohanwio (May-June), 
or to meet some urgent need (e.g. a health problem, funeral or some other ritual 
ceremony).' 
In fact, it seems that Florentine herself, like the other two women of this category 
involved in cakpalo brewing, is not interested in buying millet for credit - unlike 
other lower ranked women, who brew, though on a smaller scale, using millet 
bought on credit. In addition to the purchase of the rnillet, there are many other 
expenses before one can produce cakpalo. She says: 
'For «200 kilogrammes bag of millet, you would need 3,000, 6,000 or 9,OOOf of firewood 
for cooking, depending on the season}4. Then you would grind the millet for 750f and 
order water. You need 9-10 Jaboko of water (i.e. 200 to 250 litres). If you are lucky, from 
one bag of 100 kilogrammes, you can obtain about 200 litres of cakpalo and make 3-5,000f 
profit. Sometimes, you come up with nothing and get your back broken if you were not 
a woman before (if you were not financially well off).' 
As I have discovered, cakpalo brewing is a complicated and delicate process involv-
ing over 10 different stages, with a few sensitive ones where the whole operation 
can collapse for various reasons, most of which are said to be beyond the control of 
the brewer, no matter how experienced she might be. The grains are first immersed 
in water for 24 hours, left for two to three days to germinate and dry, and then are 
ground and the flour left for a few hours. Fresh water is added and the mixture 
remains until it reaches a certain level of fermentation before the cooking starts, 
which can last about 24 hours, after which the drink must be sold within five to 
seven days. 
The sensitive steps in the cooking process are the germination of the grains, the 
fermentation, the cooking and the marketing. There seems to be no technique known 
to cakpalo brewers to physically recognise the germinative potential of a stock of 
grain. They can observe this only after the grains have been in the water for two 
days and then put under germination for three days. When a failure occurs the 
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grain (100 kilograrrvmes in one case for Florentine) is most often only good for one 
tiling - feeding the pigs. Similar risks exist at the fermentation and the cooking 
stages when the brew can end up as porridge instead of cakpalo. In such a case, not 
even the pigs can really profit from it. As for the time limit for selling the product, 
this is due to the fact that there exists no technique to stop the fermentation process 
once it has started. Therefore, after seven days, the taste becomes intolerable and not 
even the pigs can be fed with. Florentine says: 
'Though this is an activity with a high return, not everybody can cook cakpalo. It calls 
for lot of attention and can break your back once and for all, instead of improving your 
situation. If in the same year you have three times millet of bad quality, it will be difficult 
for you to stand and walk again (to set your financial situation back to normal). Also, 
when people know that you are at the time limit for selling, they will buy on credit and 
won't hurry to pay you back. But the risk of having the same stock for more than five 
days is very limited because people drink a lot in this area.' 
The cakpalo drinkers have a diversified taste as far as the alcoholic content (i.e. 
fermentation degree) is concerned. Some people prefer the sweet variety, others wait 
until its alcoholic content is high. Consequently, most brewers of the scale of 
Florentine (or close to that) have three to five different stocks of drink, from the 
sweetest to the sharpest in order to keep their clientele. But this requires a high level 
of investment in cash and time. If one adds to this all the risks mentioned earlier (of 
non-germination, non-fermentation, and production of porridge), then one can 
understand that anyone who wants to remain in the business at the level of 
Florentine, needs at least two months of rurvning capital, costing 800 kilogrammes 
of millet, with extra investment for wood, water, grinding, not to mention the basic 
equipment in calabashes,15 cooking jars and utensils; that is, at least (in the most 
favourable periods for the cost of millet and wood), 90-100,000f. Most brewers I 
have interviewed have started slowly, with their mothers16 or a relative and have 
built up to their present levels of brewing step by step, with the ups-and-downs of 
'back breaking' and with the rescue of their husband, a rotating credit organisation 
or cash from animal husbandry. 
Florentine raises pigs and has eleven small and six adult pigs, which she feeds 
with the byproducts of the brewery. Yet, she has to sell part of her byproducts to 
other pig raisers because it is mostly too much for her own animals to consume. She 
also organises a rotating credit group and therefore can negotiate taking some or all 
of the turn of someone else when in urgent need of cash. She says, cakpalo brewing 
is an activity with a high return but you never can run this business without good 
supportive activities - some kind of 'spare tyres' such as pig raising, grain 
retailing etc. But the combination of brewing with relish is too risky, even though 
people mostly drink cakpalo with relish. 'This would ruin you' declare all brewers, 
some of whom have already tried before. 
'When you sell both products, most clients would buy both, pay for one and promise to 
pay for the second later, which they hardly do. This would not prevent them from coming 
for more credit, then on the second product. In the end you don't know how your capital 
vanishes. And you cannot be too severe with them, otherwise they will say everywhere 
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that you are a bad woman. When you sell only one single product, you do not refuse 
credit but the account is kept more easily.' 
With her activities, Florentine has managed to make some concrete achievements 
cited by people as indications of her 'living at ease'. Apart from the normal female 
equipment (i.e. clothes, jewels of relatively high value, and household utensils) she 
succeeded in buying herself a bicycle with which she now moves much faster to the 
farm and to Gbomina. She has built a house in her husband's compound with clay 
and cemented walls and a corrugated iron roof. She says 
'In the future, if things work well, I am thinking of extending my animal husbandry, 
eventually purchasing land and building a house in Gbomina for renting. The main 
handicap is that you cannot just extend cakpalo brewery as much as you like. Even when 
you have money to invest, it is almost impossible to brew more than 1.5 bags a week. You 
just cannot handle more.' 
Cakpalo, local economy and women's strategies for survival and self-achievement 
As shown in Chapter 7, women mostly have farms of small size with poor soil 
fertility and there is no possibility of purchasing land even when one has the cash 
available to do so. But the most constraining factor for women, as far as agricultural 
activities are concerned, is labour. They might manage to borrow pieces of land here 
and there but they don't yet have full control over their own labour during farming 
periods, since they must help their husbands at least for sowing and harvesting. 
Access to wage labour, especially to migrant labour, mostly passes through the 
husband or a male relative or friend and only after the man in question has made 
sure that he has met his own needs first. This delays their sowing, with consequent 
risks of a bad yield. Nevertheless, 20 percent of women still practice agriculture as 
their exclusive source of income while about 78 percent have it as their first, second 
or third income generating activity (see Zounon 1995: 34-36). 
Access to and control over land and labour largely condition the ability of 
peasants to grow cotton, the main cash crop for Togoudo peasants since the mid-
eighties. In 1991, for example, only 19 percent of cotton growers were women, while 
women make up to 48 percent of the total number of Togoudo inhabitants involved 
in agriculture. This marginal access of women to cotton, the most reliable cashcrop, 
should not be seen as linked solely to cotton. As indicated earlier, behind the cotton 
logic is the general search for income from new opportunities offered by agricultural 
activities. There are no statistics on marketing outside of state channels but one 
suspects that women have more room with crops other than cotton, where the seeds, 
fertilisers and insecticides are under the control of the state and the board of the GV, 
where there is not a single woman. In any case, with the limitations imposed on 
their access to land and labour (which does not date from the cotton era), there is 
very little chance for women to achieve much within agriculture. Among nine 
percent of the women ranked as of high status and said to be 'living at their ease' 
(six of the 65 ranked), only one has succeeded in readiing this status exdusively 
from agriculture, though she soon extended her activities to include the storage of 
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agricultural products which merchants come to collect in their lorries. As for the 
others, either they inherited from a rent situation (the wife of the school teacher and 
the mother of highly ranked state agents), or then were involved in food processing. 
It is highly indicative that among the 39 women ranked low or medium-low (that 
is 60 percent of the 65 women ranked) are all the 35 women (54 percent of the total 
65) who have agriculture as their main income-generating activity, which constitutes 
some 90 percent of the total number of the women ranked low or medium-low. 
Despite this apparently negative characteristic of women involvement in agriculture, 
this activity appears to operate as a good gatekeeper for women, as shown from the 
cases of Pélagie and Horentine, as compared with that of Sabine. 
Indeed, when it is not an exclusive source of income, agriculture is associated 
with food processing, petty trade, animal raising and, in some rare cases, a relatively 
large scale of agricultural trade. As shown in the discussion above, it plays a 
supportive and reinforcing role to non-agricultural activities, provided the woman 
concerned is not overloaded with household duties and 'free riders' as are Yofoun 
and Sabine. Given these conditions, the best self-achievement strategies that women 
can engage in are processing activities, coupled with animal raising, agriculture and 
perhaps petty trade. 
I enumerated 35 cakpalo brewers in Togoudo in 1991/92, of whom 19 do it 
permanently, on the scale of between half and one 100 kilogrammes bag of millet 
every week in good sale periods. Eight others, though brewing frequently, do not 
generally exceed half a bag per week while the others brew sporadically. People say 
that there are many more women in Togoudo who have learnt brewing from their 
mother or some other relative and have earned from it. Many of them have been 
'broken', either by bad germination, bad fermentation, or unpaid credit from 
cakpalo drinkers. All brewers are afraid of the high risks involved in this activity, 
though at the same time, it is said to have the highest return. Recent studies in the 
area (Zounon 1995) show that cakpalo brewing and groundnut processing into oil 
compete for the highest returns, according to the season for it. In all situations, food 
processing activities seem more interesting to women than agricultural activities (see 
Table 12). 
Table 12 Comparison of the gross margins for certain income generating activities 
Activities Maize 1 ha 
field*" 
Cotton 
1 ha field** 
Cakpalo 
brewing* 
Groundnut 
processing* 
Maize pro-
cessing* 
Bean pro-
cessing* 
Gross margins, FCFA 35,675 56,155 10,410 39374 4,398 4,715 
Calculation based on processing activities in July 1994, for three to five processing units. 
Calculation based on the 1993 campaign. Cotton cultivation starts in June and payment is made in 
December or January the following year 
Calculations based on the 1993 campaign. The cropping duration (from land preparation to 
marketing) is normally between four and five months. 
Source: From Zounon 1995. 
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Notice that the crop margins are for standard male performances which women, 
given the handicaps I pointed to earlier, can hardly achieve. 
There is evidence that cakpalo brewing is a good option in the local economy and 
for the social life of the village. The purchase of millet by women allows some 
peasants, either to accumulate their cotton revenue while still meeting their obliga-
tions relating to labour costs and end-of-year feasts, or for other peasants to pass the 
Ohanwio period without damage. From the 1990 figures, millet and sorghum yielded 
216 tons, half as much as maize or cassava which are the staple foods, but largely 
sold. Almost all of this was sold in the village. Some brewers say they find it 
difficult to buy millet in the village and therefore must travel to Gbomina. The 
tradition of drinking cakpalo with goat meat relish is quite special to this village. It 
is widely acknowledged that African peasants do not raise animals for home 
consumption and that their protein intake is low. Meat is consumed on rare oc-
casions, on feast days or at rituals. But here in Togoudo, the cakpalo-and-ielish 
parties provide peasants with opportunities to consume meat much more often than 
is generally assumed. I almost never saw women at those parties but some of them 
bought the relish. As for the young men, they eat it too, especially when they are 
paid their wages after the sowing or harvesting of cotton. This tradition gives goat 
raising a different character in this village than usual. There is a relatively large local 
market for these animals, in contrast to most villages where the market, at best, is 
in the nearby city. But not only goat raising profits from cakpalo brewing. The 
byproducts of the brewing are used to feed the pigs and chickens. Finally, cakpalo 
does not depend on an external market. It is consumed locally and the demand for 
it is not always met, which gives some security to brewers, as long as men can earn 
cash from cotton and other farm products. In this way, the cakpalo business balances 
the inequalities of access to agricultural production factors. Indeed, cakpalo is at the 
heart of the dynamics of the local economy. Yet, even more, it gives people the 
opportunity to meet and is therefore one of those banal events that stimulate social 
interaction among peasants isolated for months on their individual farms, and it 
contributes to the making of village identities while providing an opening for 
various sorts of negotiations. A half litre of cakpalo is sold for 50f compared with 
175f for a 66cl bottle of beer (pre-FCFA-devaluation costs). Cakpalo parties are 
therefore hardly exclusive to any social category, especially during feast periods. 
In fact, any programme aimed at making village life more dynamic (as intended 
within the Community Development Programme) would gain a lot by looking at the 
cakpalo business, especially when activities are targeted to women. In the present 
case, not a single discussion, let alone action, was oriented toward cakpalo brewing 
or groundnut processing. Nonetheless, problems exist in the business which could 
have 'interested' intervening organisations aimed at improving the self-achieve-
ment chances for women and others directly or indirectly connected with the 
business: Problems of credit for starting or continuing, the fluctuation of millet 
prices, the various risks with respect to low germination, fermentation, stabilisation 
of the fermentation process, hygiene of production, and equipment and labour 
saving techniques. The same analysis could be made of groundnut processing into 
oil, bean cake, and vegetable growing, though the major bottleneck here is the fact 
that the market for oil is completely outside the village, which makes this activity 
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less secure than cakpalo brewing. When, in the next chapter, we come back to the 
everyday implementation of the Community Development Programme in Togoudo, 
we will have a better insight into its disconnection with the local economy and 
social life, though, that in itself did not prevent its appropriation by local strategies 
for self-achievement. Let me now briefly discuss the socio-economic categorisation 
of men. 
The categories of men 
In order to complete the picture of the various ways in which people in Togoudo 
cope with constraints and advance their life projects, I will here present, through 
three different cases, the two extreme categories of men, those ranked low and those 
ranked high. 
The men ranked low: 'we too have come to life' or 'it is a matter of life' 
Fifteen of the 65 men were ranked in this category. Some informants were particu-
larly hard in their judgement of these people, of their living conditions and of how 
they came to be in their present situation. There seems little excuse for a man to 
belong to this category in Togoudo, apart from those who have been sick for a long 
period (two in total), old men without family support (three), young men who have 
just left school (two), or young men just married without enough land (three). The 
other five were granted no excuse for being what people called God's mistakes. They 
are said to be lazy, drunkards, irresponsible, and/or having wasted their time when 
they migrated to Ghana, Nigeria or the Ivory Coast. Three of them are older than 
40 years old, married, with children but do not possess more than three hectares of 
land. They are not excused for that - "They knew that situation of theirs since they 
were children.' The three young men who were just married and did not have 
enough land, though they all have very precarious living situations, were ranked in 
this category more, I think, because of their lack of land than for the actual living 
conditions of their households, which implies that despite the severity towards 
landless old men, informants were aware of the disadvantages of low land owner-
ship. 
In general, the people of this category are materially deprived and face food 
shortages regularly. When they own a bicycle it is old, their houses are in poor 
condition, except for two men who have been ill over long periods and some young 
men living in houses built by their parents. These people develop different survival 
and self achievement strategies out of their situations. Here, I give an account of two 
contrasting cases - those of Aloka and Chocotheo - to show how they identify them-
selves, which influences how open they are to self-achievement. Aloka is considered 
a lazy and irresponsible man. He is generally not taken seriously when he speaks 
in public, but he does have public responsibilities in Togoudo and the surrounding 
villages. He is in charge of looking after the water pumps and regulating their use. 
In addition to that, he conducts extension classes against guinea worms. Chocotheo, 
whom I mentioned in the second chapter of this book, together with his wife, for 
not being interested in the GV meeting on cotton, is not considered to be a lazy man 
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and does not have low social status in the everyday life of the village. He is ranked 
as one of 'God's mistakes'. That was in 1991/92. But now, three years later, he 
would have been ranked at least medium-high. The trajectories of these two men 
give us some indication of how these people cope with their situation and how they 
struggle for self identity, and incorporate pieces of intervention packages into their 
daily attempts to keep their heads above water and furthermore even engage in 
what I call externally oriented self-achievement strategies. 
Aloka, the miller 
Aloka is a nickname given to this man (David), which means the miller: Alo means 
to mill and ka means flour. Aloka was born in Sowe in 1946 and settled in Togoudo 
in 1981. He left his wife and five children behind in Sowe. He did not manage to 
build himself a house in Togoudo and lives with Ina-vieux, a lady from one of the 
first settler families, in a kind of husband-and-wife relationship. Aloka did not 
arrive in Togoudo in search of land to farm, but to work as a miller. He obtained 
this opportunity while he was in Nigeria where he met some Idaca people from 
Togoudo who came to buy a mill for a man in Togoudo, actually the father of Ina-
vieux. Aloka does not like farming, and developed a very early disdain for farming 
activities. 
He completed his primary school course in his native village and was then 
already behaving as an Akowe, a white collar worker, who did not wish to dirty his 
hands with farm work. He pretends to have always refused to help his parents on 
their farm. In 1963, he failed his first attempt to pass the entrance examination to 
secondary school. He immediately joined an uncle in Ghana where he is said to 
have done the nunimum of the cleanest job he could find, just in order to have 
enough cash for coffee and to clean his shirt and trousers. One year later, he came 
back to Sowe and had to take up milling work which he practised until 1971, at a 
monthly payment of l,000f and the possibility selling flour droppings to Fulbe 
people. Up to 1980, when he arrived in Togoudo, he travelled to Togo and Nigeria 
for milling work and other petty jobs. 
The early 1980s was the period when a UNICEF and USAID water pump project 
begun, as well as the Integrated Rural Development Project of the Zou-CARDER, 
to install water pumps in a few villages. A committee was to be set up, and one of 
its members had to be someone willing to look after the daily functioning of the 
pumps, take care of their maintenance and regulate people's access to them. Such 
a responsibility required that the person be present and often available within the 
village. Aloka was fully prepared for this and was proposed by most villagers. The 
project also needed village volunteers to teach peasants about the risks of guinea 
worm with the use of unclean water, which Aloka was pleased to do. These persons 
are now called animateurs villageois or promoters. They received some training, after 
which it was their job within the programme, as Aloka expressed it, to go round the 
wards and farms (16 in total for Aloka) to teach peasants ways of cleaning their 
water and to argue that guinea worms did not come from sorcerers but from 
unclean water. Aloka complains that people from Togoudo do not take the guinea 
worm problem seriously and never show up at the meetings he calls. When asked 
if he earned enough from this job to meet his needs he replied: 
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' UNICEF does not pay anything. But God has provided the body with a mouth, and will 
surely provide what will enter it. It was only in 1984 that I touched a hoe for the first 
time in my life in order to cultivate a farm. Now I have a small farm where I grow maize 
and okra, exactly what my mouth wills. I'm not someone for farms. It is because the job 
of miller is not doing well any more that I feel obliged to do farming. Otherwise, that is 
not my business.' 
Nevertheless, he is the secretary of a peasant group whose main activity is supposed 
to be farming. In normal days, Aloka spends much of his time with the RDV, the 
VNU and with us, ready to be sent on missions anywhere in the village. He is 
present at every public meeting of the village, especially when external agents are 
there. In most cases, he is asked by the hosting board of the meeting to prepare the 
yard (to clean it, install the chairs, tables and benches, getting the children to help) 
for the meeting. In so doing, he is incidentally quite well informed about the various 
discussions underway with the different external organisations who visit (e.g. the 
CARDER, the regional health department, officials from public aclministration, 
NGOs). Hardly any adult person takes Aloka seriously, but when it comes to contact 
with externals, he is useful to people interested in any sort of opportunity that 
might arise vis-à-vis these organisations. Questions generally addressed to him are, 
for example: 'You are the one who knows these people. How do you think we 
should introduce our case to make sure that we win it?' or, in cases when the hosts 
are late 'Are your people coming really?' Aloka would then give himself haughty 
airs, teaching peasants the right way to do things and finishing by addressing us or 
the visitors with an expression typical for agricultural bureaucrats 'Ah those 
peasants... (Ah ces paysans-là!)', implying their ignorance. Lately (early 1995) he 
was allocated a bicycle by USAID as part of new extension equipment for the anti-
guinea worms campaign. It is said that a monthly grant was promised to the 
animateurs villageois such as himself. 
Clearly, then, Aloka is emerging as a local development intermediary and 
considers himself, in those instances, closer to bureaucrats than to peasants. The 
most interesting aspect of his situation is that most peasants trust his competence 
and concede to him a respectable status. On these occasions, he looks down on 
peasants - as he probably thinks any good bureaucrat is expected to do - building 
in his own way his bureaucratic identity. After having experienced such attitudes 
from him on different occasions, I came to doubt the biographical discourse he had 
constructed about himself as someone very distant from farmers and farming, which 
indeed are mostly looked down upon by intervention agents, whether they be in 
agriculture, health, public aclministration or teaching. But outside these development 
arenas, he seems to lose social status and recognition and is considered lazy and 
irresponsible in the eyes of peasants - someone, as a peasant once told me, 'made 
by God to exorcise other human beings from devil's harms. ' I will come back to this in 
the next chapter and relate it to the status peasants attribute to intervention issues 
in their daily preoccupations. To proceed here, I would like to look at Chocotheo 
also ranked low and who develops external contacts, but quite evidently with goals 
different from those of Aloka. 
198 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
Chocothio, the multiple entrepreneur 
Chocotheo (30 years old), is much younger than Aloka and has studied longer than 
him. Moreover, he is not considered lazy by village people. He does not show any 
disdain for agricultural activities, though he is highly disadvantaged in terms of 
access to land. His grandfather settled in Togoudo as a hunter and did not bother 
to occupy any plot of land. His two sons (the father and uncle of Chocotheo) had 
to borrow land from other settlers in two different zones, because they were always 
offered small areas of exhausted soils. Now, Chocotheo has five small pieces of land 
(about a quarter of a hectare each, the total farm size available to him not exceeding 
two hectares) from different persons in different locations. These are his uncle (his 
own father died in 1979), his mother, his brother (who also were lent the land by 
the original 'owners') and a friend who received one hectare from his father for 
gbagagle, 'afternoon farrrting'. Chocotheo grows maize, cassava, groundnuts, yams 
and cotton. With the very dispersed location of his plots, he and his wife and 
children have to move over long distances from one farm to the other and therefore 
do not manage to devote much time to farm work itself. On the other hand, the 
lands are generally exhausted and he can never be certain whether a plot of land he 
has cultivated one year will be his the following year, even when the land belongs 
to relatives, because they do not have enough for themselves.17 Therefore, he 
knows that he cannot survive on agriculture, let alone make any real progress by 
relying solely on it. In addition to her involvement in farm work, Otchounsi, the 
wife of Chocotheo bakes bread with wheat flour on a scale. Chocotheo undertakes 
some trade himself. From 1985 to 1988, he travelled frequently to Nigeria to buy 
goods such as radio-cassettes, spare parts for bicycles and motor bikes, fertilisers, 
and even mills. He says: 
'At the beginning people used to pay me to take them there because they didn't know 
how to manage in Nigeria. In 1988, 1 worked as a surveyor in Gbomina and was paid 
10,000f. With that I went to Nigeria myself and bought a few spare parts and started to 
retail them. Since then I have continued and people who want to buy anything now no 
longer bother to follow me. They just give me the money and I take care of the rest, which 
is much more profitable for me. I know where and how to get cheap articles of quite good 
quality, and here, I know what people want or would like.' 
He is member of a labour exchange group and he generally uses his turn either to 
sell the labour to people in need or to pay back loans of cash or food grain. He 
keeps close contact with all external interventions entering the village and that is 
how he became recruited for the survey and also for the agricultural youth framing 
programme of the CARDER. In 1988, a young peasant cooperative (CAEJ: Cooperative 
d'Action Economique des Jeunes) was initiated by Tolidji Gaston, a young man from 
one of the first settler families living in Cotonou who had contacts with Ministers 
and other authorities of the Government.18 CAEJ had about 38 members. Chocotheo 
was elected secretary of the cooperative. Later, when the RDV launched the idea of 
a women's group, he was proposed as their secretary since none of them was 
literate. But the CAEJ did not work out, even though Gaston managed to obtain a 
large plot of land from his family for it (10 hectares). Nevertheless, Chocotheo 
worked on part of the land for two years before he was asked by the family to stop. 
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As for the women's group, he complains that they are always fighting and they 
grow only two eso (less than a half hectare) of cassava. He is also member of the 
football club of the village. All these contexts of social interaction (labour exchange 
group, football club, CAEJ, women's group etc.) allow Chocotheo to be integrated 
into networks where he could market his Nigerian experience. Persons intending to 
buy a radio-cassette, a bicycle, a motorbike, a watch, even cloth for making trousers, 
would request his advise for the make and quality of the material to be purchased. 
In many cases, he would simply be asked to obtain the goods. 
In general then, in 1991, the impression people in the village had of Chocotheo, 
was that of a poor young man, with no land, already burdened with an unfortunate 
wife and children, but doing his best to keep his head above water. It was therefore 
no surprise that he was ranked as of low status. But Chocotheo had a clear plan in 
mind - a life project in which he believed and for which he kept on working and 
searching for opportunities. He intended to start a shop /bar where he would sell 
sodabi, various bottled drinks, and manufactured goods, including spare parts for 
bicycles and motor bikes. And, in the end, he succeeded in doing so. Let me briefly 
explain how. 
Of course, the RDV was not interested in his idea. He considered it unrealistic 
from a young peasant, although it was one of the projects of the GV to start a 
similar shop in the village. Chocotheo approached the VNU also, but the latter could 
do nothing. He said he could not even inform his bosses about it to ask their point 
of view, since the idea fell completely outside the scope of the activities he was 
expected to support in the village (mainly agricultural production and animal 
husbandry), and with groups, not individuals. He approached us too (my assistant 
and me) with the same idea. He worked now and then for my research, carrying out 
part of the survey and doing translations and made a little money out of it. He 
started an animal raising group with 15 other young men but the group did not last 
for more than three months. In the meantime, my assistant introduced him to some 
ladies in Porto-Novo (south-east, on the Benin/Nigeria border) involved in whole-
sale smuggling across the border and to the Cotonou international market. Since 
then, even for his spare parts, he has stopped going to Nigeria. He can obtain them 
cheaper from these ladies, and so no longer faces risk with custom controls. Also, 
the ladies provide his wife with wheat flour on better terms than she used to get 
from Gbomina. After a few months interacting with the ladies, he managed to 
secure some articles on credit. This was in January 1992, at the time when peasants 
being paid for their cotton harvest, part of which they normally use to repair that 
bicycles which are always in very bad shape after a year of two rainy seasons. 
Chocotheo had every spare part necessary. When he came down to Cotonou in 
February to pay back the ladies, he stopped at my place and said: 
'I have made a big leap. This year is going to be a good one. I think my shop will open. 
With the profit I made in this single month, no less than 150,000f, I am able to complete 
the house, set the shelves and buy articles and open the shop. When it is ready I will 
invite you for the opening day.' 
He has a book where he keeps his accounts. He writes everything down, and does 
the same for the bakery of his wife since he has started buying her wheat from 
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Cotonou. But his decisive leap was in July of the same year when through the same 
ladies, he became involved with some dubious affair concerning a large stock of 
wheat flour that was to be sold off at a price far below normal. Hence he obtained 
20 tons of the stock without having to pay any significant part of the cost. He 
explained that, in early September, he would be able to pay it back completely as 
there would soon be the Catholic Church pilgrimage to Dassa, which offered a 
tremendous market opportunity for bread. The stock was transported by night to 
the village, with him paying for the petrol, and then retailed on bicycle throughout 
the surrounding villages, even in Gbomina, because he could offer a competitive 
price. Also, for the pugrimage, his wife baked more bread than she had ever baked, 
and sold it all. With his profits, Chocotheo arranged the bar side of his shop, bought 
a second hand kerosene refrigerator and started selling cool drinks, which were 
never to be found in the village before. Since 1994 his plan is to engage in the 
marketing of agricultural products. His contact ladies in Porto-Novo are interested 
in maize and cowpeas. He will soon start collecting them in the village. But he says 
he first needs to arrange good quality storage. He kept in touch with us and would 
drop into my, or my assistant's, office when visiting Cotonou for business. He used 
to say: 
'You people did not arrange any credit for me when I was struggling to start this shop. 
But it is thanks to you that I have got to know these ladies, who trusted me because they 
trusted you. That's why I am very grateful. I will always stop here and greet you. 
Besides, I feel that my well-being might come through you. One never knows who else 
I will meet at your place.' 
In any case, he now (in 1995) seems definitively to have his head, if not his whole 
body out of water. If in 1991 he was considered as one of 'God's mistakes', now, 
thanks to his insertion into the external world and his roots in networks in the 
village, he has ended up building himself a 'personality' in the village. Lately, 
during a minor dispute with a fellow villager who told him to stop boasting so 
much as nobody knew what tomorrow might bring. He declared: 
'Yes nobody knows of tomorrow but I boast about my work today. You and yours cannot 
break this achievement [with witchcraft he meant]. But even if you succeed, I have already 
got a name in this village. I am a reference. People refer to my name as a meeting place. 
'Let's meet at Chocotheo' they say. Even if you succeed in harming me, my name will 
not disappear. They would say 'we used to meet at ChocotMo'. On what occasion is 
your name ever called in this village?' 
The men ranked high 
All ten men ranked in this category grow cotton on a large scale, not less than five 
hectares each year for the past four years at least. All of them combine cotton with 
the cultivation of maize and beans for sale, while four grow yams for sale and the 
others vegetables. Two of them declare they own a herd of cattle among the Fulbe 
and one is the owner of one of the rnills of the village. 
During the ranking exercise, there was hardly any reference to the food consump-
tion patterns of the households of the persons ranked in this category. Informants 
stressed land ownership, the hard-working nature of the persons, the assets they 
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had accumulated (e.g. bicycles, motor bikes, houses, null, cows) and most import-
antly, the size of the manpower at his disposal. Indeed, these men all had large 
families, in some cases of three or four generations depth, where they act as the 
head of the family and mobilise its labour for their farms. In addition to that, three 
of them have Somba households living on their land who supply wage labourers 
and are particularly helpful for yam cultivation, while another, involved in the trade 
of food products, 'controls' a link with Fon labourers who arrive every year in 
Togoudo for the maize and cotton seasons. That is the case of Tinkpo, which I now 
present in more detail. 
Tinkpo, in search of animal traction 
When I first met Tinkpo on the 23rd April 1991, he was preparing to receive a 
mission from FAIB to his GRVC, a peasant cooperative. It was a hot and important 
issue for him. He had hoped for such an opportunity for three years and did not 
want to lose his chance of obtaining credit for animal traction, like his friend 
Ekpemi had succeeded in doing so a few months earlier. This issue is explored 
further in the next chapter. Despite the fact that he controls a large household, he 
always has to pay for wage labour. 
Tinkpo is in his mid-fifties. He is married with five wives. The first has eight 
children, three married girls and five boys, one of whom attends school and the 
other four work on the farm. The second wife has three children, two married girls 
and a boy born in 1970, to whom Tinkpo provided a wife a few months after we 
met. The third wife has five children, three boys and two girls, all working on the 
farm. The fourth wife has three children, all on the farm and the last one, he only 
married in 1990. The wives have their own farms, the first two are also engaged in 
food processing. But everybody in the household works first on the farm of Tinkpo, 
especially at peak periods (land preparation, sowing and harvesting). After that the 
women take care of their own business. As for the children, the girls generally help 
their mother on the farm, but it is out of question that the boys perform their own 
farm work (or help their mother) apart from some afternoon farming (gbadagle) of less 
than a hectare each, where they can work after four o'clock, in order, as Tinkpo 
puts it, to learn farming themselves. For the cotton crop, he operates a bit different-
ly. Every son between about 12 and 14 years old is allocated at least one hectare of 
land which he is expected to plough with cotton as an afternoon farm, in addition 
to his contribution on Tinkpo's own portion. But the boys do not have access to the 
revenue from this cotton farm. Tinkpo explained: 
' We do all these things together here. Only my wives keep their harvest and sell it apart, 
because I cannot take care of everything for them. I am responsible for their food. Even 
on the farms when they are working for themselves. Apart from that, they need to earn 
their money for condiments for making relish and to meet their own needs including their 
daughters. As for my sons, it is my responsibility to take care of all their needs, up to 
their trousers, bicycles, radio, pocket money and their education: how to do things in 
life.' 
The boy for whom he was going to pay for a wife was around when he was 
speaking. Incidentally, he had never received any radio or bicycle yet. A few years 
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ago, Tinkpo bought himself a motor bike and let his children have his old bicycle, 
which they ride to the farm where they usually have to spend most of their time. 
But he managed to build a house with a corrugated iron roof for the boy who is 
going to get married and is proud of that. 
With all his family labour, Tinkpo should not need wage labourers for the 
amount he produces. For the second season in 1990, he cultivated 10 hectares of 
cotton and 1.5 hectares of cowpeas. For the first season of the same year, he made 
five hectares of maize and two hectares of yam. For year 1991, he intended to do the 
same. He had already launched the first season. But he complained that the children 
seemed less disciplined now than in his time when he was working for his father. 
They do nothing on the farm until the parents arrive. Therefore, he remains depen-
dant on wage labour to some extent. But he has a well-established connection for 
that. He has a friend he came to know in Ghana, who now lives in Bohicon where 
he trades maize, and also buys maize from Tinkpo, collecting it from his farm and 
from other peasants in the village. The man is from Za-kpota, one of the villages on 
the Abomey-plateau where the Fon wage labourers come from. For four years now, 
at the beginning of the first season, Tinkpo travels down to Bohicon and his friend 
helps him through Za-Kpota to recruit labourers, sometimes as many as 15. But 
bringing in many wage labourers to plough the land can trap the peasant, and 
Tinkpo is aware of it. Indeed, it takes about five days to sow 10 hectares of a crop 
(which can be done with a dozen wage labourers and the family labour), but within 
a month, the whole field will have to be weeded in less than two weeks if it is to 
yield well. The family's labour will then not be enough and one is faced with two 
alternatives: either to buy herbicides or to recruit wage labour again. In both cases, 
extra money is spent which reduces the return on the crop. On the other hand, it is 
not in the advantage of the peasant to keep the labour on 'to host them' after 
ploughing, since, as long as they are there, they require feeding morning and 
evening, with bags of maize, beans, cassava flour, litres of oil and fish. Therefore, 
one needs to finish quickly with them and to let them go. To cope with this im-
passe, Tinkpo manages to extend the sowing of his farms over three weeks. The 
field is divided into many plots with different sowing dates, so that crops do not 
mature at the same time. Then, when weeding time comes, he can extend it over one 
and half months, and the same thing goes for the harvesting period. Therefore, he 
uses only his family labour for those activities. Though mamtaining labourers over 
three weeks, he does not have to feed them for more than six days. This is the way 
he does it: 
'Before I go for labourers, I talk with two or three people whom I know badly need some. 
I even discuss it as if it were a secret matter. Many people in this village are dependent 
on wage labourers but do not work out their labour needs in advance. They just wait here 
and, if labourers come, they start running after them. When my labourers arrive, they 
work on my farm during the first two or three days and I feed them. Then they move to 
one of the others and come back to my farm at the end of the second week and so on. 
Since I started doing this (about four years ago), I have never used wage labour for 
weeding and harvesting crops, except for harvesting cotton. And the people I arrange with 
are very grateful to me.' 
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Nevertheless, Tinkpo is not satisfied with the way he solves his labour problems. 
He has up to 30 hectares of land and could grow more of every crop if there was 
a worthwhile solution to this problem. When he employs wage labourers, he has to 
be behind them and check to see if they are doing the job properly, which is not 
always the case. And when any of them gets harmed in one way or the other (e.g. 
breaks a leg, or gets bitten by a snake), he feels responsible, and at least has the 
person taken back home or pays for the transport, for someone to carry him, and 
something for the treatment. His disatisfaction with his labour solution became more 
acute last year when his friend Ekpemi received animal traction from the FAIB 
project. Sometimes he has considered simply purchasing this for himself. It costs 
about 600,000f to have the oxen and complete set of tools needed for ploughing, 
sowing, and weeding. If he takes the decision, he will do it for two years. 
For the cotton season of 1990 only, he made a net revenue of 400,000f (deducting 
fertilisers and insecticides); the labour he paid for from income on maize and 
cowpeas. He has already planned how to use this money: 120,000f for the marriage 
of his son (mainly bridewealth), 60,000f would be left for solving household 
problems, maybe for eventualities such as burials, ceremonies, and health problems. 
He wants to buy an extra calf for 40,000 to add to the four animals he already has; 
70,000 will be used to pay the wage labour of the first season of 1991. Then, 40,000f 
will be kept in case the children ask for anything, whilst the rest, 70,000f Tinkpo 
said, would be used for pagaille by which he meant repairing a few things on his 
motor bike that could well extend over the next year, buying shirts and trousers for 
himself and staying with the friends ('relish and meat parlies'). Although he says 
he could well plan and buy the animal traction himself, he thinks it is too risky to 
do such a thing. He explained: 
' I have never used the thing. I only see people doing it and they say that when you buy 
one, the CARDER organises a training session for you and tames the animals. But what 
if I don't learn well? What would happen if I simply don't have the luck: the metal 
implement might break in my hands, my land can refuse to respond or, most importantly, 
the animals can die? That is why I prefer to have it on credit. If it does not work for one 
reason or another, I would simply ask the people to come and collect their devil back. If 
it works, then I can pay them the credit.' 
Rural diversification, labour constraints and men's strategies for survival and 
self-achievement 
The discussion presented above gives an idea of the different ways in which men 
in Togoudo cope with the major constraints of fanning activities, (i.e. access to land 
and labour). The case of Chocotheo is an indication, in addition to what we have 
already seen with the women, of diversification that is taking place in the local 
economy, entailing income-generating activities complementary to agriculture. The 
settlement patterns in Togoudo and the absence of a land market seem to have 
generated relatively fixed situations of landownership, which people have to cope 
with. Various options have been tried or are under way, of which the cases of Aloka 
and Chocotheo are two radically different examples of the changes taking place. 
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Aloka's illustrative disdain for agriculture and his preference for an intermediary 
role between externals and the local population in the matter of development 
intervention - actually a sort of development brokerage at grass-roots level19 - is 
not actually related to any lack of land. Indeed, Aloka is not just a single case in that 
kind of choice. Other people, having large access to land, happen to take the same 
option (as the case of Gaston Tolidji discussed in Chapter 9), while others simply 
migrate to the main Benin cities or to Nigeria or the Ivory Coast. 
As for Chocotheo, he provides one example of the different ways in which people 
constrained by limited access to agricultural land try to secure the best out of their 
environment. The subsequent diversifications engaged in by people in Togoudo 
concern animal husbandry, mainly pigs raised freely without any enclosure or 
particular care but for which reliable market opportunities exist.20 Alternative 
activities include tailoring, carpentry, house building, the transportation of agricul-
tural products on bicycle or animal traction to the village or the market, the or-
ganisation of labour exchange groups for the hiring out of labour, which most 
people ranked medium-low or medium-high actually do to make both ends meet. 
Others are being trained in some of the main cities in Benin (Bohicon, Parakou, 
Cotonou, Porto-Novo) to be mechanics, taxi drivers, tailors, and so forth. For those 
who remain in the village, these non- or para-agricultural activities are supported 
by farming. 
As for access to and control over labour, this is principally the fault of people like 
Tinkpo, who own a relatively big farm and hopes to plough as much as possible. 
Although this offers some sort of survival opportunity to landless people and 
migrants, it also creates situations whereby the head of the household tries to retain 
household members as a labour force that can be mobilised easily. In such a context 
and aiming towards collective management of assets, some heads of household keep 
the children with them, without much effort to send them to school. Boys can then 
be bribed with an early marriage as in the case of the son of Tinkpo, who obtained 
his first wife from his father when he was only 21 years old. The woman, once 
arrived, becomes an additional member of the labour force for Tinkpo. But these 
situations are not static. Despite all these attempts to control people, Tinkpo and 
Ekpemi do not feel comfortable with these solutions, not only for moral questions 
but because they have to face now and then clashes of interests within this coalition 
of individuals that make up the household, which makes the solution unreliable. 
They are trying therefore to have animal traction. 
For the moment, though we will return to these dilemmas in Chapter 9, one 
remark deserves to be made on the three cases of men (as individuals, but at the 
same time, as social categories). These people are different as to their social iden-
tities, what they set as life objectives, and therefore in the types of resources they 
struggle for. Nevertheless, all of them resort to intervenors in some way or another, 
seeking to establish common ground between the intervention packages and their 
projects. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to provide insights into the complexity of the economic 
web that social actors generate, reproduce and at the same time struggle with locally 
in their daily attempts to earn a living and meet what they conceive of as 'well-
being' and 'development'. There are various categories of people, different in 
their own perceptions of their identities, in the perceptions they have of the social, 
economic and ecological environment, and therefore in the setting of different 
strategies, individual and collective, aimed at achieving their life projects, which 
local ideologies of development categorise as survival or self-achievement strategies. 
The differences between these categories of people have much to do with their 
access to the assets necessary to produce, that is, to their material potential to 
provide for minimum basic needs. But the differences are not limited to that and are 
more subtle. There are individual ways of doing things, taking decisions, organising 
and following up different 'branches' of their businesses, which makes for the 
enormous difference between Sabine, on the one hand, and Pélagie and Chocotheo, 
on the other. There is also the individual capacity to manipulate politically social 
norms and relations such as household patterns, long distance relations, etc. with 
the aim of acquiring, controlling and using elements of the social and ecological 
environment. These elements become - but only then - assets for generating social 
status and material goods, as we have seen with Pélagie when she gets into trading 
agricultural and horticultural products, Chocotheo with his retailing of bicycle spare 
parts and wheat flour, and Tinkpo in the management of his household and the 
need for migrant labour. Each of them, in his or their own ways, have acted as 
entrepreneurs in the transactional sense (see Long 1977), identifying evaluation gaps 
in given situations and then bridging transactions to exploit these gaps, taking 
relevant decisions in due time and using these social networks built incidentally as 
well as intentionally. They have emerged as economic brokers, controlling crucial 
sets of relationships that link the local economy with the wider regional and 
national structure. Finally, these are examples of how the identities people define 
for themselves can produce radical differences in what they primarily define as 
assets or means of production. The ways they go for these assets and the social 
status they obtain from these ventures makes the difference. Take, for example, the 
difference between Aloka and Chocotheo. 
My intention in this chapter, as I mentioned at the beginning, was to complete the 
discussions of Chapter 7 with an état des lieux of what different categories of individ-
uals and groups define as constraints and opportunities for achieving their life 
projects. This has been done in order to prepare discussions on the ways in which 
these everyday definitions of well-being and development find grounds for negotia-
tion with the actions attempted by the RDV in the Community Development 
Programme. I was not engaging in a discussion of entrepreneurial decision-making 
per se, though some models of such an analysis have been used in the foregoing 
discussions.21 My argument is that differences between categories of people in 
terms of living conditions cannot be confined to economistic assets or indicators 
used to identify poverty or social inequaHties. Oppenheim (1990: 3) asserts that 
'poverty takes away the tools to build the blocks for the future, your life chances' 
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(quoted by Alcock 1993: 3). But which tools for which future? The differences in the 
perception of these parameters, as I hope to have shown, are not just ethnic or of 
geographical nature. They are rooted in the individual identification of self, in 
personal experiences and ideals, the pursuit of which might bear potential stimuli 
or threats for the dynamic of economic and social life at local level. Not making 
these differences clear brings us to so-called etic categorisations to an homogenisa-
tion of people who are completely different, either by pitying and making them 
objects of misery or idealising their potential to exit from poverty or to solve 
inequality problems once adequate policy is designed for it. 
Notes 
1 See Alcock (1993: 9), where he suggests that differences be made between poverty (a prescriptive 
concept implying the need for corrective policy actions) and inequality (a descriptive concept not making 
any normative appreciation on the state of affairs projected. 
2 Townsend (1979) has worked out these sorts of indicators for poverty in Britain, from standards of 
living set by himself, which show high correlation with income. The approach was later improved by 
letting the indicators be assessed by the interviewed before the survey (Mack and Lansley 1992). In both 
cases, these indicators were based on static categories, produced from the imaginations of the researchers 
themselves. 
3 Recently, we have used emic socio-economic categorisations in villages of the Abomey plateau. There, 
the soils are irreversibly exhausted but nevertheless yearly scoured by resident peasants who liked to 
keep hope. Almost all able men have migrated to northern Zou or to cities, while women busy themsel-
ves with petty trade and food processing for a nearly illusionary market, that barely gives them any 
return. In short, it is a generally precarious context. The criteria elaborated locally to differentiate people 
in terms of their living conditions, referred to their ability to keep their poverty within the privacy of 
individual households (not to speak of it in public) though everybody is aware of it. 
4 In this case, a census of adult women was taken before randomly selecting 65 of them, as there was no 
pre-established list of women available. 
5 These are tomato and spicy sauces with goat meat sold by some women from early in the morning (7:30 
to eight o'clock) through mid-day and early afternoon (two to three o'clock), which is not a farming 
period. Otherwise, the selling stops at nine or 9:30pm. People, mostly men, gather at those places, buy 
the relish, order some calabashes of cakpalo, eat the meat and sauce without any rice or bread or 
anything whatsoever while drinking the cakpalo. For the cakpalo-and-relish parties I have attended, I 
have hardly seen people sharing relish. As for the cakpalo, people took turns in buying, and the calabash 
cup used to drink it passes from hand to hand. The parties take place at the house of the cakpalo or relish 
seller or in a peasant's house. About one litre of cakpalo costs lOOf. 
6 Nevertheless, as already indicated in Chapter 2, cotton production has been rising since the mid-eighties 
as the most reliable cash crop. After the FCFA devaluation on January 11th, 1994 (50 percent), the increase 
in the price of cotton from HOf to 140 (about 27 percent) made this crop apparently more interesting for 
peasants than yam, though the prices of fertilisers and insecticides were increased by 50 percent. Yam 
was still largely sold to Nigeria while the exchange rate of the Naira, the Nigerian currency, did not 
change much after the FCFA devaluation, as Naira had lost its value following that devaluation. Another 
constraint with yam cultivation in these last years is the difficulty to find specialised labour for the 
making of the buttes, since most young men in Togoudo find it too hard and the Fon labourers from the 
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South come from a different farming systems area. Only the Somba take this work now, but there are not 
many of them. 
7 These were: the time we took to identify the informants and to build for ourselves a background 
knowledge of different living conditions in the village, the particular way in which the rankings were 
conducted, the feeding of the criteria identified back in informal group discussions for refining them or 
revailing alternative forms of local ideologies on development, - the fact that we did not constitute the 
groups that conducted these discussions, nor did we decide on the topics for discussions. 
8 In most of these cases, and within a one to two week period, individuals or groups are asked to rank 
list(s) of people according to their 'wealth/poverty'. Then, eventually a few people from each category 
of wealth are invited, in so-called focused group discussions, to identify solutions to improve their 
situation. For examples on this technique, see Grandin 1988; Sharrock et al. 1993; Tung and Balina 1993; 
and more generally the issue RRA Notes n°15 of May 1992, especially edited on 'wealth ranking'. 
9 In his approach and following Mitchell and Epstein (1959), Long selected 10 social occupational 
positions in the village which a sample of 50 men and women were asked to rank on a four-point scale 
and explain the reason of their ranking. Seur used the 'repertory grid technique' following Kelly (1955), 
and Bannister and Fransella (1971), whereby individual key informants were asked to compare peasants 
of different triads drawn from a list of 10 peasants, and each time explain the differences. 
10 See Arce and Long 1987; Drinkwater 1988 and van Donge 1993 for discussions about the notion of 
'lifeworld'. 
11 He is self-sufficient in his affairs, could give financial or material assistance (credit) to many people 
without any drawback or harm on his own affairs. 
12 For 10 kilogrammes of rice, cooked on two occasions, she would need around 7,500 or 9,500 FCFA in 
cash and sell for about 12,000 FCFA. But from many consumers, she will not get all the money before a 
week or ten days, some would even wait until April when they are paid for their cotton, which means 
that she would need at least three to four times the necessary capital to run the business, around 30 or 
35,000 FCFA. But often, she buys part or all the inputs on credit and then they are 1.5 or 2 times more 
expensive. Sometimes she obtains loan from people at various rates (10 or 20 percent per week), 
depending on the persons, but it is not easy to find enough money. Her children in the Ivory Coast 
usually send her money, mainly at the end of the year. If she is lucky and the money comes early, then 
things are better and she can run the business through June if nobody falls seriously ill in the meantime. 
13 Contrary to chickens and goats, nobody raises pigs on the farms because, since the animals are left 
to wander, people fear that the pigs would destroy all crops if they are raised on the farms. But as this 
activity interests primarily the women in the village, they are the ones to be disadvantaged by this issue. 
14 Firewood is expensive in the rainy seasons because every thing is wet and people who could carry 
it home are busy on their farms. 
15 Cakpalo is not drunk in a glass. Never! It is sold in calabashes of different sizes according to the 
quantity one wants (about a quarter, half or one litre), and served in calabash cups. These calabashes are 
locally produced, out of a legume called Egusi in Yoruba and Gusi in Fon, the fruits of which are used 
to make cheese for relish, oil or cake, all very much appreciated in meals in Benin from north to south 
and in Nigeria. According to brewers, when used permanently, a stock of calabashes can last for one or 
two years. A break of six months would mostly oblige the brewer to renew part of the stock because, 
unless they are regularly exposed to the sun, mildews attack the calabashes. 
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16 Florentine learned to brew from her mother, who later helped her to start up on her own. 'I have 
grown up with it' she says. As a little girl, she used to help her mother throughout the whole process. 
When she was around 12, she continued cooking with her mother who used to sell part of the sweet 
cakpalo to her on a wholesale basis, taking into account to some extent her contribution in the whole 
process. Florentine started then organising trade of sweet cakpalo, saving money and making her own 
clientele. She was around 17 when she first brewed cakpalo entirely on her own, from her own millet, 
wood and water, with the help of her mother and using the equipment of her mother. Since then, she has 
never stopped. Despite the ups and downs, this has remained her main activity, supported now and then 
by farming and the occasional rescue by her husband. 
17 There have been some incidents. One day, the uncle removed some of his cassava plants from the plot 
of land he had lent Chocotheo, arguing that he had overstepped the limits of the plot he had allowed him 
to use. Chocotheo claims that the uncle was angry with him for not agreeing to remain and work with 
him. Indeed, Chocothéo's father died in 1979. He dropped out of school in 1985 and came to the uncle, 
though he had his first son in 1979 while he was still in primary school. As shown in the previous 
chapter on household patterns, staying with the uncle meant that Chocotheo had to work for him with 
only food as compensation. But he did not like this idea and decided to move to the house of his father 
and manage on his own. 
18 The case of this cooperative is developed in Chapter 9. 
19 See Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1994 for a brief discussion on the concept of courtiers (du 
développement) aux pieds nus, bare-footed development brokers, and Mongbo 1995 for a case study on these 
brokers in Benin. 
20 To raise pigs in Togoudo, one simply needs to buy a young sow for 2,000 or 3,000f and just wait, 
giving it now and then kitchen waste so that it recognises its sleeping place and owner. For the rest, the 
animal would find its way around the village, come across a male from which it would have young, and 
eat anything it finds and scrounges. Contrary to what happens in many other villages, there is no 
regulation requesting that animals be put behind fences at the beginning of the cropping season and it 
would in any case be untenable for the animals, as the peasants stay for weeks on the farms. As raising 
pigs requires very little work, so does the selling of them. Specialised pig traders come right to Togoudo, 
mainly on Tuesday to purchase dozens of them for the markets of Cotonou and Porto-Novo. 
21 See Long (1977:105-143) for an extensive conceptual framework and methodological discussion on the 
analysis of entreprerteurship. 
9 The Community Development Programme at the 
crossroads: 
Social interfaces, transformation of development policy and 
the reproduction of the field of rural development 
Toute la terre avait une seule langue et les mêmes mots 
... Et l'Eternel ait 
... Allons! descendons et confondons leur language 
Afin qu'ils n'entendent plus la langue les uns des autres 
Genèse,lT.l,6,7 
Et ils furent tous remplis du Saint-Esprit, 
Et se mirent à parler en d'autres langues 
...La multitude accourrut et elle fut confondue 
Parce que chacun les entendait 
Parler dans sa propre langue. 
Actes,2:4,6 
Introduction 
The foregoing chapters have given us a picture of the historical background, the 
frames of action, the values, interests and future perspectives of the different actors 
involved in or concerned with the Community Development Programme in the Zou 
Province, particularly in Togoudo. These actors cover the CARDER staff as state 
agents, the people of Togoudo, but also ourselves as researchers. The discussions 
have highlighted the important differences between, but also within, each of these 
'epistemological communities'. Indeed one question, following Louk Box from a 
similar context in Costa Rica, whether these people were able to engage in any 
purposive social interaction at all (Box 1989: 167). Yet we now know, from the 
example discussed in Chapter 5 on the burial of the Community Development 
Programme in the Atlantic Province, that actors can in fact reach some sort of 
agreement out of cacophonous non-dialogical social interaction. Likewise, the 
election of the GV board discussed in Chapter 2 indicates that consensual sub-
mission can be achieved at a specific time and space on particular issues, through 
conflict, verbal violence and power, without this prejudging the strategies that the 
'losing' parties might later deploy, in other arenas, for further struggles over the 
same issues. In fact, the various social contexts of the implementation of the Com-
munity Development Programme, both within the CARDER and on the village 
scene, bring us to what Norman Long has conceptualised as social interfaces, those 
'critical points of intersection between different social systems, fields or levels of 
social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative 
value and social interest, are found' (Long 1989: 2). In the present case, these are 
the physical or symbolic social encounters where the different, sometimes conflicting 
and contradictory, frames of meaning1 present do find some common grounds for 
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negotiation and struggle over values and interests around 'well-being' and 
'development', sometimes reaching ad hoc or operational consensus which becomes 
instrumental in a continuation of the struggle and argument. By so doing, actors at 
these social encounters contribute, not really intentionally, but nonetheless efficiently 
to the reproduction of the field of rural development as a distinctive field of social 
interaction. 
According to Long and Villarreal, a detailed study of social interfaces provides 
insight into the processes by which policy is transformed, how 'empowerment' 
and room for manoeuvre is created by both intervenors and 'clients', and how 
persons are enrolled in the 'projects' of others through the use of metaphors and 
images of development. They further argue that in this analysis there is a need to 
elucidate the types of social discontinuities present and to characterise the different 
kinds of organisational and cultural forms that reproduce or transform them (1993: 
143, 147). In addition, I argue in the present chapter, from the digestion of the 
programme within CARDER and its actual implementation in the villages, that such 
social encounters are conflict and coalition generating par excellence or the playing 
grounds of existing conflicts and accommodations. In these various ways, they 
function as places were fields of social interaction (in our case the field of rural 
development) are activated and reproduced. 
I first discuss the process of incorporation of the Community Development 
Programme into the Zou-CARDER. I argue that the CARDER staff attempted to lock 
the new policy statement and approach implicit in the Community Development 
Programme into their former frames and culture of intervention while trying to 
attract funding agencies. At a second stage, the same process is discussed at village 
level, giving particular attention to how local actors dealt with the programme and 
made it meaningful in their everyday life. What I attempt to show in this chapter 
is the seeming gap between the activities of the Community Development Pro-
gramme and the daily preoccupations of the people it is supposed to benefit -
whatever its relevance. At least that is the impression gained when one first encoun-
ters it. I also look at how these gaps are produced, and this later allows me, in the 
concluding part of the chapter, to examine their rationale in reproducing the field 
of rural development. 
New Minister and old staff: locking the new policy orientation into former frames 
in the Zou-CARDER 
The initiation phase of the programme 
The report written at the head office of the Zou-CARDER and entitled Plan de mise 
en oeuvre du programme de développement communautaire dans le Zou (Zou-CARDER 
1989) is self-explanatory as to how the idea, which the Minister wished to be a new 
one, was incorporated into old practices.2 Elaborated by the ministry staff to be an 
alternative approach to development intervention, the idea of the Community 
Development Programme perhaps, in fact quite probably did, generate new 
behaviours and attitudes, but it was first incorporated into the frames of the Zou-
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CARDER, participating therefore in the various bargaining, conflicts and gainsaying 
at work which constitutes the everyday realities of CARDER. The report starts by 
pointing out the fact that the ultimate goal of the operation was to 'promote 
integrated development in rural areas, based on the effective participation of the 
populations and on the identification of needs felt as a priority in the villages'. 
Then it gives the various steps to be followed by the staff for the implementation 
of the programme, after which it proceeds to outline the strategy for action in the 
next three years. 
The first step was the preparation of various guides for use by the RDRs, those 
responsible for rural development, and their staff, who were in charge of the 
initiation phase of the programme. The second step was its introduction in the field, 
and the third, the appointment of the RDVs, who had taken no part in the former 
steps but were responsible for the actual implementation of the programme in the 
villages. Among the documents handed over to the RDRs and their staff to help 
them with their initiation actions were guides for writing village monographs, and 
a paper on 'the development of the villages' that gave some basic recommenda-
tions for developing plans from below and for their implementation. The most 
interesting aspect of these different documents was that in spirit as well as form 
they were a very good summary of some three generations of state intervention in 
rural areas since the colonial period. They combined recent neo-populist rhetoric 
about participation and people taking their destiny into their own hands with a 
careful definition of the domains in which actions were to be conducted. The latter 
specified the Groupement Villageois, the GV, as the village organisation to which 
all villagers must adhere, and the actions to be carried out and when - in other 
words, laying out a blue-print approach. This then removed from the people in 
question what they had just been given, that is the freedom to choose and plan for 
themselves the activities and the types of organisations that would support them. 
The second indication of the multi-generational and multi-fashioned nature of the 
document is the list of domains of action identified beforehand. These were: food 
(combatting child malnutrition and improving the diet of the population); public 
health, i.e. sanitation, drinking water hygiene, devising a timetable for frequent 
visits of a medical doctor and vaccination of the children, and training four villagers 
in primary health care; socio-economic infrastructure (building schools, post offices, 
markets); protection of the environment by improving cropping techniques at 
different levels of intensification, by improving animal husbandry and preventing 
animals from wandering all over the village and by encouraging better household 
use and saving of energy; land use management (gestion des terroirs); improving the 
self-financing capacity of the populations through diversification of income-generat-
ing activities, improving crop yields, youth training, and the organisation of cooper-
atives. The domains and activities thus identified were then planned over the short, 
medium and long terms. Despite all these detailed statements, the staff in charge 
were asked to organise village meetings where the people a la base could express 
their needs to be incorporated into a participatory design for the programmes. The 
staff were sufficiently, if not overly, directed. From the various documents they had 
received and the information meetings they held with the General Director (sessions 
where the latter gave instructions), they were well equipped for any kind of devel-
212 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
opment plan, which could be written without the need for organising village 
meetings. But the village meetings were organised, with the assistance of a 
monitoring committee from CARDER head office, and therefore they had to take 
place, not only for the extra knowledge they might provide but also because they 
were part of bureaucratic procedures (such as mission reports, expense claims which 
included per diems) - that is, all the little things that gave concrete life to the 
programme and could serve as reporting materials to the ministry. For the writing 
of the village development plans, as none of the RDRs wanted to take the risk of 
being accused of having left some domains out, they simply covered them all, 
specifying from time to time that the encadrement would be based on the Training 
and Visit' system. 
There were 30 development plans for the 30 villages selected, but they were 
almost the same, the main differences being how the texts were organised and how 
detailed they were. They were almost a re-writing of the guide received from head 
office, packaged into descriptions of the villages and the providing of some local 
details. The most interesting aspects of these documents are not the village develop-
ment plans per se, nor whether part or all of the activities planned in the documents 
were implemented, but the following two characteristics. First is the excellent 
reproduction of the old 'top-down' approach to development planning packaged 
in a 'bottom-up' rhetoric. The second is the operationaHsation of the new abstract 
idea of the 'Community Development Programme' in concrete form, yet using old 
interventionist devices that had been at work for decades in agricultural services 
(wandering animals, adherence to a specific, and state-designed, type of cooperative, 
elaborating plans which excluded those who later had to implement them) and some 
newer ones (such as the so-called 'intensification levels' and the 'Training and 
Visit System' of the last development project of the Zou Province). In fact, at large 
village meetings organised by intervention organisations supposedly to prepare 
development plans from below, requests brought by villagers are almost invariably 
the same, and concern social infrastructure, public services, credit and what they 
themselves call their 'ignorance of good and improved cropping techniques'. One 
should not, therefore, be surprised that the meetings organised in this case yielded 
nothing more than the classic shopping list of development plans, which field staff 
knew perfectly, and which was already largely covered by the document guides 
prepared by CARDER head staff. The question, then, is: of what use were all these 
guides and reports when the villagers already knew their 'lesson on development 
plans'? And why go through the whole process when the information already 
existed in the regular documents and reports of the CARDER? 
I realised that this had something to do with the need to give the Community 
Development Programme an existence on paper, and in the minds of all the in-
dividuals involved within the structure of the institution and in the villages, that 
would appear independent of the on-going activities of the CARDER. In short, these 
were a set of bureaucratic devices to show compliance to the Minister's orders and 
to show evidence that the job was done, while, at the same time, feeding elements 
of the programme into the everyday routine of the staff in order to make it real to 
them and to acquaint them with the new language and the accompanying require-
ments of the new approach, even if little change occurred in the hardware styles of 
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development intervention within the organisation.3 As a member of head staff once 
told me, 
'with all the things we have done here within this programme, no one can say that we 
did not try, that the issue was not tackled. If the villages are no more dynamic than they 
were before, it won't be because we did not do our job.' 
It became an opportunity to bring into the discourse new (or renewed) fashions, 
derived from the funding agencies and their experts. In this way, one sees the old 
and the new melted into the same package, such as the regulations against animals 
wandering in the village, a feature of the hygiene campaigns of colonial and early 
post colonial periods, and more recent concerns such as waste recycling, energy 
saving and sustainable agriculture. In my view, this is one of the processes through 
which new items reach down to village level and become incorporated into the 
shopping list. Now, for example, the villagers are using, more and more, the rhetoric 
of 'planting trees for a safe environment', and 'participation', 'taking the jar up 
to one's hip before people help you put it on your head'.4 
The process described above is indicative of the bureaucratic, adrninistrative and 
discursive power and adaptability of CARDER for reproducing itself, but also for 
keeping up with the changing requirements of funding agencies, experts and 
Ministers, while at the same time, informing its peasant clients about the latest 
fashions in the language and rhetoric of development.5 
In fact, another dimension of importance, beyond the concerns expressed by the 
Minister, is the survival of the CARDER. Indeed, around 1989-91, as I discussed in 
Chapter 3, fundamental debates over national politics and a structural adjustment 
programme, the closure of a major World Bank rural development project in the 
Zou Province, the launching by the French government of a new project with a non-
state orientation that suggested that the CARDER should not be involved, created 
a vulnerable climate for the CARDER. It needed to present an acceptable, new face 
in order to attract resources for development intervention. The figures for cotton 
production were no longer sufficient to motivate funding agencies. Hence the 
Community Development Programme was put on show. The villages considered to 
be the most successful, and like Togoudo, were visited by all the missions that 
arrived in the province, while the General Director requested that the RDVs design 
projects to be submitted to the funding agencies. 
The social life of the programme: bargaining and watching your step within the CARDER 
In reality, all this turmoil meant little more to CARDER staff, especially at the 
medium and lower levels, than what they called the tracasseries habituelles du 
CARDER.6 And they did not yield much success, at least for the CARDER head 
staff. Not many projects were designed by the RDVs from the villages and very few 
of these projects (most of which were small) were funded at peasant group level. At 
a quarterly meeting of the RDVs, the General Director voiced strong irritation after 
each RDV, reporting on what he had done during the past three months, told of 
people building their own schools, health centres, markets and rural roads with local 
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non-durable materials, extension work on improved diets for children and adults 
and so on. He shouted: 
'But where are the projects? Do you think people need you before making houses with 
local non-durable materials? Where are the projects on land and natural resource manage-
ment (gmtkm £m temrir), water catchments for cattle. You should be more active and you 
must know that fte pmp'k wttl not bs ®fmy hdp to fsufor ife Hs&ekjymmi qf their 
mttage (my emphasis). I need from each of you at least one project every month and you 
should not forget that I am not appointed to this post (General Director) for 100 years. 
I am prepared every day to be moved. Therefore I don't want you to waste my time.' 
This apparent misunderstanding between the General Director, and the RDVs was 
far from being the only one among CARDER staff about the Programme. The divide 
did not put field agents, the front-line workers, against office or head staff. It was 
more that the Programme got caught up in the everyday quarrels and conflictive 
routines within CARDER. But apart from this, or perhaps because it, the social life 
of the programme produced its own social groupings, stakeholders, interest groups 
and networks, with it own changing operational/organisational chart. To give just 
a very schematic overview. The main stakeholders were Cewe and the RDVs, the 
General Director, the RDRs and their staff, the Director of Production (DPro), and 
other senior staff such as Ekanye, Dourodje etc. 
Cewe is the staff member at head office who was appointed informally by the 
General Director to replace Ekanye, who remains officially the technical assistant 
and coordinator of the programme.7 Cewe believed that the programme would later 
turn out to be an important one, and the coordinator's job a promising one with 
a car allocation. He was apparently more dynamic than Ekanye, but for many, that 
was not the main reason for his winning the position over Ekanye. Cewe was from 
the same native area as the General Director, and both were from the same province 
as the Minister who launched the programme, and as the Prefect of Zou Province. 
Moreover, Cewe had good private contacts with the General Director and was a 
friend of the Prefect. The three men happened to meet now and then. The relaxing 
element for them was speaking in their mother language and the shared stereotypes 
on local food, customs and women, about which they joked. On these occasions, 
however, Cewe behaved respectfully, conforming to his age and place in the social 
hierarchy, which it seems gave the Director confidence in his loyalty, as compared 
to that of Ekanye with whom he shared no other social space than the work place, 
which mostly remains very formal and distant. But beyond the ethnic factor, there 
were some personal attributes Ekanye did not have, that might have allowed him 
to overcome this barrier. A common expression in the CARDER about situations like 
his was 'he has not been vigilant', meaning 'it was not enough to get a position; 
one has to keep it', and for that, 'professional competence is not enough; you need 
to bark as the dogs if you want to eat with them'.8 This indicates that 'watching 
your step' was part of the normal everyday life of CARDER, and people had to 
learn to cope with it. Furthermore, CARDER'S culture placed the ultimate blame 
on the 'victim', who was supposed to have room for mahoeuvre. Ekanye's 
reaction to this was a rather fatalistic one: 'I have seen many DGs coming and 
going. He will not remain DG for ever. His sun is shining now, let him make hay.' 
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Cewe received no particular sympathy from the RDVs. They often complained 
that he liked playing the boss too much and that he would become tyrannical if ever 
endowed with power. They also thought that one should not bring a goat when 
hunting when one owns a dog.9 Nevertheless, Cewe remained their best ally at the 
CARDER head office. There was animosity by some headquarter's staff towards 
them, and it was a period of instability with rumours of redundancies because of 
the structural adjustment programme becoming more and more persistent. Thus 
they hoped that because of the good relations between Cewe and the Director, their 
requests and complaints would stand a better chance of reaching him through Cewe 
than through Ekanyé. As for Cewe, he hoped that in the near future, CARDER 
would form an autonomous team of experts on issues concerning community 
development. Also, he strongly believed that the programme would become import-
ant. It was mutual enrolment on both sides, in individual or collective projects. The 
RDVs hoped to secure their position and interests in the CARDER while Cewe 
found there some prospects for an interesting career. 
From their side, the RDRs responsible for development within the head office 
were greatly frustrated by the programme, to which they were generally hostile, and 
they resented and showed great animosity towards the RDVs. The first pomme de 
discorde, or bone of contention, was that they, the RDRs, had designed all the 
development plans for the villages, but it was the RDVs, appointed to the villages 
in their geographical coverage, who had responsibility for implementing the plans 
and, even more galling (and contrary to established CARDER procedures), they did 
not have to report to them. The RDRs thus accused the RDVs of doing nothing in 
the villages, because they were not subjected to any control. What the RDRs con-
sidered most unfair was the fact that the RDVs received the same monthly allow-
ances as them. The type and amount of those allowances was subject to a lot of 
bargaining and argumentation at the beginning of the programme. Within the 
organisational structure of the CARDER, there were five general hierarchical 
positions with their own level of monthly allowances (especially the primes de 
responsabilité and primes de suggestion) in addition to the salary. These positions were 
the Directeur Général, the Directeurs, the Responsables, the Chefs de service, and the Chef 
de section. The denomination of the position Responsable de Dynamisation du village, 
RDV, had been decided at Ministry level and could not be changed, but became a 
focus of bargaining in the Zou-CARDER. As they had the title (Responsables) and 
also the same level of qualifications as the RDR, they claimed and won - although 
working at village level - the same level of allowances as the RDRs who worked at 
the District level. The RDRs considered this unjust, not only because they had a 
wider geographical area to cover than the RDVs, but because they had designed the 
plans during the initiation phase of the programme, and all the RDVs had to do was 
simply to implement them! 
Although the topic was one of the most debated informally among CARDER staff, 
RDVs such as Asuka and Tinguédjo had particular relationships with the RDR of 
the area where they were appointed. Asuka originated from the same area as the 
RDR of Gbomina, they spoke the same language and practised the same religion. 
Neither had their family with them and they mostly drove home together at week-
ends in the RDR's car. As for Tinguédjo, his RDR simply respected him for his 
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seniority. The RDR called Tinguédjo Doyen, and Tinguédjo used to resort to the RDR 
now and then for transporting tilings from the village to Bohicon or the other way 
around. 
But, in general, the opposition of the RDRs to the programme found a 'ground' 
at the department of production and with the DPro and some of her staff. The DPro 
was said to have been especially appointed to her position by the former Minister, 
the one to precede the initiator of the Community Development Programme. Being 
one of the rare women at the higher levels of the agricultural bureaucracy in Benin, 
she was known to be very strong and to have a big mouth. She was one of those 
who objected to the whole idea of this programme.10 
When the Minister's instructions to start this programme came, the General 
Director of 1991 was in fact the head of the DSEI. In normal times, the working 
relations between the Department of Production and the DSEI is not an easy one. 
The former is responsible for the everyday operation of the various intervention 
programmes under way in the CARDER (and therefore has close contacts with the 
RDRs and their staff) while the DSEI is supposed to evaluate the work of the field 
agents and apply sanctions, which a Dpro might well take as a criticism of them-
selves. As explained in the case of Gbèdjèmin in Chapter 6, some field agents were 
aware of this situation and played on it, playing one director off against the other 
in order to escape sanctions. Actually, the Dpro was said always to be in conflict 
with the former DSEI, which worsened when the latter was appointed General 
Director by the new Minister. Therefore, while at the begirtning of the Community 
Development Programme she did give a minimum contribution to the programme, 
later she dropped it. Within the formal organisational structure of CARDER, the 
DPro holds a strategic position between field staff and the subject matter specialists 
at head-office (see the Chart). She held the power to prevent them from visiting the 
RDVs in the field to provide them with the technical support they might request.11 
Despite the behaviour of the DPro and some other agents such as Asuka, the 
General Director (the former and the new one) could not easily disclose all these 
internal disputes to the Minister, since it might convey the impression that they did 
not have a grip on their staff. 
The split between the DPro and the DSEI (later the DG) on the relevance of the 
Community Development Programme (which to some extent reflected the conflict 
between their Minister protectors) would certainly have influenced the views of field 
agents about the programme. But not all the staff of the Production Department 
sided with the DPro. One of her staff, Dourodjè, was involved in the monitoring 
committee.12 As a former DPro, Dourodjè still had good relations with some staff 
of this department, whom he had initially recruited into the programme, despite the 
opposition of the DPro which she could not always express. Also, although he 
complained of the incompetence of the General Director (note that they were 
colleagues when Dourodjè was acting-DPro and the General Director was DSEI), he 
resolved to sustain the programme because he did not approve of the systematic 
opposition of the DPro. In fact, Dourodjè was enroled by the General Director one 
Sunday after a church service at the Protestant Church when the latter addressed 
him as a colleague, as they used to do when both were of the same rank. Dourodjè 
later told me: 
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'I was surprised that day because, contrary to his habit, the Director was not making 
gros dos (playing the big man). He was simple and respectful. You know, chameleons 
usually walk with a lot of grace. But when there is danger, they run faster than any other 
reptile. That's what happened. The Director expressed his sorrow about the programme 
and about the animosity of the DPro. We discussed the philosophy of the programme 
which by the way I adhere to. Then I decided to become active in it' 
But, by April 1991, Dourodje told me he had decided to withdraw since 'Cewe has 
turned the programme into his own affair', making it almost impossible to have 
any meaningful or constructive discussions with him or with his boss (meaning the 
General Director) about the programme.13 
An overview 
To sum up this brief discussion on the fate of the supposedly new policy orientation 
within CARDER, I would say that it operated as an activating ingredient for the 
various parties involved in this institution to express different attitudes, much of 
which could not be predicted, but which nevertheless became decisive for the 
direction taken by the operations. The programme was interpreted differently 
according to staff perspectives, to the coalitions and cleavages produced by different 
individual and collective interests, to the ethnic and geographical origin of staff, to 
patronage, but also to the individual and collective capacities of the actors to enrol 
others, no matter what their technical efficiency or hierarchical position. 
Given such a dynamic social life, the operational structure of the programme 
changed a lot, but almost never in conformity with the formal plan. The programme 
was placed at the DSEI instead of the DPro, with a supporting network through 
Dourodje from the DPro, which excluded Ekanye, the formal coordinator of the 
DSEI. Later it was placed under the General Director, marginalising Dourodje while 
attempting to attract funding agencies. The most interesting aspect of this social 
turmoil was its contribution to the reproduction of CARDER as an institution for 
rural development intervention, by activating the various people involved in its 
everyday realities. By giving opportunities for argument over administrative 
procedures and technical matters, with everyone having an opinion on how things 
could best be done, with the emergence of new stakes, scandals etc., the programme 
prevented the everyday life of CARDER from falling into lethargy, a variety that 
added spice to the everyday life of the people. Another aspect of this reproduction 
process was that despite the occasional jokes and frequent criticism of the pro-
gramme, no one contested the relevance of the 'participatory approach*. This was 
a common ground, though there were differences as to how this could best be 
achieved, which allowed for continuous transformation and appropriation of this 
neo-populist discourse within the CARDER, even at village level. 
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New policy orientation and negotiated development at village level: the example 
of Togoudo 
The activities of Asuka, the RDV in Togoudo (or more precisely, what local actors, 
including Asuka, turned the programme into and achieved within it), roughly fall 
into two categories: the construction of social infrastructure; and the constitution of 
peasant groups for applying for external funding and facilities. In each of these 
domains of action, Asuka always had to negotiate his entrance and his copyright 
over the achievements. Until his departure in 1993, the RDV had succeeded in 
placing himself at the centre of the village scene of development intervention as an 
authority in the sense that he received authorisation (see Callon and Latour 1981: 
278-279) by some peasant leaders and women to play this role. He did not obtain 
this authorisation from his appointment by CARDER as the village RDV. Though 
his introduction in the village was accompanied by official ceremony,14 as was the 
case for all the RDVs, he had to negotiate his position in village affairs and struggle 
to keep it. So, Asuka managed to inveigle himself into some of the public debates 
taking place in the village when he arrived. 
The RDV inveigles his way into village public life 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Togoudo was marked by PCD student agitation 
concerning the Mayor and the GV management, and it was in that context that a 
committee had to be appointed by the villagers (Comité de Développement Communau-
taire also called Comité de Suivi) to coordinate all development activities in the 
village. The setting up of this committee involved most members of the various 
committees and boards in public life in Togoudo,15 except the young PCD members 
who did not show much interest. 
It was not clear to people what the aims of CARDER were with this programme 
('maybe the state has remembered us, something might be coming'), although a 
few had doubts ('how can the state send money to villages while it does not have 
enough to pay the salaries of its own workers? A kneeling man cannot hold a child 
on his knees!'). Part of the discussions with the CARDER staff in charge of setting 
up the Comité de Suivi were about the problems people faced in the village ('what 
are the difficulties you face, what makes life difficult for you?'), to which villagers 
attending the meeting gave the well-known infrastructural shopping list, the school, 
health centre, houses, and the roads.16 From these discussions emerged the consen-
sus to let those who had no leading role in the existing important committees and 
boards, have the chance to sit on the comité de suivi. Nevertheless, the APE commit-
tee received different treatment because its members strongly argued that rebuiïding 
the school class recently destroyed by a tornado was the most important thing that 
should be done. Thus Agbegui was appointed President of the comité de suivi and 
Dawé as his deputy. Agbegui was a mason building the school house, while Dawé 
was the secretary of the APE. Asuka used to joke about these dispositions saying: 
'When I came, people thought I brought money to build their village for them. But, when 
it became clear that I did not have such money, things changed. Especially when I got 
interested in the GV and started talking about its reorganisation. Teeth began to rattle.' 
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This was his first experience in political bargaining in Togoudo, which was soon 
followed by the turmoil around the GV. At the end of 1989, the young PCD mem-
bers were already organised in small groups for controlling all the 15 cotton markets 
that existed in the village. Asuka took an active part in this, claiming expertise on 
peasant organisation.17 At the end of the marketing period, he had organised a 
training session for the board members, the marketing teams and all GV members 
who were interested in cooperative matters and in what are known as standard 
byelaws for GVs in Benin, where it is stated that there should be elections of board 
members every year. Seizing this excuse, the young PCD members, whose objective 
was to overthrow the former GV, requested immediate elections. A general assembly 
was called, and the RDV had to take an active part in deals between the Vieux sages, 
the young PCD members and some individual big producers over the allocation of 
positions on the GV board, which gave him the opportunity to support the other 
groups in the struggle to prevent exclusive control of the board by the young men. 
Among other things, this engagement of the RDV produced the legitimacy he got 
from interveriing in the book-keeping of the GV. 
Asuka's access to bookkeeping and to decisions on the allocation of GV 
resources, that is the cotton returns (see Table 13),1S was deterrnining for the infra-
structural part of his achievements. These GV resources are important in Togoudo. 
For the cotton marketing of 1990, it amounted to about 1,900,000 FCFA. The year 
after it was 2,317,348 FCFA.19 It was not clear how much the revenues (ristournes) 
were in 1987 and 1988, nor how the board spent them (see Table 13). The goal of the 
RDV was to devote a large part of this revenue to, what he called, development 
actions in the village, which he succeeded in doing. He suggested, through an 
internal ruling, approved by the General Assembly of early 1990, that 10 percent of 
the revenue should be paid to the general secretary to cover all the costs he might 
make during the year. His claims in previous years had constituted up to more than 
half the revenue. The other board members would be refunded for their costs. Since 
then, many villagers (especially the board members, the heads and secretaries of the 
cotton markets and some big producers) would spontaneously resort to the RDV, 
'our engineer', for organisational problems related to the GV and to cotton 
production and marketing, such as timely distribution of the various inputs, and the 
distribution of revenues that fell within the competence of the AVA, the C/PACA 
and the C/SS. They would also call on the RDV for problems concerning GV 
management that was the speciality of the C/PACA. On the other hand, when any 
external agent (government or non-government organisation), or agent of public 
aclministration (the Prefect of the Province for example) came to the village, the 
RDV would be called to the preparation meeting and to be among the officials. 
Contebuting to cleaning up the GV management, won him the confidence of many 
producers, who were aware of the practices of Baba and some CARDER agents, but 
did not know how to fight them. Producers worry particularly about their own 
revenue (over which they had Utile control, handing it over to Baba), and not that 
much over collective GV revenue (see Mongbo 1994). In a period when (from about 
mid-1980) the most important cash crop had been cotton, it was vital that they felt 
secure about what they earned. Therefore, the whole process gave the RDV official 
recognition in the village and at the same time some legitimacy to keep an eye on 
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Table 13 Ristournes and plus value received by the GV of Togoudo 
Years 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 
Ristournes 2 2 0 3 8 nk 552,643 2,317,348 1,132,595 2,329,236 5,043,182 
Plus-
values 
- - l,000,000nk 2,277,147 6 2 9 3 8 nk nk 
- :Null 
nk: Not yet known (for certain) 
Sources: CARDER and GV statistics. The dates given by them did not always coincide. 
It was in this way that Asuka got his job description. It was no longer the vague 
statement of 'make the village life more dynamic' prescribed in project documents. 
In fact, this was a position he had negotiated.20 In his struggle for self identity, 
Asuka benefited from the representation that most peasants have of cotton produc-
tion as state business, and extracted profit from the events of the end of 1989 and 
early 1990. As he used to say, this gave him access to some reliable resources to 
build the village. The process went together with actively building social networks: 
he recruited some of the people he considered to be key actors, who, in their turn, 
were engaged in a process of recruiting him for their projects, but with whom, 
according to him, relations were neither stable, nor very trustful. The first persons 
were Aloka and Chocotheo, mentioned in the previous chapter. Later, a few new 
members of the newly elected GV board, leaned on the RDV and his tough manage-
ment, to become famous in the village. As Dawe, the President said 'when I leave 
this position, people will point at things (infrastructures) and say those are the 
things Dawe achieved when he was here.' There was also the Mayor who used the 
RDV's presence to get some GV funds for the commune's administration. At the 
same time, there were others who considered such persons as the peons of the RDV. 
But Asuka also had to cope with or struggle against existing networks that appeared 
to have set agreement on the ways to use GV revenues that were not exactly legal. 
At the centre of this network was Baba, the secretary, with allies among village and 
district agents of CARDER. These networks proved to be efficient in influencing 
organisational aspects of GV life (e.g. programmes of visits, of meetings, accounting 
control) to the advantage of Baba. But the fight between these two groups (the 
RDV's and the secretary's) did not stop until the departure of the RDV in 1993, 
and, as we see in what follows, there was more on the building of infrastructure 
than on the making of cooperatives. 
the overall management of GV resources, which most cotton growers who took part 
in the bargaining considered to be one of the reasons he had been sent to Togoudo, 
since cotton remains a symbol of state intervention in rural areas. Moreover, apart 
from missions sponsored by the public administration, most villagers considered all 
the visits from intervenors hosted in their village since the programme started were 
due to the presence of the RDV. They say that it was thanks to him that their village 
became known in higher places and was visited by people from outside. 
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Building village infrastructures 
Around 1985/86, the GV board, with the advice of the C/FACA, decided to build 
a new storage unit for agricultural inputs (mainly for cotton - seeds, fertilizers, 
insecticides) with a shop where the GV would sell consumer goods. The former 
storage unit had become too small. By 1989, the GV had still not managed to finish 
the unit, which was one of the criticisms against the board. Asuka seized upon this 
problem and argued that the revenues obtained at the end 1989 should be devoted 
to solving the issue. The school and health centres were also brought into the 
discussion and it was agreed that they were urgent as well.21 Part of the revenue 
was allocated to the APE to finish the school house,22 while for the health centre 
it was decided that, as a provisional solution, the existing storehouse would be 
renovated for this purpose, once the new one was completed. In the meantime, 
financial assistance would be searched for from outside. But this did not work out 
and in any case there were some groups who did not want the village to wait for 
hypothetical goodwill from outside. They argued that the GV could meet the cost 
if villagers contributed. The person who pushed hard was the Mayor who lacked 
an office. He had suggested that the provisional health centre could be used as the 
Mayor's office once the village had its own centre for child delivery. But in 1991, 
the new storage was found too small again. It had been designed and started in 
1985, and nobody could have forecast that cotton production would double in 1988. 
So another storehouse was needed in addition to the new one, which the GV board 
set as a priority above the health centre. Strong arguments followed, and a 2,000f 
contribution for men and l,500f for women was fixed for the health centre. The 
amount collected was supplemented by an allocation from the ristournes and so a 
large child delivery house was built in 1992, together with a house for the midwife. 
In the same year, the new storage unit was started, and was finished by 1993. Then 
the Mayor was allocated the other unit as his office. 
As one might expect, none of this went as smoothly as appears here on paper. 
The GV board objected strongly to contributions from the ristournes for the building 
of village infrastructure and other public issues.23 They argued that the ristournes 
belonged only to cotton growers, not to the whole village, while the problem for 
which funding was sought did concern the whole village, including the civil 
servants working in the village, who were better served with school and health 
services than the cotton growers who had to pay for the infrastructure. 
The everyday relationship between Asuka, Baba the secretary, Dawe the president 
and other board members of the GV was often one of fierce arguments, especially 
when it came to revenue allocation, Dawe much less than Baba. The RDV would be 
careful to distribute inputs to growers on time (so as to sustain cotton production), 
and to distribute cotton revenue quickly to growers who would be waiting for it to 
pay their contribution to some infrastructure project. On the other hand, Baba would 
give various excuses (delays on the side of the growers such as the non-payment of 
certain fees)24 in order not to perform these operations on time. In some cases, 
these stratagems were meant to harm some particular market, demonstrate the 
inefficiency of market secretaries, or simply to delay the plans of the RDV. For 
example, in 1991 and 1992, it took two full weeks for the GV board to go to 
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Gbomina and get the revenues, and when they did, it was because there was the 
threat that the money would be sent back to SONAPRA. Jh 1991, they managed to 
organise the revenue allocation while the RDV was absent, bypassing the different 
rates decided upon in the règlement intérieur. The RDV suspected that they had 
accomplices at the CARDER district office. Therefore, he called an official meeting 
of GV board members, village and district CARDER staff, specifying the agenda (i.e. 
clarification of revenue allocation in Togoudo) and sent a copy of the invitation 
letter to the General Director of the CARDER apparently to conform to bureaucratic 
routines. But it is a common knowledge in CARDER that any agent who gives any 
kind of support or takes part in an illegal use of cotton revenues runs the risk of 
loosing his/her job. Sending a copy of the invitation letter to the General Director 
of CARDER with this specific agenda was a quiet way of setting a trap, that all 
CARDER staff know of. This meant that a copy of the minutes of the meeting would 
be sent to the Director and any body who was invited but missing could well be 
asked to explain why. Furthermore, if there was disagreement (indicated in the 
minutes), the Director would be obliged to open a file on the case in order to 'cover 
himself' because written documents now exist. If he does not do so and people 
from the village later write a letter to the Minister or the President (which people 
often do), he could be in trouble. Therefore, all those invited were present. The 
meeting lasted from 10:00am to 19:30pm! A complete review of the règlement 
intérieur was made and the extra payment obtained by each person calculated. The 
RDV and the C/SS delivered moralising speeches, elaborating on the shameful size 
of the matter and the bad reputation the board members and the village would 
have, 'especially with the presence of 'foreigners' of first degree (the VNU) and 
of second degree (us, the researchers)'. The persons concerned promised to pay 
back but never managed to until 1993. Now and then, some board members would 
openly contest the right of the RDV to stick his nose into the affairs of the GV, 
saying: 
'TTzis man, his position is Responsable de Dynamisation du Village, which means that 
he is here for the whole milage. Now he has turned himself into GV master. He should 
leave us in peace. There is the comité de suivi with which he is supposed to work, but he 
does not feel comfortable with that...' 
Now and then, the RDV would openly declare that the people he was fighting were 
bewitching him. He became seriously sick from August to September 1991 and even 
people in the village said he had been poisoned because he went too far in inveigl-
ing himself into other people's affairs. But he said they were wasting their time 
because he was protected by God. He was a christianiste céleste, reading his bible 
very frequently. Some people were against him and did not hide it. Very rarely did 
he drink or eat with peasants, pretending that it was his way of remaining impartial, 
though he did obtain a piece of land from Ekpemi for cultivation. 
Nevertheless, people were unable to break the bridge to him. His authority was 
further legitimated by the capacity he had shown in bringing district level CARDER 
staff, mcluding the RDR, to meetings of the GV. Most importantly, he knew the 
regulations and always argued on what he called a legal and democratic basis. They 
also needed him from time to time for explanations of the various 'innovative' 
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decisions taken in their names (the GV) by the CAPJDER head office, within the 
programme of restructuring agricultural services and the expected withdrawal of 
CARDER from some activities, such as for example direct negotiations between GVs 
and SONAPRA. Another top-down decision of the sort was the creation of the 
district union of cotton growers. Yet, the GV board members argued continuously 
that their revenues belonged to the cotton growers, and not to the whole village, 
and should not therefore be used as though they were for village development 
plans. They kept on searching for marginal, yet legal ways, to derail their revenues 
from these plans. One idea they had in November 1991 was that the GV would 
devote at least 50 percent of the revenues for credit to its members for farm labour 
costs, especially for cotton harvesting. The RDV did not reject the idea but suggested 
that it first be submitted to the general assembly in December 1991. The assembly 
rejected it strongly, saying that if ever such an operation was started, only the board 
members would benefit from it. 
The relations between GV board members and the RDV were not always conflic-
tive, especially when government and non-government development organisations 
were expected to intervene in the village. At these occasions the RDV would give 
the people concerned a kind of pep talk or initiation into how to talk and behave 
in order to win the hoped for help. These 'training' sessions are more frequently 
given to the women's and men's groups formed by the RDV, which constitutes 
the second aspect of his work in the village, discussed below. 
'I want to form a women's group: are you interested?' 
When Asuka arrived in Togoudo, the fashion25 of men's and women's groups 
had already been introduced into the village by Tolidji Gaston and the Animatrice, 
promoter of the district social service.26 It was part of a national project for the 
promotion of soya cultivation, supposedly to improve household diet. The approach 
consisted of calling a large meeting of women, demonstrating soya porridge prep-
aration and consumption, recording it on video and then asking women to form a 
group to cultivate soya, with help from the project (e.g. in farming equipment, 
individual and collective credit, vivres PAM, and the World Food Programme). The 
case of Tolidji, though not unique to Togoudo in that period, was more localised 
and more challenging than was the case of Asuka when he arrived. 
Tolidji Gaston, the CAE] and the clash with Asuka 
In 1987, Tolidji Gaston, a young artist-painter from Togoudo (born in 1959) who had 
tried in different ways but failed to settle in the Ivory Coast and in Cotonou to 
exercise his profession arrived in the area. He had been to Cuba for training on a 
government fellowship and had come back to his village to start a peasant youth 
cooperative, not to settle as a member (he never was), but as Chef de projet he said, 
in charge of the external relations for the cooperative. In short, a broker. He named 
the group CAEJ, Cooperative d'Action Economique des Jeunes.27 Over 40 young men 
were registered for membership but, despite the assistance of local authorities, the 
group was refused access to three different locations visible from busy roads so that 
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people could see what young men were capable of. With these successive failures, 
by 1988, the group had almost vanished.28 Then, in order 'to rescue the project', 
three families, including Gaston's family, agreed to offer land, most members being 
from those families. By end of 1990, about two years after the application and with 
the help of Nancy, a Peace Corps volunteer whom Gaston had met by chance in 
Dassa in 1988, the group obtained 400,000f animal traction and equipment. The 
members (three families) were not interested in working together and preferred that 
the money be shared out, but the AVA, Nancy and Gaston insisted on the primary 
objective and so the animals and equipment were bought. But they were never in 
fact used.29 That was where Asuka came in. In a meeting with Nancy, Gaston, the 
AVA and what was left of the CAEJ board, he suggested that the animals and 
equipment should be hired out, which Gaston took as an attempt to kill off his 
project. Although both men interacted in their daily life in the village, they never 
addressed each other about the issue.30 They even became intensively close when 
Gaston's wife was sick and had to be transported to the hospital in Gbomina. 
Asuka helped him over some weeks, carrying him on his motor bike, yet each had 
sworn not be the first to start the discussion on the CAEJ matter. Gaston commented 
to me that Asuka should learn to be modest and suggested I ask him how things 
had started and what went wrong, and that Asuka might even learn from it. On his 
side, when I approached Asuka on the issue, he declared: 
'Forget about these dreaming politicians. Not just anybody can start a cooperative! It 
is a technical matter, not a political one. I am not a politician, but a technician, and if 
he stays around for some time, perhaps he would learn something about launching and 
managing a cooperative...' 
I tried and failed to bring these two men together to discuss the problem. Each of 
them warned me never to try again. Asuka said me e tunhun gan e we'non sa gan ha 
- 'You sell metals (gold) to him who knows its value', while Gaston said, T know 
well now that people here are individualistic. I just wait and see how far Asuka will 
go with the cooperatives he is starting'. 
Though it appeared as a failure, the experience of the CAEJ awakened the interest 
of a few peasants with large farms to plough using animal traction. Inuring the 
whole revolutionary period when cooperatives were strongly promoted, no such 
concrete assets were ever given. Asuka considered the whole issue a challenge. 
Ekpemi was one peasant whose desire for animal traction equalled Asuka's desire 
to meet the challenge. 
Ekpemi, Tinkpo and their GRVC familial 
Ekpemi was in his forties, married with three wives, eight children and heading a 
household of 16 persons, including his father, mother and two younger brothers. His 
father owned 25 hectares of land which he ploughed together with the household 
of his brother. They had a cotton market in the area with a former demonstration 
plot of 40x50 m2. He was the head of the market board and was involved in the GV 
discussions of early 1990. He had tried to make private contacts with the RDV and 
was favoured because his family originated from the same village ward as Dossou, 
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the landlord of the RDV. Ekpemi and Dossou lived in the same compound and 
therefore, visiting Dossou, Ekpemi became more acquainted with the RDV. Further-
more, Adjike, the wife of Dossou, was the treasurer of the soya group and Ekpemi 
had listened to a few discussions between Adjike and the RDV. One day he told the 
RDV that he wanted to create a family cooperative, un GRVC familial. 'But that is 
not possible!' said the RDV. You need at least seven adult persons (president, 
secretary, treasurer, two organisers and two account checkers) and a common farm. 
Then Ekpemi replied 'if that is so, then with my wives, children, brothers and 
father and mother I could form even two GRVC familialY'. Asuka told him that it 
would not be accepted that he find some other non-family members, to which 
Ekpemi replied: 
'But I don't see the problem you are mentioning. When people come to visit the GRVC, 
they will see the members (adult persons, men and women), they will see a good collective 
farm. Then what else? Would they ask about the identity cards of the members?. If 
necessary, every body will use his mother's family name.' 
Finally, the RDV visited his farm, and agreed on the idea. Further contacts were 
made with the AVA, the C/PACA and the C/SS whom the RDV had involved in 
the case. Ekpemi was told that the area must be well divided with large paths every 
100 metres (every hectare) so that a car could pass, and that all the fields should be 
sown in the same period. An appointment was made for early May 1990, about one 
month after the sowing, for the official launching of the cooperative, with its board 
and everything. Ekpemi explained to his relatives that he was in discussions with 
the Engineer and that probably he would find some vivres PAM for the family, and 
perhaps animal traction providing some of them cultivated part of the farms around 
the demonstration plot at the same time and sowed the same crop. The other 
persons involved did not see any harm in doing so as long as these remained 
individual farms. 
'But then every body should properly look after his farm so that if the akowes visit it at 
any time, they will always see it in good shape. It is just like we used to do on the cotton 
fields when we were young' he added. 
The AVA helped Ekpemi to divide the area very well and, finally, eight hectares of 
cowpeas and maize cultivated. A showboard was put at the place announcing GRVC 
Kodji. On the day of the appointment, Ekpemi prepared a meal (pounded yam with 
chicken sauce and cakpalo). The AVA, the C/PACA, the C/SS and the RDV came. 
The GRVC Kodji members were there (13 people: ten men and three women aged 
from 20-45 years; see Figure 17 for the kinship relations between them). Ekpemi was 
the president, two others were secretary and treasurer, and the rest were simple 
members. They were told that the collective farm was perfect. Now they should 
open a bank account at the agricultural bank in Gbomina. They were also accorded 
a long explanation, in a mixture of Fon and French, of the standard bylaws for 
cooperatives, which Ekpemi kept on repeating. Then it was declared that their 
GRVC was launched and recognised by CARDER. And, then, with the departure of 
the visitors, the so-called GRVC members continued with their affairs as before. 
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Figure 17 Kinship relations between the members of GRVC Kodji 
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Tinkpo, the friend of Ekpemi, whom we know from Chapter 8, soon decided to do 
the same and prepared himself for the following year. When we met him, he was 
ready and knew the conditions: 
'I know, it is easy: you have to be at least 15 persons, have a PV (Parcelle de Vul-
garisation) i.e. a demonstration plot of at least five hectares with wide and straight alleys 
after each hectare to allow the passing of cars. One can grow any crop, not necessarily 
cotton. The group should have an account of at least 12,000fat the agricultural bank and 
yield one-and-a-half to two tons cotton per ha. None of these conditions are difficult for 
us on my farm.' 
In fact, Tinkpo had just compiled a list of different things from different extension 
periods: the 15 persons, the PV and the cotton yield relating to the extension groups 
of the mid-seventies to eighties, and the other conditions which really related to his 
so-called GRVC. The RDV, together with the AVA, the C/SS and the RDR, whom 
the RDV enroled on the matter, started formalities for both of the GRVCs to acquire 
vivres PAM and animal traction. This worked for Ekpemi in 1991 (he received his 
animals and equipment later in 1992), but Asuka did not succeed in solving 
Tinkpo's case before he left the area in 1993. 
The women groups 
Apart from the CAEJ, another group that existed in Togoudo before the arrival of 
the RDV was the soya women's group formed by the animatrice, based in Gbomina, 
as part of the campaign promoting soya to improve household diets. When the RDV 
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took up residence, the group had already split into three: one part had simply 
dropped out, saying that they did not have time to always sit at meetings while 
none of the things promised when they started had ever arrived (vivres PAM, 
farming implements, individual and collective credit). Alele was one of the early 
drop-outs. She lived in the neighbourhood of the president and the treasurer. Her 
husband was in Nigeria and used to return home in the dry seasons. She said she 
had been interested because, in the annoimcement of the meeting, it was said that 
all the women who had problems with food should come and there would be a 
solution for them. Many women arrived, but when everything started, she noticed 
that it was not a matter simply for those who had food problems, but was rather for 
the Medjome. T could not be in such a group. It was higher than me' she said. 
Sabine (see Chapter 8), the secretary, and a few other women living in the same 
ward, quite distant from the ward of the president and treasurer, also complained 
that the latter two wanted to force their ideas and will on the group and did not 
want to listen to others. She added: 'They have big eyes and when ever they open 
their mouths, only big things come out'.31 In fact, Sabine was in her thirties while 
both the president and the treasurer were over fifty and belonged more to the 
category people call 'belly full'. In the end, the two groups collapsed. There was 
even conflict between the president and treasurer, the latter accusing the former of 
sorcery.32 
The RDV was first told a version of this story by Adjike, the treasurer, a few 
weeks after he settled. After discussions, they agreed that Adjike would invite the 
other women for a meeting. But Adjike proceeded to recruit new women on the 
basis of a multipUcity of criteria: kinship, neighbourhood, behaviour, style of 
working, childhood friendship and so on, each of which criteria being applied quite 
specifically from one person to the other (see Koning and Speets 1991 for similar 
cases in Dani). Women like Alele were excluded, though she was Adjike's neigh-
bour. Adjike said it was because 'the woman doesn't work hard. And besides, her 
husband is absent and is a man who likes problems. He would say that I had driven 
his wife into bad things'. It was no longer the soya sub-group of the ward. Of the 
13 members who remained from the 20 she recruited, only two were members of 
the original soya group. At the meeting, as the women recalled it, the RDV declared, 
assuming they were the soya group, 
' I have heard about your misadventures with the group you started on soya. Now, I 
want to create a women's group. Are you interested! OK. If you are interested, you 
should know that making a group is a matter of organisation. You will have to arrange 
every little thing.33 But to start, what activity would you like to do in the group?' 
One of the women told Asuka to give them some suggestions, but he refused. 'No. 
You have to decide for yourself what is the most convenient to you'. Later, from 
the way some women commented, it was obvious they were expecting something 
different: 
'we thought it was because he had words in his mouth to tell us that he called us. He 
thought we would group, but did not think around what. At least the mtimMbs knew 
what we were going to group on - soya...'. Some others added 'anyway we accepted 
228 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
because he said good things would come from it for us. And we see from the surrounding 
milages all the things women get from grouping. Whoever saw good things and refused?' 
Finally, the group started with soya and cassava but in 1991 sowed cowpeas too. 
Another issue Asuka discussed with them that day was the board. The treasurer 
remembered very well how it happened. She said: 
"That day, I did not expect the RDV to ask for a president. Suddenly he said: 'who are 
the people you think would be the chiefs in your group? Choose them'. I did not want 
to be President. I am too nervous for that. I am quick to abuse people. The woman I 
thought could play this role wasn't in the village. She'd gone to her native village for 
a ceremony. The President of the soya group was a sorcerer so I didn't want her in my 
group. Then I told the RDV: 'We don't know each other well yet. We have to think on 
it for a few days and we'll let you know'. The others couldn't argue with me because 
I was the one who had called them. They did not know anything about the issue in the 
first place. Later I explained it to them. They all agreed and said that they would leave 
everything to me, provided I managed to bring good things for them in the group.' 
The woman chosen by Adjike for President was another neighbour, with whom she 
(together with her husband) had spent more than five years in Ghana working on 
cassava processing. The idea of Adjike was to process cassava with the group. There 
were women in her home village who had been donated a processing machine so 
that it was even less tiring. Both women were much involved in farm activities and 
raising animals. They were over fifty and thought processing cassava and staying 
at home (i.e. no longer going out to the farm) would not be a bad thing for them at 
their age. But other members were in their twenties and thirties. They were inter-
ested in petty trade and cooking relish. They hoped for the credit that people had 
spoken of, and wished to start their businesses. 
Asuka later repeated the same procedure with Sabine's group and presented it 
as the récupération et restructuration des groupements soya. For Sabine, the chief interest 
was stabilising her petty trade. For some of the 24 other members of her group, 
agriculture was their main activity and they wanted insecticides on credit for their 
cowpea farms and to store maize. Very soon, the group of Adjike obtained vivres 
PAM (500 kg of rice, some bottles of vegetable oil and canned fish).34 Both groups 
had asked for credit for a mill, which they would manage. The condition posed by 
the FATB was that they attended a literacy course on how to manage the mill 
themselves. The VNU took care of the literacy programme, with the assistance of 
Baba, the GV secretary. At the end of 1992, Sabine's group obtained the null and 
had to prepare for the mill workshop themselves, which they did. The group of 
Adjike was promised the cassava processing machine, which they did not get until 
1993 when the RDV left. 
Most women's groups in Togoudo started in the way described above, by the 
wish of someone from outside, or from inside the village, to form a group.35 Until 
1993, there was not a single group (in the sense of Groupement Féminin) formed on 
the initiative of a woman.36 This does not mean that women in this area lacked or-
ganisational potential. Apart from the everyday organisation of their own income 
generating activities, there were many rotating credit organisations, initiated and 
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managed by women, that involved both men and women. There were also labour 
exchange groups, music groups and social groups for mutual assistance, with 
defined regulations - one example of which I will give later in this chapter. The 
point is that the women concerned were not yet accustomed to these so-called 
Groupements Féminins. The situation would probably change rapidly, as it had in 
other areas. But here, the women were still learning. Indeed, another important side 
of the implementation of the Community Development Programme in Togoudo (as 
in other villages) was to initiate those villagers closely involved into the various 
rituals of meeting with external agencies, and the organisation of speeches and 
rhetoric on development needs. 
Class-room situations for men and women on group matters 
The women looked on it as attending school, learning a new thing. The habit, 
largely taken for granted by the bureaucrats, of starting a meeting with a stated 
agenda, introducing all participants, appointing officials, are all new settings and 
rituals for those who attend, together with other factors such as social control, which 
they must learn if they are not going to have their discursive capacities reduced in 
these encounters, thus allowing the decision ground to be displaced from them and 
shifted elsewhere. Hereafter is a piece of the conversation between the RDV and 
some members of Adjike's group, a few days after the group received the visit of 
a UNDP mission that suggested they start literacy braining and try to form a union 
of women's groups in Togoudo. To start, the RDV asked what they had retained 
from the meeting: 
1st woman: I think they spoke of literacy in Idaca. 
2nd woman: They spoke of literacy, and also recommended that we work on a 
union so that we can succeed. 
The RDV: From these, what do you think are the activities to start now? 
3rd woman: What I see: as the RDV is here, he is the one to show us the way, to 
guide us, as we are just starting. 
The RDV: Consequently, when I leave, the group would collapse. Each of you 
know how to manage your own economic activities to make them 
work. You are the ones to choose what you like and I will help you 
in the organisation. 
3rd woman: When you put a child to school for the first time, you have to guide 
him until the moment he is able to take care of himself. 
The RDV: If that is what you meant, then I understand, I agree. 
These types of classes ended up with decisions to carry out activities that met the 
requirements of potential funding agencies. Others were meant to prepare for the 
actual visit, whereby Asuka would try to think out all the possible questions the 
visitors might ask (and possible answers) with the people concerned. Sometimes, 
such meetings also concerned the GV. In most cases, a review of village needs was 
made (mostly on infrastructure, but selected according to what Asuka knew of the 
field of interest of the corning mission). A way of presenting these needs was 
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devised and good spokesmen were selected for introducing them, with an indication 
of the best moment for doing so. The RDV would add: 
'When you state the problem, you should then tell them all the things we have already 
done about it before you move on to asking for their support to complete it. You must 
show that we are trying to solve our problems by ourselves.' 
In most meetings, things did not work out as prepared: some subject was introduced 
too early, or by someone who was not appointed to do so, or without using the 
appropriate participatory-exWbiting formulation. Then spontaneously, someone 
would point out the mistake, in the Idaca language. A very brief conversation would 
follow to recall what was agreed on and then the meeting would continue, either 
in French or in Fon. In some other cases, the RDV would forget to review,mix with 
the group, things he thought were already known, for example, the various posi-
tions on the board. 
In her group, Adjike did not at first think of the necessity to have someone who was 
literate. When the need was noticed, they agreed to recruit ChocotMo, who was the 
secretary of the CAE], as a member and secretary of their group. When they started cash 
contributions, the treasurer collected the WOf weekly then went to the secretary to have 
them recorded. A few weeks later, she found the procedure inadequate and asked the 
members to hand their contributions directly to the secretary who gave it back to her 
every week or so. One day, this group received the visit of a mission who asked about the 
board members. Most people spontaneously presented Chocotheo as the pencil (secretary) 
and the box (treasurer), which upset Adjike very much. 
One other dimension of these presentation exercises concerned group activities. In 
most cases, commitment to the group's official activities were rninimum. Adjike's 
group worked on three quarters of a hectare, with the ploughing and the weeding 
done entirely by paid labour, while none of them worked privately on less than one 
hectare of land. The president and the treasurer continued to press for their idea of 
cassava processing. They were still looking for land for a group cassava farm not 
far from the village. The RDV told them that it was necessary to start the cassava 
field before he applied for a machine to FAIB. But the women said 'what would 
happen if after 10 months your machine is not there. We don't want to do it with 
local equipment it is too hard*. The RDV applied for the machine. When the FAIB 
mission arrived, he warned them to say that they had already started a two-hectare 
cassava plot. 'If necessary, you can show her the demonstration plot of the cassava 
project. But if every thing goes well, then right next week, you should really start 
your own cassava farm'. Yes they said. That visit was almost successful but there 
was a mixture of expectations presented, revealing the differing interests of the two 
subgroups in the group: for credit and for the processing machine. Mme. Landry, 
the lady of the mission, could not understand: 
• What do you want the credit for? 
• For trade: we will buy and sell things. We will also cook food for sale. 
• Do you want to process cassava or do you want to trade? 
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• When we process cassava, it would also be for sale. We can start selling before 
our own cassava is ready to be processed. Then we would already know how to 
sell. 
• People should not put two fingers in the nose at once. Do you want to process 
cassava or do you want to trade? 
The treasurer, shouting with anger over the ladies who had answered until then, 
said 
• We have always spoken of cassava processing and that's why we have already 
a cassava field. I don't know what they are talking about now. When we process 
our cassava, we can start the trade with our own money. 
By 1993, the machine was not yet there. In the meantime activities have continued, 
the president and the treasurer enjoying more and more their status and the image 
of group they represented, while the others liked the social security they felt and the 
prospect of good things to come: 'we too are someone in the village. People come 
to visit us and our names are over there in high places. One day something will 
come'. The idea of credit was not left out and was worked on with their own 
resources within the group. 
The group of Sabine was more lucky. After a few months of literacy training they 
obtained FAIB credit for a grain mill. But on the arrival of the mill, Sabine quit the 
village. Her love affair with the head master of the Gbomina school had gone far 
and she was following him to his new appointment in the south. I discussed this 
with her when she had already taken her decision: 
• Is it true that you intend to leave after all the work you did in this group? 
• Yes I will go and I think it is better. 
• But here you have the chance with this mill to organise the credit for your affairs! 
• Yes but I am a woman. And people in this village don't respect you when 
you're young like me and you don't have a husband 
• So what would you do over there, household work? 
• When we get there, I will see. I can sew. The place is bigger than Gbomina, there 
would be more chance to have clients. Also, it is a privilege to do household 
work for a husband. Or at least to have the possibility to say yes or no to house-
hold work for a husband. Until now, I did not have that. When we are in the 
group and some women are joking about their husbands, they sometimes say: T 
don't want to cook for him today...' I prefer their situation to mine... I would 
like to say that now and then too. 
The Kluiklui and the Toba groups: two multifunctional groups 
As I indicated earlier, there are many local experiences of group formation, where 
the membership patterns and management are completely different from that 
forcefully suggested by intervenors. Let me then briefly examine two groups - one 
female group organized around food processing and another mixed group focusing 
on music - that are quite different in nature and differently linked to the Com-
munity Development Programme. 
232 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
The Kluiklui group 
This is the group to which Pelagie belonged and that processed groundnuts into 
kluiklui. In fact, it was the private enterprise of Nanan, the president, where mem-
bers came to learn how to process kluiklui, working as free labour for Nanan. Those 
who showed good skills but did not have the means to acquire the equipment and 
groundnuts to start up on their own, could always receive capital from Nanan and 
use her equipment. But she knew perfectly how much one could make out of the 
processing and so she requested 50 percent of the profit. In this same group, five 
women were members of a labour exchange group specifically for cultivating 
groundnuts. This allowed them to sell their own groundnuts at market price to the 
processing unit, which in fact increased their share of the profit. They had started 
a rotating credit organisation aimed at equipping each of them with the necessary 
tools. Two of them had already obtained the tools but the five preferred to continue 
working for Nanan because, first, they said marketing was easier - wholesalers 
knew Nanan and collected all the produce at once. They rarely needed to transport 
things to Gbomina. Second, they would have had too much trouble with their 
husbands and children if they had established their work at home, because they 
would then have lacked time enough to devote to their work. 
This group was simply enroled by the RDV and presented on each occasion - just 
as those previously mentioned, and despite the various and complex logics on 
which they operated - as cooperatives whose members worked together and who 
shared the profit on an equal basis, as prescribed by cooperative regulations. Asuka, 
however, did not show much interest in the music group, because, according to him, 
it was involved in practices (i.e. playing music at funerals performed in pagan ways, 
drinking alcohol and so on) which his religious beliefs forbade him to encourage 
and, in any case, the group was not organized strictly for productive activities. Let 
me briefly present this second group. 
The Toba group 
The group was composed 25 members but started in 1986 with 10 members who 
contributed a total of 13,500f, complemented by 9,500f from wage labour on a cotton 
farm, to buy the musical instruments. In 1988, four members were sent on a three 
week training course in singing and drum beating in Savalou at a total cost of 
10,000f allocated to them by the group. The group performed on various occasions 
(e.g. funerals, marriage celebraions, and official visits to the village) for cash, the 
amount paid by the client and negotiated each time according to means and status. 
Since then, they have charged between l,000-7,500f, the client also giving two litres 
of sodabi, five packets of cigarettes and providing a hot meal after the performance. 
When any group member is directly concerned in such an event, she/he is given 
assistance by the others. 
Membership application follows the criteria as indicated above in the case of 
Adjike. Once accepted, the person is expected to give 2,500f, two packets of ciga-
rettes and two litres of sodabi. As far as the organisation of management was con-
cerned, there was the Agba egbe who acted as president, Abaniowo who was his 
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adviser, and the treasurer, next to whom were the main singer and the drummers. 
Then, almost outside the group were the Baba zgbe (a kind of male referee), and Iya 
zgbe. (the female referee), both charged with settling disputes and conflicts within 
the group and between the group and outsiders: 'These people are particularly 
helpful when we perform on credit for someone, for example, at a funeral, and who 
is delaying to paying us'. 
Exarriining the life histories of members of the group, one finds that among the 
10 founders, there were two labour exchange groups, who came together in 1985 to 
start a rotating credit organisation. And since 1988, the membership has split into 
four labour exchange groups. Some new members were already in such a group and 
others managed to join a group of this kind after becoming members of the Toba 
group. As they wanted to keep the size of labour exchange groups manageable, and 
taking into account the distances between the farms and the growing membership, 
so they split into new labour groups, with the rotating credit organisation - the most 
visible activity of the group - constituting the glue that held together most of the 
members. 
Every January, they organise a feast. Up to 1989 a goat was slaughtered, and after 
that the group has slaughtered a cow, part of which is cooked for a common meal, 
the rest being shared among the members, and given as gifts to certain persons 
outside the group. At the feast of 1992, various groups were shown operating 
together, thus reflecting the different subgroups based on kinship, neighbourhood, 
and occupational criteria, as well as marking out points of conflict over various 
arguments, and affairs with women. These different recruitment criteria indicated 
specific but changing networks that were instrumental at the time in relation to the 
particular achievements of their members. In addition to the common meal, some 
of these groups, which had been reconstituted many times, continued to gather at 
particular cakpalo or home parties days after the main feast. 
To conclude this section, I should mention that not all RDVs have the same 
attitude as Asuka to these music groups. In Wedeme, another village of the pro-
gramme, the Toba group was used by the RDV as an entrée for contact with the 
young men, with whom he later started group-based fish raising activities. 
Bridging external and local logic on development 
Beyond the simple process of learning about development interface rituals and 
rhetoric, both men and women involved in these groups are continuously doing 
their best to bridge different and changing logics. On the surface of this bridging 
exercise, the modes of group formation, patterns of membership and management 
of the groups are of a completely different nature ranging from various so-called 
'formal' to the 'informal' types. Nevertheless, despite the simplistic approaches 
of Gaston, the animatrice, and also Asuka to group formation, and although the 
groups studied under the Community Development Programme were quite recent 
(i.e. existing for two years maximum), careful social recruitment was clearly visible, 
as illustrated by the composition of the soya group. It was not at all as Asuka 
seemed to think. There was an explicit attempt by the treasurer and the secretary, 
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each pushing their own interests, to create groups that suited their options better. 
Yet when we consider the ways in which the membership issue was treated by 
Asuka and other CARDER staff (in the case of men's groups) and most important-
ly, the ways in which the group's productive activities are presented to potential 
funding agencies, one suspects that the RDV is really not unaware of the logic of 
these (in this case women's) groups. 
Nevertheless, another more complex, phenomenon, that probably escaped the 
attention of the RDV, is the appearance of subgroups within the large group. This 
was particularly evident in the Toba group, but also transparent from the women's 
groups. The first division within the primary soya group highlights differences in 
spatial residence, but mostly in economic status and self-achievement projects. The 
group of Sabine does not enjoy great homogeneity in terms of occupation and 
expectations of the members. Indeed Sabine herself declared that she was not 
interested in farming activities, but in credit to stabilise her petty trade and food 
processing. This changed later for other priorities, which she became more aware 
of as she interacted with the other members of her group. The case of Nanan's 
group shows this process more clearly, namely, the existence of subgroups gener-
ated through the interweaving of individual projects in the context of a specific 
development project (see Villarreal 1994: 93-140 for a careful documentation of 
similar processes in a Mexican case). In Dani, the women's group that managed to 
obtain a refrigerator and start a savings and credit system as well as home garden-
ing eventually split up. To external observers, they presented themselves as a 
unified organisation with particular members appointed to be responsible for each 
of the different activities. In fact these activities were almost always private interests 
of the particular sub-groups, with individually managed revenue, while the cash 
collected individually from their savings was presented as group revenue from all 
the activities. 
Beyond the encounter: credit for labour 
The RDV was busy everyday in the village with the groups, especially the women 
groups, with the contribution boxes, literacy efforts and eventually the small 
common plots. Outside the village, he continually sought for vivres PAM for them, 
for animal traction and the cassava processing machine (though less actively for the 
latter). In the meantime, a phenomenon that quickly spread through all the groups 
was the allocation of credit for members for their small plots that were planted 
twice a year, the second time with cotton. Credit of between five and 10,000f was 
allocated to members primarily for food processing, petty trade, animal husbandry 
or agricultural labour. Interest on the loans varied from between 10 to 20 percent. 
The effect that this produced on the group of Adjike was that the two main leaders 
were able to hold their people together because each of the 13 members stayed in 
the group with the hope that such credit would be increased each year. In this way, 
the leaders secured the opportunity of continuing their public relations operation 
aimed at acquiring the cassava processing machine. 
At the level of the GV too - though the General Assembly in December 1991 
rejected the idea - credit allocation was launched in 1992 and has been distributed 
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Conclusion 
More closely than previous ones, this chapter has looked at the actual processing of 
the policy orientation within the CARDER that concerned the Community Develop-
ment Programme, and its implementation in Togoudo. Though the settings consti-
tuted sigruficantly different epistemic communities, similar processes occurred, of 
which I wish to underline too in the concluding discussion. 
First, although it occasioned within the CARDER and in the village some hot 
debates on values, images and interests, it ended up passing away as no more than 
a moderately significant episode in the everyday life of the people. Life goes on: For 
Ekanye in the CARDER, and Alele, Dourodje and Sabine in the village, and finally 
Dawe in the village and Cewe in CARDER, their different degrees of involvement 
making them perceive the programme very differently in terms of what they could 
personally achieve from it for their life projects. Furthermore, in none of these cases 
to 41 growers (out of the 600 registered members) from 13 of the 23 markets. The 
amount received by these growers ranged from between 10/J00f and 40,000f at 25 
percent interest per year, the total amount distributed being 595,000f. No possibility 
existed to escape payment. The debt was deducted directly from their cotton 
revenues for the year. The GV board concluded that the operation was a success and 
for 1993 they raised the credit account to 750,000f. This was started immediately 
after the RDV left the village. Another interesting development of the GV and also 
out of the reach of the RDV, the AVA and the VNU, was that some of the board 
members who were defeated in the 1990 elections fell back on their cotton markets 
where they were already the leading figures. They started demanding further 
autonomy for each market. Until 1990, each market had a team of local supervisors 
appointed by the GV, who were fed by the market and received a per diem from 
the market fees paid by SONAPRA. Some market leaders started arguing that this 
was no longer necessary, that every market was mature enough to supervise itself 
and keep the per diem in its own 'box'. This was accepted in 1992. The credit 
operation also extended to the markets. Formerly, market members did not pay 
much attention to the common box of the demonstration plot that was held by the 
market leader. From the end of 1990, a few markets started setting up their own 
form of general assembly for credit allocation for cotton harvesting. And, by 1992, 
the situation became general, and had certainly stimulated the GV board in its 
decision to launch the credit operation despite the opposition manifested by the 
majority of growers present at the 1991 general assembly. As Agbegui told me in 
1992: 
'That comité de suivi was nothing. There was nothing to say, nothing to do. My deputy 
who was with me, immediately when elected as president of the GV, took the project with 
him to the GV and you always see them together (the RDV and him). He thought there 
was something in it. He was disappointed. I got in the GV too because I am a market 
leader and supervisor. But with that Asuka, it was too hard to get anything with him. 
Nothing is happening there really. Things now happen at the level of the market. Every-
body manages his market and gives credit to his people, and they are happy with me.' 
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was the appraisal of the instrumental value of the programme made in isolation 
from the other actors involved, or from the arenas and grounds of their actions. The 
very fact of appraising whether the programme could have a place in one's life 
trajectory brings one to those social interfaces where values and meanings are 
negotiated, and interests struggled for. What is also significant here is that through 
the appraisal, negotiations and struggles related to the Community Development 
Programme, the latter seemed to lose its very substance and was dismembered into 
pieces that become meaningful within and beyond the actual context of the pro-
gramme: fights (and coalitions) over allowances, bureaucratic procedures, future 
perspectives, allocation of revenues, resource management, definition of group 
identities etc. When looked at closely, this constitutes not just a deconstruction of 
a programme, but at the same time an active and inventive creation of social, 
political and economic opportunities and interactions in various walks of life, the 
definition of roles in the heat of social action, à la faveur of a given programme that 
broadly defines the ground of interaction. It is doubtful whether social actors often 
use prescribed definitions of roles as Baba did in relation to the RDV ('this man's 
position is RDV, which means for the whole village'), or concerning situations or 
events other than those closely related to the specific piece one is dealing with at the 
moment. In short, the small pieces of life's realities into which the dismembered 
pieces of the programme are incorporated become more meaningful to the actors 
than the actual programme itself, thereby making of the latter, as I indicated at the 
beginning of the text, an episode, since forgotten. 
And that is where the second aspect of the processes at work comes in. By 
bringing actors together at socially-defined interfaces, the appraisal, negotiation and 
struggles activated by the programme, once digested (and reduced into manageable 
pieces), span or go far beyond the grounds and arenas projected by programme 
designers, or as experienced by its implementers or by the people involved in it. 
Within CARDER, discussions on procedures, allowances and intervention 
approaches contributed to the definition and reproduction of spheres of social 
interaction beyond the single Community Development Programme, such as the 
operations of credit for labour engaged by different groups in the village. Conscious 
distinctions might even be attempted, as shown by Agbegui, who tries to separate 
the credit allocation actions in his market from the general discussions under way 
in the GV and the comité de suivi. In these ways, a programme like the Community 
Development Programme contributes to the reproduction of the field of rural 
development, beyond the perceptions that each individual category of actor has of 
this field, thus making it possible for actors - even though their values and preoc-
cupations of the moment might speak a different language and fight for contra-
dictory interests - to still consider themselves as sharing the same battle or coalition 
ground of social interaction. 
Finally, one readily notes that, as an instrument designed for intended (planned) 
social change in the field of rural development, the actual development plan covered 
only a very limited segment of the realities of the field and those of the actors. 
Neither the concerns and worries of CARDER agents, nor the everyday preoccupa-
tions of the villagers found explicit place in the actual formulation and operation of 
the development plan. Intervention in the villages, supposedly aimed at making 
The Community Development Programme at the crossroads 237 
village life more dynamic, ended up being overturned by the dynamism of village 
life itself. In my view, therefore, the question is not how to bridge these gaps to 
make policy more relevant to peasants' needs. This does not make much sense. As 
I have shown in this and earlier chapters, individual and collective lives within 
contrasting epistemological communities (i.e. among bureaucrats, villagers, etc.) as 
well as the social processes at the critical social interfaces, cannot be predicted nor 
modelled. Furthermore, the logic of planned development is not just (or only) for 
the well-being of the people it addresses, but lies beyond the everyday interests of 
such people. The logic of the field is precisely the room it leaves to different stake-
holders - Ministers, staff as well as peasants - to identify their stakes, and agree or 
fight for them in grounds and arenas they find relevant. The field cannot exist 
otherwise. This leads us to understanding why it is that some social scientists -
acting also as social actors in the field of rural development - argue for gap bridging 
while others struggle for a better understanding of these gaps in the policy making 
and practice of rural development. These processes are indicative of their own entry 
points and interests in the field of rural development, drawn from the struggle with 
other actors in the different grounds of the development field. In the pursuit of 
these, social scientists likewise may (incidentally) generate assets for the self-achieve-
ment projects of others, thus producing patterns for structural change, provided, of 
course, that such inventiveness in the various grounds and arenas of the field are 
not too constrained by wider structural, political and economic factors. 
Notes 
1 By 'frames of meaning' I mean the historically, socially and politically constituted but ever changing 
individual and collective dispositions through which knowledge is constructed, exchanged and trans-
formed. 
2 Two sources of information were available to me for an investigation into how the programme started 
and how it was experienced by CARDER staff in its first months and year. These were the memories of 
the actors involved and the various documents that give an account of these preliminary activities. I am 
aware of the limitations of written reports as far as their reliability as a source of investigation is 
concerned, because they are transcriptions of the ideal situation which the writer wants to project and 
the image he wants to produce of himself and his actions. In this particular situation, these documents 
are part of the struggles within the CARDER and its relation with the Ministry around this programme. 
But that is exactly what makes the present documents interesting because even as they stand, they already 
show the gaps that exist (which the staff would probably wish to hide) between the neo-populist rhetoric 
and the actual intervention style deployed within the programme. 
3 Undoubtedly during the first months of the programme, an important number of CARDER staff were 
busy on it: the accounting department allocating cash and cars for the monitoring committee, secretaries 
typing reports and messages, drivers from the head-office bringing the committee to visit the villages 
(there were thirty villages each of which hosted a sensitisation meeting by the committee), the village 
agents in thirty villages gathering data for the village monographs, all the 15 RDRs of the CARDER 
pulling all these data together with existing ones in order to write the village development plans, etc. 
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4 This is the metaphor of a person fetching water at the river or the well. Traditionally (and still now in 
many places) the receptacle used was a round clay pot, a jar. Usually, no one would bend down to the 
ground to help put the jar on the water fetcher's head. Once the latter has got his/her pot full, he/she 
would have to take it by him/herself to the hip before people help him/her put it on his/her head. This 
metaphor is now widely used in intervention contexts, indicating the participation of people in the actions 
that are meant to improve their situation. 
5 In the end, we have here a set of well experienced dispositions for survival, the functioning of this 
organisation, as well as the state itself, being largely funded from outside (see Chapter 3), which requires 
that these actors show that they are à jour, even if it is only superficially. 
6 Just like hot 48 hour messages. As RDRs say, '48 hours hot messages arrive every day on your table, 
requesting that a given task is done within 48 hours, dropping all previous activities in the meantime 
(toute activité cessante). Which means that when you start today preparing an answer to a hot 48 hours 
message, another one may come tomorrow and request that you drop everything because the coming 48 
hours should be devoted to the new hot message. But you still need to spend at least 24 hours on the 
previous hot message! That is the life we have here'. 
7 Ekanyé and Cewe were both staff of the DSEI, the department of monitoring and internal evaluation 
of CARDER in which the programme was located. Cewe was trained as a soil scientist at the Benin 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences. He worked a few years in the CARDER Atacora (the North-Western 
Province) as RDR. Then he was appointed at the DSEI in Zou-CARDER as the head of Service Etudes et 
Synthèses. Ekanye was a sociologist. He was trained in Benin University and later received his PhD in 
sociology from a French University. He worked at the DSEI of CARDER Mono (South-West Benin) before 
he was appointed at the DSEI of Zou-CARDER as Chargé d'Etudes. 
8 There were two different examples among the RDVs, neither of whom were from the Director's ethnic 
group. One built very personal relations with him, through his way of addressing him and frequently 
visiting his home bringing gifts. The second one (Asuka) was exactly the opposite, arguing that he did 
not need to buy the favours of the Director and would not let the latter step all over him. He was very 
aggressive and highly self confident in replying to the Director. He was always repeating that he never 
asked to be appointed and that he could be moved at any time and he did not mind. On the other side, 
the Director avoided confrontations with him, praising his achievements. 
9 This is a Fon saying: ana bo cuku bo so gbo do nyan gbe a? They wonder why CARDER (i.e.the General 
Director) would put aside a sociologist and appoint a soil scientist to monitor a community development 
programme. 
10 Most staff had expected the programme to be located at the Department of Production, but the lady 
refused to have it and declared the whole idea as nonsense. People said she dared to react in this way 
because the new Minister based his idea on severe criticisms of the styles of the former Minister, her 
protector, who still held a powerful position in the Polit Bureau of the Party (under Kérékou's regime). 
11 But she did not always succeed in exerting this power. People sometimes managed to get to the field 
when they really wanted to go. Also at the time, she had everything in place to the USA on a four years 
PhD programme which she took up at the end of 1990. Knowing this, many DPro staff thought it more 
prudent to show loyalty to the General Director than to the DPro who would be leaving in any case. 
12 Dourodjè was senior to CARDER staff members Cewe and Ekanyé. He graduated from the Benin 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences much earlier than Cewe. He was RDR for many years, then functioned 
as acting DPro for a full year before he went to France for eighteen months of post graduate training in 
rural extension. Actually, when he returned from France, he was expecting to be confirmed as DPro when 
the former Minister brought the lady-DPro in from outside CARDER, from the National Research 
Institute. From an internal arrangement within CARDER, it was suggested he be given the position of 
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assistant DPro, in charge of training and extension. He rejected it, arguing that he had passed this 
position years ago. As a result, he was loosely attached to both the DPro and the General Director (with 
his office in the DPro building) as what was called Analyste, which was an innovation of the Zou-
CARDER. Later in 1992, Dourodjè was appointed DPro. 
13 There was apparently fear from Cewe of being shadowed by Dourodjè, especially at a the time the 
programme was being aggressively 'marketed' to funding agencies. But Dourodjè had one single 
obsession, being appointed DPro. 
14 A special committee came from head office which at the ceremony was led by Dourodjè and Ekanyé. 
The RDR and the heads of all the other state services were present in Gbomina, including the Head of 
the District himself. 
15 As discussed in Chapter 6, there was no traditionally rooted and legitimately accepted institutional 
structure in Togoudo, a residential composite that owed its village identity largely to its incorporation 
into the modern state in the mid-sixties. Therefore, apart from the old men, the Agba Ilu or Vieux sages, 
the active groups in the public life of the village (the various committees and boards) are all connected 
to the state, i.e. to external intervention. Apart from the Mayor and the three village ward heads, the three 
most important committees according to people (the most visible) were the GV board, the APE (Assoria-
tion des Parents d'Elèves), the parents who have children at school, and the managing committee of the 
village health, the UVS (Unité Villageoise de Santé). Then, as far as external intervention is concerned, come 
less visible committees or groupings around the cotton markets. There were 15 in 1990 and 23 in 1991, 
each with a board and all those related to the GV. In fact, these markets started as agricultural extension 
groups USV (Unité de Suivi et de Vulgarisation) at the beginning of the project and were later called GCE 
(Groupe de Contact et d'Encadrement). Each of them has a demonstration plot, mostly planted with cotton, 
the yield of which is sold and the revenue held in a common pot. Another committee mentioned was that 
of the Catholic Church. 
16 They did not cite the new GV storage, the building of which had been going on since 1985, because 
it was already clear to them that they would have to build it themselves. 
17 He belongs to the same category of Tinguédjo in Chapter 6, a sac au dos who did an Engineer's 
degree in cooperative matters at the Centre Panafricain de Formation Coopérative in Cotonou. 
18 The components of these revenues, ristournes, as paid to all GV cotton growers in Benin are the 
outcome of a long bargaining process between the CARDER, SONAPRA, the funding agencies and the 
growers. At the time there were market charges and the value of the surplus weight. SONAPRA was 
charged for every ton marketed because it was assumed to be its job to purchase the cotton and weigh 
it by the kilo. The peasants are organised to perform this and related work (i.e. they prepare the place 
for marketing by weeding it, watch the cotton from the time it is weighed until the moment it is collected 
by SONAPRA, and help to load the trucks that collect the cotton), and the GV is paid for it. As for the 
value of the surplus weight, it is measured when cotton is delivered to the gins. This weight is obtained 
in the following way: When cotton is marketed in a village, every grower records five to seven percent 
less than the real weight of his cotton. Thus, the weight measured at the gin is not less than the sum of 
the weights of all the growers recorded in the village; otherwise, there would be difficulties in sharing 
the total revenue among individual growers. The value of the surplus weight obtained, and the market 
fees, are paid to each cotton market via the GV, almost a year after the purchase of cotton by SONAPRA, 
that is usually in the last trimester of the year. In the case of Togoudo, especially with the arrival of 
Asuka, as in many other villages, the attempt is to keep this money at the level of the GV, supposedly 
for public use. 
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19 In addition to this and since 1992, it was decided that 30 percent of the net national return on cotton 
production and marketing would be returned to growers (40 percent for stabilisation funds, 15 percent 
for the Government and 15 percent for SONAPRA), which all the GVs share, according to the total 
amount of cotton each has marketed. This is called Plus value that counts from the 1989/90 campaign and 
amounted to 400 millions FCFA for all the GVs of Benin (CME, 1993). 
20 Indeed, though every RDV was installed officially and formally in the villages, as in the case of Asuka, 
not more than three of the eight RDVs got such a central position in their village of appointment. In Dani, 
for example, another Idaca settlement 50 kilometres to the north where the programme was implemented, 
the RDV was hardly noticed on the village scene, only as someone loosely in charge of a few women's 
groups. 
21 A provisional storehouse, formerly used as one of the classrooms of the school, actually the former 
church house, was destroyed by a tornado a few months earlier. All the villagers were requested to 
contribute to the building of a new store, 500 FCFA for men and 200 for women. But the money collected 
was insufficient to complete the storehouse. The health centre was intended for child delivery. Such a 
centre was much needed as many women lived out on the farms and would have to go to Gbomina (no 
less than 20 kilometres from the farms) before they could visit a midwife, which they therefore rarely 
bothered to do. Almost all these women delivered at home, some even on the road from the farms to the 
village. 
22 Still, additional funds were necessary before the house could be finished. This was funded by a 
German foundation through a man from the village who was a director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and who served formerly in Germany. 
23 The GV is considered as the local funding agency for all public affairs. When a guest has to be hosted, 
the GV is expected to meet the costs. In some cases the costs even include a gift to the host. But who 
would pay? After long discussions people suggested that the GV give the money, but as a loan to the 
local administration. In these discussions, the GV board members would start by protesting very strongly 
and even threaten to quit the meeting. The RDV would first side with them for some time and then start 
examining the reasons why the GV would not do something. If one of the board members continued to 
object, the RDV would get angry, saying that he had been appointed by the state to work with them and 
could not be in a meeting where no consideration was given to state officials. 
24 The cotton production chain is quite complicated and offers various room for manoeuvre to the 
secretary, who is particularly expert in the matter. He had accumulated a wealth of experience since 1985 
and from the various training he had from CARDER. To give just some idea of the complexity of the 
operations along this chain: first, every grower must indicate the size of cotton field he intends to grow; 
this information is collected at the level of every market and handed over to the GV secretary. On this 
basis, an estimate of the quantities of seed, fertilizer and insecticide needed is made for the whole village 
and transmitted to SONAPRA via CARDER, charged with making sure (since 1990) that every market 
secretary makes the same calculation for every grower of his market. Formerly, this was done by Baba 
with the help of the AVA. In due time (before June), CARDER delivers the inputs, distributed to the 
growers via the markets, with a meticulous recording of the credit thus obtained by every grower. This 
would later (around April the following year) be deducted from his revenue. When the time comes for 
the marketing (collecting the cotton) a general plan is made for the village (15 markets in 1989,23 since 
1990), on the basis of a time schedule given by CARDER. This allows the SONAPRA and CARDER staff 
to check the cotton quality and supervise each market during its operation, making sure that the 
regulations are kept (e.g. correctness of the weighing machine, and anti-fire precautions). Every market 
board would prepare itself to offer a special reception to the official delegation (the CARDER and 
SONAPRA staff and main members of the GV board) on the marketing day. Special weighing bags are 
rented out by CARDER for which the GV secretary makes sure every grower pays for according to the 
quantity he sells etc. The market secretaries (since 1990) have to fill out forms for every grower and for 
the whole market indicating the quality and quantity sold, all of which are checked by GV secretary. 
Peasants are later paid on the basis of this form while the revenues will be calculated on the basis of the 
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cotton weighed at the cotton ginnery. Not only errors are possible in any of these steps, but operations 
can be delayed for a multitude of good reasons (I was sick, my motor bike was broken, growers did not 
bring their data to me, every one is ready except such a market and if I do not wait for them they will 
say I am against them, the CARDER district staff was absent, there a mistake in the calculations and I 
have to start again, some peasants still have to pay for the weighing bags of last year, I was ready to go 
and get the revenues but the president and the treasurer were not, my wife/sister/father/children was 
(were) sick and we had to go to the hospital in Gbomina etc.). From 1992, the GV of Togoudo was 
selected, as part of an experiment, along with a few others, to transfer all cotton operations from the 
CARDER to the GV. This entailed that no transaction from the GV to SONAPRA would pass any longer 
via the CARDER. The GV had therefore to be more precise and better scheduled. 
25 Here I leave out all the experiences people formerly had with cooperatives. In fact, the agricultural 
services had always worked on this basis for the extension of technical packages. Groups of people were 
supposed to have collective demonstration plots. As I have indicated earlier, most cotton markets started 
as demonstration groups, with a collective plot of about 40x50 m2. 
26 In fact, around 1986/1987, women's and then men's groups (GF and GRVC: (Groupements de Femmes, 
Groupement Révolutionnaire à Vocation Coopérative) mushroomed all over the northern Zou area. They 
attracted attention when passing through the area, with here and there a bright placard announcing the 
name of some or other women's group. One interesting aspect of this development was the fact that 
attempts to put peasants into cooperatives was as old as development intervention itself (see Chapter 3) 
but they had never been as successful as they seemed at the end of the 1980s when the GRVCs and GF 
blossomed, five to ten years after the revolutionary government had forcefully fried and failed via 
CARDER to induce peasant cooperatives from socialist models. The basis for the recent upsurge was, 
among other reasons, the sort of liberalisation of development intervention that occurred from about 1985, 
when local and foreign NGOs started promoting various sorts of cooperatives (see Daane and Mongbo 
1991). From 1990, at the end of the revolutionary regime, most of these groups had adjusted their generic 
names to these new developments by skipping the R of révolutionnaire. 
27 Gaston got this idea from attending the meetings of OJRB (Organisation de la Jeunesse Révolutionnaire 
du Bénin), a national youth organisation linked to the party, that were chaired by Ah Houdou the Minister 
of Information, where a few youth production cooperatives were formed in towns and villages. They 
received massive media coverage (all media then controlled by the state) and some administrative support 
from local state services. It was the period when Houdou, together with a few other young members of 
the regime, and as an answer to the growing youth unemployment, began to criticise the corruption and 
the political and administrative practices within the party and launched a populist movement of 
'development from below'. It was a kind of reformative tendency that arose too late or too slowly for 
the upheavals at end of the 1980s as described in Chapter 3. In the case of Tolidji Gaston in Togoudo, 
Houdou wrote official letters to the Benin representation of the FAO, the Minister for Rural Development, 
the head and Gbomina offices of Zou-CARDER, and to the various levels of public administration to 
request political, technical and administrative support. 
28 Each time the group was denied access to the land after at least the land preparation work had already 
been carried out. In the first case, two hectares of fruit trees donated by CARDER had been planted by 
the group, with one hectare of yam, while in the second case leguminous trees had been planted. Many 
people were discouraged by this continual process of restarting and left the group. With all the official 
letters written by the Minister, the young men had expected some 'project' for their group (some 
funding that would bring direct material advantages), or at least a food donation from the World Food 
Programme (vivres PAM). But things did not happen as quickly as they had expected, so they dropped 
out. 
29 The explanation given to Nancy was that there were too many small trees on the land which required 
preparation work before traction could be used and therefore a special machine was needed, unless extra 
money was invested in paying for labourers specialised in this work (the Somba). 
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30 Up to 1993, the equipment had never been used: one animal died in 1991 for lack of attention, and 
Gaston used the second one during a few months for the transportation of agricultural products from 
farms to Gbomina, before he left at the end 1992 for the Ivory Coast again. 
31 More than 40 women gathered at the beginning. The disagreement was about how to start group 
activities. Some soya seeds were given to the group at its constitution. According to Sabine and some 
others, the yield from these first soya seeds should be sold and the revenue used to buy maize, cowpeas 
and groundnut seeds, which would be planted after group members had cultivated the land themselves. 
Two other women objected to this saying they preferred every member to contribute lOOf each week to 
buy seeds and pay labourers to plough the land. Some of those who quit told me later that they would 
have been very happy to subscribe lOOf each week to a common pot. They could manage to spend some 
time every week on the group field, but contributing to pay for labourers was unminkable for them. 
Though some added that they might do it if they were sure that the group would recruit them as 
labourers. 
32 One day they argued on the group field about the organisation of the work. The point of view of the 
treasurer was accepted by the members. Then the president became furious and gave her a bad look. On 
her way home, the treasurer was bitten by a scorpion and she said it was the president who had turned 
into this animal to exact revenge. 
33 To we. enon to b'enon nyi monto, a Fon saying that does not translate, which plays on the word monto 
(car), to (to arrange) and mon we to (the way it has been arranged). 
34 This provoked uproar from some of the former members who had been dismissed, especially the 
former president. They wrote a letter to the RDV to protest and requested that they be taken into account 
for the distribution. They contended that the donation was for the original group as this had been 
promised at the very first meeting by the white woman who had arrived, 'and we know that when 
whites make a promise, within 100 years, they stick to it'.They threatened the group members that if 
they ever used the stock without them, they would remember their life long that they had eaten 
something. The other women got afraid of sorcery and solicited the RDV (who was against) to accept that 
the food allocated be shared with the other women, which was finally done. 
35 The animatrice who came to the village was the first to launch the idea of a women's group after a 
meeting and discussions with women on the diet and protein value of soya. The RDV gathered what he 
thought were the women of the original soya group to launch his own ideas for a group. Some male 
heads of large households simply gathered their women and relatives (as Ekpemi, the Mayor, and others 
did), and declared that they were henceforth a group. 
36 In fact, the cases of women's groups analyzed by Koning and Speets (op. cit.), in Dani, are not very 
different from the present situation. Here too, the movement was launched by an animatrice some years 
before the RDV activated it here in 1989. After that, Aimée, the woman who acted as the local promotor, 
was employed as a village animatrice for the detection of malnourished children. The new groups formed 
later, originating from a schism of the group that she had started with the support of the RDV. 
10 Reflections on my practical and theoretical 
explorations into the field of rural development 
Introduction 
In the course of the field research for this thesis, I under went some particular 
experiences that led me to conclude that there was a need to fundamentally question 
the way in which notions such as 'mterv-ention' and 'rural development' had so 
far been approached by development practitioners and social scientists. My adven-
ture started, not with the Community Development Programme on which the dis-
cussion in this book is based but, as I mentioned in the first chapter, with the 
Research & Development Project (R&D) that was to end in mid-1990, following the 
decision of the funding agency to stop financing it. I had my research proposal 
neatly prepared to make a farming systems analysis and to look at formal and 
informal cooperation between researchers, extensionists and peasants geared to 
developing technologies to improve agricultural production at farm level. The head 
staff of the project were struggling with field staff and the funding agency to get 
field activities and funding going, while reassuring me that the project would last 
at least a further two years. In fact, while most of the discussions I was having with 
the staff were on farm production, farming constraints and agricultural technology, 
my very presence was used by head staff as a bargaining card to calm field staff, 
who were becoming more and more recalcitrant, and at the same time to convince 
the funding agency to proceed with the funding of the project. 
In the meantime, CARDER staff members who were not concerned with the R&D 
project, appeared uninterested in discussing agricultural production matters. They 
were anxious about the ending of their project with the World Bank, not because it 
would hamper agricultural production for peasants, whom they generally treated 
as ignorant or at least difficult to deal with, but because the ending of this project 
would put a stop to the flow of the 'working means' vital for their own life 
projects. In the villages, and from my first contacts and discussions with cotton 
growers, I thought a peasant 'revolution' was soon to erupt. Peasants seemed to 
be upset and wanted rid of the exploitative and cheating practices of field agents. 
But I became confused when I noticed that in their normal social interactions, agents 
and peasants apparently lived on good terms. These and similar experiences drew 
my attention to the ways both agents and villagers dealt with intervention, and not 
just to what they stated about it. I went through a number of other experiences that 
were surprising for me which I have discussed in this book, but here in the con-
cluding chapter I mention only a few in order to clarify the basis of my argument. 
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I then review how I organised the book in order to make the argument. Finally, I 
explore some questions about the 'rurality' of rural development intervention, 
conceptualised in this book as a field of social interaction. But before examining 
these issues, I need some common ground of agreement with the reader. My point 
is that I did not limit myself to the accounts people gave of these situations or to 
what they claimed to have done or not done, but derived my material instead from 
first-hand experiences, undergone in close contact with the people to whom I refer, 
who sometimes also used me as an accomplice to their strategies. 
The 'intervened' intervening over the 'intervenors' 
Men and women, whom local classification would not rank low on the socio-
economic ladder, were presented by village agents to externals as the poorest, and 
encouraged to come together to form groups (so-called cooperative or pre-cooper-
ative groups), in order supposedly to improve their living conditions by working 
together. A group of ten or more members would then mostly start collective 
farming, or, less commonly, other activities that were not usually any more substan-
tial and often did not even earn as much as one or two of them already did in their 
private businesses. However, they would hope that because they had formed a 
group, 'something good would come to them from outside'. 
Another experience that definitely raised doubts as to the relevance of current 
approaches was my encounter with the Community Development Programme. After 
dropping my original research proposal with the collapse of the Research & Devel-
opment project, and while looking for another research focus relevant to my para-
digmatic orientation, I discovered that no one discussed on-going CARDER activities 
with, mentioned the Community Development Programme. They were more 
interested in national political events, in their worries about the dying project, and 
in local gossip about interpersonal relations and resource allocations within 
CARDER. It was only after an incidental meeting with the young men of the 
programme, and getting to know more of it from Ekanye, that I became excited and 
surprised about it. Excited because I thought I had finally found a good ground 
where the contexts and happenings of the project (which I expected to be many) 
would be suitable for actor-oriented research and for understanding the discrepan-
cies of views and interests among people who were supposed to have common 
goals. I was moreover surprised that nobody in the CARDER had mentioned that 
this programme was rvmning. After all, its stated objective of turning our dying 
villages into dynamic places, was, I had supposed, the raison d'etre of CARDER and 
its agents. 
Within the Community Development Programme, I came across other absurdities 
that raised, even greater, my surprise. One of these concerned the involvement of 
the RDVs in the village. As I discussed in Chapter 5, after they had dropped their 
mask of being enthusiastic village dynamisers, I soon realised, interacting with 
Asuka, Gbedjemin, Tinguedjo, AniSie and others that these people were more 
interested in their own careers and life projects than in anything else. They ques-
tioned their presence in the village, more from the point of view of whether it fitted 
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in with their own needs than for making village life more dynamic. Preoccupations 
with career and material achievements play an important role in the everyday 
interactions of CARDER agents, in a general culture of 'tripping up' and 
politicking in order to seize positions, and where kicking someone else out (as we 
saw with Ekanye and Cewe) is taken for granted. And though most RDVs con-
sidered Ekanye more suitable for monitoring the programme, they felt their material 
preoccupations to be safer in the hands of Cewe. But their enthusiasm was not just 
a mask. They did try, each in his own way, to immerse themselves in village life 
and to engage with 'development activities'. When they managed to find their 
ways into the village scene, getting involved in local conflicts, we have seen, 
especially in Chapter 9 from the case of Asuka in Togoudo, that they had to face 
adversity from both within and outside the village. Baba, supported by some 
persons within the village and in CARDER, insidiously tried to oppose the ideas of 
the RDV for 'building the village', not because Baba was convinced of any ir-
relevance of the views of Asuka, nor that he had better alternatives to suggest, but 
because this intruding of Asuka in the affairs of the GV, the cotton growers' as-
sociation, greatly disturbed his established management style, which was for his 
profit and that of his network, but also for their reputation in the village scene. 
When he and his followers struck on the idea of allocating credit to cotton growers 
to meet their demands for wage labour at critical periods, this more to reduce the 
RDVs room for manoeuvre than to solve peasant problems, even though the 
measure served both purposes in the end. Nevertheless, despite these several 
different preoccupations and fights within CARDER and the village, and between 
Asuka and the other stakeholders in Togoudo, these people find the ways to present 
a coherent and attractive picture of CARDER, of the Community Development 
Programme and of a dynamic Togoudo village to externals. 
The argument of the book and its organisation 
On the dismembering of the programme and on the intervened becoming intervenors 
In my struggle to make sense of these processes, I argue in the book that the first 
step to be taken is to free the notions of 'intervention', 'intervenors' and 'inter-
vened' from the static and preset definitions that we generally imply when using 
them. Indeed, by ignoring processes occurring around development programmes or 
considering them as 'side effects', by checking project outcomes against formulated 
goals, and by straggling to devise from such a point of view ways of improving the 
living conditions of the 'intervened', the 'intervenors' choose or fail to see the 
alternative ways in which the intervened improve their living conditions and work 
out their own ways for achieving what they define as 'rural development'. More-
over, if one sticks to the standpoint of comparing project outcomes against formu-
lated goals, one cannot understand the processes through which the discourses and 
practices of rural development are reproduced at local level and how, in turn, the 
intervened become intervenors, taking the initiatives of intervention into their own 
hands, and thus largely deciding on the orientation of affairs within the intervention 
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context, even if they partly utilise the images made by the intervenors of themselves 
and their institutions. 
Illustrations of this argument in Chapter 9 are, for example, how Asuka, arriving 
in Togoudo with a mission to make village life more dynamic, became embroiled 
in local relationships and interests through with which he managed to negotiate the 
insertion of the programme into the village, and yet keep his own identity as a 
CARDER agent, specialist on cooperative matters, orthodox christian, and 'forceful 
man'. He also pushed through some personal projects such as implementing the 
cooperative plan he had developed during his Master's training, successfully 
withstanding the challenge from within the GV, and from Gaston and the General 
Director of CARDER. Similar processes, with different outcomes, occur in other 
villages of the programme, where the instructions of the General Director and the 
standard development plan written for the villages take various concrete shapes, 
depending on the battlegrounds in the village and the negotiating capacities of the 
RDVs - this, despite the regular monitoring visits and quarterly meetings with head 
staff. 
At the group level, Ekpemi succeeded in getting the RDV, the C/PACA, the RDR 
and other CARDER staff enroled in his idea about GRVC familial - despite the fact 
the RDV and the C/PACA usually disagreed about cooperative matters - which 
resulted in his obtaining the ox-plough technology which he had coveted as a 
solution to his labour management problems. Within the women's groups, as with 
Ekpemi, the cooperative shape of the groups was meant to conform to formal 
prescriptions and external standards. However, internally the groups operated as 
specific categories of individuals, selectively recruited, who went on negotiating and 
fighting for their own subgroup interests in so far as these could best be served 
within the cooperative framework. Asuka was opposed to Ekpemi's idea of making 
a family cooperative, as he was to the idea of supporting Adjike's group to apply 
for a cassava processing unit before the women had committed themselves to 
cassava farming. But, in the end, he let himself be convinced by the fact that, as 
Ekpemi said, when outsiders arrive to visit a GRVC, they do not ask for the identity 
cards of members. With this idea of deceiving the externals, put to him by Bxpemi 
- assuming of course that it had not occurred to him before - he then encouraged 
Adjike's group to present the trial plot of the UTA cassava project as their own 
farm, provided that they began immediately afterwards on their own farms, which 
they did only after the RDV left the village in 1993. 
Allowing themselves to be enroled, as we see them doing here, does not mean 
that field staff are passive and easily manipulated. Like the actors with whom they 
are engaged in these adventures, they have their own interests, partly constructed 
in the heat of the action (largely discussed in Chapter 9), as a result of the encoun-
ters of their life-worlds and expectations (discussed in Chapter 5) with those of other 
people (detailed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8), whose interests they might also promote. 
Asuka found himself some challenges: for example, with Baba and his CARDER 
network, Gaston, and even the women who dropped out of the group, about whom 
he would then swear: 'they will soon regret it. When things start doing well for the 
group (i.e. there is help from outside), they will want to come back, but then, they 
will not be accepted'. Another important reason why village agents were strategi-
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cally interested in these ventures and often actively contributed to them, was that 
these group initiatives were later rhetorically organised by the RDVs into some sort 
of attractive development discourse to present at the quarterly meetings, but, most 
importantly, to visitors coming to the village, which then produced a progressive 
image of the village, showing it to have a dynamic population and a dynamic RDV. 
On the other hand, although the General Director might scold the RDVs at the 
quarterly meetings, requesting clear and marketable projects for the funding 
agencies, and although the other head staff of the programme (mainly the DSEI and 
Cewe) might criticise and make suggestions in order to stamp their authority on the 
matter, they would also later appropriate these achievements and use them as 
indicators of how the CARDER was now engaged in an exciting new type of 
participatory intervention. In these insidious and barely perceptible ways, the small 
actions and initiatives taken by people at village level - normally considered the 
'intervened' - affect the image that intervenors produce of themselves and of the 
intervention institution. 
Such a hurting upside down of intervention logic not only occurs in relations 
between villages and external agencies. It starts from the CARDER head office with 
the digestion of the policy orientation of the Minister, as I discussed in the first part 
of Chapter 9. In this instance, one can consider the Ministry and Ministerial order 
as the mtervening side and the CARDER agents as the intervened. Here, I have 
shown how the policy orientation became an asset for, and also a source of, the 
coalitions and conflicts that emerged within CARDER, from which new and chang-
ing informal organisational charts were produced, together with new or renewed 
sub-groups and leadership roles, that were more operational in the implementation 
of the programme than in the official plan. Even the formal arrangements them-
selves were the product of bargaining that went beyond technical considerations. 
These processes were debated in Chapters 5 and 9 and concerned the bargaining 
and pohticking that went on within the CARDER around the programme, processes 
in which not only technical and hierarchical positions counted but also heteroclitic 
parameters since they were decisive in the operational management of CARDER, 
though having nothing or very little to do with what is usually presented in official 
settings. These parameters concerned, for example, regional origin, ethnic or religion 
membership, family and/or patron-client relationships within the CARDER, but also 
with Ministers or other individuals external to CARDER, personal charisma, am-
bitions, and witchcraft, whereby the Director's best allies were no longer their 
technical staff, but rather the drivers, night watchmen or village agents working in 
remote villages who become important resource persons in decisions on tech-
nical/professional matters. It was by combining all these factors, along with the 
elements of existing technical and intervention culture, that CARDER staff trans-
formed the policy orientation of the Minister, giving it their own historical imprint, 
but chiefly, turning it into manageable pieces appropriated in the various interstices 
of CARDER's everyday social and administrative reality. At the same time, they 
developed a written and spoken discourse on the programme through which the 
institution was given legitimacy to integrate the arenas of the 'new', 'fashion-
able' participatory rhetoric of development intervention. 
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On differential life-worlds and different arenas and negotiating grounds of development 
intervention 
The differential processes of appropriation and dismembering of the Community 
Development Programme, in both village and CARDER contexts, varied according 
to the life-worlds and future perspectives of the stakeholders in the various encoun-
ters where the programme or elements of it were dealt with. Chapter 4 looked at the 
historical emergence of the frame of development intervention in Benin that gave 
us a picture of the shared stock of experiences, norms and values on which bureau-
crats as well as villagers draw in their interactions with each other in matters of 
development intervention. The life-worlds within each social entity which, following 
Arce (1993), I call 'epistemological communities', were dealt with in several chap-
ters. In Chapter 5,1 problematised the link between state and state agents using an 
illustration of the selective, opportunistic, and some times involuntary use of state 
power by state agents. Then the social worlds behind and beyond particular agents 
were discussed, drawing upon four locally defined categories of agents. The nature 
of their involvement in the programme appeared to be more linked to these worlds 
than to their ideological or philosophical convictions about the development of 
others, and how to go about it. The discussions in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 give us a 
larger view on the material and cultural background resources of the different 
categories of actors operating at village level. Apart from clarifying the wide variety 
of stakes and preoccupations that exist in the village and the dynamic ways in 
which 'rural development' is daily operationalised, the ethnography reveals that 
similar processes and rationales of involvement exist where villagers have been in 
contact with or are aware of the existence of elements of the programme or some 
local discursive and practical operationalisation of it. In other words, before people 
actively reach out to interact with others and seek consensus with them on various 
aspects of the programme, they need first to agree among themselves, to appropriate 
part of the programme as meaningful to their own life trajectories. I here stress the 
active out-reaching of actors, to remind us, as I did in Chapter 9 where we ident-
ified contrasting epistemological communities at the crossroads of the Community 
Development programme, that this appraisal of the instrumental value of the 
programme to individual life trajectories does not take place outside the interaction 
grounds and arenas of everyday life, but in action contexts where some involvement 
has already started. 
It appears therefore that the grounds and arenas are many (even exponential if 
one imagines the result one might obtain from matrix of the various preoccupations 
of the different categories of stakeholders), on which bits of a project like the Com-
munity Development Programme are dealt with and reshaped in terms of various 
sorts of social interactions. Clearly, at the crossroads of planned development and 
everyday realities, there exist wide discrepancies between the constructions that 
intervenors make of clients' worlds and the actual realities of these worlds. The 
poverty of plans is further revealed when one compares the actions and dispositions 
presented and argued for, with the everyday preoccupations and sorrows of the 
various actors involved, from villagers to intervention officers, not forgetting of 
course the possible intrusion of social researchers. These various actors give to 
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development intervention dimensions that are far beyond the conceptual frame-
works of designers. Hence, not only is it very hazardous, with the methodological 
means at our disposal at present, to speak of project failure (see Long and van der 
Ploeg 1988), but furthermore, the programme itself loses its substance, even its 
existence in the minds of the people dealing with or using pieces of it in their 
everyday lives. Indeed, life goes on, and pieces of the programme become a part of 
life's on-going social interactions and routines. Actors do not keep permanently 
present in their consciousness the material existence of the plan as a whole, but only 
when material or symbolic up-dating takes place to keep it alive (e.g. seminars and 
other public rituals of the sort, missions, official documents circulated, incentives, 
and per diems). In the villages, the presence of the RDVs keeps people aware of the 
programme. Nevertheless, new issues and processes that have emerged from the 
operation of the programme are consciously separated by social actors as having 
nothing to do the programme per se. In this way, even Asuka spontaneously 
declared at the beginning that the credit operation launched opportunistically by 
Baba and his friends from the GV revenue had notiiing to do with the spirit of his 
programme, though he might later try to appropriate it. In fact within the village, 
specific organisational developments in the GV, the efforts to turn cotton markets, 
into credit groups, the active use of so-called GRVCs and women's groups to try 
to solve labour and starting fund problems in farrning and in food processing - and 
petty trade activities involving externally-oriented, self-achievement strategies - they 
are all relatively autonomous grounds and arenas of the everyday ordinary defini-
tions people impute to rural development. In contrast, within CARDER these defini-
tions derive from debates on positions and prerogatives, on the hierarchical relations 
between field agents and head staff, on CARDER'S resource allocations, interven-
tion approaches; and social interactions with the heteroditic parameters previously 
mentioned. Pieces of the programme grafted onto these grounds and arenas are 
accrued with elements from previous interventions and experiences, and thus 
neutralise the actual programme, which then has a good chance of getting lost. 
While the compilation derived from this process can be turned into an intervention 
devise by which the intervened (be they within CARDER or in the villages) attempt 
to influence the intervenor, with success as in the case of Ekpemi, but also for 
Tinkpo (on group experiences of farmers) and Adjike, as president of her group 
with their shared experiences in cassava processing in Ghana. 
It is of crucial importance to learn from all this that our vision of development 
intervention needs to be turned upside down. Despite the pre-formed development 
plans, the quarterly instructions of the General Director, and the frequent visits of 
Cewe, can we really maintain that Asuka and other RDVs are intervening in 
populations who might then cope with the intervention? Where are they inter-
vening, and concerning what? Agricultural matters, cooperatives, labour problems, 
or family relations? What share does Asuka have in the fact that Sabine, after 
struggling for two years to win the grain mill for her group from which she might 
expect sustainable solutions to her credit problems, then decides that her life choice 
is to move with the school master into an uncertain world because, as she puts it, 
she too wanted to enjoy the pleasure of saying 'I don't want to cook for him 
today.'? I have argued that the way to make coherent sense of these multiple stakes 
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and preoccupations is to conceptualise development intervention as generating a 
social field made up of a multiplicity of interests, values and strategic actions. 
On development intervention as generating afield of social interaction 
This is the central core of the argument in this book, which I stated at the outset. It 
is through putting into practice 'intervention', composed of various interests and 
normative conceptions of well-being in rural areas called 'rural development', that 
a whole specific and specialised voluntary sphere or domain of human activity is 
generated and continuously reproduced. This is what I call the field of rural develop-
ment. 
I discussed the various theoretical corners of this conceptualisation in Chapter 2, 
including the rhetorical and practical reproduction of the field, through a discussion 
of one concrete happening of the Community Development Programme, i.e. a 
general assembly of the cotton growers' organisation. I argue in Chapter 3 that the 
Community Development Programme was a political innovation in the field of rural 
development. Its rationale must be searched for in the economic and political 
changes at national and village levels from which it emerged. These developments 
are rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial history of Benin. The general assembly 
of the cotton growers' organisation was only significant in relation to the history 
of development intervention in Benin and in most of the former French colonies of 
West Africa. Organising the theoretical debates on the field of rural development in 
this way announced the methodological thread that runs throughout the book. 
Namely the use of 'microcosms', such as development encounters in the village 
and government offices, and in the everyday routines in professional, public and 
private lives, to reveal various 'macro' dimensions of development intervention 
and social change. 
The history of the emergence of the frame of development intervention in Benin 
was exarnined in Chapter 4, while the actors, the culture and the language of 
development intervention were mainly discussed in Chapters 5 and 2, and implicitly 
in Chapter 9. The settings for my exploration of the field of rural development (the 
Community Development Programme and the village settings) were outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and further elaborated in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which included 
details on the village settlement process, the social attributes of the inhabitants and 
the many stakes generated from the interactions between the various groups present 
and with the state and external bodies. The systematic depiction of the productive 
life of the village (Chapter 7) revealed the diversified and dynamic nature of the 
local economy, while discussions in Chapter 8 highlighted the diversity of the Jiving 
conditions of individuals and groups in the village and of the different ways in 
which people dealt with survival, self-achievement and well-being. What these 
discussions together reveal, as I have already pointed out in this concluding chapter, 
is how development intervention (in it intentions and operational design and 
implementation) distantiates itself from the life circumstances and everyday liveli-
hoods and strategies of villagers and intervention staff. The analysis of the various 
gaps or discrepancies identified at the various social junctures in the implementation 
process, allows us to understand that that gaps are an integral part of the existence 
Practical and theoretical explorations 251 
and the functioning of the field of rural development. Attempts to bridge such gaps 
indicate some misunderstanding of the logic of the field, or a desire on the part of 
the potential gap-bridger, whether development worker, social scientist or whoever, 
to enter the field of rural development as a social actor, as an integral part of the 
game, and stakeholder. 
A footnote on the 'rurality' of the field of rural development 
Before closing, I would like to recall a point I raised at the beginning; namely, that 
I do not feel comfortable with the rural qualification of the social field generated in 
the process of rural development intervention since 'rural' carries an 'agrarian' 
connotation, and sometimes a rural/urban opposition. There are two reasons for my 
dissatisfaction: one relates to the enormous self-evident changes that have occurred 
to date in the socio-economic organisation of rural life; and the second concerns the 
rationale for my conceptualisation of the field of social interaction. 
From the case of Togoudo, we see that despite the dynamism of agriculture and 
related activities, and the fact that those involved in non-agricultural activities barely 
manage unless their activities are backed up by agriculture, nowadays the improve-
ment of individual and collective Jiving conditions is significantly linked to the 
development of activities that are not strictly speaking rural/agricultural in charac-
ter. Nor are rural households confined to or survive primarily on rurally-generated 
resources. This is clearly evident from the survey data presented in Chapter 7, and 
indeed is incorporated into local ideologies on self-achievement, well-being and 
development, to such an extent that people who have no activity other than agricul-
ture or at least no source of income external to agriculture (even cash occasionally 
from relatives living in town) are not considered to be completely 'out of water'. 
The various survival and self-achievement strategies delineated in Chapter 8 show 
that, whatever their rank on the emic socio-economic scale, and whatever their 
gender, living in rural areas implies the management of close and distant urban 
family and working relations, similar to what one might expect in urban and 
suburban areas. On the other hand, although they continue to be considered villages 
from an administrative point of view, settlements such as Togoudo, with their 
considerable population and economic activities have become urbanised, at least in 
the locally admitted sense of the term. 
The general point I am making is that there is a need for social scientists con-
cerned with rural intervention issues to find durable grounds for the practice of 
their profession on designations other than simply the 'rural'. In the African 
context, a recent study of the African Development Bank records that during the last 
30 years urban population in Africa has shifted from 14 to 40 percent, and that by 
the year 2020, the urban population is projected to have increased to 60 percent of 
the total population, without this precipitating any particular additional disasters 
(BAD 1994). Development intervention might then become, as is already evident, 
more oriented towards the suburban slums that have resulted from this rapid 
increase of the urban population. But likewise it would not be appropriate or very 
innovative for social scientists to substitute a 'sociology of urban or suburban 
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development' for that of 'the rural', especially since I would argue that most of 
the processes that we are now documenting from intervention contexts in rural areas 
are broadly similar to those occurring in urban settings. 
When one approaches the realities of development intervention from the per-
spective of a field of social interaction, it appears even more inconsistent to use the 
label 'rural'. The various physical and symbolic grounds and arenas I have 
referred to throughout this book, and that are relevant to a comprehensive study of 
intervention situations, do not operate entirely in rural settings though they might 
analytically be related to interventions in rural areas. Moreover I have argued that 
in their daily interactions over the bits and pieces of an intervention programme 
actors do not necessarily have to have the reality of the programme in question 
present in front of them. Indeed, there is nothing specifically rural about the 
bargaining, negotiations and struggles in which the actors are engaged in the 
particular physical and symbolic locations described in this book. Even those 
interactions taking place in rural areas and on agrarian issues incorporate macro-
political and economic realities with which actors in other settings also have to deal. 
In fact, as I have tried to argue throughout, these grounds and arenas are 'micro-
cosms' where, for various sakes and stakes, social actors process, generate or 
reproduce larger and more 'macro' phenomena, whether they operate with or in 
rural or urban assets or settings, or, as is frequently the case, they become inextric-
ably mixed. If the social sciences have any need at all to segment development 
studies (in order to throw light on particular historical, economic, or political 
dimensions), then the differentiation between 'local' and 'global' might be a 
better alternative to rural and non-rural, especially since, as I hope to have shown 
in this book, there is no simple determinism between the global and the local. 
But here I must bring to an end the argument and close the book. Fortunately the 
rhetorical construction and deconstruction of social scientists' discourses, especially 
on issues concerning development intervention - a favourite battleground being in 
ine field of (rural) development - carries with it certain collective stakes, so I leave it 
to the readers and other scholar/stakeholders to take up the baton. 
Appendix 
The National Conference in Benin: the peaceful 
shift from the Revolutionary Regime to the 
Renouveau Démocratique 
(A short note) 
The National Conference: its initiation and preparation 
On the 6th and 7th December 1989, the three main bodies of the so-called Marxist-
Leninist single-party regime (the Central Committee of the Party, the Government 
and the Parliament) held a joint meeting, the main objective of which was to 
examine the very critical political, economic and social situation of the country and 
the government, and to take measures to institute change. The formal economic 
apparatus (e.g. the banks, the commercial enterprises, the foreign exchange system) 
had had reached total bankruptcy. In order to reduce the salary load on its budget, 
the government had decided, in 1985-1986, to stop recruitment of university 
graduates but yet was not able (in 1987), to pay the salary of civil servants regularly 
- there were delays amounting to between five and eight months. This led to a 
series of strikes by civil servants and students who blocked the functioning of the 
state apparatus. The mounting crisis was evident in both towns and villages. From 
the beginning of 1989, the country was thrown into general confusion and turmoil 
with frequent demonstrations and riots, calling for the dismissal of the President 
and the Government. There was a widespread sense of the destruction of state 
authority in most services, in the villages as well as in the army. Indeed, several 
cases like that of Togoudo were reported where local state authorities accused of 
corruption were forced to resign; and many attempts at a coup d'Etat were 
reported.1 For the Government and its secret police, most of these pressures (from 
students, civil servants, army, and some villages) were the result of the iruiltration 
of the PCD, whose members were subjected to strong repression. 
But the difficulties the government faced did not originate only from within the 
country. There were also strong, though less visible pressures, from exiled political 
groups, either directly or via the IMF, the World Bank and some western diplomatic 
representations in Benin. For the members of the three main bodies of the single-
party regime who gathered at the meeting of the 6th and 7th December 1989, it was 
clear that a breakthrough was urgently needed. This provoked the most spectacular 
metamorphosis ever witnessed in Benin: those who had adopted intensive use of 
Marxist-l^ninist rhetoric for more than 15 years now claimed to be the artisans of 
a pluralist democracy. And in final official statement of the Party-Parliament-
Government joint session, it was declared that: 
"The President of the Republic, Head of State, will convene during the first trimester of 
1990, a national conference gathering the 'authentic representatives of all the living 
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forces' of the nation, no matter which 'political side' they belong to, so that they can 
contribute to the emergence of a 'democratic renewal ' and to the development of a 
healthy new political ambience in our Country.'1 
It was also decided that Marxism-Leninism would no longer be the state political 
ideology and that the PRPB (Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin) would stop 
playing a leading role in national and state affairs. The Government was requested 
to work towards a pluralist democracy that would allow for open political par-
ticipation and enlist all potential energies for joint actions against the economic 
crisis. There was no doubt that the economic, social and political situations had 
reached a critical stage, forcing the regime (with pressure from the IMF and the 
World Bank) to make a complete change in the political system. Otherwise, one 
could hardly believe that a joint session of the three main bodies of the political 
regime would proclaim an end of Marxism-Leninism, their raison d'être and the 
cornerstone of their whole political order. But, in reality, before the open crisis of 
1988 and 1989, not much was left of the so-called socialist construction apart from 
the strongly-rooted interests of political and economic groups involved one way or 
another in the regime. Populist socialist types of action were halted in the early 
eighties: there was a drastic reduction from 1982 in the number of state-owned 
companies and an end to the recruitment of university graduates in 1986; then, in 
1975, and educational reform was launched that resulted, in 1982, in the attempt 
break away from the French elitist and urban-based system. By 1985, the phrase 
'The Party leads the State' (le Parti dirige l'Etat), which suggests that major 
decisions are to be taken by the Party and implemented by the Government, was no 
more than pure discourse. Most of the people hanging on to positions in the party 
were apparently more interested in the privileges attached to them (i.e. social status, 
housing, cars, easy and uncontrolled access to public patrimonies) than in any 
ideological conviction. Major decisions on internal and external affairs (mcluding 
major appointments) were taken by the President assisted by a changing entourage 
(not necessarily recruited within the Polit Bureau of the Party, nor always within the 
Party), and supported by his magico-religious secret police.3 As reported by Jeune 
Afrique n° 1591, the very idea of the conference came during a tête-à-tête between 
the President and Robert Dossou, the newly appointed Minister of Planning, who 
was not even member of the Party. 
In fact, when taking the decision to call a national conference, the participants to 
the joint Government-Party-Parliament session did not really intend to hand political 
power over to other groups. At best some factions within the actual regime would 
be evicted, whilst others would improve their positions and 'new men' would 
come in.4 But they knew that they had their backs against the wall: big mobs in the 
street, an empty treasury and pressures from outside. There was not much else they 
could do than try to make this gesture aimed at temporarily calming the situation, 
and then hope that in the meantime, they could play off different forces against each 
other and make them co-responsible for the unpopular economic decisions they 
were forced by the IMF and the World Bank to take before loans or any other 
financial facilities could be made available to the Government.5 However the regime 
was already weakened by its internal contradictions, with factions fighting each 
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other. In such circumstances, one can understand that, although they participated 
in taking or vaHdating the decision for the conference, they soon lost control over 
its organization, while both initiators and organizers failed to keep control over the 
actual proceedings of the meeting.6 
The actual conference and the major decisions: a total shift 
The conference took place from the 19th to the 28th February 1990 with 488 partici-
pants from various social sectors: farmers, students, representatives of trade unions, 
local organisations, civil servants, NGOs and so-called sensibilités politiques.7 Others 
invited were the Beninese from the 'diaspora' - so-called important personalities, 
i.e. people who held important national or international positions (all the former 
Presidents of Dahomey,8 former high officials in the World Bank, the FAO, ILO, 
UN, IFAD). In addition, the Christian Churches, the Muslims and the local religions 
were represented. During the previous 15 to 20 months, the Catholic Church had 
contributed to the political debates mainly through official published statements 
from the Bishops. One of the representatives of the Catholic Church at the National 
Conference was Mgr. Isidore de Souza, the Bishop of Cotonou, who turned out to 
be the main mediator of the whole drama. The Conference had appointed him 
Chairman and most people involved, or who had followed the whole process, agree 
that he played the determinant role in making the peaceful changes possible. 
Very soon, the discussions turned to the legal status of the conference and the fate 
of its decisions. The consequences of the end of Marxist-L«rùhist ideology on the 
Constitution and for all the institutions deriving from it (the Parliament, the Govern-
ment and so forth) were critically analyzed. The conclusions reached that, since it 
had been decided to end the Mar^t-Leninist ideology, the joint session of the 6th 
and 7th December 1989 had created a constitutional vacuum, making the Parliament 
and the Government illegal. Indeed, many articles in the Constitution referred to 
'Marxism-Leninism' as the central organizing principle of both Parliament and 
Government. As 'Marxism-l^runism' was abolished, neither the Parliament, nor 
the Government could be considered as having legal status any more. Therefore, the 
only legal political structure existing at the time was the Conference, whose par-
ticipants were authentic representatives of the population. On the basis of this analysis, 
the participants proclaimed that the Conference was sovereign and that all its 
decisions were therefore to be assimilated to law.9 Except for the President, who 
would remain Head of State (but no longer Head of the Government, nor Minister 
of Defense as he had been since 1972), the Conference created transitory institutions 
that would operate until the adoption of a new Constitution as the institutional basis 
for a new Republic. Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank high official, was 
nominated Prime Minister and was mandated to form a transitory Government that 
would be accountable to a transitory Parliament (the HCR, High Council of State), 
composed of one representative of each province, the former Beninese Presidents, 
the Presidents of the various working panels of the conference and the board of the 
conference. The Chairperson of the Conference, Bishop Isidore de Souza, was 
appointed Chairman of the HCR. A special resolution was taken in regard to the 
education system for an urgent reopening of the schools and universities after two 
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Notes 
1 Some high ranking military were arrested and the major part of the army was disarmed, except for the 
personal guard of the President BGP (Batailbn de la Garde Présidentielle) This section of the army received 
special treatment, including occasional distribution of food products. People refered to the BGP as 'an 
army within the army'. 
2 'Le Président de la République, chef de l'Etat convoquera au cours du premier trimestre de l'année 
1990, une conférence nationale regroupant les représentants authentiques de toutes les forces vives de la 
nation, quelles que soient leurs sensibilités politiques, afin qu'ils apportent leurs contributions dans 
l'avènement d'un renouveau démocratique et au développement d'une saine ambiance politique 
nouvelle dans notre Pays'. A few weeks before this meeting of the regime, a conference of Beninese 
expatriate political and intellectual elites took place in Versailles in France and had suggested exactly this 
way out. But one should not maintain that the actual decision of the regime was a simple acceptance of 
the 'Versailles suggestion'. In itself, the idea of a national conference was not new. In 1979, a confer-
ence was initiated by the President that was called the Conférence Nationale des Cadres. The objective then 
was to give the floor to the 'cadres' for an open criticism of the actions of the Party and the Govern-
ment, since most of these 'cadres' refused to adhere to the Party. But the situation at the end of 1989 
was far more critical than that of 1979. The symbolic reference used by the President for the gathering 
of 1990 was that used by King Ghezo of the Danxomean Kingdom (1818-1858) - the symbol of the holed 
jar - at a moment of his reign when the economic and political situation was also very critical. King 
Ghezo invited all the sons of the country to come and block up the holes in the jar with their fingers, and 
by so doing they would save the nation: a call for unity (see Jeune Afrique, n" 1591). 
3 In Benin, there seems to exist a permanent link between political power and magico-religious power. 
According to Elwert-Krestschmer (1995), 'vodoun institutions are a centres of local power whose power 
potential one needs to control, oppress, repress or co-opt if one wants to get rooted, at local level as a 
state central power'. With Kérékou's regime, there is evidence that the massive anti-sorcery campaign 
of the mid-seventies provoked better integration of political and magico-religious actors, rather than 
dividing them. In the early eighties (and although vodoun cults had been forbidden from 1975 and 
without passing any official act to rrevoke the law) Kérékou used to appear in official public ceremonies 
with spiritual leaders of local religions, the latter exhibiting symbols of their power (snakes and other 
artifices). In the meantime, one man managed to reach the highest level of confidence with the President 
successive years of being declared invalid. Another recommendation of the Con-
ference concerned public accountability and a parsimonious management of national 
assets (Moralisation de la vie publique). 
Within ten days, the 488 participants to the conference, supported by on-going 
street demonstrations, the media10 and encouraging of messages from all over the 
world, had completed a radical change in the political regime without any blood-
shed. Only the President of the Republic escaped the tidal wave, which was inter-
preted as a necessary concession for preserving peace in the country, since the Presi-
dent still enjoyed loyalty of the BGP, the best equipped body of the army. The 
transitory institutions were given the mandate to install all the institutions of the 
new Republic (Constitution, Parliament, Presidential elections, and Government) 
witliin one year (see ONEPI1990, for the main reports of the conference). The new 
political discourse, whose key words were Renouveau Démocratique, Transparence, that 
were invented (or adopted) by the joint session of the meetings of the 6th and 7th 
December 1989 of the former regime, thus emerged definitely, while its initiators 
were politically evicted, at least temporally. 
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of the Republic as his magico-religious protector but political adviser. This was Mohamed Cissé (from 
Mali) who even played determining roles in the appointment and dismissal of Ministers and heads of 
state enterprises. The editions of the journal Africa Confidential of 5th February 1988 (vol 29 n° 3) in fact 
refer to him as the Minister in charge of the Interior, Security and Territorial Administration from the 
end of November 1987, which was not officially the case but it at least indicates the important role this 
man acquired in Benin public affairs. 
4 The so-called single party system was by no means a common-purpose or a common-interest political 
system. Different conflicting interest groups confronted each other right from the start. The mass organs 
of the Party: the trade unions (UNSTB), the youth association (OJRB, built onto the previous COJ), the 
women organisation (OFRB, previously COF), the committees for the defense of the revolution (CDR), 
the revolutionary action groups (GAR) were now and then used by their leaders as pressure groups and 
political leverage to gain power within the system. Interest groups and ideological trends were also 
organised around some key personages of the regime. Even though the President of the Republic, with 
his strong magico-rehgious and well armed secret police had almost an exclusive hand over important 
decisions (especially from the mid-eighties), he mostly had to take into account the power balance among 
the various factions, as well as other considerations such as ethnic and regional balance, commercial 
lobbies, and major religious groups (vodoun, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim). 
5 The measures in the Benin case were not different from the well known remedies proposed by the IMF 
in those situations. They included the privatisation of most state-owned companies and banks (which of 
course involves loss of jobs), the reduction by up to 30 per cent of the size of the 45,000 state staff within 
5 years, together with a termination (after 1986) of staff recruitment. The ultimate goal was that the state 
would keep its expenses within the limits of its declining earnings, and pay back the debt of FCFA 600 
billion or US$ 2.4 billion. 
6 In the report of the joint Party-Parhament-Government session, it was stated that The Head of State will 
convene a National Conference. This meant that full power was given to the President for the organisation 
of the conference, but it also shows the distrust of the President towards the different factions, and his 
will to move away from them and make the process of the conference credible for the various forces 
fighting the regime. The President appointed a commission at the head of which was Robert Dossou, 
Minister of Planning, a lawyer, university intellectual (former Dean of the Faculty of Law, Economics and 
Politics) who joined the Government only in 1987. He was in charge of the organisation of the 'Co-
nférence des Cadres' in 1979. He is an outstanding political personality. He was President of the FEANF, 
the Federation of African Students in France, and an active militant with Kwame Nkruma in the Pan-
Africanist movement (see Jeune Afrique n° 1591). The President delegated his full power to the commis-
sion and to its head to decide on who would be invited and who would not, provided that the seats were 
fairly distributed among all the forces vives, so that the conference would create room for fair democratic 
discussions. Apparently, the President had lost confidence in his traditional partners and did not want 
them to dominate the debates at the Conference. Such an attitude cut the grass from under the feet of the 
leading figures of the regime who, though they tried, were unable to exert any manipulation over the 
process of seat allocation to potential participants. 
7 This was the word used in place of 'political parties' and covered the state party as well as all groups 
who proclaimed themselves to have a political position, provided they handed in an analytical document 
on the state of affairs in the country and how this could be improved. There were 51 'sensibilités 
politiques' represented at the conference though it should be mentioned that the Communist Party of 
Dahomey refused to take part in the Conference. This Party was the only well structured political group 
that had put the Regime into serious difficulties within the country for more than a decade. The Party 
has been subjected to brutal repression from the police. Many PCD members or sympathisers were jailed, 
tortured and killed. It is acknowledged by many political actors outside the PCD that, without the 
perspicacious actions of this party, the changes experienced through the National Conference could not 
have taken place, at least not at that moment. It seems that the PCD would have preferred a Maoist-type 
of popular armed unrest that would lead to a spectacular overthrow of the Regime, as happened in 
Togoudo and in other villages. According to some PCD members, the idea of the Conference was a 
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treachery. For them, 'It was an invention of reactionary forces aimed at creating an illusion to the 
people, especially for the petit bourgeois, who, by nature, preferred ad hoc and illusive arrangements than 
radical and more effective solutions'. 
8 Dahomey is the former name of Benin, given after the Danxomean kingdom that fought against French 
colonisation. The name was changed by the socialist regime in 1975. 
9 Many members of Kerelcou's regime argued against such a reading of the Constitution with regards 
to the decision to end the 'Marxism-Leninism'doctrine. Nevertheless, they did not manage to develop 
any coherent strategy against the other conference participants. As some influential party member, who 
took part in the meeting, later confessed, 'not only was the group was in a minority, but it was already 
dismantled, even before the conference started*. 
10 The conference was broadcast live by the state radio and television. Also during the conference, many 
debates were organised on television on various topics (e.g. human rights, democracy and development), 
at which different people debated their views. 
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Summary 
This book concerns a Community Development Programme which provides a 
vehicle for a theoretical discussion of the reproduction of the discourse and practice 
of development intervention in general, and the concept of rural development as a 
field of social interaction in particular. The actions on which the theoretical dis-
cussion is based took place in various settings: in ministry offices, within the 
development intervention institution (the CARDER) and at village level. The 
Community Development Programme ran in all the six provinces of Benin from 
1989-1993 and involved five to eight villages in each province. The programme was 
implemented by the CARDERs, which held a quasi-monopoly over development 
interventions in Benin from 1975 (when they were created) until they were dis-
banded in the early 1990s with the demise of the Marxist-Leninist regime 
The programme's goal, as formulated in the policy statement, was 'to turn our 
dying villages into dynamic places'. It was presented as an open ended participa-
tory type of programme, meant to be an original approach to improving the living 
conditions of rural people, since, according to an assessment made of the village 
situation, all previous projects implemented had failed to lift rural peoples from 
their poverty. But looked at closely, the programme seemed more an attempt by the 
Minister and his close staff to contribute to the general campaign launched by the 
regime to win back the people's enthusiasm and support, then at its lowest ebb due 
to the particularly severe socio-political and economic crisis in Benin at the end of 
the 1980s. The sharp drop in state earnings following the persistent crisis in Nigeria, 
together with, among other things, the weak management of state resources, had 
made it difficult for the government to meet its rurvning costs, the most visible 
aspect being the delay in paying civil servant's salaries, sometimes by as much as 
five to eight months. A structural adjustment programme was being negotiated with 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, together with a restructuring 
of agricultural services under which staff were to be reduced by more than 50 
percent. This was to extend to all civil servants. The Community Development 
Programme, as with other aspects of the regime's campaign, failed to win back 
people's confidence. There were street demonstrations and various political and 
economic pressures, from within and without the country, that finally brought the 
regime to an end at the famous National Conference of February 1990. This context 
was neither outside nor above the people but was a part of the everyday reality of 
intervention institutions and villages alike, and contributed to the making of the 
socio-political landscape surrounding the programme. 
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In the CARDERs, the lvUnister's policy statement - that was to launch this new 
approach - was incoporated into a state intervention framework and culture that 
dated back to or had its roots in the colonial adrxiinistration. It had been reproduced 
continuously in the process of creating a nation state out of what was a 
heterogenous Dahomean colonial territory. In the Zou Province, the implemenatation 
of the programme started with an initiation phase that resulted in almost standard 
development plans for all the eight villges concerned. Yet the plans had been 
formulated and presented with a participatory rhetoric that had matched the 
lyfinister's orders and the development intervention language then current, while 
giving to the CARDERs structure and functioning an image of coherency. But 
behind the coherent image, the programme both reflected and generated many 
conflictive situations. Ad hoc as well as more stable groupings and leadership 
emerged or were reproduced out of unspoken criteria and preoccupations as varied 
as people's regions of origin, ethnic affiliation, religion, patron-client relations, 
career perspectives, private (family) problems and sometimes purely technical 
matters. The social interactions in which the actors involved in the Community 
Development Programme were engaged, generally guided by the various groupings, 
criteria and preoccupations mentioned above, were deterrruning for decisions which 
afterwards were presented as state policy. Such interactions were also an integral 
part of the process of policy transformation to which the Community Development 
Programme was subjected. They helped to produce both formal and informal 
'charts' for the implementation of the programme, which were at odds with the 
official ones. Nevertheless, the process showed itself to be efficient in reproducing 
the hidden social realities within the Zou CARDER while at the same time giving 
it the image of being up to date in the latest fashion of development language and 
practice. 
In the villages, the programme was variously implemented, with very little 
connection to what had been planned or to the regular injunctions and instructions 
from the General Director and his monitoring staff. Activities developed in the name 
of the programme, and particularly the everyday life of these activities, differed 
from one village to the next depending on a multiplicity of factors, such as the 
balance of power between local political forces (the socio-poUtical landscape), recent 
intervention adventures in a village, the particular interests of the village agents 
appointed to the programme, etc. In Togoudo (the case documented in this book), 
a significant factor in the implementation of the programme, and a factor that might 
have played some role in other villages too, was the settlement patterns of the local 
population. This factor contributed to producing the existing socio-poUtical land-
scape, to the pattern of the local economy, and to individual and household income 
generating activities. 
In fact, Togoudo, a residential composite of Idaca people who had arrived from 
villages in the surrounding Dassa hills during the early years of the colonial admin-
istration, enjoyed a dynamic and diversified economy. It was linked to the national 
and regional economy through the market of Gbomina and by frequent short and 
long term migrations of its inhabitants to Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The 
main income generating activity of the village was agricultural production, on land 
over which the settlers held only insecure and problematic ownership rights, a 
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situation typical for the relatively recent farm settlements of the Idaca, Fon and 
Ditamari cultivators on Nagot and Mahi territory of central Benin. But for men, the 
most successful survival and self-achievement strategies in the village were those 
in which agricultural production was combined with animal husbandry and, in 
some cases, the trading of agricultural products. For women, in addition to agricul-
ture and animal (pig) husbandry, activities such as food processing (mainly cdkpaio 
from millet and maize, and oil and kluiklui from groundnuts), trading of agricultural 
products and petty trade were important for economic and social success. These 
activities were combined in different ways and in varying degree, depending on 
several factors relating to the capability and organisational skills and strategies of 
individuals and groups of actors for mobilising productive resources - chiefly land, 
labour and credit. One further asset, crucial to self-achievement strategies, was the 
mobilisation or insertion into the networks of people in different geographical 
locations. This was iratrumental to people's access to labour, credit, market and 
other external opportunities and depended on (but at the same time protrayed) the 
local ideologies on development and the different ways in which the people individ-
ually and collectively conceived of and worked to improve their own well-being (the 
local definition of 'rural development'). 
In Togoudo, the activities within the programme fell broadly into two categories: 
the building of socio-economic infrastructure in the village, and the formation of 
men and women's groups whose objective was to create mcome-generating oppor-
tunities. Socio-economic irurastmcture had already been initiated by villagers before 
the arrival of the RDV. These included a storehouse for agricultural inputs (mainly 
cotton), a maternity centre, a classroom for the village school (with the assistance of 
a German donor) and the maintenance of water pumps and wells. The buildings 
were funded, and expected to be funded, entirely from the resources of the GV - the 
cotton grower's association - and from the cash and labour contributions of vil-
lagers. The RDV, taking advantage on his arrival of the pressure put on the GV 
board by young Communitst Party members, introduced himself as a specialist in 
peasant cooperatives (which he indeed was) and managed to gain access to the 
village scene. He smuggled himself into village affairs and was given authority to 
look at the management of GV resources. This allowed him to secure a significant 
share of these resources for what he called development work in the village. But this 
authority was resented and frequently challenged by groups within the village, as 
well as groups in the CARDER, who felt the RDVs intervention was a threat to 
their own professional prerogatives and hierarchical position in the village and 
within CARDER. For the GV Secretary, for individual members of the GV Board 
and for some CARDER agents who had interests in the existing state of affairs, the 
involvement of the RDV in the management of the GV was intolerable. These people 
made various attempts to divert GV resourses to usages other than those agreed 
upon at the GV general assembly or as dictated by GV byelaws; they favoured an 
increase in the share of GV revenue distributed to board members; they allocated 
credit to individual cotton growers; they increased the running cost of the GV etc. 
In doing so, even though their actions solved the critical problems of some growers, 
their motives were more to hamper the plans of the RDV than to serve the best 
interests of village development. 
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The income generating men and women's groups were formally presented as the 
cooperative or pre-cooperative ventures of groups of poor peasants working 
together and sharing the produce on an equitable basis. But in fact they were either 
family groupings, or made up of members coopted selectively by their leaders on 
the basis of a number of criteria. Such groups rarely included people from the 
lowest rank of the locally constructed socio-economic ladder. Furthermore, collective 
activities were limited to a minimum, while sub-groups were informally constituted 
within the groups around activities and concerns not disclosed to the RDV (at least 
he seemed not to know of them) but considered more relevant to the survival needs 
of the members. In some ways, as had occurred in its incorporation into the 
CARDER, the Community Development Programme helped reproduce the conflicts, 
groupings and leadership already existing among actors at local level. Here too, the 
RDV smuggled himself into the existing village trends in group formation, which 
were based on a mixture of logics and principles derived from various previous 
intervention fashions and operations, and all somehow deviant from what were 
considered good cooperative ways and practice. But the RDV had his reasons for 
embarking on such trends. Through his contacts with the head of CARDER and 
potential donors he appropriated the activities started by the groups, using his 
rhetorical skills to bridge the gaps and presenting all as ligitimate attempts on his 
part to implement the Community Development Programme in the village. 
These activities, supposed to turn the dying village into a dynamic place, actually 
covered only very marginal aspects of the local economy. Moreover, many of them 
served only a limited range of the socio-economic categories present in the village, 
excluding those barely surviving or keeping their heads above water, while includ-
ing those considered to be the well-off. In fact, the rhetorical presentations of 
CARDER and the programme in various settings, drawing on different bits of the 
programme, served more the self-reproducing ends of the intervention itself than 
they did the development they sought to bring about. They processed old jargons 
and permanently created their own realities and problems. Within the village itself, 
and within the CARDER, the programme as such was considered to be irrelevant. 
People were prone to forget its existence. Any social changes occurring in this 
context derived from dismembered pieces of the package being incorporated and 
utilised by individuals to serve the aims of their own daily preoccupations and 
survival strategies. The pieces were made concrete as they were taken up in the 
local 'field of rural development', in the arenas and grounds that emerged from 
putting into practice existing normative conceptions of well-being in rural areas, and 
developed historically into a specific field of social interaction where policy makers, 
development practitiioners, social scientists and rural producers engage, as stake-
holders, in struggles and negotiations over individual and collective interests. The 
various pieces are to be found, therefore, in various arenas and grounds where 
people meet over issues that are important to them but that seem to have nothing 
to do with the programme itself. In such conditions, structural ignorance, gaps and 
discrepancies become normal and attempts to bridge them or document the process 
turn development practitioners and social scientists into stakeholders themselves in 
the field of rural development. 
Résumé 
Ce livre traite d'un Programme de Développement Communautaire. Autour de ce 
Programme, une discussion théorique est engagée sur les processus de reproduction 
des discours et des pratiques d'intervention pour le développement. Le 'dévelo-
ppement rural' y est vu et conçu comme un champ d'interactions sociales. La 
discussion théorique s'articule sur les actions engagées autour de ce programme 
dans les bureaux rrvinistériels, dans l'institution d'intervention (le CARDER) et 
surtout aussi dans les villages. 
Le Programme de Développement Communautaire, encore dénommé Programme 
de Redynamisation des Villages a été conduit de 1989 à 1993 dans les six dépar-
tements du Bénin et dans cinq à huit villages par département. D. a été exécuté par 
les CARDER. Ceux-ci détenaient alors un quasi-monopole sur les interventions pour 
le Développement Rural de 1975 (date de leur création) jusqu'au début des années 
1990, fin du régime marxiste-lérûniste. 
Le Programme se dormait pour but de 'dynamiser nos villages qui, hier floris-
sants, étaient devenus des cités mourantes'. Le programme se présentait comme 
étant participatif et se voulait développer une approche originale d'amélioration 
des conditions de vie des populations rurales après que les projets exécutés jusque 
là ne soient pas parvenus à sortir les populations rurales de la pauvreté. 
Le soutien populaire au Régime marxiste-léniniste était alors au plus bas du fait 
de la crise économique et socio-politique particulièrement sévère au Bénin à la fin 
des années 80. Le programme semble être la contribution du Ministre et de son 
entourage à la campagne lancée par le régime pour regagner une certaine adhésion 
populaire. 
La baisse sensible des revenus de l'Etat qui résultait entre autre de la crise 
persistante au Nigeria et de la gestion déficiente des ressources publiques avait 
plongé le gouvernement dans une crise financière dont l'aspect le plus visible était 
le non-paiement des salaires des agents permanents de l'Etat, avec des arriérés de 
cinq à sept mois. Un programme d'ajustement structurel était négocié avec le Fonds 
Monétaire International et la Banque Mondiale. Un volet important de ce program-
me était la restructuration des Services Agricoles par une réduction de moitié de 
leurs effectifs, comme du reste pour tous les agents permanents de l'Etat. On 
manifestait dans les rues et des pressions politiques intérieures comme extérieures 
finirent par mettre un terme au régime lors de la célèbre Conférence Nationale des 
Forces Vives de la Nation, en Février 1990. Ce contexte particulier n'était pas 
éloigné des gens. Au contraire, il faisait partie des réalités de tous les jours des 
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acteurs des institutions d'intervention et des villages et a contribué à modeler le 
paysage socio-politique dans lequel le Programme de Redynamisation des Villages 
a été intégré. 
Les instructions ministérielles supposées lancer une nouvelle approche de 
développement arrivèrent au CARDER-Zou. Elles furent traitées dans un cadre et 
une culture d'intervention d'Etat développés sous l'administration coloniale et 
reproduits depuis lors durant le processus de création d'un Etat-Nation sur 
l'hétérogène territoire colonial Dahoméen. Ainsi, dans le département du Zou, le 
programme démarra par une phase d'initiation durant laquelle, malgré une 
rhétorique participative qui semblait conforme aux instructions du Ministre et au 
langage en vogue, des plans de développement quasiment standard furent formulés 
pour les huit villages. Ces plans donnaient par ailleurs une image cohérente du 
CARDER et de sa structure. 
Mais derrière cette image se cachaient des situations conflictuelles et le program-
me a contribué à en générer de nouvelles. Il consolida des alliances et des leader-
ships et en fit émerger de nouveaux, parfois ad hoc parfois plus durables. Ceux-ci 
se constituèrent selon des préoccuppations et des critères divers et souvent inavoués: 
région d'origine, appartenance ethnique, religion, relations de parenté, relations 
patron-client, perspectives de carrière, problèmes au sein de la famille, et parfois 
seulement selon des questions techniques. Ainsi, dans la prise de décisions présen-
tées comme étant des politiques de l'Etat, les interactions entre acteurs impliqués 
dans le Programme de Redynamisation des Villages ont été déterminantes. Le 
programme fut l'objet d'un processus de transformation en fonction des critères 
et préoccupations citées ci-dessus. Les organigrammes réels d'exécution du pro-
gramme différèrent de l'organigramme officiel. Ce processus de transformation sert 
de révélateur des réalités sociales cachées du CARDER- Zou tandis que l'institution 
se donne une image correspondant à la dernière mode en matière de langages et de 
pratiques du développement. 
Dans les villages, l'exécution du Programme de Redynamisation des Villages prit 
des formes diverses ayant peu de rapport avec ce qui était prévu et ne correspon-
dant pas aux instructions régulières du Directeur Général ou du personnel de suivi. 
Les actions entreprises au nom du programme et plus encore les mises en oeuvre 
quotidiennes de ces actions ont varié d'un village à l'autre selon les rapports de 
force entre acteurs politiques locaux, les interventions récentes dans lesquelles le 
village a été impliqué, les contigences de la vie quotidienne des acteurs concernés, 
les intérêts particuliers du RDV chargé de l'exécution du programme au niveau du 
village et bien d'autres facteurs. 
Un facteur qui a joué un rôle sigruficatif dans l'exécution du programme à 
Togoudo, dont le cas est traité en détail dans ce livre, est lié aux modes d'installa-
tion des populations dans la zone. Ceux-ci ont contribué à façonner le paysage 
socio-politique actuel et l'économie locale avec ses activités génératrices de revenu 
au niveau des individus et des ménages. Togoudo est un village habité par un 
ensemble hétéroclite de peuples Idaca venus des alentours des collines de Dassa 
durant les premières années de l'administration coloniale. Le village a une éco-
nomie diversifiée, liée à l'économie nationale et régionale à travers le marché de 
Gbomina et par de biais des fréquentes migrations de courte et longue durée des 
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habitants de Togoudo en direction du Nigeria, du Ghana et de la Côte d'Ivoire. La 
principale activité génératrice de revenu du village est l'agriculture, pratiquée sur 
des terres sur lesquelles les occupants ne détiennent que des droits peu sécurisants 
et problématiques. Cette situation est typique des terroirs de colonisation récente des 
cultivateurs Idaca, Fon, Ditamari sur les territoires des Nagot et Mahi du moyen 
Bénin. Pour les hommes, les stratégies les plus fructueuses sont celles où la produc-
tion agricole est combinée avec la production animale et, dans certains cas, le 
commerce. En ce qui concerne les femmes, en plus de l'agriculture et de l'élevage, 
élevage de porc surtout, ce sont les transformations agrc>alimentaire (bière de 
sorgho, huile d'arachide, craquelin d'arachide), le commerce de produits vivriers 
et le petit commerce qui sont déterminants pour la réussite. 
La façon de combiner et de conduire ces activités varie selon les stratégies des 
concernés et selon leurs capacités à mobiliser des ressources productives (terre, main 
d'oeuvre et crédit). Un facteur déterminant de ces stratégies est la capacité à mobili-
ser des réseaux sociaux couvrant plusieurs localités géographiques et à avoir accès 
ainsi à la main d'oeuvre, aux crédits et à d'autres opportunités. Tout ceci est à la 
fois le produit et le reflet des idéologies locales en matière de développement et de 
la manière dont individus et groupes définissent et recherchent leur bien-être, 
autrement dit c'est le produit et le reflet de leur définition opérationnelle du 
'développement rural'. 
A Togoudo, le Programme de Redynamisation des villages a engagé des actions 
de deux types: la construction d'infrastructures socio-économiques villageoises 
d'une part, la constitution de groupements autour d'activités génératrices de 
revenus d'autre part. Les villageois avaient déjà démarré la construction d'infra-
structures socio-économiques villageoises avant l'arrivée du RDV: un magasin 
d'intrants agricoles (essentiellement pour le coton), une case d'accouchement, un 
module de trois classes pour l'école du village, l'entretien des puits et pompes 
d'eau potable étaient à la charge du Groupement Villageois (association des 
producteurs de coton) et des villageois qui se cotisaient. Le RDV à son arrivée, 
profitant de la pression exercée sur le conseil d'administration du GV par des 
jeunes du village membres du PCD (Parti Communiste du Dahomey), fit valoir ses 
compétences de spécialiste de l'Action Coopérative et parvint à accéder à la scène 
publique du village. Il s'inséra dans les affaires villageoises et se fit attribuer 
l'autorité de suivre la gestion des ressources du GV, ce qui lui permit de faire 
allouer une part importante de ces ressources à ce qu'il appelait le développement 
du village. Cette autorité fut maintes fois contestée et défiée par les villageois 
comme par les autres agents du CARDER qui vivaient l'intervention du RDV 
comme une remise en cause de leurs prérogatives et de leur position hiérarchique 
dans le village et au sein du CARDER 
Pour le Secrétaire du GV, quelques autres membres de son Conseil d'Admini-
stration et certains agents du CARDER qui avaient des intérêts dans le statu quo, les 
intrusions du RDV dans la gestion du GV étaient intolérables. Ils firent plusieurs 
tentatives pour que des ressources du GV soient allouées à des usages différents de 
ceux dont il avait été convenu en Assemblée Générale et de ceux qui étaient consig-
nés dans le règlement intérieur du GV. Bs firent en sorte que s'accroissent la part 
des revenus du GV allouée aux membres du Conseil d'Administration de même 
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que les frais de fonctionnement du GV. Us lancèrent également une opération 
d'allocation de crédit aux producteurs pour la récolte de coton. Bien que certaines 
de ces actions se soient révélées pertinentes et aient contribué à résoudre des 
problèmes critiques chez certains producteurs, ces décisions d'allocations alter-
natives des revenus du GV n'étaient pas fondées sur la conviction que ces revenus 
contribueraient ainsi mieux au développement du village. En réalité, la motivation 
première était de gêner les plans du RDV. 
Les groupements d'hommes et de femmes conduisant des activités génératrices 
de revenus étaient officiellement présentés comme des groupes coopératifs ou pré-
coopératifs de paysans pauvres travaillant ensemble et partageant le produit de leur 
labeur sur une base équitable. En fait, ces groupes étaient constitués de parents ou 
de membres sélectionnés par des leaders selon leurs propres critères. Les gens qui 
auraient été placés au bas de l'échelle socio-économique localement définie n'en 
faisaient presque jamais partie. Les activités économiques collectives y étaient 
réduites au minimum. Pourtant, au sein de ces groupes, des sous-groupes informels 
s'étaient constitués autour d'activités et de préoccupations spécifiques et pour 
leurs membres, ces dernières contribuaient plus à leur survie et à leur réussite. Mais 
le RDV ne semblait pas en être informé. 
A l'image de sa 'digestion' au niveau du CARDER, le programme de Redyna-
misation des Villages a favorisé la reproduction de conflits ainsi que l'émergence 
de groupes et de leaders parmi les acteurs villageois et les agents locaux du CAR-
DER. Comme il l'avait fait pour les infrastructures socio-économiques, le RDV 
s'inséra dans la dynamique existante de constitution de groupements. Ces groupes 
s'inspiraient de principes et de logiques disparates, selon des modes diverses et des 
opérations d'intervention pour le développement variées. Il en découlait des modes 
de mise en place de groupements et de gestion coopérative que le RDV, en tant que 
spécialiste en la matière, ne devait pas considérer comme compatibles avec les règles 
de l'art. Néanmoins, il se trouva de bonnes raisons pour se laisser 'embarquer' 
dans ces groupes: lors de ses contacts avec le personnel de la Direction du CARDER 
et avec des bailleurs de fonds potentiels, il s'appropriait entièrement les activités 
démarrées par les groupes, utilisait ses compétences rhétoriques pour masquer les 
lacunes qu'il voyait dans les principes de constitution de ces groupes et présentait 
tous ces événements comme le fruit de son Programme de Redynamisation dans le 
village. 
Tout compte fait, les activités sensées 'transformer nos villages mourants en cités 
dynamiques' couvraient des aspects très marginaux de l'économie locale. La 
plupart ne concernaient en outre qu'une gamme limitée de catégories socio-écono-
miques, et excluaient celles-là même qui sont en train de lutter pour maintenir leur 
tête au dessus de l'eau. 
Les présentations rhétoriques du programme et du CARDER servent surtout à la 
reproduction de l'intervention plutôt qu'au développement dont elles sont sensées 
rendre compte. Elles recyclent pour cela de vieux jargons et créent leurs propres 
réalités. Dans les villages comme au sein du CARDER par contre, le programme 
n'est pas jugé pertinent par les différentes catégories d'acteurs. Il leur arrive d'en 
oublier jusqu'à l'existence même dudit programme. Si des changements sociaux 
se produisent dans ce contexte particulier, c'est que des morceaux issus du 
278 The appropriation and dismembering of development intervention 
dépeçage du paquet que constitue le programme (ses discours et ses dispositions 
matérielles) sont incorporés dans les préoccupations quotidiennes des acteurs et 
dans leurs stratégies personnelles. 
Ces morceaux réapparaissent sur diverses scènes locales du champ du dévelop-
pement rural. Ces scènes ont peu à peu émergé de par la mise en oeuvre de concep-
tions normatives et intéressées du bien-être du monde rural et elles se sont cristal-
lisées en arènes et terrains du développement. Elles ont au fil des temps constitué 
un champ spécifique d'interactions sociales au sein duquel décideurs politiques, 
praticiens du développement, spécialistes des sciences sociales et producteurs ruraux 
engagent des négociations et des luttes sur leurs intérêts individuels et collectifs. Les 
morceaux de ce paquet peuvent alors être recherchés dans ces diverses arènes et 
terrains où les gens se rencontrent pour traiter de questions à leurs yeux importan-
tes et qui semblent parfois ne rien avoir de commun avec le programme lui-même. 
Un trait caractéristique d'un tel champ est la circulation chaotique de l'informa-
tion, du fait des divergences d'intérêts et des écarts entre discours et réalités. Ceci 
découle en fait de constructions stratégiques ou spontanées/tactiques des acteurs 
impliqués. En tentant de combler ces 'lacunes' et même en ne tentant que d'en 
rendre compte, praticiens du développement tout autant que chercheurs en sciences 
sociales entrent dans le champ du développement rural comme parties prenantes, 
concernées eux aussi par ses enjeux et leurs propres intérêts. 
Samenvatting 
Dit boek analyseert een Community Development Programma waardoor de moge-
lijkheid wordt geschapen voor een meoretische discussie van de reproductie van het 
taalgebruik en de praktijk van ontwiWcelingsinterventie in het algemeen en van het 
concept rurale onhvikkeling als een veld van sociale interactie in het bijzonder. De 
acties waarop deze theoretische discussies zijn gebaseerd, vonden plaats binnen 
verschillende contexten van ministeriële bureaus, de staate-ontwikkelmgsorganisatie 
CARDER en op het niveau van het dorp. Het Community Development Programma 
speelde zieh af in de période van 1989 tot 1993 in alle zes provincies van Bénin en 
omvatte vijf tot acht dorpen in iedere provincie. Het programma werd uitgevoerd 
door de CARDERs, die een quasi monopolie hadden op ontwikkelingsinterventies 
vanaf het startjaar 1975 tot het begin van de jaren negentig, toen het marxistisch-
leninistische bewind tot een einde kwam. 
Het doel van het programma, zoals het officieel geformuleerd werd, was 'onze 
stervende dorpen te veranderen in dynamische plaatsen'. Het werd gepresenteerd 
zonder een temporeel en financieel kader en als een programma met een parti-
cipatief karakter, bedoeld als een originele aanpak ter verbetering van de levensom-
standigheden van de rurale bevollcing. Beoordeling van de situatie had immers aan 
het ücht gebracht dat alle tot dan uitgevoerde projecten om de rurale bevolking te 
verlossen van armoede, waren mislukt. 
Maar, nader beschouwd lijkt het programma een bijdrage te zijn van de rninister 
en zijn naaste medewerkers aan de algemene campagne van het bewind om het 
enthousiasme en de steun van de bevolking terug te Winnen. Deze aarihang had een 
absoluut dieptepunt bereikt door de buitengewoon ernstige sociaal-politieke en 
economische crisis in Bénin aan het einde van de jaren tachtig. De scherpe daling 
in staats-inkomsten, als gevolg van o.a. de aanhoudende crisis in Nigeria, alsook van 
het zwakke beheer van de hulpbronnen van de Staat, maakten het de overheid 
moeilijk de uitgaven te dekken. Deze crisis was het beste zichtbaar in de achterstand 
in de betaling van de ambtenaren die opliep tot vijf à acht maanden. Er werd met 
het Internationale Monétaire Fonds en de Wereld Bank onderhandeld over een 
aanpassingsprogramma en eveneens over een hershicturering van de agrarische 
diensten waar de staf met meer dan 50 procent moest worden verminderd, in 
overeensternming met het algemene plan voor het ambtenarenapparaat. Noch het 
Community Development Programma, noch andere onderdelen van de overheids-
campagne slaagden er in het vertrouwen van de bevolking terug te Winnen. Betogin-
gen en politieke en economische druk van binnenuit en buitenaf resulteerden 
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uiteindelijk in de befaamde nationale conferentie van februari 1990. Deze bijzondere 
omstandigheden gingen niet buiten de mensen om maar vormden onderdeel van de 
werkelijkheid van alledag binnen zowel de mterventie-organisaties als in de dorpen; 
zij droegen bij aan de vorrrdng van het sociaal-politieke landschap rond het pro-
gramma. 
De beleidsbeslissing van de minister die een nieuwe aanpak moest inluiden, werd 
binnen de CARDERs verwerkt in een stelsel en cultuur van staatsinterventie waar-
van de basis was gelegd tijdens het koloniale bewind. Sindsdien werd dit steeds 
gereproduceerd tijdens het procès van opbouw van een nationale Staat in het 
heterogene, koloniale territorium van Dahomey. In de Zou provincie begon de 
uitvoering van het programma met een initierende fase die uitmondde in vrijwel 
standaard ontwikkelingsplannen voor de acht betreffende dorpen. Toch werden de 
plannen gef ormuleerd en gepresenteerd met de nodige retoriek omtrent participatie, 
in overeensternming met de opdracht van de minister en met het gangbare ontwik-
kelingsinterventie- taalgebruik, terwijl aan de structuur en het functioneren van de 
CARDERs een beeld van samenhang werd gegeven. Maar achter een dergelijk beeld 
van coherentie vertoonde en creëerde het programma vele conflict-situaties. Zowel 
tijdelijke als meer stabiele groeperingen alsook leiderschap ontsproten of werden 
gereproduceerd vanuit zeer verscheidene onuitgesproken criteria en preoccupaties, 
zoals de regio van origine van de mensen, etnische achtergrond, godsdienst, pa-
troon-cUentrelaties, carrière-perspectieven, privé of familie problemen en soms 
zuiver technische problemen. De sociale interacties waarin de actores die te maken 
hadden met het Community Development Programma waren verwikkeld - door-
gaans geleid door de verschillende groeperingen, criteria en zorg zoals hierboven 
genoemd - waren bepalend voor beslissingen die achteraf werden gepresenteerd als 
overheidsbeleid. Zij vormden eveneens een integraal onderdeel van het procès van 
beleidsverandering waaraan het Community Development Programma was onder-
worpen. Zij droegen bij aan de tot stand koming van zowel formele als informele 
'richtsnoeren* voor de uitvoering van het programma, in beide gevallen afwijkend 
van de officiele plannen. Toch bleek het procès er in te slagen de verborgen sociale 
realiteiten binnen de CARDER Zou te reproduceren, terwijl tegelijkertijd het beeld 
werd gegeven van een organisatie die voldeed aan de laatste mode op het gebied 
van ont^ikkelings-taalgebruik en praktijk. 
Het programma werd in de dorpen op verschillende wijze uitgevoerd, zonder 
veel verband met wat geplanned was of met de regelmatige bevelen en instructies 
van de Directeur Generaal en de toezichthoudende staf. Acties ondernomen in de 
naam van het programma, en in het bijzonder de alledaagse gang van deze activitei-
ten, verschilden van dorp tot dorp, afhankelijk van tal van factoren zoals de bestaan-
de machtsbalans tussen lokale politieke krachten (het sociaal-politieke landschap), 
de récente interventie-avonturen waarin het betreffende dorp betrokken was, de 
bijzondere belangen van de RDV ( de functionaris op dorpsniveau belast met het 
programma) enz. Een belangrijke factor bij de uitvoering van het programma in To-
goudo - de casus die gedocumenteerd is in dit boek - en die ook enige rol kan 
hebben gespeeld in andere dorpen, was het nederzettingspatroon van de lokale 
bevolking. Deze factor droeg bij aan de totstandkoming van het bestaande sociaal-
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politieke landschap, maar ook aan het patroon van de lokale économie en aan de 
inkomen-verschaffende activiteiten van individu en huishouden. 
Togoudo - een residentiële compositie van Idaca-mensen die zieh daar aan het 
begin van de koloniale période vestigden vanuit de Dassa heuvels - genoot in feite 
een dynamische en gediversificeerde économie, enerzijds door de verbinding met 
de nationale en regionale économie via de markt van Gbomina en anderzijds door 
de herhaalde korte en lange migratie van Togoudo inwoners naar Nigeria, Ghana 
en Ivoorkust. Landbouw vormde de belangrijkste inkomen-verschaffende activiteit 
in het dorp. Deze werd uitgeoefend op land waarop de kolonisten een onzekere en 
problematische titel bezaten, een situatie die kenmerkend is voor de relatief récente 
agrarische bedrijfsvestigingen van Idaca, Fon en Ditamari in Nagot- en Mahi-
gebieden van midden Bénin. Maar, de meest succesvolle overlevings- en succès 
strategieën van mannen in het dorp waren die waarbij agrarische productie werd 
gecombineerd met veehouderij en, in sommige gevallen, met handel in agrarische 
Produkten. Voor vrouwen waren activiteiten als voedselverwerking - vooral cakpalo 
van gierst en mais, en olie en kluiklui van aardnoten - handel in agrarische Produk-
ten en, in het algemeen, de kleine handel, gevoegd bij akkerbouw en veehouderij 
(varkens), belangrijk voor economisch en sociaal succès. Deze activiteiten kwamen 
in verschillende combinaties en op verschillende schaal voor, afhankeHjk van 
verscheidene factoren verbunden met bekwaamheid en organisatorische vaardighe-
den en strategieën van individuen en groepen van actores om produktie-hulpbron-
nen, vooral land, arbeid en crediet te mobiliseren. Bepalend voor het succès van de 
zelf-verbeterings-strategieën was ook het vermögen om netwerken te mobiliseren of 
deel te nemen in netwerken van mensen in versdüllende geografische plaatsen. Een 
dergelijke participatie was van belang voor de toegang tot arbeid, crediet, markt en 
andere kansen van buiten. Dit alles hing af - maar is daarvan tevens een afschil-
dering - van de lokale ontwikkelings-ideologieën en de verschillende manieren 
waarop mensen individueel en collectief denken over en streven naar welvaart en 
welzijn, dus van hun praktische definitie van 'rurale ontwikkeling'. 
De activiteiten binnen het programma in Togoudo konden in grote lijnen in twee 
categorieën ingedeeld worden: het bewerkstelligen van sociaal-economische infra-
structuur en de formatie van groepen marmen/vrouwen voor inkomensgenererende 
mogelijkheden. Dorpelingen werkten reeds aan de realisering van sociaal-econo-
mische infrastructuur met een opslagplaats voor agrarische benodigdheden - vooral 
voor de katoen - een kraamkliniek, een lokaal voor de dorpsschool (met steun van 
een Duitse donor), en het onderhoud van waterpompen en putten. Deze infra-
structurele werken werden - althans, dat was de verwachting - geheel gefinancierd 
uit middelen van de GV, de organisatie van katoenproducenten, en met bijdragen 
in geld en arbeid van de dorpelingen. Bij zijn aantreden maakte de RDV gebruik 
van druk op de GV leiding door een aantal jonge mannen, PCD leden (Communisti-
sche Partij van Dahomey), en presenteerde zieh als specialist op het gebied van 
boeren-coöperaties (wat hij ook werkelijk was) om zo toegang te krijgen tot het het 
openbare leven van het dorp. Hij wrong zieh in de publieke dorpsaangelegenheden 
en verkreeg het nodige gezag zieh te mengen in het beheer van de GV middelen. 
Dat gaf hem de mogelijkheid een belangrijk deel van deze middelen te bestemmen 
voor wat hij noemde 'ontwildcelingwerk op dorpsniveau'. Maar zijn autoriteit 
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werd herhaaldelijk ter discussie gesteld en ondergraven door zowel groeperingen 
in het dorp als in de CARDER. Zij meenden dat de interventie van de RDV een 
bedreiging vormde voor hun eigen professionele voorrechten en hierarchische 
positie binnen het dorp en binnen CARDER. Voor de secretaris van de GV, enige 
personen binnen de GV-leiding, en enige CARDER-functionarissen, die allen belang 
hadden bij handhaving van de bestaande situatie was de uitdijende rol van de RDV 
in het beheer van de GV onverdraaglijk. Zij ondernamen verscheidene pogingen om 
een deel van de middelen van de GV te bestemmen voor andere dœlen dan was 
overeengekomen tijdens de algemene vergadering van de GV en die in de GV-
resoluties waren opgenomen. Zij verklaarden zieh er voorstander van dat mensen 
in de leiding een groter aandeel zouden krijgen in de GV opbrengsten, dat aan 
katoenproducenten een crediet-toekenning zou worden gegeven, dat meer beschik-
baar zou worden gesteld voor de kosten van beheer van de GV, enz. Hoewel hun 
acties van belang bleken bij de oplossing van enige netelige problemen bij een aantal 
producenten, was hun bedoeling meer het hinderen van de plannen van de RDV 
dan het op de beste manier dienen van de belangen van dorpsontvvikkeling. 
De inkomen-genererende activiteiten van de mannen- en vrouwen-groepen 
werden formeel aangeduid als coöperaties of pre-coöperaties van groepen arme 
peasants die samenwerken en de produetie op basis van gelijkheid delen. In feite 
ging het hierbij of om groepen van farrülieleden of om leden die door enige leiders 
zelf waren uitgekozen op grond van versc±ullende criteria. Mensen die laag standen 
op de lokaal gedefiniëerde sociaal-economische ladder, waren bijna nooit lid van 
deze groepen. Daarenboven werden zogenaamde collectieve produktieve activiteiten 
tot een minimum beperkt, terwijl er binnen de betreffende groepen informeel sub-
groepen werden gevormd rond speeifieke activiteiten en belangen waarover de RDV 
niet werd ingelicht, althans hij scheen er niet van te weten. Juist deze activiteiten 
werden van groter belang geacht voor de bestaansbehoeften van de leden. Op 
enigerlei wijze en net als in het geval van de vemerking binnen de CARDER, droeg 
het Community Development Programma bij aan de reproduetie van conflicten, 
groeperingen en leiderschap zoals die al aanwezig waren bij actores op lokaal 
niveau. Ook hier wrong de RDV zieh in de bestaande tendenzen van groepsformatie 
in het dorp, tendenzen gebaseerd op een mengsei van logica en principes, voortko-
mend uit verschillende vroegere interventie-modes en projekten en allen op de een 
of andere manier afwijkend van wat te beschouwen zou zijn als een goede manier 
en praktijk van coöperatie. Toch vond hij goede redenen om zieh in te laten met 
deze gang van zaken in het dorp. In zijn contacten met CARDER superieuren en 
potentiate donoren eigende hij zieh de door de groepen gestarte activiteiten volledig 
toe. Hij gebruikte daarbij zijn retorische bekwaamheden om tekortkomingen in de 
organisatieprincipes van de groepen te verdoezelen, alles presenterende als zijn 
legitieme pogingen het Community Development Programma in het dorp uit te 
voeren. 
Deze activiteiten, bedoeld 'om het stervende dorp te veranderen in een dynami-
sche plaats', bestreken hoe dan ook slechts zeer marginale aspecten van de lokale 
économie. Daarenboven ging het hierbij vaak om een beperkt aantal socio-economi-
sche categorieën van in het dorp aanwezige mensen; niet zij die nog net overleefden 
of streden om het hoofd boven water te houden, maar zij die beschouwd werden 
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als de beter gesitueerden. De retorische presentaties, bij verschillende gelegenheden, 
over CARDER en over het programma, waarbij gebruik gemaakt werd van kleine 
onderdelen van het programma, dienden in feite meer de zelf-reproducerende 
doelen van de intervenue dan de ontwikkeling die zij verkondigden teweeg te 
brengen. In deze retoriek wordt oud jargon verwerkt en ontwerpt men constant 
eigen realiteiten en problemen. Zowel binnen de dorpen als binnen de CARDER, 
beschouwde men het programma als zodanig van geen belang. De mensen waren 
geneigd het bestaan ervan te vergeten. Alle sociale veranderingen die in deze 
context optraden kwamen voort uit onderdelen die losgemaakt waren van het totale 
programma, die geïncorporeerd en gebruikt werden door Individuen ten dienste van 
hun eigen dagelijkse zorgen en overlevinsstrategieën. De onderdelen werden 
concreet gemaakt doordat ze werden opgenomen in het lokale 'veld van rurale 
ontwückeling', in de strijdperken en op terreinen die naar voren kwamen door 
bestaande normatieve opvattingen betreffende welvaart en welzijn in rurale gebie-
den in praktijk te brengen. Zij ontwikkelden zieh historisch in een speeifiek veld van 
sociale interactie waarin beleidsmakers, ontvvikkelingswerkers, sociale wetenschap-
pers en rurale producenten als belanghebbenden bezig zijn met strijd en onderhan-
delingen over individuele en collectieve belangen. De onderscheidene onderdelen 
kunnen daarom worden gevonden in versdullende arenas en op terreinen waar 
mensen met elkaar te maken hadden in verband met onderwerpen die belangrijk 
voor hen waren maar die niets te maken schenen te hebben met het programma zelf. 
In zulke omstandigheden worden structurele onkunde, leemtes en tegenstrijdighe-
den normaal. Pogingen om deze te overbruggen of om deze processen te documen-
teren maken ontwikkelingswerkers zowel als sociale wetenschappers zelf tot 
belanghebbenden in het veld van rurale ontwikkeling. 
